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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Criminal Procedures and Sanctions Against Seafarers
After Large-Scale Ship-Source Oil Pollution Accidents:
A Human Rights Perspective

Degree:

PhD

The international maritime community is highly concerned about the unfair
application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers, particularly after
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, because such unfairness may cause
severe negative consequences for individual seafarers and the shipping sector in
broader terms. A lot of work has already been done towards the elimination of the
respective unfairness. Yet, the unfair practice continues. This dissertation attempts to
give new ideas as to how to facilitate the fair application of criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents.
The dissertation starts with the clear definition and comprehensive
explanation of the standard of fair criminal procedures and sanctions against
seafarers. The offered standard is – relevant human rights.
The dissertation continues with the analysis of whether or not those rules of
UNCLOS and MARPOL which can be linked to criminal procedures and sanctions
applicable against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are
clear and comply with human rights. As a result, several deficient rules of UNCLOS
and MARPOL are identified and corresponding recommendations on how to
interpret these rules are given within the dissertation. Many of these
recommendations are innovative, particularly, because when addressing the issue of
the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, the international maritime
community, so far, has predominantly focused on criticising particular EU and
national laws and practices, instead of looking critically at the relevant rules of
UNCLOS and MARPOL as well.

vi

After analysing the relevant legal norms of UNCLOS and MARPOL, the
dissertation turns to the long-standing discussion on the qualities of EU Directive
2005/35 on ship-source pollution, particularly to the controversy of whether the
Directive conflicts with the MARPOL exceptions from liability, or not. The
dissertation, inter alia, makes an original conclusion that the root cause of the
controversy is the failure of the drafters of MARPOL to agree on the issue as to
when, if ever, State Parties to MARPOL may adopt more stringent standards than
MARPOL.
Some insight into relevant national laws and practices is provided by the
dissertation – through the case study of four large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents: the Erika, Prestige, Tasman Spirit and Hebei Spirit accidents. The case
study shows that after all four afore-mentioned accidents seafarers were exposed to
unfair criminal procedures and sanctions.
After this unfortunate finding, the dissertation analyses whether IMO/ILO
Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers are capable to bring considerable positive
change in practice. Conclusion is made that the Guidelines, per se, are not capable to
bring such change, however some rules of the Guidelines are good basis for further,
more substantial developments.
The dissertation ends with revisiting of all research questions and providing
user-friendly lists of main recommendations related to these questions. At the very
end, a couple of overall conclusions and recommendations, which, at times, reach
even further than only large-scale ship-source oil pollution offences, are given. One
of such recommendations is the recommendation to develop three new IMO
instruments: one binding (the International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to Penal Liability in the Maritime Domain) and two non-binding (the
Sanctioning Guidelines for Offences in the Maritime Domain and the Guidelines on
Penal Proceedings Which Involve Seafarers).
KEYWORDS: unfair treatment of seafarers, criminal procedures and sanctions,
human rights, ship-source oil pollution accidents.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Statement of Problem
Since the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the international maritime
community has been highly concerned about the unfair application of criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers, particularly after large-scale ship-source
oil pollution accidents – accidents which cause public and media reaction and
together with that also heightened political tension.1 It has been argued that seafarers
are detained for prolonged periods, without clear grounds, without access to legal
advice and without interpretation services; and that, they are held as “material
witnesses”, as hostages pending the resolution of a financial dispute, treated as
scapegoats for dubious owners with deficient ships or as inducement for those
responsible to come forward and convicted without proving their criminal intent, by
applying a lower standard of proof or basing conviction on political motivations.2
Through case-study analysis conducted for this dissertation, those fore-mentioned
concerns of the international maritime community will be confirmed as wellfounded.

1

See infra, pp. 29-30 for explanation of “large-scale” in the context of this dissertation.
See, for example, Deirdre Fitzpatrick and Michael Anderson, (ed.), Seafarers’ Rights, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005 at p. 35; Edgar Gold, Gard Handbook on Protection of the Marine
Environment, 3rd edition, Arendal: Gard, 2006 at pp. 545 and 552; Proshanto K. Mukherjee,
“Criminalisation and Unfair Treatment: The Seafarer’s Perspective”, in Journal of International
Maritime Law, Volume 12, Issue 5, September-October 2006 at p. 329; Anthony G. Olagunju,
“Criminalization of Seafarers for Accidental Discharges of Oil: is There Justification in International
Law for Criminal Sanctions for Negligent or Accidental Pollution of the Sea?”, in Journal of Maritime
Law and Commerce, Volume 37, No. 2, April 2006 at pp. 237-238; Edgar Gold, “Fair Treatment of
Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident: New International Guidelines”, in Tafsir Malick
Ndiaye and Rudiger Wolfrum, (ed.), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes:
Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007 at p. 406;
Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment, London: Informa, 2009 at
pp. 1074 and 1076; John A.C. Cartner, Richard P. Fiske and Tara L. Leiter, The International Law of
the Shipmaster, London: Informa, 2009 at pp. 200-201. See also the relevant documents submitted to
IMO, for example: Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident, LEG 95/5, 27
February 2009, submitted by BIMCO; Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime
Accident, LEG 97/6, 29 September 2010, submitted by BIMCO; Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the
Event of a Maritime Accident, LEG 97/6/1, 1 October 2010, submitted by CMI, P&I Clubs, BIMCO,
ICS, ISF, ITF and INTERTANKO.

2

2

It is a true and promising fact that large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents have decreased significantly over the past several years.3 Consequently,
there are also less cases of unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions
against seafarers after these accidents. However, it is highly likely that sooner or later
a large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident will once again occur, because as
Mooradian has stated:
[...] given the inhospitable nature of the marine environment, it is unlikely that mankind will
ever completely eliminate marine disasters. One would surmise that it would be practically
impossible to completely eliminate, through legislative edict, human error and the
incalculable element of misfortune.4

Everybody in the maritime community wants to be sure that if and when another
such unfortunate oil-pollution accident were to occur, seafarers would not be
exposed to unfair criminal procedures and sanctions again, because such unfairness
against seafarers brings severe negative consequences.
First of all, such unfairness can damage seafarers’ and their family members’
psychological and physical health.5 Secondly, such unfairness can negatively
influence seafarers’ professional career, with resultant economic implications for
them and their family members. If a seafarer is detained or imprisoned, he is not able
to continue to work and may lose his salary and social benefits. If a seafarer is not
detained or imprisoned, his career still might be impacted. Criminal conviction, as
such, even if only a monetary penalty is imposed, puts a “stigma” on the seafarer and
may subject him to debilitating. For example, some states do not give visas to
persons who have been criminally punished. In the case of seafarers, the inability to

3

See ITOPF, Oil Tanker Spill Statistics 2015, available at:
http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/Company_Lit/Oil_Spill_Stats_2016.pdf [accessed 7
March 2016].
4
Christopher P. Mooradian, “Protecting ‘Sovereign Rights’: the Case for Increased Coastal State
Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution in the Exclusive Economic Zone”, in Boston University
Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 3, June 2002 at p. 769.
5
ITF, Hebei Spirit fact sheet, available at: http://www.itfglobal.org/campaigns/hebeifacts.cfm
[accessed 21 March 2013]. See also the case study in this dissertation which indicates that after
Tasman Spirit accident seafarers who were arbitrary deprived of their liberty by Pakistani authorities
suffered severe depression. One of the seafarers even attempted to commit suicide - tried to slit his
neck and arm muscles with sharp pieces of broken glass. He was rushed to hospital with extensive
bleeding.

3

obtain a visa can prevent them from carrying out their duties.6 Even criminal
accusation followed by an acquittal puts “stigma” on a seafarer;7 because, typically,
any accusation questions seafarers’ respect for the law, and such questioning can
cause the perception that a particular person is not reliable. Naturally, employers do
not want “unreliable” people to work for them. Thus, they might be reluctant to hire
respective seafarers.
Implications for individual seafarers are not the only negative consequences
of the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers.
These consequences are much broader. As BIMCO puts it:
[…] the implications for individual seafarers cannot be seen in isolation. Thus, the
considerable number of high profile cases of unfair treatment is bound also to have
consequences for the shipping sector in broader terms, its image, and the ability to recruit and
retain a sufficient number of qualified seafarers to the sector.8

Results of several studies show that many seafarers are concerned about a possibility
that they will be unfairly criminalised or otherwise unfairly treated after maritime
accidents, including large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents.9 This concern
pushes seafarers to seek for alternative employment in which they are less exposed to
the risk of accusation and conviction – employment ashore or if still on a ship, then
at lower rank. In turn, it results in the lack of qualified seafarers, especially officers.10
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Olivia Murray, “Fair Treatment of Seafarers – International Law and Practice”, in the Journal of
International Maritime Law, Volume 18, Issue 2, March-April 2012 at p. 156;
BIMCO, Unfair Treatment of Seafarers – Serious Implications for the Seafarers Involved, available at:
https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2010/03/04_Unfair_treatment_of_seafarers.aspx?RenderSearch=true
[accessed 23 December 2014];
BIMCO, IOPC Fund Launches Recourse Action in Hebei Spirit Incident, available at:
https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2010/03/15_IOPC_Fund_launches_recourse_action.aspx?RenderSea
rch=true [accessed 23 December 2014].
7
MURRAY, ibid.
8
BIMCO, Unfair Treatment of Seafarers – Serious Implications for the Seafarers Involved, supra note
6.
9
See Nautilus International, Criminalisation of Seafarers Report, 2011 and SRI Criminal Survey,
2013.
10
Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “Criminalisation and Unfair Treatment: The Seafarer’s Perspective”, in
Journal of International Maritime Law, Volume 12, Issue 5, September-October 2006 at pp. 335-336;
Alfred Popp, “The Treaty-Making Work of the Legal Committee of the International Maritime
Organization”, in Aldo Chircop et al., (ed.), The Regulation of International Shipping: International
and Comparative Perspectives: Essays in Honor of Edgar Gold, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2012 at p. 222; BIMCO and ICS, Manpower Report: The Global Supply and Demand for Seafarers in
2015, London: Maritime International Secretariat Services Limited, 2016.
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This shortage of seafarers brings implications on trade. In the worst-case
scenario, hundreds of ships may be retired as a result of having no qualified seafarers
to navigate them. Considering the fact that shipping transports over 90% of global
trade – for instance, raw materials, consumer goods, essential food stuff and energy –
and that a vast majority of these products cannot be transported any other way,11 one
can imagine the catastrophe that a shortage of seafarers may cause. For convincing
those who lack an imagination, Mukherjee suggests every ship everywhere in the
world to come to a halt just for two days. Empty supermarket shelves then will allow
the modern consumer society to understand the harsh nightmare of a world without
shipping.12
Even if the above-described, extreme scenario (the scenario of nobody to
navigate ships) never were to materialize, a shortage of seafarers still has the
potential to bring severe negative impact on trade. A survey on the shortage of
seafarers which was carried out by Moore Stephens and was based on responses from
key players in the international shipping industry, concluded: competition for crews
is likely to help push up crew wages and other crew costs and, together with it, also
the total vessel operating costs.13 Perhaps the saddest thing is that more costly crews,
in this case, do not mean better crews. Responses to this issue in the abovementioned survey were like these: “Crew competence and skill is declining” and “A
lot of the new crews are of a very low standard.”14 Such responses are not surprising.
General research on the labour market has often concluded that there exists a strong
inverse relationship between the number of professionals in a field and the skills
shortage in this same field.15 One might wish to see more research proving this
11

IMO, IMO and the Environment at p. 2, available at:
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/documents/imo%20and%20the%20environment%202011
.pdf [accessed 2 September 2015].
12
MUKHERJEE, supra note 10 at p. 336.
13
Moore Stephens, Future Operating Costs Report, 2012 at pp. 2-4, available at:
http://www.moorestephens.co.uk/vessel_operating_costs_expected_to_rise_over_the_next_two_years
.aspx [accessed 2 September 2015].
14
Ibid.
15
See, for example, Mari Lind Frongner, “Skills Shortages”, in Labour Market Trends, January 2002
at p. 23; Antonio Domingos Mateus, Charles Allen-Ile and Chux Gervase Iwu, “Skills Shortage in
South Africa: Interrogating the Repertoire of Discussions”, in Mediterranean Journal of Social
Science, Volume 5, No. 6, April 2014 at p. 64.
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relationship, also, specifically in regards to the shortage of seafarers and their
declining skills. However, even without such research, it is clear that there is a high
possibility that such a relationship exists; for instance, at the maritime educational
institutions, quality might be compromised in the quest for increasing quantity and
inexperienced seafarers might be promoted quickly due to a lack of officers. Lessqualified crews, obviously, bring with them a higher risk of accidents.
Another phenomenon caused by the unfair application of criminal procedures
and sanctions against seafarers which results in higher risk of accidents is the
reluctance of seafarers, due to fear of self-incrimination, to cooperate with
institutions which carry out safety investigations of accidents – investigation in
accordance with the IMO Code of the International Standards and Recommended
Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident,
adopted by IMO Resolution MSC.255(84) (hereinafter – IMO Casualty Investigation
Code),16 or other similar investigations.17 The objective of a safety investigation, as it
is stated in Paragraph 1.1 of the IMO Casualty Investigation Code, is “preventing
marine casualties and marine incidents in the future.” This objective is reached by
revealing the causes of the casualty or incident and giving relevant recommendations
to the whole maritime community. The unwillingness of seafarers to cooperate fully
and openly with a safety investigation can hamper the revelation of the true causes of
the casualty or incident. Yet, without knowing these causes, it is very hard to take
effective response measures and, consequently, to achieve the above mentioned
objective of preventing marine casualties and marine incidents in the future.

16

IMO, Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation
into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code), adopted by IMO Resolution
MSC.255(84), 16 May 2008.
17
For example, see SRI Criminal Survey, 2013, in which it is stated that 46% of seafarers who
answered the question concerning safety investigations said that they would be reluctant to cooperate
fully and openly with such investigations, and among reasons indicated for such unwillingness to
cooperate is fear of self-incrimination.
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The high probability of the unfair application of criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers may also have negative impact on the will of masters of
ships to seek refuge in particular states.18 It can lead to accidents which may not have
happened at all or may have had less severe consequences if a ship had asked for and
was granted a place of refuge.
Arguments discussed above prove that aiming to secure a cleaner
environment with the help of criminal law, if this law is developed and enforced in
unfair manner, in fact can cause the opposite effect – more pollution due to poorly
qualified crew navigating ships, due to inability to find out the true causes of the
accident and eliminate them and due to unwillingness of masters of ships to seek
refuge in particular states.
A lot of work has been done by the international maritime community
towards the elimination of the unfair application of criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers. In 2004, the Joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working
Group on the Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident was
established. According to the terms of reference, the Working Group needed to
prepare suitable recommendations for consideration by the IMO Legal Committee
and the ILO Governing Body, including draft guidelines on the fair treatment of
seafarers in the event of a maritime accident.19 The Working Group successfully
accomplished its task and, consequently, in 2006, the IMO Legal Committee as well
as the ILO Governing Body adopted “Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in
the Event of a Maritime Accident” (hereinafter – IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair
Treatment of Seafarers). 20,21
18

Marc A. Huybrechts, “Whatever Happened to European Directive 2005/35/EC? Europe’s
Ambivalent Approach to the Fight Against Marine Pollution and Its Consequences for Seafarers”, in
Baris Soyer and Andrew Tettenborn, (ed.), Pollution at Sea: Law and Liability, London: Informa,
2012 at p. 266; “Proposed Criminal Sanctions for Oil Spills Top Legal Agenda”, Lloyd’s List, 24
August 2004.
19
Report of the Joint ILO/IMO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the
Event of a Maritime Accident, ILO, GB.292/STM/6/1, March 2005.
20
IMO, Adoption of Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers in the Event of a Maritime Accident,
Resolution LEG.3(91), adopted on 27 April 2006; ILO, Minutes of the 296th Session of the Governing
Body of the International Labour Office, GB.296/PV, adopted on 12 and 16 June 2006.
21
For detailed analysis of the IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers see Chapter 7 of
this dissertation.
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Apart from the IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers, there
has been a significant contribution by the international maritime community towards
enhancing the fair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers
via several studies, such as:
•

CMI study on fair treatment of seafarers, 2006. During this study the
information on laws and practices of specific countries in regards to the
criminalisation and deprivation of liberty of seafarers after maritime accidents
was compiled. The results of the study indicated that laws and practices of
several countries are not in line with the relevant international requirements.22

•

BIMCO Study of the Treatment of Seafarers, 2010. During this study the
examples of cases of unfair application of criminal procedures or sanctions
against seafarers from 1996 to 2009 were identified and briefly described.
The results of the study showed topicality of the issue.23

•

Already fore-mentioned SRI Criminal Survey, 2013. During this survey
seafarers were questioned to acquire the data on their personal and their
colleagues’ experiences of facing criminal charges or being a witness in a
criminal prosecution. Amongst the findings of the survey were the following:
8.27% of respondents had faced criminal charges; 90.21% of respondents
who had faced criminal charges and who answered the relevant question did
not have legal representation; 91.20% of respondents who had faced criminal
charges and needed interpretation services were not provided with these
services; 88.66% who had faced criminal charges and who answered the
relevant question did not have their legal rights explained to them; 80.00% of
respondents who had faced criminal charges and who answered the relevant
question felt they were intimidated or threatened as an accused; 24.49% of
respondents who had been witnesses in a prosecution and who answered the
relevant question felt they were intimidated or threatened as a witness. These

22

CMI, Fair Treatment of Seafarers: Summary of Responses of CMI Members to the Questionnaire,
2006.
23
BIMCO, Study of the Treatment of Seafarers, September 2010.
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findings showed that during penal proceedings specific human rights of
seafarers are often not respected.24
Unfortunately, all above-mentioned and other efforts of the international
maritime community have appeared to be not enough for elimination of the unfair
application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers. The evocative
proof of the truthfulness of this statement is the recent judgment of the Spanish
Supreme Court in the Prestige case – the judgment with which, more than 13 years
after the accident, the 81 year-old master of Prestige was sentenced to two years
imprisonment for his role in the large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident;
although the guilt of the master in no-way could be considered as being high if it
could be considered as existing at all.25 In other words, despite all efforts, the issue of
unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers, particularly
after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, has remained topical.
Consequently, new ways for minimising the respective unfairness must be explored.
This dissertation will do so.

1.2. Aim and Objectives of the Dissertation
The aim of this dissertation is to facilitate the fair application of criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents and, with that, reduce the severity of the negative consequences which
arise from the unfair application of such procedures and sanctions.
The objectives of the dissertation are:
•

to identify unfair international law, EU law and examples of unfair national
law on criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against seafarers after
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents;

•

to identify unfair enforcement of laws on criminal procedures and sanctions
against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents;

•
24
25

to make recommendations for eradication of the identified problems.

SRI Criminal Survey, 2013.
For the full analysis of the Prestige case see the case study in this dissertation.
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1.3. Research Questions
For achieving the above mentioned aim and objectives the following
questions have been analysed in the dissertation:
1.

What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions are prescribed by
international and regional human rights instruments, such as UDHR;26 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;27 the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(hereinafter – the European Convention on Human Rights);28 the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union;29 the American Convention on
Human Rights30 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights?31

2.

What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against
seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are prescribed
by specific international “hard law” instruments and whether relevant legal
norms in these instruments are clear and comply with human rights:
2.1. What are the relevant legal norms of UNCLOS,32 are they clear and
do they comply with human rights?
2.2. What are the relevant legal norms of MARPOL,33 are they clear and
do they comply with human rights?
2.3. If legal norms are unclear or do not comply with human rights, how
they should be interpreted?

26

UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 999, p. 171.
28
Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
29
EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02.
30
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose",
Costa Rica, 22 November 1969.
31
Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"),
27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
32
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, United Nations, Treaty
Series, Volume 1833, p. 3.
33
IMO, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the
Protocol of 1978.
27
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2.4. If legal norms are unclear or do not comply with human rights, what
can be done to improve them?
3.

What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against
seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are prescribed
by Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties,
including criminal penalties, for pollution offences (as amended by Directive
2009/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October
2009 amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the
introduction of penalties for infringements) (hereinafter – Directive
2005/35)34 and whether relevant legal norms in this Directive are clear and
comply with human rights, UNCLOS and MARPOL? If relevant legal norms
of Directive 2005/35 are unclear or do not comply with human rights,
UNCLOS or MARPOL, how these legal norms should be interpreted and
what can be done to improve them?

4.

What are examples of unfair national laws on criminal procedures and
sanctions applicable against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil
pollution accidents?

5.

Does the practical enforcement of laws on criminal procedures and sanctions
against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents comply
with human rights?

6.

What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against
seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are prescribed
by IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers and whether relevant
legal norms in these guidelines are capable to bring significant positive
change in practice?

34

Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on shipsource pollution and on the introduction of penalties, including criminal penalties, for pollution
offences, OV L 255, 30.9.2005, p.11.
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1.4. Structure of Dissertation and Target Groups
Structure of this dissertation is highly linked with its research questions:
•

Chapter 1 is an introduction.

•

Chapter 2 explains the standard of fairness – being human rights.35 Firstly, it
discloses the concept of human rights. Secondly, it examines the exact
content of individual human rights which can possibly be violated when
applying criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents. Thirdly, where exact content of the
relevant human right is not clear, recommendations are made regarding how
to make this content clearer. Chapter 2 is accompanied by Annex I. This
annex contains compliance check-lists for each human right analysed in the
dissertation.

•

Chapters 3 and 4 are allocated to specific international “hard law”
instruments: UNCLOS and MARPOL respectively. First of all, each of these
instruments is introduced. Secondly, those rules from each of the instruments,
which can be linked to criminal procedures or sanctions applicable against
seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, are identified
and analysed in detail. Thirdly, where above-mentioned rules are unclear or
inconsistent with human rights, recommendations are made regarding the
interpretation of these rules. Chapter 3 is accompanied by Annex II. This
annex contains a user-friendly table indicating who, under UNCLOS, has
criminal jurisdiction over large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents.

35

For detailed explanation on why, exactly, human rights are treated as the standard of fairness for the
purpose of this dissertation, see Sub-chapter 1.6.1 “Terms “Fair” and “Unfair””.
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•

Chapter 5 is allocated to Directive 2005/35. Again, first of all, the Directive is
introduced. Secondly, those rules of the Directive, which can be linked to
criminal procedures or sanctions applicable against seafarers after large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents, are identified and analysed in detail.
Thirdly, where above-mentioned rules are unclear or inconsistent with human
rights, UNCLOS or MARPOL, recommendations are made regarding the
interpretation of these rules. Differently from analysis of UNCLOS and
MARPOL in Chapters 3 and 4, analysis of Directive 2005/35 in Chapter 5 is
carried out from the perspective of one single case – highly debated case of
INTERTANKO and others v. Secretary of State for Transport (hereinafter –
INTERTANKO case).36

•

Chapter 6 is a case study. It examines whether, in the aftermath of specific
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, criminal procedures and
sanctions applied against seafarers complied with human rights. To some of
the conclusions from the case study brief reference is already made in the
earlier chapters.

•

Chapter 7 is dedicated to the introduction to and critical analysis of the
IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers.

•

Chapter 8 sums up the earlier analysis and discusses the possible ways
forward for enhancing the fair application of criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents
(and beyond). Chapter 8 is accompanied by Annexes III, IV and V. These
annexes list possible legal norms of three new legal instruments proposed by
this dissertation.

36

INTERTANKO and others v. Secretary of State for Transport, Case C-308/06, Judgment of 3 June
2008, ECJ.
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Part of the dissertation contributes to the already on-going widespread discussions,
for example, the discussion on the compatibility of Directive 2005/35 with UNCLOS
and MARPOL or discussions on the treatment of seafarers after specific large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents. Yet, another part of the dissertation is more
innovative. For instance, despite the fact that the international maritime community
often talks about the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against
seafarers, it, so far, has not clearly defined and comprehensively explained the
standard (or “yardstick”) for fair criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers.
This dissertation does so. Similarly, while the international maritime community has
been very active in criticising EU and national laws and practices related to the
application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents, it has relatively rarely looked critically at the
corresponding rules of international maritime conventions, particularly UNCLOS
and MARPOL, perhaps hastily assuming that these rules are not the source of the
problem. This dissertation does not make such an assumption. It examines in detail
relevant rules of UNCLOS and MARPOL.
The main target groups of the dissertation are:
•

authorities which make and promulgate legislation in the maritime field (such
as IMO, the EU and Ministries of Transport in particular states);

•

authorities which make and promulgate legislation in the criminal law field
(such as Ministries of Justice and Ministries of Interior in particular states);

•

bodies which practically enforce criminal procedures and sanctions (such as
police, prosecutor’s offices and courts);

•

bodies which monitor fairness of the enforcement of criminal procedures and
sanctions (such as human rights NGOs and maritime industry NGOs).

14

Descriptions, analysis, conclusions and recommendations incorporated into this
dissertation strive to provide the above-mentioned groups of people with the legallyinformed framework for their decisions in regards to criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, and
beyond. The dissertation, inter alia, strives to facilitate proactive decision-making, as
the dissertation not only identifies unfairness which is already fait accompli but also
warns about unfairness which may occur in the future. This “warning” is expressed:
1) by analysing relevant law, as such, and identifying where this law deviates
from human rights – even if, so far, this law has not caused unfairness against
seafarers in practice;
2) by analysing cases outside the maritime field, for example, general human
rights cases which illustrate different violations of the right to liberty or the
right to fair trial – even if, so far, similar violations have not occurred in
regards to seafarers.

1.5. Legal Theory and Methodology
This research is legal research. It examines qualities of law: the clearness of
meaning of particular rules and the coherence between different rules. Consequently,
this research predominantly uses legal research method, namely, the analysis of
written materials. Such analysed written materials include: legislative acts, case law,
reports, books and articles from journals.
For identifying the true meaning of particular legal norms, apart from looking
into already available interpretations (for example, interpretations in court
judgements or scholarly literature), methods (or rules) of interpretation incorporated
in Art. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties are applied.
Thus, any legal norm is interpreted by establishing the ordinary meaning of the terms
used in it. Yet, this ordinary meaning is determined not in the abstract but in the
context and in light of the object and purpose of the legal instrument in which the
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legal norm is situated.37 In other words, literal (philological), systemic and
teleological methods of interpretation are applied simultaneously. However, the
teleological method of interpretation (the method which examines the object and
purpose of a legal instrument) is used cautiously, because a majority of scholars treat
this method as extrinsic; they emphasize the primacy of the text as the basis for the
interpretation.38 If, after application of the above-mentioned methods of
interpretation, meaning of a legal norm remains ambiguous or obscure, or if these
methods of interpretation lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable,
recourse is made to the preparatory materials (or travaux preparatoires) of the legal
instrument in question.39
For resolving conflicts of law, conflicts of law principles are applied, such as:
lex superior derogate legi inferiori meaning where two laws govern the same factual
situation, a law higher in the hierarchy overrides a law lower in the hierarchy, and lex
specialis derogate legi generali meaning where two laws govern the same factual
situation, a law governing a specific subject matter overrides a law which only
governs general matters.40
The case study began by gathering as much factual information as possible
about the cases, inter alia, by approaching institutions and persons directly involved
in respective cases. Then, the gathered information was analysed. It was analysed on
the basis of human-rights compliance check-lists incorporated into Annex I of this
dissertation.

37

See Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations,
Treaty Series, Volume 1155, p. 331.
38
UN, Document A/6309/ Rev.1: Report of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of
Its Seventeenth Session and Its Eighteenths Session, in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1966, Volume II, New York: United Nations Publications, 1967 at p. 218.
39
See Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 37.
40
Daiga Iļjanova, “Tiesību normu un principu kolīzija”, in Edgars Meļķisis, (ed.), Juridiskās metodes
pamati, Riga: University of Latvia, 2003 at pp. 101-109; Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law:
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN International Law Commission,
A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006.
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The information given above (starting with the aim of this dissertation) shows
that the research is concerned with qualities of law and practice. It is not concerned
with quantifying anything. In other words, this research is qualitative. As any
qualitative research, or in fact as any interpretive activity, this research is subjective.
However, all efforts are made to enhance the credibility of the findings, for example,
by taking into account the multiple perspectives and multiple interests and by testing
rival explanations, as well as by comparing and cross-checking the consistency of
information derived by different means. Therefore, it is hoped that all target groups
will perceive this dissertation, not as propaganda, nor mere critique, but as a
balanced material which can serve as a basis for constructive discussions and
improvements.

1.6. Clarification of the Scope of Dissertation and Use of Terms
1.6.1. Terms “Fair” and “Unfair”
It was stated above that the aim of this dissertation is to facilitate fair
application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents and, with that, reduce the severity of the negative
consequences which arise from the unfair application of such procedures and
sanctions. The terms “fair” and “unfair” are also used in other places of this paper.
Similarly, IMO documents, different reports and scholarly literature utilises the terms
“fair” and “unfair” when talking about the treatment of seafarers. However, the terms
“fair” and “unfair” are vague. The dictionary meaning of the term “fair” is: “just or
appropriate in the circumstances”.41 Consequently, “unfair” means – unjust or
inappropriate in the circumstances. Yet, such terms as “just”, “unjust”, “appropriate”
and “inappropriate” are not any more instructive than the terms “fair” and “unfair”
themselves. In other words, dictionary definitions of the terms “fair” and “unfair” are
of little help for revealing the exact notion of fairness.

41

Judy Pearsall, (ed.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001
at p. 657.
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If the dictionary definitions of the terms “fair” and “unfair” are of little help
for revealing the exact notion of fairness, it must be revealed with the help of “tools”,
other than dictionaries. One might see legal norms as such a “tool” and say: “What is
lawful is fair.” and “What is unlawful is unfair.” Others might see moral norms as
such a “tool” and say: “What is morally right is fair.” and “What is morally wrong is
unfair.” However, neither the law, alone, nor morality, alone, can serve as a standard
of fairness, at least not for the purpose of this dissertation. The law, alone, cannot
serve as a standard of fairness because the law, itself, can be unfair. Morality, alone,
can, possibly, serve as the standard of fairness in a specific community, but it cannot
serve as a standard of “global fairness” because actual moralities differ from culture
to culture. This dissertation is concerned with the fairness of criminal procedures and
sanctions applied against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents globally, irrespectively in which country seafarers find themselves in the
aftermath of the accident. Therefore, some instrument incorporating the standard of
“global fairness” would be the best “tool” for revealing the exact notion of fairness
for the purpose of this dissertation. Such an instrument exists; it is human rights.
First of all, human rights are law; but not simply law, they are morally justified law.
This justification gives strong belief that human rights is “fair law” and, as such, can
serve as a standard of fairness for any other law, as well as for enforcement practices.
Secondly, human rights are morality but not simply a compilation of existing
divergent morality. They are compromise “global morality”, established with the
help of law. It makes human rights almost synonymous to “global fairness”.42
Consequently, human rights are adopted as the standard of fairness for the purpose of
this dissertation and, thus, within the dissertation: “fair” means – in compliance with
human rights; “unfair” means – not in compliance with human rights.

42

Dual nature of human rights (law and morality), is analysed in more detail in Sub-chapter 2.1,
“Concept of Human Rights”.
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It can be argued that the concept of human rights is still vague (similar to the
concepts of “justice” and “appropriateness”), that human rights are just general
principles, which in different states may be enforced in different manners, and,
consequently, that they cannot help draw an exact boundary between “fair” and
“unfair” actions. Sub-chapter 2.1 “Concept of Human Rights” will show that the
reality is that human rights are different – they range from abstract to specific (or
from general to precise). For example, social rights, such as rights related to health
care, education and labour, indeed, are still vague.43 Also, some human rights
associated with criminal procedures and sanctions are rather general; for example,
despite the fact that there exists the human right to be free from disproportionate
punishment, few guidelines can be found which help to understand whether specific
punishment is proportional or disproportionate in the circumstances in question.
However, the majority of human rights associated with criminal procedures and
sanctions are relatively precise, their exact content can be revealed in a relatively
detailed manner, particularly it can be done with the help of case law from human
rights tribunals. The whole of Chapter 2 “Human Rights” of this dissertation, which
introduces relevant rules from human rights instruments and which extensively
analyses relevant case law of human rights tribunals, proves that the abovementioned statements are true. Obviously, one might wish to have an even more
precise standard than human rights on his hands when assessing the fairness of
criminal procedures and sanctions. However, it is hard to find such a more precise
standard (if possible at all).

43

Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 at pp. 3-4.

19

1.6.2. Focus on Law
The aim of this dissertation – to facilitate fair application of criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents and, with that, reduce the severity of the negative consequences which
arise from the unfair application of such procedures and sanctions – can be achieved
only by eliminating the causes of respective unfairness. However, causes of
respective unfairness might be quite diverse, for instance:
•

social interests – such as the interest to diminish outcry of the general public;

•

political interests – such as the interest to preserve a state’s image, when in
fact action or inaction of authorities of this state caused the accident, or at
least facilitated it;

•

economic interests – such as the interest to find, as quickly as possible,
somebody (preferably not the state itself) guilty of the accident so that losses
caused by the accident could be recovered (in the jurisdictions where civil
remedies result from finding the criminal offence and offender);

•

poor education of law enforcement officials – such as poor education of
police officers on human rights or law of the sea what ultimately leads to the
application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers not in
conformity with existing law.
It can be said that all the above listed potential causes of the unfair

application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents are outside the scope of this dissertation, yet they
are not completely outside its sight. The dissertation sketches some conclusions and
recommendations related to social, political, economic and educational aspects.
However, these “sketches” are not expanded upon. For that, wider knowledge than
this author has in sociology, politics, economics and other fields is necessary. It is
hoped that other scholars (scholars with relevant background) will take the abovementioned “sketches” incorporated in this dissertation and develop them, so that all
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causes of the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against
seafarers disappear.
This author does indeed have a legal background. Therefore, focus of this
dissertation is on law. The author believes that one of the possible causes of the
unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after largescale ship-source oil pollution accidents (parallel to causes related to social, political,
economic and education aspects, as well as others) is simply inappropriate law – law
which is not clear and law which does not take into consideration all relevant aspects,
for example, human rights. Consequently, the fairness of the application of criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents, inter alia, can be improved by simply explaining and improving relevant
law. Exactly this explanation and improvement of relevant law is what this
dissertation predominantly strives to provide – by developing recommendations how
to interpret law and by developing recommendations how to adjust law, where
necessary.
1.6.3. Focus on Human Rights and Specific International and EU Legal
Instruments
The vision of this dissertation can be described in the following way: this
dissertation strives to change the situation whereby human rights instruments secure
more human rights than specific international and EU legal instruments, as well as
national law and practice, to the situation whereby specific international and EU
legal instruments, as well as national law and practice, follow human rights.
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However, due to the limited amount of time allocated to carry out this research, the
dissertation focuses only on the first three blocks (human rights, specific
international legal instruments and specific EU instruments) of the vision. Into the
following blocks (national law and practice) only insight is given – through the case
study at the end of the work.
Rules on criminal procedures and sanctions can predominantly be found in
national law. Also, the enforcement of criminal procedures and sanctions takes place
at national level. Consequently, it is very important to carry out a comprehensive
analysis of criminal laws and corresponding practices of different countries, to assess
whether respective laws and practices comply with human rights and specific
international and EU legal instruments. Ground-breaking research in this regard has
already been carried out – by CMI.44 Yet, the work of CMI should be continued to
cover more countries and wider subject matters. This author hopes that it will be
done. At the same time, this author thinks that it is important not to jump into
criticising national laws and practices for being unfair before setting the clear
standard of fairness and before making sure that relevant international and EU law
(law based on which national law and practice should be developed) is clear and fair
itself. In other words, this author sees the analysis of human rights and specific
international and EU legal instruments as an absolutely necessary precondition for
further, though not less important, research.
1.6.4. Only Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law Perspective
In very broad terms, this dissertation is concerned with the unfair treatment of
seafarers. However, the topic of the unfair treatment of seafarers, even within the
domain of law, exclusively, can be approached from different perspectives, for
example:

44

See CMI, Fair Treatment of Seafarers: Summary of Responses of CMI Members to the
Questionnaire, 2006.
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•

administrative law perspective – the issue of unfair denial of shore leave;

•

labour law perspective – the issue of unfair conditions of employment (for
example, unfair terms regarding wages, hours of work, failure to provide
decent accommodations on-board, failure to serve good-quality food onboard and failure to provide medical care).

This dissertation examines whether criminal procedures and sanctions applicable
against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are fair. Thus, it
analyses treatment of seafarers only from the perspective of criminal procedure law
and criminal law. Criminal procedure law is a body of law which determines the
process of instituting, investigating and adjudicating criminal case.45 Criminal law is
a body of law which determines what should be treated as crime and what
punishment should be imposed for specific crimes.46 For the sake of convenience,
further on in the paper, term “criminal law” is used to refer to both “criminal
procedure law” and “criminal law.”
1.6.5. Terms “Criminal Offence”, “Criminal Procedures” and
“Criminal Sanctions”
As the scope of this dissertation is limited to criminal law perspective, then
only criminal offences (or crimes) and, consequently, only criminal procedures and
sanctions are addressed in it. Usually national law defines which offences and,
consequently, which procedures and sanctions are criminal. Serious offences are
usually termed “criminal offences”, and those of comparatively less seriousness are
termed otherwise, for example, “regulatory offences” or “administrative offences.”47
However, this dissertation is not national law based; it is human rights based.
Therefore, in this dissertation, the term “criminal offence” and, consequently, the
45
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Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “The Penal Law of Ship-Source Marine Pollution: Selected Issues in
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terms “criminal procedures” and “criminal sanctions” must be understood similarly
as it is understood by human rights tribunals.
Human rights tribunals treat as “criminal offence” and, consequently,
“criminal procedure” and “criminal sanction”, not only any offence, procedure or
sanction which is defined as criminal under particular national law; they may treat as
“criminal offence” and, consequently, “criminal procedure” and “criminal sanction”,
also any offence, procedure or sanction which under particular national law is
defined as “regulatory”, “administrative” or otherwise. What matters is not the name
given to the offence, procedure or sanction under national law, but the nature of the
offence, procedure or sanction itself, particularly the nature and degree of the
severity of the consequences that the person risks to incur.48 For example, even if six
month pre-trial detention or ten year imprisonment are treated as administrative
measures (or otherwise) in a specific country, they still will be treated as criminal
measures by human rights tribunals, because these measures bring severe negative
consequences to the person against whom they are applied.
1.6.6. Term “Criminalisation”
Instead of talking about “unfair criminal procedures and sanctions against
seafarers” (what this dissertation does) the international maritime community often
talks about the “criminalisation” of seafarers – either using this term parallel to the
term “unfair treatment” or as a part of the term “unfair treatment”, or as a synonym
to the term “unfair treatment”. For example, BIMCO, ICS, ISF, INTERCARGO,
INTERTANKO, ITF, P&I Club, and the Hong Kong Shipowners’ Association in
their joint protest at the detention of the two officers of Hebei Spirit stated that they
“cannot and will not support the criminalisation of seafarers, nor unjust,
unreasonable and unfair treatment.”49
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See, for example, Lutz v. Germany, Judgment of 25 August 1987, ECtHR, paragraph 54; Engel and
others v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 8 June 1976, ECtHR, paragraph 82.
49
BIMCO, Shipping World Protests at Unfair Detention of Seafarers in Korea, available at:
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aspx [accessed 1 April 2013].
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The author of this dissertation finds such use of the term “criminalisation”
misleading. The word “criminalisation”, as such, does not carry any negative
meaning. Criminalisation is an ordinary concept of the theory of punishment and it
simply means “turning an activity into a criminal offence.”50 It is quite obvious that
some activities should be criminalised to maintain order in society, including
activities carried out by seafarers. For example, there should be no doubt, and
actually there is no doubt, that a ship master who intentionally causes a collision and,
with that, the deaths of people should face severe criminal charges. Similarly, it is
appropriate to criminalise deliberate pollution from ships. Consequently,
criminalisation, as such, is not an issue. Only unfair criminalisation is an issue.
Unfair criminalisation of seafarers is within the scope of this dissertation.51
However, within the scope of this dissertation are also cases when criminalisation, as
such, was, perhaps, fair (a seafarer deserved to be criminally punished), but applied
criminal procedures or sanctions still were not fair; for example, detention was
applied as preventive measure when it was not necessary or imprisonment was
applied when it was disproportionate to do so. Therefore, this dissertation talks not
just about “unfair criminalisation of seafarers” but more generally about “unfair
criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers.”

50

Judy Pearsall, (ed.), The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001
at p. 434.
51
Criminalisation of an individual as distinguished from criminalisation of an activity means treating
the individual such as a seafarer as a criminal regardless of whether the act committed by the
individual has been proven to be a criminal act.

25

1.6.7. Only Seafarers Perspective
After large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, criminal procedures and
sanctions can be applied unfairly against different groups of people, for example,
ship owners, insurers and classification societies. However, this dissertation analyses
fairness of criminal procedures and sanctions only in respect to seafarers. With the
term “seafarer” this dissertation understands any person who is employed or engaged
or works in any capacity on board a ship. This meaning is consistent with Art. 2(1)(f)
of MLC.52
1.6.8. Only Ship-Source Oil Pollution Offences
Criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers can be applied unfairly
after different kinds of alleged offences, for instance, manslaughter and illicit
trafficking. This dissertation focuses only on one type of alleged offence: ship-source
oil pollution offences.
With ship-source oil pollution this dissertation understands the introduction
of oil from a ship into the marine environment which results or is likely to result in
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.
Such definition of ship-source oil pollution is in line with the general definition of
“pollution of the marine environment” given in Art. 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS.
Despite the fact that the focus of this dissertation is on ship-source oil
pollution offences, at times, it also addresses other types of offences. As the
dissertation itself will show, such expansion is natural, because ship-source oil
pollution offences are inseparably linked with the wider penal system.

52

ILO, Maritime Labour Convention, 2006.
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1.6.9. Only “Accidental” Ship-Source Oil Pollution
The scope of this dissertation is narrowed even further – not all types of shipsource oil pollution are covered by the dissertation, only accidental ship-source oil
pollution is covered. What is “accidental” and consequently what is “accidental
pollution” can be understood differently by people who look at these terms from the
perspective of law of the sea and from the perspective of criminal law.
The meaning of the term “accidental pollution” within the domain of law of
the sea, in fact, is not absolutely clear. The Preamble of MARPOL, in one place,
distinguishes between just two types of pollution – deliberate and accidental –
suggesting that any reckless, negligent or purely accidental pollution should be
treated as “accidental pollution”. In another place, the same Preamble distinguishes
among three types of pollution – deliberate, negligent and accidental – suggesting
that negligent pollution (and therefore, most probably, also reckless pollution) should
not be treated as “accidental pollution”. Yet, scholarly literature addressing different
types of pollution shows that the first understanding (the understanding which treats
as accidental pollution any pollution which is not intentional) is more preferred
within the maritime community.53 Thus, it can be said that from the law of the sea
perspective, two broad groups of pollution exist – deliberate pollution and accidental
pollution.
Types of specifically ship-source oil pollution can be further classified as
follows:

53

See, for example, John A.C. Cartner, Richard P. Fiske and Tara L. Leiter, The International Law of
the Shipmaster, London: Informa, 2009 at p. 199; Proshanto K. Mukherjee, “The Penal Law of ShipSource Marine Pollution: Selected Issues in Perspective”, in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rudiger
Wolfrum, (ed.), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum
Judge Thomas A. Mensah, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007 at p. 468; Erik Jaap Molenaar,
Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998 at p.
19.
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Ship-source oil pollution
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Figure 2 – Types of ship-source oil pollution.

Slightly different classification of the types of ship-source oil pollution can be found
in scholarly literature. For example, Mukherjee distinguishes accidental spills and
two types of voluntary pollution – deliberate (dumping) and operational
(discharges).54 Molenaar distinguishes accidental (unintentional) and operational
(intentional) pollution.55 However, according to the rules of logic, the first step in the
54
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process of classification is the determination of criteria based-on which objects will
be grouped. To mix different criteria into one grouping means to make a serious
mistake in logic and create muddled classification, or divisio confusa.56 Mukherjee
and Molenaar in their classifications mix different criteria (a polluter’s inner mental
state towards pollution and a pollution’s linkage to normal operations of a ship) in
one grouping, and thus they make serious logical mistake. In line with the rules of
logic is to say that ship-source oil pollution can be classified: in respect to a
polluter’s inner mental state towards pollution – into intentional pollution and
unintentional (accidental) pollution; in respect to the linkage to normal operations of
a ship – into operational pollution and non-operational pollution; and alike. There are
many other possible criteria under which grouping can be made (for example,
lawfulness of the discharge, necessity of the discharge and scale of the discharge),
and there are plenty of possible combinations of features under different criteria,
inter alia, intentional operational, accidental operational, intentional non-operational
and accidental non-operational ship-source oil pollution exists. Figure 2 above does
not aim to show the full spectrum of the classification of different types of shipsource oil pollution, it simply aims to show what exactly accidental ship-source oil
pollution is – with the mere purpose to identify the scope of this dissertation.
From the perspective of criminal law, it is more relevant to talk about
“accidental pollution” only in the case of an occurrence of an accident a person did
not foresee, did not have to foresee and could not foresee – casus fortuitus or an
unavoidable accident. All other acts or omissions are seen as blameworthy conduct
and can potentially be defined as offences. More detailed analysis, in this regard, is
provided later in this dissertation – in Sub-chapter 2.4.2 “General Principles for
Determining Criminal Liability”. However, Figure 3 below helps to get the general
idea about the variation in the understanding of the term “accidental pollution” from
the criminal law perspective and law of the sea perspective.

Liability and Policy: China, Europe and the US, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International,
2010 at p. 218.
56
Ivans Vedins, Loģika, Riga: Avots, 1998 at pp. 77-78.
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Criminal law perspective
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Figure 3 – Comparison of the meaning of the term “accidental pollution” from the perspective of
criminal law and from the perspective of law of the sea.

This dissertation, if not expressly stated otherwise, adopts the law of the sea
meaning of the term “accidental pollution”.
1.6.10. Only “Large-Scale” Ship-Source Oil Pollution Accidents
Another aspect which should be noted regarding the scope of this dissertation
is that this dissertation focuses only on large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents. What type and amount of pollution constitutes large-scale pollution cannot
be stated in absolute numbers. Experts say: “the precise extent of the damage to the
environment can only be determined by a methodical scientific investigation
covering major components of the ecosystem.”57 It is so because each pollution case
is unique in many respects – type of pollutant, surrounding environment in general
(from tropical to arctic), weather conditions at the time of the accident and other
factors. Furthermore, it is not only damage to the environment which might
determine the scale of pollution; there is also socio-economic damage. A relatively
57
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small oil spill in an economically-active coastal area may cause greater socioeconomic damage than a huge spill in the middle of the ocean. Consequently, the
first spill can perhaps be treated as “large scale”, and the second spill – as “small
scale”.
As it was stated in the fourth and the fifth column of Figure 2, two sub-types
of ship-source oil pollution accidents can be distinguished: marine casualties and
marine incidents. Paragraph 2.9 of IMO Casualty Investigation Code defines “marine
casualty” as follows:
2.9 A marine casualty means an event, or a sequence of events, that has resulted in any of the
following which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship:
.1 the death of, or serious injury to, a person;
.2 the loss of a person from a ship;
.3 the loss, presumed loss or abandonment of a ship;
.4 material damage to a ship;
.5 the stranding or disabling of a ship, or the involvement of a ship in a collision;
.6 material damage to marine infrastructure external to a ship, that could seriously endanger
the safety of the ship, another ship or an individual; or
.7 severe damage to the environment, or the potential for severe damage to the environment,
brought about by the damage of a ship or ships.
However, a marine casualty does not include a deliberate act or omission, with the intention
to cause harm to the safety of a ship, an individual or the environment.

Paragraph 2.10 of IMO Casualty Investigation Code defines “marine incident” as
follows:
2.10 A marine incident means an event, or sequence of events, other than a marine casualty,
which has occurred directly in connection with the operations of a ship that endangered, or, if
not corrected, would endanger the safety of the ship, its occupants or any other person or the
environment.
However, a marine incident does not include a deliberate act or omission, with the intention
to cause harm to the safety of a ship, an individual or the environment.

Paragraphs 2.9 and 2.10 of IMO Casualty Investigation Code indicate that a marine
casualty is a relatively major accident which involves either serious events per se
(Paragraph 2.9.5) or specific serious consequences (Paragraphs 2.9.1-2.9.4 and 2.9.62.9.7), while marine incident is a relatively minor accident, which does not involve
such events or consequences. It is unlikely that ship-source oil pollution resulting
from a marine incident (for example, pollution that is not severe resulting from the
valves not being left open intentionally after cargo transfer operations) will ever be
considered as large-scale pollution. Consequently, marine incidents are not within
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the scope of this dissertation, only marine casualties (such as, stranding or collision)
are.
1.6.11. Choice of Cases for Chapter 2 “Human Rights”
Cases from the practice of human rights tribunals chosen for referencing in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation are simply random cases which can serve as a helping
hand for understanding the standard of fairness (human rights themselves). Factual
details of these cases are of little importance for the purpose of this dissertation, and,
therefore, they did not determine the choice. These factual details are not even
displayed in the dissertation – cases are introduced very superficially, just in the
amount necessary for understanding the standard.
Naturally, more references are made to the cases of ECtHR, because, as
scholar de Wet has put it, ECtHR is the most advanced international system for the
protection of human rights; it has developed relatively broad case law and, therefore,
exactly this system is a valuable point of departure.58 Nevertheless, references are
also made to the cases of IACtHR. Regarding the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, the author did not find any case in the practice of this court which
would be relevant for the purpose of this dissertation.
1.6.12. Choice of Cases for Chapter 6 “Case Study”
Cases chosen for the case study are: the sinking of Erika (France, 1999), the
sinking of Prestige (Spain, 2002), the grounding of Tasman Spirit (Pakistan, 2003)
and the collision of Hebei Spirit and Samsung No.1 (South Korea, 2007). Factors
which determined the choice are following:
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1) Year in which an accident happened. Only such accidents which happened
during the time period from year 1996 to year 2015 (from the time since
which the international maritime community has been highly concerned about
the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers
to the time of finishing this research) were considered for the case study. This
time period provided a rather long list of cases from which to choose.
2) Scope of the dissertation. Only large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents
were considered. It allowed the author to narrow the list down to 6 cases.
3) Likelihood to identify unfairness against seafarers. Only such accidents,
whose preliminary analysis suggested that in the aftermath of them seafarers
were exposed to unfair application of criminal procedures or sanctions, were
considered. This consideration excluded the grounding of Sea Empress
(United Kingdom, 1996) from the list.
4) Availability of relevant materials. Only such accidents regarding which
considerable amount of relevant materials, such as judgments, reports and
scholarly articles, were available were considered. This consideration
excluded the collision of Evoikos and Orapin Global (Singapore, 1997) from
the list.
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2. Human Rights
2.1. Concept of Human Rights
Beitz states: “Human rights have become ‘a fact of the world’ with the reach
and influence that would astonish the framers of the international human rights
project.”59 Indeed, today the notion of human rights is well-recognised, and language
related to human rights is widely-used. However, despite this, the concept of human
rights is far from straightforward.
One way of defining human rights is: human rights are rights under
international, regional and national human rights instruments. However, such a
definition reveals human rights from just one perspective – a purely legal one. To
develop a more exhaustive definition of human rights, it is necessary to look at these
rights not only from a legal perspective, but also from a philosophical perspective.
That makes the task of developing the definition much more complicated, because
even today there are different opinions regarding philosophical questions associated
with human rights (such as the existence, nature, universality and the justification of
human rights). Due to existing disputes on the above-mentioned philosophical
questions, it is possible to find many, often contradictory, definitions of human rights
in scholarly literature. For example, human rights have been defined as “fundamental
rights that humans have by the fact of being humans, and that are neither created nor
can be abrogated by any government”60, as “rights which are believed to belong
justifiably to every person”61, as “God-given natural rights”62 and as “source of
hope”63. Many of these definitions are based on very strong claims, for example, that
human rights exist independently of legal enactments as justified moral norms or that
59
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human rights are universal. When viewed along with existing practices, these claims
seem more like overstatements. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to define
human rights in a more modest manner, for example, as morally justified rights,
superior to all other rights, which are believed to be vitally important for human
well-being, and, therefore, should be universally recognized, promoted and
protected. To analyse this definition appropriately, it is better to look at its parts
separately.
First, human rights are rights. Such a statement might seem obvious and,
therefore, not worth mentioning. However, some human rights are goal-like rights,
for example, social rights. They cannot be associated with very specific, instantly
enforceable duties. Instead, they just declare high-priority goals and assign general
responsibility for their progressive realisation. Some scholars argue that these goallike rights are not real rights.64 Nevertheless, it seems more appropriate to recognize
as real rights also goal-like rights, because, although they are very abstract, they still
comprise all elements of the notion of a right: right holder (person), addressee
(primarily, government) and assigned particular mandatory duty (duty to
progressively realize established goals). It is simply necessary to come to terms with
the fact that rights range from abstract to specific (or from general to precise).65
Second, human rights are morally justified rights. It is not to say, however,
that human rights are justified by moral norms actually shared by all humans; first of
all, because practice proves that there is hardly any moral norm on which actual
consensus among all humans exists and, secondly, because a description of an
existing moral consensus is not the aim of human rights. The aim of human rights is
“to serve as potent critic of existing practice” and “to help to transform reality”.66 To
resolve possible ambiguity, it should be noted here that although human rights are
justified by morality they are not pure moral rights. First of all, it is hard to imagine
how agreement on human rights (agreement on “global morality” in a world where
64
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diverse actual moralities exist) could be reached without the help of legal norms.
Secondly, for full realisation of human rights, it is necessary to secure their
enjoyment. In such complex societies as there are today, morality alone cannot meet
this demand, for example, morality cannot create institutions (such as courts and
educational institutions) which are, in fact, required for fulfilment of many positive
duties associated with human rights. So, morality alone is relatively weak and
ineffective. Law is functionally necessary to make up for the weaknesses of morality.
Therefore, human rights are better thought of as “Janus-faced”, with one part related
to morality and the other to law.67
Third, human rights are superior to all other rights. They are meant to take
precedence over alternative social and political considerations. This does not mean,
however, that human rights are absolute. Human rights strive not only for individual
well-being but also for collective well-being. Therefore, in particular circumstances,
human rights of an individual can be limited for securing collective aims, or in other
words “rights of the few” can be limited for the “good of the many”. The point is that
these limitations should be kept to an irreducible minimum. As scholars Mann,
Gostin, Gruskin and others have stated:
[…] the permissible restriction of rights is bound in several ways. First, certain rights (e.g.,
right to life, right to be free from torture) are considered inviolable under any circumstances.
Restriction of other rights must be: in the interest of a legitimate objective; determined by
law; imposed in the least intrusive means possible; not imposed arbitrarily; and strictly
necessary in a “democratic society” to achieve its purposes.68

Human rights are often described as “fundamental rights”; for example, the EU in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union uses this term in relation to all
human rights. However, there are well-grounded arguments that lead to the
conclusion that not all human rights are fundamental rights. Fundamental rights
should be very general (for example, life and liberty) so that they can apply to
thousands of years of human history, not just recent centuries. But today human
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rights are numerous and specific.69 Such specificity stretches “beyond what might
plausibly be accepted as a legacy of philosophically respectable thought about
fundamental rights”.70 Perhaps it is possible to give theoretical explanation as to how
to get from those specific rights found in contemporary human-rights instruments to
the fundamental rights. However, the more pragmatic way seems to be to treat
human rights simply as high-priority rights. The term “high-priority rights”
undoubtedly encompasses all human rights.
Fourth, human rights strive for universal recognition, promotion and
protection. It is often said that human rights are universal. This world view is also
directly incorporated into international human rights documents, for example, Art. 5
of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993, states:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the
same footing, and with the same emphasis.71

The most straightforward explanation of the idea that human rights are universal is
that human rights belong to persons “as such” (regardless of their contingent
relationships or social setting), that they are derived from human nature and therefore
apply to everyone and are claimable by everyone.72 However, not everybody agrees
with these statements and consequently with the idea that human rights are universal.
For example, Nelson argues that hardly anything called human rights can be derived
from human nature, because the behavioural dispositions we actually observe in
human beings are too diverse and conflicting to allow for any coherent
generalizations.73 Moreover, for full realization of the idea of human rights as a
universal standard, universal recognition and implementation of human rights is
necessary. Today human rights are recognised almost globally. First of all, an
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absolute majority of states are UN Member States,74 and, thus, have made themselves
bound by Art. 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which identifies promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights as one of the principal purposes of the UN.75
Secondly, an absolute majority of states have also made themselves bound by main
international and regional human rights instruments.76 However, human rights still
often go unobserved in terms of practice (due to simple ignorance, due to
unwillingness to give up long standing traditions or due to other reasons). In other
words, human rights are universal under the human rights doctrine and they are
almost universally recognised, but their universal implementation and consequent
enjoyment remains merely an aim and not a reality in practice; therefore, it is more
appropriate to treat human rights as rights which strive for universal recognition,
promotion and protection, not as rights which are universal already.

2.2. Right to Liberty
2.2.1. Introduction
Art. 3 of UDHR states: “Everybody has the right to […] liberty […]”. Art.
9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 5(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, Art. 7(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights and
Art. 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights repeat the statement in
Art. 3 of UDHR. Thus, the right to liberty is firmly established in international and
regional human rights instruments.

74

See the list of UN Member States at UN website: http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml.
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945.
76
For State Parties of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights see
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en;
European Convention on Human Rights –
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=7&DF=13/07/2014&CL=
ENG; American Convention on Human Rights – http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm; African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights – http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/.
75

38

In a broad sense, liberty is “the power to do as one pleases”.77 In this sense,
the notion of liberty embraces various civil, political, social and economic rights, for
example, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of
association and freedom to choose an occupation. IACtHR interprets the right to
liberty as including the notion of liberty in this above-mentioned broad sense.78
However, the majority of IACtHR case law in respect to the right to liberty addresses
only physical liberty of a person.
ECtHR has narrowed the notion of the right to liberty itself. It has explicitly
stated that this notion encompasses only physical liberty of a person.79 It means that
in Europe, the right to liberty is concerned only with a person’s right to move
wherever he wants. ECtHR has limited the right to liberty even further – by stating
that this right does not secure against all restrictions on movement of a person but
only against such restrictions which amount to a deprivation of liberty.80
In a number of its judgements, ECtHR has stated that the difference between
mere restrictions on movement and restrictions on movement serious enough to fall
within the ambit of a deprivation of liberty is one of degree or intensity, and not one
of nature or substance. Therefore, in order to determine whether someone has been
deprived of his liberty, the starting point must be his concrete situation, and account
must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and
manner of implementation of the measure in question.81 For example, in the case of
Medvedyev and others v. France, ECtHR declared that the crew members of the
Cambodian ship Winner, who was boarded on the high seas and afterwards taken to
France by French authorities on suspicion of carrying large quantities of drugs, were
deprived of their liberty. After boarding the Winner, French authorities confined her
crew members to their cabins. Later restrictions were relaxed – crew members were
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allowed to move about the ship under the supervision of the French Special Forces.
However, in the Court’s view, this relaxed approach did not alter the fact that the
crew members were deprived of their liberty throughout the voyage – as the ship’s
course was imposed upon by the French authorities.82
This dissertation, similarly as the right to liberty under the European
Convention on Human Rights, is also concerned only with the deprivation of liberty.
The dissertation is even more focused. It is not concerned about all types of
deprivation of liberty; what are many, including placement of a person in psychiatric
or social care institution, confinement of a person in airport transit zone and
subjecting a person to crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order
grounds. This dissertation is concerned only with those types of deprivation of liberty
which form criminal procedure or sanction, such as arrest, detention, house arrest and
imprisonment.
Not any deprivation of liberty constitutes the violation of the right to liberty.
Only arbitrary deprivation of liberty does. Apart from explicit prohibition of arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, human rights instruments set a number of guarantees for
persons deprived of liberty – to give additional safeguards against arbitrariness.
Failure to provide these guarantees also constitutes the violation of the right to
liberty. The next sub-chapters analyse in detail, respectively, what constitutes
arbitrary deprivation of liberty and what are the guarantees for persons deprived of
liberty.
2.2.2. Violation of the Right to Liberty: Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty
Art. 9 of UDHR states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention […]”. Art. 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Art. 7(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights and Art. 6 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights reflect Art. 9 of UDHR. The European
Convention on Human Rights does not refer to arbitrary deprivation of liberty
explicitly. However, it can be concluded from the case law of ECtHR that the
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European Convention on Human Rights, just like other human rights instruments, is
also concerned with arbitrary deprivation of liberty. For example, in the case of
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia ECtHR stated:
The Court reiterates that in proclaiming the “right to liberty”, Article 5 § 1 aims to ensure
that no-one should be dispossessed of his physical liberty in an arbitrary fashion.83

For deprivation of liberty not to be arbitrary, four conditions should be met.
First of all, there must be sufficiently precise law regulating respective deprivation of
liberty. Secondly, this law must be complied with. Thirdly, there must be recognised
ground for respective deprivation of liberty. Fourthly, existence of this recognised
ground must be convincingly demonstrated.
2.2.2.1. Deprivation of Liberty Without Existence of Sufficiently Precise Law
Before a person can be deprived of liberty, there must be the law regulating
this deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, this law must follow the principle of legal
certainty, meaning that it must be sufficiently precise to avoid the risk of
arbitrariness and to allow the person to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. For example, in
the case Medvedyev and others v. France, ECtHR found that the French authorities
had no jurisdiction to intercept Cambodian ship Winner on high seas. France argued
that it acted on basis of a diplomatic note from Cambodia, authorising French
authorities “to intercept, inspect and take legal actions against the ship”. However,
the court held that this diplomatic note:
1) was not sufficiently clear – court found that the text of the diplomatic note did
not allow to determine whether Cambodia authorised the deprivation of liberty
of the crew members of Winner and their transfer to France;

83

Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Judgment of 7 January 2010, ECtHR, paragraph 314.

41

2) did not meet requirement of foreseeability – court found that it is unreasonable
to contend that the crew of a ship on the high seas flying the Cambodian flag
could have foreseen that they might fall under French jurisdiction because of
the ad hoc agreement reached by France and Cambodia through the exchange
of diplomatic notes.84
Similarly, in the case of Baranowski v. Poland, ECtHR found the lack of legal basis
of the requisite quality for the deprivation of liberty of Mr. Baranowski – the person
charged with fraud. In this case, the Court established that Polish law had no precise
provisions in place that the detention order for a limited period at the investigation
stage can be prolonged at the stage of the court proceedings. Despite that, Mr.
Baranowski was kept in detention based on such an order at the stage of the court
proceedings.85
2.2.2.2. Deprivation of Liberty not in Conformity with Existing Law
Examples in the previous sub-chapter illustrate that there are two broad
groups of law which are of utmost importance in regards to deprivation of liberty:
laws which set the jurisdiction to carry out deprivation of liberty (jurisdictional rules)
and laws which set the procedure how deprivation of liberty should be carried out
(procedural rules). Where there is relevant law, it should be complied with.
The requirement to act in accordance with jurisdictional rules is rather
straightforward: no jurisdiction – no action. Consequently, if deprivation of liberty of
a person is carried out by the state which does not have jurisdiction to do so or by the
official who does not have jurisdiction to do so, this deprivation of liberty is
arbitrary. Case law reaffirms such a position.86 However, due to the complexity of
rules on jurisdiction, it may prove difficult to identify whether, in a particular
situation, a state or an official acted within the limits of their jurisdiction and,
consequently, whether there was, or was not, arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
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The requirement to act in accordance with procedural rules is less
straightforward, because case law indicates that not all procedural deficiencies render
a deprivation of liberty arbitrary, only serious deficiencies do. For example, in the
case of Voskuil v. the Netherlands, ECtHR found the violation of a right to liberty on
basis of procedural deficiency. In this case, it was established that national law of the
Netherlands did, in fact, provide for notification in writing of the detention order
within twenty-four hours, but Mr. Voskuil – a journalist detained on the ground of
refusing to give evidence – was provided with a written copy of the detention order
only some three days later.87
2.2.2.3. Deprivation of Liberty Without Existence of Recognised Ground
Art. 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 5(1)
of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 7(2) of the American
Convention on Human Rights and Art. 6 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights establish that a person may be deprived of liberty only on specific
recognised grounds. Types of allowed deprivation of liberty most relevant to be
observed for the purposes of this dissertation are:
1) deprivation of liberty after conviction;
2) deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal obligation;
3) preventive deprivation of liberty.
2.2.2.3.1. Deprivation of Liberty After Conviction
Art. 5(1)(a) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that no one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the case of “the lawful detention of a person
after conviction by a competent court”. Cases recognizing deprivation of liberty after
conviction as an exception to the right to liberty are, for example, Solmaz v. Turkey88
and Eriksen v. Norway89. This exception applies not only to final convictions but also
convictions which still can be appealed. For instance, in the case of Solmaz v. Turkey
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ECtHR stated that a detention of a person convicted at first instance, whether or not
he has been detained up to this moment, falls under exception “deprivation of liberty
after conviction”.90 Although deprivation of liberty after conviction, in principle, is
recognised as non-arbitrary, to avoid being branded as arbitrary, deprivation of
liberty after conviction, still, should satisfy two important conditions.
First, deprivation of liberty on pure basis of conviction is acceptable only
when a punishment imposed by this conviction also involves a deprivation of
liberty.91 Secondly, the conviction may not be the result of flagrant denial of
justice.92 This condition is very closely linked with the right to fair trial, which will
be analysed later. If the trial has not been fair, there is a greater possibility that also
conviction is not fair, and subsequent deprivation of liberty on basis of this
conviction is arbitrary. However, it must be kept in mind that when judging fairness
of the deprivation of liberty after conviction, human rights tribunals will not analyse,
in detail, all proceedings resulting in the conviction. They will look only for
proceedings which are manifestly contrary to the principles embodied in the right to
fair trial, or, in other words, for “flagrant” denial of justice. Whether or not there has
been “flagrant” denial of justice, the courts will evaluate on a case by case basis. As
an example of flagrant denial of justice can be mentioned conviction based on
criminal proceedings held in absentia, without any indication that the accused has
waived the right to be present during the trial.93
2.2.2.3.2. Deprivation of Liberty for Non-Compliance with a Legal Obligation
Art. 5(1)(b) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that no one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the case of “the lawful arrest or detention of a
person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the
fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law”. In short, this exception to the right to
liberty can be named “deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal
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obligation”. Cases recognizing this exception to the right to liberty are, for example,
Ciulla v. Italy94 and Beiere v. Latvia95.
It is obvious from the mere text of the above-mentioned rule that there is
basis for the deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal obligation only
when there exists particular unfulfilled legal obligation, for instance, obligation to
undergo a blood test ordered by a court or obligation to observe residence
restrictions. However, similarly as the exception “deprivation of liberty after
conviction”, the exception “deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal
obligation” is not unconditional.
First, the legal obligation for fulfilment of which a person is deprived of
liberty should be of a specific and concrete nature.96 Secondly, prior to the
deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal obligation, a person must have
had an opportunity to comply with respective obligation and failed to do so.97
Thirdly, deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal obligation should be
necessary. In other words, the deprivation of liberty will be non-arbitrary (justified)
only if fulfilment of an obligation in question cannot be achieved by milder means.98
Fourthly, deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal obligation should be
proportional stricto sensu. It means that for determining whether deprivation of
liberty in a particular situation was not arbitrary, it is necessary to assess whether the
balance between the public interest in complying with the obligation and the private
interest in staying free has been met.99 Fifthly, deprivation of liberty for noncompliance with a legal obligation must be carried out merely for the purpose of
securing fulfilment of this particular legal obligation. It means that the deprivation of
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liberty in this case cannot be punitive in character and, if it is relevant, a person
should be released as soon as the respective legal obligation is fulfilled.100
2.2.2.3.3. Preventive Deprivation of Liberty
Art. 5(1)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that no one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the case of “the lawful arrest or detention of a
person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority
on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having
done so”. In short, this exception to the right to liberty can be named “preventive
deprivation of liberty”. Types of acceptable reasons for the preventive deprivation of
liberty most relevant to be observed for the purposes of this dissertation are:
1) the risk that the accused will fail to appear for trial (danger of absconding);
2) the risk that the accused will take action to obstruct the proceedings.
Risk that the accused will fail to appear for trial (danger of absconding)
The purpose of the deprivation of liberty on grounds of the danger of
absconding is obvious – to secure appearance of a person for trial. However, this is a
distant purpose. The more operational purpose of this type of deprivation of liberty is
simply to further the investigation, for example, by questioning a suspect.
Consequently, arbitrariness or non-arbitrariness of particular deprivation of liberty is
not dependant on whether a person ultimately is tried or not. Even if a person,
ultimately, is not tried, inter alia, when later, as a result of investigation, it turns out
that the person is not guilty, particular preventive deprivation of liberty still might
had been justified. It is not, however, justified under the conditions described below.
First, preventive deprivation of liberty on grounds of the danger of
absconding will be arbitrary if it is applied without existence of reasonable suspicion
that a person has committed a particular offence. Whether the suspicion is
“reasonable” will depend upon all the circumstances of the case in question. Case
100
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law gives general guidelines in this respect. For example, in the case of Erdagoz v.
Turkey ECtHR stated:
[...] facts which raise a suspicion need not be of the same level as those necessary to justify a
conviction or even the bringing of a charge, which comes at the next stage of the process of
criminal investigation [...] However, for there to be reasonable suspicion there must be facts
or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may
have committed an offence.101

Secondly, preventive deprivation of liberty on grounds of the danger of
absconding will be arbitrary if it is not necessary under the circumstances in
question. It means that the authorities, when deciding on the respective deprivation
of liberty, are obliged to consider alternative measures. If another, less stringent,
measure (for example, conditional bail) is sufficient for furthering the investigation
and, ultimately, bringing the person before trial and this less stringent measure is not
applied, particular deprivation of liberty has strong potential to be recognised as
arbitrary. For instance, in the case of Jarzynski v. Poland ECtHR established that Mr.
Jarzynski – suspect on several counts of armed robbery – was held in preventive
deprivation of liberty for over 6 years and 3 months. Yet, relevant decisions did not
contain any information on why the authorities considered that other preventive
measures would not have ensured the appearance of Mr. Jarzynski before the court.
Nor did they mention any factor indicating that there was a real risk of absconding.
Consequently, ECtHR held that the right to liberty of Mr. Jarzynski had been
violated.102
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Always, when the necessity of the deprivation of liberty on grounds of the
danger of absconding is assessed, it is important to take into consideration factors
related to the individual person in question, such as his character, morals, home,
occupation, assets, family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which he is
being prosecuted. These and other more formal factors (like severity of the offence
and level of suspicion that the person has indeed committed the offence) should be
assessed in their entirety. For example, in the case of Becciev v. Moldova ECtHR
found that Moldavian domestic courts when deciding on deprivation of liberty of Mr.
Becciev – suspect on charges of embezzlement – did not take into consideration good
character of Mr. Becciev, his lack of criminal record, the fact that he had not
obstructed the investigation in any way, the fact that many reputable persons were
prepared to offer guarantees to secure his release and the fact that he, himself, was
ready to give up his passport as an assurance that he would not leave the country.
Under such circumstances, ECtHR concluded that there had been violation of the
right to liberty of Mr. Becciev.103 The fact that authorities should assess all relevant
factors in their entirety, inter alia, means that the mere severity of charges does not
give rise to the danger of absconding.104 Also, serious indication of guilt, by itself,
does not justify preventive deprivation of liberty.105
Thirdly, preventive deprivation of liberty on grounds of the danger of
absconding will be arbitrary if it is not stricto sensu proportional measure under the
circumstances in question. This idea is clearly expressed, for instance, in the
judgment of the case of Lopez-Alvarez v. Honduras:
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The legitimacy of the preventive detention does not arise only from the fact that the law
allows its application under certain general hypotheses. The adoption of this precautionary
measure requires a judgment of proportionality between said measure, the evidence to issue
it, and the facts under investigation. If the proportionality does not exist, the measure will be
arbitrary.106

Deprivation of liberty may be a disproportionate measure in different aspects. Two
important aspects worthy of mention are: severity of an offence in question and
length of the deprivation of liberty. Regarding severity of an offence in question,
case law has stated that it is disproportionate to apply preventive deprivation of
liberty on grounds of the danger of absconding in relation to relatively minor
offences.107 It has also explicitly stated that respective measure may not be applied in
any other context as criminal proceedings.108 Regarding the length of the deprivation
of liberty, case law has stated that, in principle, any deprivation of liberty on grounds
of the danger of absconding, no matter how long, is presumed to be non-arbitrary if it
is carried out pursuant to a court order.109 However, there always comes a point in
time when deprivation of liberty becomes unreasonably long. When this point in time
is reached, a person must be released.110 Whether or not the period of deprivation of
liberty is reasonable must be assessed in each case separately.111 An important factor
to be assessed in this regard is who can be considered to be responsible for delays in
investigation. If a state can show that delays in investigation were caused by the
person deprived of liberty himself or by any other factors that do not engage the
state’s responsibility, even a relatively long period of deprivation of liberty might be
recognised as reasonable.112
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Due care must be taken not only in deciding whether the deprivation of
liberty on grounds of the danger of absconding is a necessary and proportional
measure in the circumstances in question. In cases when it is decided to release the
person on bail, due care must be taken, also, in fixing an appropriate amount for bail.
Bail must be fixed by reference to the assets of a person deprived of liberty and his
relationship with the persons who are to provide security, in other words to a degree
of confidence that is possible that the prospect of loss of security or of action against
the guarantors in case of his non-appearance at the trial will act as a sufficient
deterrent to dispel any wish on his part to abscond.113
Risk that the accused will take action to obstruct the proceedings
General tests of necessity and proportionality are applicable, also, in regards
to the preventive deprivation of liberty based on the risk of obstruction of the
proceedings. Furthermore, authorities cannot rely upon this basis in abstracto; it has
to be supported by factual evidence.114
2.2.2.3.4. Civil Claim – Unjustified Ground for a Deprivation of Liberty
Human rights instruments do not contain a list of all specific cases in which
deprivation of liberty is prohibited. It is not necessary (and perhaps not even
possible) to give such a list. As it is evident from previous sub-chapters, instead,
human rights instruments approach the issue from the other end – they name only
exceptional cases in which deprivation of liberty is allowed. Any deprivation of
liberty which does not fall under recognised exceptions is not allowed.
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However, some of the human rights instruments contain rules which identify
one specific case from this “unwritten list” of cases in which deprivation of liberty is
prohibited. Thus, Art. 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states: “No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a
contractual obligation”. Art. 7(7) of the American Convention on Human Rights
states: “No one shall be detained for debt. [...]”. These rules clearly indicate that it is
not proportional to deprive person from liberty in relation to civil claims. Inclusion
of the above mentioned rules in human rights instruments points to the fact that
drafters of these instruments considered that, in practice, there is a rather high risk of
deprivation of liberty in relation to civil claims and drafters wanted to make it
absolutely clear that such practice violates human rights.115
2.2.2.4. Deprivation of Liberty Without Convincingly Demonstrating Its
Justification
For deprivation of liberty not to be arbitrary, it is not enough that this
deprivation of liberty is, in principle, justified (based on recognised grounds). In
addition, respective justification must be convincingly demonstrated by the
authorities, because only by giving reasoned decision there can be public scrutiny of
the administration of justice.116 Such cases as Idalov v. Russia117 Tase v. Romania118
and Gudiel Alvarez et al. v. Guatemala119 show that, unfortunately, authorities very
often fail to follow this obligation – reasons for deprivation of liberty in their
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decisions are limited to standard phrases from national law on criminal procedures,
without explaining how they apply in the case in question.120
2.2.3. Violation of the Right to Liberty: Failure to Provide Required Guarantees
for Persons Deprived of Liberty
As it was already stated above, human rights instruments not only forbid
arbitrary deprivation of liberty but also set a number of guarantees for persons
deprived of liberty – to give additional safeguards against arbitrariness. These
guarantees are:
1) right to be informed on the reasons for deprivation of liberty and charges;
2) right to automatic judicial review of deprivation of liberty;
3) right to actively seek a judicial review of deprivation of liberty.
2.2.3.1. Right to Be Informed on the Reasons for Deprivation of Liberty and
Charges
Art. 9(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
“Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for
his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.” Art. 5(2) of
the European Convention on Human Rights and Art. 7(4) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, in essence, repeat Art. 9(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
There have been some cases when human rights tribunals have found that the
authorities have failed to give to the person deprived of liberty any information about
the reasons for his deprivation of liberty and charges against him.121 More often,
however, authorities provide some information but not properly. For “proper
informing”, the below introduced conditions should be met.
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First, information on the reasons for the deprivation of liberty of a particular
person and any charges against him must be provided to this person himself or his
representative. In other words, presumption of receipt of the information is not
sufficient.122
Secondly, a person deprived of liberty should be informed of the reasons of
his deprivation of liberty and any charges against him “promptly”. Requirement of
promptness will be satisfied where the person deprived of liberty is informed about
the reasons of his deprivation of liberty within a few hours after the fact of
deprivation of liberty.123 Information on charges must be given to the person as soon
as this person has been formally charged.124
Thirdly, information on the reasons for the deprivation of liberty shall include
essential legal and factual grounds for the deprivation of liberty of a particular
person.125 Concerning the charges, a person must be informed in detail.126
Fourthly, a person deprived of liberty should be provided with the
information on reasons for his deprivation of liberty and charges against him in a
language which this person understands. It means not only that the information
should be provided in English, Spanish, French or any other language which the
person understands, but also that the information should be told in simple, nontechnical language.127
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2.2.3.2. Right to Automatic Judicial Review of Deprivation of Liberty
Art. 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power [...]”. Art. 5(3)
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Art. 7(5) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, in essence, repeat Art. 9(3) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The first thing to note in regards to the above-mentioned legal norms is that
they require automatic bringing of a person deprived of liberty before a competent
legal authority for judicial review of his deprivation of liberty. Automatic judicial
review means that this review cannot be made dependant on a previous application of
a person deprived of liberty.128
Competent legal authority, before which a person deprived of liberty is
brought for an automatic judicial review of his deprivation of liberty, must satisfy
certain conditions. First, it must have power to make a binding order for the release
of the person deprived of liberty.129 Secondly, it must be independent of the
executive and of the parties.130
A person deprived of his liberty must be brought before a competent legal
authority for judicial review of his deprivation of liberty promptly. Case law has
defined the limits of promptness rather strictly – any period in excess of 4 days is
prima facie too long.131 Also shorter periods might be recognised as not satisfying
the requirement of promptness if there are no special difficulties or exceptional
circumstances preventing the authorities from bringing the person deprived of liberty
before a competent legal authority sooner.132 Some exceptional circumstances may
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justify bringing of a person for automatic judicial review of his deprivation of liberty
more than four days after the deprivation of liberty. One of such “exceptional
circumstances” which justifies delay is directly linked to the maritime domain,
namely, deprivation of liberty at sea, far away from coast, which makes it materially
impossible to bring the crew “physically” before competent legal authority within the
required four-day period.133 At the same time, authorities must keep in mind that in
cases when deprivation of liberty takes place at sea, far away from coast, and
therefore a person is not brought before competent legal authority for judicial review
of his deprivation of liberty within the required four-day period, nothing justifies any
further delays once the person finally is transferred ashore.134
Competent legal authority before which a person deprived of liberty is
brought must review merits of the particular deprivation of liberty: whether it is
lawful and whether it falls within the permitted exceptions from the right to liberty.
In other words, the competent legal authority must examine circumstances militating
for or against deprivation of liberty.135
Before taking the decision on whether the deprivation of liberty in a
particular case has been justified, competent legal authority must hear the individual
deprived of liberty in person.136 There is no positive duty during this hearing to
secure legal assistance to a person deprived of liberty. However, there is negative
obligation not to hinder effective assistance from lawyers, because such hindrance
can adversely affect the ability of a person deprived of liberty to present his case and
with that violate the principle of “equality of arms”.137
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2.2.3.3. Right to Actively Seek a Judicial Review of Deprivation of Liberty
Art. 9(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
“Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.” Art.
5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Art. 7(6) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, in essence, repeat Art. 9(4) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In simpler language, it can be said that the
above-mentioned rules secure the right of the person deprived of liberty to actively
seek a judicial review of his deprivation of liberty. In a number of legal systems this
action is known as habeas corpus.
Right to actively seek judicial review of deprivation of liberty has many
similarities to the right to automatic judicial review of deprivation of liberty.
However, there are also important differences between these two types of judicial
review. The first difference is rather obvious: one judicial review is automatic, but
the other judicial review follows after an active action of a person deprived of liberty
(after his relevant application).
Secondly, automatic judicial review should be carried out “promptly”, but
review after the application must be carried out “speedily”/“without delay”. Case law
has stated that the notions of “speedily” and “without delay” indicate a lesser
urgency than that of “promptly”.138 While courts have set a rather strict baseline for
the “promptness” requirement (four days are considered prima facie too long), there
is no such strict baseline for a “speediness” and “without delay” requirements.
However, case law points to some specific time limits also in relation to these
requirements. For example, in the case of Mamedova v. Russia ECtHR found a
period of 26 days incompatible with the notion of speediness139, in the case of Tibi v.
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Ecuador – 21 days140, in the case of Kadem v. Malta – 17 days141. In any case,
administrative difficulties (such as excessive workload or vocation period) on the
side of the state may not serve as an excuse for not following the “speediness” and
“without delay” requirements.142
Thirdly, although matters which should be reviewed in the case of the review
after an application, in general, are the same as in the case of automatic review
(whether particular deprivation of liberty is lawful and whether it falls within the
permitted exceptions from the right to liberty), it must be kept in mind that factual
circumstances which determine whether deprivation of liberty is justified are subject
to change with the passing of time. Thus, deprivation of liberty which was justified at
the initial stages of investigation may become unjustified later:
•

grounds for deprivation of liberty may disappear altogether (asking for
unconditional release);

•

risks associated with the release may decrease (asking for replacement of
deprivation of liberty with less stringent measures);

•

period of deprivation of liberty may become unreasonable (also asking for
replacement of deprivation of liberty with less stringent measures).

Because of all these above-mentioned possible changes to the circumstances in
question, states are under obligation to give an opportunity to a person deprived of
liberty his deprivation of liberty to be reviewed not only once, but regularly, at
reasonable intervals. There is no strict answer to the question of what length of such
intervals between reviews is “reasonable”. However, case law has noted that these
intervals must be short.143 Moreover, this regular review of deprivation of liberty
cannot be only formal. With the passing of time, the courts’ reasoning must evolve
to reflect the developing situation and to verify whether the earlier-given grounds for
the deprivation of liberty remain valid at the advanced stage of the proceedings.144
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2.3. Right to Be Free from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment
Art. 5 of UDHR states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment [...]”. Art. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 4 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 5(2) of the American
Convention on Human Rights and Art. 5 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, in essence, repeat Art. 5 of UDHR.
Although all main human rights instruments establish the right to be free
from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, none of these
instruments defines “torture”, “cruel treatment”, “inhuman treatment” or “degrading
treatment”. A conventional explanation is that human rights instruments use these
different terms just to distinguish the severity of suffering caused by particular
treatment.145 Yet, there are also scholars, institutions and judges who disagree with
this explanation.146 Consequently, it can be concluded that the question, actually, is
not decided and, therefore, no one can be absolutely sure exactly what form of
forbidden treatment has taken place in any given situation.
Nevertheless, as Evans has stated, it is possibly a mistake to focus too much
on the issue of where, exactly, borders lie between torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment, because all of the above-mentioned treatment is simply illtreatment or mistreatment which constitutes the violation of human rights.147 More
importantly is to establish the “entry threshold” – the point at which ill-treatment can
be considered at least degrading, because ill-treatment which is not at least degrading
does not constitute the violation of human rights.
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Unfortunately, there are basically no binding international or regional
standards which would outlaw any particular practice of treatment of persons.
Consequently, for determining whether specific treatment of a person has been at
least degrading, courts simply assess the cumulative effect of the conditions on the
particular person. In the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom ECtHR stated:
[…] ill-treatment must attain a certain minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the
scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its
physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim,
etc.148

In other words, courts have broad scope of discretion in determination which
treatment is at least degrading and which is not. Obviously, such discretion of courts
leads to uncertainty; in fact, it allows courts to shape the boundaries of lawful and
unlawful treatment.
For the purposes of this dissertation, the treatment of persons deprived of
their liberty (in one word “prisoners”, both untried and convicted) is of particular
interest. Also in regards to the treatment of this group of people there are basically no
binding international or regional standards which would outlaw any particular
practice. Yet, there are legal instruments which can help to identify the treatment
which most probably will be recognized by human rights tribunals as a violation of
the human rights of a prisoner. These instruments are relevant case law of ECtHR
and IACtHR as well as relevant “soft law”, for example, UN Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (hereinafter – Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners)149. Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, although not a binding
instrument, are highly recognized as “reliable benchmarks as to minimal
international standards for the humane treatment of prisoners”.150 These rules cover
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such areas as: accommodation151; personal hygiene, bedding and clothing152; food153;
exercise and work154; medical care155; discipline and punishment156; contact with the
outside world157; religion158 and removal of a prisoner to or from an institution159.160
The above-mentioned rules, and examples of their violation, clarify what
exactly constitutes unlawful ill-treatment of prisoners. However, these rules, and
examples of their violation, cover just one aspect of the right to be free from torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment – a substantial aspect of this right.
The right also has a procedural aspect. Even if unlawful ill-treatment, as such, has
not occurred, in particular circumstances (if a state fails to carry out effective
investigation of the allegation of ill-treatment), it may still be concluded that the
human right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
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has been violated.161 Effective investigation is investigation which is independent,
impartial, thorough and prompt. For example, in the case of Ahmed Duran v. Turkey
ECtHR noted that the investigation cannot be considered as effective in the case
when the first steps to pursue investigation are taken just seven months after
receiving the complaint, and, ultimately, the prosecutor refuses to prosecute illtreatment relying completely on the validity of deficient medical reports.162

2.4. Right to Be Free from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment
2.4.1. Introduction
Art. 5 of UDHR, Art. 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 4 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 5(2) of the American Convention
on Human Rights and Art. 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
safeguard not only against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (as described in
Sub-chapter 2.3 above) but also against cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
Despite the fact that human rights instruments talk about treatment and punishment
parallel to each other, punishment actually forms part of the broader concept of
treatment.163 It means, inter alia, that, similarly as in regards to treatment, in regards
to punishment, the most important thing to do for identification of human rights
violations is to establish the “entry threshold” – the point at which punishment can be
considered at least degrading.
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Unfortunately, establishment of this “entry threshold” in very large extent is
left to the discretion of individual states. There is no “International Criminal Code”.
Also, relevant case law of human rights tribunals is very limited. There is some case
law outlawing extremely harsh forms of punishment, for example, irreducible life
imprisonment164 and imprisonment under continuous solitary confinement165.
However, apart from these extremes, human rights tribunals stick to the position that
specific penal systems of particular states are outside the scope of their supervision,
because issues relating to just and proportionate punishment are the subject of
rational debate and civilised disagreement.166
Such a very passive position of human rights tribunals regarding punishmentrelated issues is understandable. Disagreements on respective issues, indeed, are
rather wide – it is evident from different national laws and practices, as well as from
scholarly literature. Nevertheless, in the opinion of this author, the position of human
rights tribunals is not fully justified, because, despite the above-mentioned
disagreements, there are still punishment-related rules regarding which a sufficient
degree of consensus exists. These “rules” are general principles of punishment.167
Consequently, general principles of punishment can be utilised for determining
punishment which is at least degrading. In other words, these principles can be
treated as extended hands of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment.
General principles of punishment can be organised around two significant
questions: the question of liability (to whom punishment can be applied) and the
question of amount (how severe punishment can be imposed). Also this sub-chapter
is further organised around these two significant questions.
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2.4.2. General Principles for Determining Criminal Liability
2.4.2.1. Introduction
Criminal liability is the most severe form of liability which brings with it a
high degree of suffering, like infringements to liberty and reputation. Therefore, it is
worth noting already at the very beginning that the good old and very important
principle which must be kept in mind by those who make decisions on
criminalisation of particular conducts is that application of criminal liability should
be kept to an irreducible minimum. It should be imposed only for serious offences,
for which other, milder forms of intervention, such as administrative or civil liability,
are not sufficient.168 Criminal liability should be kept to an irreducible minimum not
only to save people from a high degree of suffering, but also to maintain the high
authority of criminal law and, consequently, high respect towards it. If too many
offences are made criminal, the value or moral force of criminal law diminishes.169
Also the effectiveness or physical force of criminal law might suffer in such a case
because, if too many offences are made criminal, resources of police, prosecution
and courts are wastefully diverted from the central insecurities of our life, like
robbery, burglary, rape, assault, and governmental corruption.170 Even human rights
tribunals have indirectly referred to the principle that criminal liability should be kept
to an irreducible minimum. For example, in the case Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy – a
case in which the liability of doctors for the death of a new-born child was
considered – ECtHR noted: “[...] if the infringement […] is not caused intentionally,
the positive obligation […] to set up an effective judicial system does not necessarily
require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case.”171
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Another very important principle is the principle of legality of criminal
offences and penalties (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) (hereinafter – principle
of legality). Principle of legality is firmly established also in the international and
regional human rights instruments.172 This principle dictates that only the law can
define a crime and prescribe a penalty. Thus, a person may not be accused and
convicted under law which is not yet in force at the time of a conduct or law which is
no longer in force at the time of a conduct. Similarly, a person may not be accused
and convicted under “general principles” or insufficiently clear law. The standard is
not that concrete facts giving rise to criminal liability should be set out in detail in
the law. What are required are the same qualities of law as in regards to other human
rights: that the law is accessible and foreseeable.173 In case of ambiguity the rule of
lenity must be applied, what means where two reasonable interpretations of a law
exist, one inculpating and the other exculpating a person, a less harsh reading must
be employed. In other words, the law shall be interpreted in favour of the person
accused or convicted. Likewise, a person may not be accused and convicted by
applying law by analogy.174
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Apart from the above-described principle that criminal liability should be
kept to an irreducible minimum and the principle of legality, another important
principle is that criminal liability should not be applied if corpus delicti of a
particular crime is not present. Corpus delicti is the totality of the required elements
of the crime. If any of the required elements of the crime is lacking, there is no
corpus delicti and there is no crime. Elements of a crime are objective (physical,
external) and subjective (mental, fault). Objective elements characterise the outer
display of a crime (conduct itself and state of affairs). Subjective elements
characterise the inner mental state (state of mind) of a person at the time of the
conduct. In a number of jurisdictions, the Latin term actus reus (guilty act) is used to
describe objective elements of a crime and the Latin term mens rea (guilty mind) is
used to describe subjective elements of a crime. Furthermore, criminal liability can
be applied only when actus reus and mens rea are contemporaneous. This subchapter further analyses, in detail, different objective and subjective elements of a
crime. At the end of the sub-chapter, strict liability and defence of necessity are
addressed separately.
Before moving on to the analysis of the different objective and subjective
elements of a crime, one more very important note should be made here. Standard of
proof for criminal liability is a proof beyond a reasonable doubt.175 It means that a
person may not be held liable for a particular crime if all elements of this crime are
not proven to the extent that there could be no “reasonable doubt” in the mind of a
“reasonable person” that the accused person is guilty. As Gardner and Anderson have
put it:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt means that it is not enough to prove that it was more likely
than not that an element of the crime was true. The proof must be such that a reasonable
person could not conclude the element was not true.176
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It is difficult to put a valid numerical value on the probability that a person really
committed the crime, but scholars who do assign a numerical value generally say that
“beyond a reasonable doubt” means at least 91% certainty of guilt.177
2.4.2.2. Objective Element “Act”
An “act” is the objective element of any crime. Term “act” in relation to
criminal liability must be understood in a wide sense, embracing not only acts strictly
speaking, but also omissions. An act strictly speaking is the active conduct of a
person: physical action (bodily movement), such as beating, shooting or steering, as
well as verbal action such as threatening, insulting or inviting. An omission is the
passive conduct of a person by not fulfilling his obligations.178 To embrace both
terms – “act” and “omission” – this dissertation uses the term “conduct” from hereon.
2.4.2.3. Objective Element “Harm”
A crime from its objective side can be defined by the conduct alone (such
crimes are known as “conduct crimes”179). However, very often, crimes are defined
by harm – negative consequences caused by a conduct (such crimes are known as
“result crimes”180). Harm might be of a different kind, for example, death, bodily
injury, economic loss or environmental damage. If a particular crime is defined by
some kind of harm, then also this harm is an objective element of the crime.
Consequently, if a conduct has not resulted in the prerequisite harm, a person may
not be held liable for committing a particular crime.
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Philosophical discussion exists whether it is right to make criminal liability
dependant on harm caused by a conduct. On the one hand, many agree that harm is
only of marginal importance. They say that in principle the same antisocial conduct
(sin) of different persons may or may not result in particular harm merely due to bad
or good luck, but to make criminal liability dependent upon sheer luck is absurd and
shocks the common sense of justice.181 On the other hand, it is recognised: if to make
criminal liability dependent on a sin alone, then too many people will be exposed to
severe sanctions, and it will make more evil than good to society. Therefore some
compromise is necessary. The long standing compromise is to choose out for severe
sanctions (and, inter alia, for deterrence to others) those who actually have caused
great harm.182
2.4.2.4. Objective Element “Causation”
When the crime is defined by particular harm, criminal liability may not be
applied simply because there exists this harm and there exists the conduct which
potentially might have caused this harm. It must be proven that the conduct in
question, indeed, is the cause of the harm in question.183
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Criminal law distinguished between two forms of causation in regards to
conduct and harm: factual causation and legal causation. First of all, factual
causation must be established. For establishing this causation the so called “but for”
test is used, which means that “but for” the conduct, the harm would not have
occurred. The following question should be asked: had the person not carried out the
conduct, would the harm have happened? If the answer is “yes”, then the conduct is
not the factual cause of the harm. If the answer is “no”, then the conduct is the
factual cause of the harm. If by applying the “but for” test it is established that the
conduct is not the factual cause of the harm, examination of the causation can be
terminated here. If by applying the “but for” test it is established that the conduct is
the factual cause of the harm, legal causation must still be established.184 For
establishing legal causation, one must determine whether the conduct in question was
the proximate cause of the harm in question. It does not mean that the conduct of an
alleged offender should be the sole cause or the main cause of the harm in question.
However, it does mean that the conduct of an alleged offender should be more than
the minimum cause of the harm in question.185 Determination of legal causation, in
fact, is value judgment. Williams has stated:
When one has settled the question of but-for causation, the further test to be applied to the
but-for cause in order to qualify it for legal recognition is not a test of causation but a moral
reaction. The question is whether the result can fairly be said to be imputable to the
defendant. […] If the term ‘cause’ must be used, it can best be distinguished in this meaning
as the ‘imputable’ or ‘responsible’ or ‘blamable’ cause, to indicate the value-judgment
involved.186

As a general rule, an intervening cause (a happening that occurs after the initial
conduct and changes what would have been the outcome if it had flowed freely from
the initial conduct) breaks the chain of causation. It blocks the connection between
the initial conduct and the harm.187 In such case, it is almost impossible to prove that
it was exactly the initial conduct which caused the particular harm. However, the
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approach has never been so strict as to recognise absolutely any intervening event as
breaking the chain of causation. There have been cases when courts have said: if a
persons’ conduct mainly or substantially caused the accident it matters not that it
might have been avoided if the others had not been negligent. In other words, only if
the second (intervening) cause is so overwhelming as to make the original cause
merely part of the history can it be said that the harm does not flow from the original
cause.188 A typical example in this regard is where person A injures person B, who
then requires medical treatment, but the medical treatment provided is negligent,
what causes even greater harm to person B. It is recognised that in such a situation
medical negligence rarely will supervene to become an independent cause of the
harm rendering the act of person A “insignificant”.189 This example can be easily
associated with the situation when person A causes ship-source oil pollution, which
requires the response to this pollution from the side of coastal authorities, but the
response provided is improper, what causes even greater damage.
2.4.2.5. Other Objective Elements of a Crime
In addition to “act” and “harm”, a crime may be defined by other objective
elements, for instance, a particular territory where the conduct was carried out or
where the harm occurred, a particular period of time when it happened, particular
circumstances in which it happened or particular methods and tools used to carry out
the conduct. As Allen has stated:
The term actus reus has a much wider meaning than the ‘act’ prohibited by the law which it
implies. A useful working definition is that it comprises all the elements of the definition of
the offence except those which relate to the mental element (mens rea) required on the part of
the accused.190

If these other specific objective elements are included in the definition of a crime,
elements other than simply “act” or “harm”, they must, also, be proven before a
person can be held liable for committing a particular crime.
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2.4.2.6. Subjective Element “Intent”
Three broad groups of mental state which potentially can form the basis for
criminal liability can be distinguished: intent, recklessness and gross negligence.
From the perspective of culpability, these mental states stand in hierarchical
relationships: intent is associated with the most serious level of culpability; gross
negligence – with the least serious level of culpability. Intent, as the mental state
associated with the most serious level of culpability, is unanimously admitted as the
basis for criminal liability.
In ordinary language, the word “intent” is used when somebody sets out to
achieve something. In criminal law as well “intent” is used in this sense; however, it
is also used to describe cases when a person, strictly speaking, does not set out to
achieve something, but merely foresees, though unwanted, the outcome.191 In other
words, in criminal law two types of intent exist: direct intent and indirect intent.
Direct intent, known also as “specific intent” or “desire-intent”, is present when a
person foresees negative consequences of his conduct and wants these consequences.
Indirect intent, known also as “oblique intent” or “general intent”, is present when a
person foreseeing the negative consequences of his conduct, does not want these
consequences as an end yet knowingly allows them.192
If only intent, and no other form of mental state, is required by law as a
precondition for criminal liability in relation to a particular conduct, then without
proving intent on his side a person cannot be held criminally liable for the particular
conduct. If the law also recognises other forms of mental state as the basis for
criminal liability for a particular conduct, the presence of these other forms of mental
state must be examined in addition.
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2.4.2.7. Subjective Element “Recklessness”
Recklessness is present when a person foresees the possibility of negative
consequences of his conduct, yet thoughtlessly trusts that it will be possible to avert
these consequences. In other words, recklessness can be described as acting with
unjustified confidence or as wittingly flying in the face of an unjustified risk.193
In this description of recklessness special attention should be paid to the word
“unjustified”. It points to the fact that, if the risk one takes is justified (reasonable),
conduct is not reckless even if actual consequences of this conduct ultimately are
negative. Whether taking a risk is justifiable depends on a balancing of the social
utility, or value, of the activity involved against the probability and gravity of harm
which might be caused. For example, dangerous surgical operations are inevitably
accompanied by risks, yet social interests – interests of the life and health of the
patient – justify taking these risks.194 Similarly, particular response measures applied
after ship-source oil pollution accidents are inevitably accompanied by risks, yet
social interests – interests of the safety of a crew as well as the clean environment –
justify taking these risks, particularly if these risks are taken by professionals, such as
seafarers themselves, relevant coastal authorities or reputable salvage companies. As
Sistare puts it:
Physicians perform risky surgical operations, police officers engage in risky car chases, pilots
make risky crash landings. In such cases risks taken are justifiable, and this is a crucial
consideration, as only risks which are unjustifiable warrant the attention of the law.195

There are different views on where, exactly, the border between indirect
intent and recklessness should be drawn. Some say that the term “intent” must be
used only in those situations when a person believes that negative consequences will
certainly occur, and that where their occurrence is merely thought likely to occur the
appropriate term to use is “recklessness”.196 Others say that the term “intent” must
also cover the situations when a person believes that the occurrence of negative
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consequences is likely, and that the term “recklessness” must be reserved only for
those situations when a person believes that the occurrence of negative consequences
is unlikely.197
Irrespective of which understanding of the terms “intent” and “recklessness”
one follows, in general, recklessness, similarly to intent, is a mental state of a person
which is highly recognised as the basis for criminal liability. Justification for such
recognition lays in the fact that in both cases the negative consequences of the
conduct are foreseen by the person.198
However, general recognition of recklessness as the basis for criminal
liability does not mean that it is always enough to prove recklessness for justifying
application of criminal liability. Law, in relation to a particular conduct, may
explicitly state that only intentional conduct is criminally punishable. Then, in
relation to this particular conduct recklessness lies outside the scope of criminal
liability. When for intentional conduct criminal liability may be applied but for
reckless conduct it may not be applied, the above-mentioned discussion on different
understandings of the terms “intent” and “recklessness” may become of vital
importance. Therefore, each national legal system, as well as international law, when
using the terms “intent” and “recklessness” in relation to particular offences, must
make clear what meaning, exactly, it gives to each of these terms.
2.4.2.8. Subjective Element “Gross Negligence”
Negligence is the failure to take reasonable precautions against harm,
unaccompanied either by intention to do harm or an appreciation of the risk of
harm.199 In other words, if the person had to foresee the potential harm of his conduct
and take precautions against such harm, if this person in principle had capacity to do
it, but due to carelessness did not do it – he acted negligently.
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Two broad degrees of negligence are distinguished: gross negligence and
something less (“ordinary”, “simple” or “civil” negligence).200 Negligence can be
said to be gross in two cases:
1) if the precautions to be taken against harm are very simple, such as persons
who are but poorly endowed with physical and mental capacities can easily
take201;
2) if a person does something which is obviously likely to cause harm in most
circumstances, even if precautions to be taken against harm are not simple or
are even non-existent202.
Traditional common law system did not impose liability for negligence (with
the exception of manslaughter).203 However, today, even in common law countries,
many agree that liability for negligent conducts should not be excluded completely –
that civil or administrative liability may be applied for such conducts.204 Regarding
criminal liability views differ. Some argue that criminal liability should never be
applied for negligent conducts.205 Others argue that only minor forms of negligence
(“ordinary”, “simple” or “civil” negligence) must be excluded from criminal liability,
but for gross negligence criminal liability in principle can be applied.206 The author
agrees with this last opinion.
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However, again, similar to the case of recklessness, general recognition of
gross negligence as the basis for criminal liability does not mean that it is always
enough to prove gross negligence for justifying application of criminal liability. Law,
in relation to a particular conduct, may explicitly state that only intentional conduct
or reckless conduct is criminally punishable. Then, in relation to this particular
conduct, gross negligence lies outside the scope of criminal liability.
2.4.2.9. Other Subjective Elements of a Crime
Similarly to the fact that the objective side of a particular crime may be
defined not only by “act” and “harm” but also by other objective elements, from the
subjective side a particular crime may be defined not only by intent, recklessness or
gross negligence but also by other subjective elements, for instance, specific aim,
specific motive or specific emotional condition. If these or other specific subjective
elements are included in the definition of a crime, they must also be proven before a
person can be held liable for committing a particular crime.
2.4.2.10. Strict Liability
The principle that criminal liability is dependent not only on particular
objective elements (actus reus or guilty act) but also on particular subjective
elements (mens rea or guilty mind), as encapsulated in the Latin maxim actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (the act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a
guilty mind), is treated as a hall-mark of a civilised legal system.207 Nevertheless,
law sometimes deviates from this principle. One such deviation is the concept of
strict liability.
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Strict liability is liability irrespective of guilt.208 In other words, when, by
law, a particular conduct is turned into a strict liability offence, for punishing a
person for this offence, it is not necessary to prove his guilty mind any more; it is
enough to prove only objective elements of the particular offence. Logically, if the
mental state of an alleged offender is not evaluated, there is a risk that punishment
will be imposed to persons not only for intentional, reckless or negligent conducts,
but also for reasonable mistakes and pure accidents.209
A number of arguments in favour of the application of strict liability can be
found. For instance, it has been argued that, as the mental state is something inside a
man, it is impossible, or at least very hard, to prove it.210 Indeed, despite the
developments in the forensic sciences – from fingerprinting to DNA sampling – the
ability to prove mental state remains as limited as it has always been. Short of
confessions, it is still dependant on inferences from the perpetrator’s outward
behaviour.211 By introducing strict liability, prosecution is simplified and evidential
problems allayed.212 Together with that, the risk that a guilty person will escape
justice diminishes.213
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However, there are strong arguments suggesting that there is more to lose
than to gain by the application of strict liability. What can be gained are some
utilitarian benefits. What can be lost are spiritual values of profound importance,
including compassion. Moreover, arguments in favour of strict liability, although in
principle are valid, at the same time, are not very persuasive. For instance,
difficulties of proof of mental state of a person indeed exist, but these difficulties are
possible to overcome. Legal theory and practice has developed relevant
techniques.214 After all, as Allen has stated, it is impossible to set proportional
sanction for the offence without knowing whether the offence was committed
intentionally, recklessly, negligently or without the presence of any of these mental
states. Thus, evaluation of subjective elements is necessary, anyway, if not at the
stage of setting liability then at the stage of setting specific punishment. And, if so,
[i]f penalties which truly reflect the offender’s culpability can only be determined by
thorough investigation and proof to the same standard required for conviction, there would
seem to be little reason for having strict liability offences.215

It is relatively highly recognised that strict liability can be applied for minor
offences.216 Minor offences might carry different names, for instance, “regulatory
offences”, “administrative offences” or “technical offences”. They also are often
labelled by jurists as “quasi-criminal” or “not criminal in any real sense”.217 Yet,
irrespective of the term used, what truly distinguishes minor offences from serious
offences is their comparatively little blameworthiness.
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Recognition of the application of strict liability for minor offences is in line
with the historical roots of the institution of strict liability. The institution of strict
liability is said to be the fruit of scientific and technological revolution which took
place at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. At that time
manufacturing grew rapidly. Together with this growth grew relative legal
relationships. One of the chosen mechanisms for controlling these relationships was
the creation of a separate group of offences for which persons could be convicted
irrespectively of their guilt (on a basis of strict liability). Such deviation from the
general principles of liability was justified by the aim to secure public health and
safety (public welfare). However, the argument of “public welfare” alone was not
seen as enough for applying strict liability. In addition, the offence for which strict
liability is to be applied needed to carry small penalty and little or no stigma
(blameworthiness). In other words, the offence needed to be a minor offence.218
Today, strict liability is applied not only for minor offences (quasi-criminal
offences), but also for some serious offences (truly criminal offences), for example,
dangerous driving or pollution.219 This proliferation of strict liability in the criminal
law has occasioned the vociferous, continued, and almost unanimous criticism of
scholars in law.220 For example, Sayre in this regard has stated:
To inflict substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely innocent, who caused
injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the feelings of the
community as to nullify its own enforcement.221

This author agrees with the respective criticism. Moreover, this author is of the
opinion that the application of strict liability is unacceptable not only for serious
offences, but also for minor offences. Those who support the application of strict
liability for minor offences justify their position by saying that what is lost by
applying strict liability for minor offences is insignificant as compared to what is lost
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by applying strict liability for serious offences.222 However, the true loss in both
cases is the same – those are already above-mentioned “spiritual values of profound
importance”. Just because an offence is minor does not nullify the moral protest not
to punish innocent people. Most probably because of this reason, there have always
been states which do not recognise the institution of strict liability, at all, for
example, Russia223 and Latvia224.
If one is still not convinced that application of strict liability is not fair
measure (neither in regards to serious offences, nor in regards to minor offences), no
less authority than ECtHR can be called upon to increase the confidence in the
rightness of this conclusion. Sub-chapter 2.5.4 below will show that ECtHR does not
recognise the institution of strict liability (neither for serious offences, nor for minor
offences), because this institution is in conflict with the human right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty in accordance with the law (presumption of innocence).
2.4.2.11. Defence of Necessity
Even when all elements of corpus delicti of a particular crime are formally
present, it might be true that there is no crime. For example, it is so when the conduct
is carried out in a specific situation – a situation of necessity. With necessity in
criminal law one must understand the situation in which a person causes harm to
some interests safeguarded by criminal law (carries out in abstracto forbidden
conduct) with the aim to prevent greater harm.225 This explanation clearly shows why
defence of necessity is also sometimes called a lesser evil defence.
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2.4.3. General Principles for Determining Sanction to Be Imposed for an Offence
Broadly speaking, there is only one principle which should be taken into
account when determining what specific sanction should be imposed for a particular
offence. This principle is proportionality. In regards to criminal sanctions, the
principle of proportionality is even directly incorporated into one of the regional
human rights instruments. Art. 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union states: “The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the
criminal offence”.
The problem is that the word “proportionate” is “more oracular than
instructive”.226 It is relatively easy to give a general theoretical definition of
proportionality. However, in practice, proportionality requires the balancing of
complicated quantitative and qualitative factors, including conflicting rights, values
and interests.227 Consequently, the simple reference to proportionality is not enough
for understanding, exactly, what sanction is appropriate to impose for a particular
offence; more detailed guidelines are necessary.
There have been suggestions to use a tripartite test for assessing
proportionality of a particular sanction. This test requires making three relatively
distinct types of comparison:
1) comparison of the single offence with the sanction for this offence;
2) comparison of the single offence and its sanction with other offences and
their sanctions in the same jurisdiction;
3) comparison of the single offence and its sanctions with the sanctions for the
same offence in other jurisdictions.228
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The test can be illustrated as follows:
World
State A

State B

Offence A

Sanction

Offence A

Sanction

Offence B

Sanction

Offence B

Sanction

Offence C

Sanction

Offence C

Sanction

Comparison 1

Comparison 2

Comparison 3

Figure 4 – Tripartite test of proportionality of sanctions.

Yet, all of the above-mentioned three types of comparison involve difficulties.
Comparison of the single offence with the sanction for this offence can be
easily associated with the ancient concept of “an eye for an eye”, meaning what the
person has done should be done to this person.229 Although at the first glance this
concept sounds straightforward, in fact, it is not so straightforward. First of all, the
“eye for an eye” maxim is simply inapplicable to most offences.230 For example, if
offender causes harm in the form of oil pollution along 100 km of shoreline, the
same harm cannot be imposed on the offender as punishment. Secondly, the “eye for
an eye” maxim ignores the question of culpability of an alleged offender –
consideration of which characterises a civilised legal system. Consequently, it can be
said that, today, legal systems should safeguard against “an eye for an eye” thinking,
rather than promote it. In short, within the civilised society, sanction for a particular
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offence must correspond not only to the offence as such (the harm done or risked),
but also to the offender (his level of culpability).231
However, there is no natural relationship between harm and culpability from
one side and punishment from the other side. In other words, the seriousness of an
offence forms one scale and severity of punishment another.232 Assessment of their
mutual proportionality would be like comparing apples with oranges. Consequently,
it has been argued that proportionality of a particular sanction can only be assessed
within a system of sanctions for different offences:
[...] what is required is not some ideally appropriate relationship between a single crime and
its punishment, but that on a scale of tariff of punishments and offences, punishments for
different crimes should be ‘proportionate’ to the relative wickedness or seriousness of the
crime. For though we cannot say how wicked any given offence is, perhaps we can say that
one is more wicked than another and we should express this ordinal relation in a
corresponding scale of penalties.233

Thus, for setting proportional sanctions, what becomes extremely important is the
existence of a unified scale of the relative seriousness of different offences. Yet,
development of such a scale meets with its own challenges.
The relative seriousness of an offence is determined by the same abovementioned two main elements: the degree of harmfulness of an offence and the
degree of culpability of an offender.234 Just in this case, these elements are compared
not with the sanction of a particular offence (“apple - orange” comparison) but with
the harmfulness and culpability involved in other offences (seemingly “apple apple” comparison). However, it is not always easy to say what is more harmful and
what is less harmful or in what circumstances a person is more guilty and in what
circumstances a person is less guilty.
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Regarding the degree of harmfulness of an offence, it is relatively easy to put
into scale of seriousness one type of harm, for example, different bodily injuries or
different amounts of money stolen. Only some types of harm might be problematic to
put into such a scale, for example, only highly competent experts on a case by case
basis can assess how “serious” is harm to the environment. The task becomes much
harder when one must put into a unified scale of seriousness different types of harm,
for example, bodily injury and harm to the environment. It, again, requires
comparing apples with oranges. The only broad agreement is that a person’s life
stands above everything. Regarding other types of harm, there is no broad agreement
on what is more harmful and what is less harmful.
Regarding degree of culpability of an offender, there exists a clear scale of
seriousness – from highest degree of culpability to lowest: direct intent, indirect
intent, recklessness, gross negligence, simple negligence. However, it must be kept
in mind that also within each of these broad concepts of culpability exist further
degrees of culpability.235 Moreover, concepts of intention, recklessness and
negligence do not exhaust the factors which do, and should, influence judgments of
culpability. In addition, these judgments should take into consideration the wide
range of volitional and situational factors, known also as aggravating and mitigating
factors.236
Even if one successfully develops the scale of relative harmfulness of
offences and the scale of relative culpability of offenders, the question still remains
of how to put together these scales and thus determine the ultimate relative
seriousness of a specific offence. In other words, it is not clear as to what is the
measure of seriousness between the objective harm and subjective culpability, for
instance, is negligent destroying of a city worth than intentional wounding of a single
person?237
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As a result of such uncertainties as introduced above, there is lack of
agreement on the seriousness of different offences. This lack of agreement on the
seriousness of different offences, inter alia, has been proven by several opinion
surveys.238 In other words, as Hart has put it:
It is true that for all social moralities certain major evaluations hold good. [...] But it is
sociologically very naive to think that there is [...] a single homogeneous social morality
whose mouthpiece the judge can be in fixing sentence. [...] Our society, whether we like it or
not, is morally a plural society [...]239

Our society is morally a plural society already within the borders of one state. It is
even more naive to think that there is a single homogeneous social morality
worldwide.240
All above-mentioned forces ask the question – is it possible to assess
proportionality of sanctions at all? Scholars have argued that grossly disproportionate
sanctions can be identified relatively easily. For example, Ashworth has stated:
[...] loose notions of equivalence [...] are unspecific in their central zones but [...] contain
outer limits. It is not lex talionis, which assumes a ‘natural’ equivalence between crime and
punishment, but a looser formula which excludes punishments which impose far greater
hardship on the offender than does the crime on victims and society in general.241

Also, human rights tribunals show readiness to identify those sanctions which are
grossly disproportionate. For example, in the case of Weeks v. the United Kingdom,
ECtHR commented that one could have serious doubts as to the compatibility with
the ‘right to be free from inhuman punishment’ the sentencing of a boy of 17 to life
imprisonment for robbery, having threatened the owner of a pet shop with an
unloaded starting pistol and stolen 35 pence.242 However, in general (beyond such
extremes as in the case of Weeks v. the United Kingdom), to identify disproportionate
sanctions, indeed, is very problematic. To identify such sanctions would be much
238
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easier if a common international standard of a fair penal liability and sanctioning
system existed.

2.5. Right to Fair Trial
2.5.1. Introduction
Art. 10 of UDHR states: “Everyone is entitled […] to a fair […] hearing
[…]”. Art. 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6(1)
of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8 of the American Convention
on Human Rights and Art. 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
in essence, repeat Art. 10 of UDHR. Human rights instruments also list a number of
specific trial-related rights. However, it is important to remember that respective lists
are not exhaustive; they contain just “minimum rights”, the observance of which is
not always sufficient to ensure the fairness of a trial.243 For example, despite the fact
that none of the human rights instruments explicitly refers to the right to duly
reasoned judgment, this right forms part of the general right to fair trial.244
Further on in this sub-chapter, specific rights under the fair trial umbrella
which are explicitly mentioned in human rights instruments are analysed in more
detail. Before that, one more clarification should be made. Despite the fact that the
right refers only to “hearing” or “trial”, where relevant, it is applicable also to pretrial proceedings, because this stage is of crucial importance for the preparation of
trial, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which
the offence charged will be considered.245
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2.5.2. Right to a Public Hearing
Art. 10 of UDHR establishes that everyone is entitled to a public hearing.
Right to a public hearing is incorporated also in Art. 14(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights, Art. 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union and Art. 8(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights.
Right to a public hearing obliges courts to hold an oral hearing of the case
without excluding the public (including the press) from this hearing. This obligation
also encompasses affiliated duties, such as to provide information on time and venue
of the oral hearing to the public and to provide adequate facilities for the attendance
of interested members of the public, within reasonable limits.246
Right to a public hearing is not absolute. Exceptions are permitted. However,
they are permitted only under particular circumstances which, themselves, are
defined in human rights instruments. In accordance with Art. 14(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8(5) of the American Convention on Human
Rights, as well as relevant case law, the public may be excluded from all or part of a
trial for the following reasons:
1) necessity to protect morals;
2) necessity to protect public order;
3) necessity to protect national security;
4) necessity to protect interests of the private life.
Even if there is a basis for closed proceedings and, consequently, proceedings
are not held in the presence of the public, any judgement shall still be made public.
There are also some exceptions to this rule. However, these exceptions are very
unlikely to be invoked in relation to the trial of a seafarer after a large-scale ship-
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source oil pollution accident, because they are related to the protection of juvenile
persons.247
2.5.3. Right to Be Tried by Competent, Independent and Impartial Tribunal
Established by Law
2.5.3.1. General Introduction to the Right to Be Tried by Competent,
Independent and Impartial Tribunal Established by Law
All international and regional human rights instruments require any case to be
heard by a tribunal. “Tribunal”, here, must be understood in a wide sense, similarly
as “judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power” in relation to
the right to liberty.248 However, different instruments embrace slightly different
requirements related to the qualities of the tribunal which may adjudicate the case:
•

UDHR – independent and impartial tribunal (Art. 10);

•

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law (Art. 14(1));

•

European Convention on Human Rights – independent and impartial tribunal
established by law (Art. 6(1));

•

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – independent and
impartial tribunal previously established by law (Art.47(2));

•

American Convention on Human Rights – competent, independent and
impartial tribunal previously established by law (Art. 8(1));

•

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights – impartial tribunal (Art.
7(1)(d).
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2.5.3.2. Requirement for a Tribunal to Be Established by Law
Requirement for a tribunal to be established by law means that, at least to a
certain degree, this tribunal is regulated by an act of parliament, which satisfies the
general requirements of precision and foreseeability.249 Case law has also clarified
that the phrase “established by law” covers not only the legislation concerning the
establishment and jurisdiction of a tribunal but, also, the composition of the bench in
each case.250
2.5.3.3. Requirement for a Tribunal to Be Competent
Only very few judgements of human rights tribunals have referred to the
requirement for a tribunal to be competent. These few judgments which do refer to
this requirement talk about “having competency” as – “having jurisdiction”.251 In
other words, under human rights instruments, the requirement for a tribunal to be
competent is not related to the ability of a judge, it is related only to the jurisdiction
of a tribunal.252
As stated above, the requirement for a tribunal to be competent is
incorporated only in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights. However, it does not mean that, under other
human rights instruments, it is acceptable to try persons by tribunals who have no
jurisdiction to do so. Simply, under these other human rights instruments, the
requirement for a tribunal to be competent is observed as an integrated part of the
requirement for a tribunal to be established by law.
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2.5.3.4. Requirement for a Tribunal to Be Independent
Case law has established that, when deciding whether a tribunal can be
considered “independent”, regard must be given, inter alia, to the manner of
appointment and dismissal of its members and to their terms of office, to the
existence of guarantees against outside pressures and to the question whether the
body presents an appearance of independence.253 One of the aspects of the
requirement for a tribunal to be independent is a lack of subordination of this tribunal
to any other organ of the state, in the sense of the doctrine of the separation of
powers. It is recognised that such factors as, for example, composition of the tribunal
of judges: whose tenure is for a limited period, whose salary may be reduced or who
can be dismissed without good cause, may infringe on the independence of the
tribunal.254 Another aspect of the requirement for a tribunal to be independent is
independence from private pressure groups.255
2.5.3.5. Requirement for a Tribunal to Be Impartial
Impartiality of a tribunal means the lack of prejudice or bias of this
tribunal.256 There are two tests for assessing whether a tribunal is impartial. The first,
a subjective test, seeks to determine whether the judge is not, in fact, a party to the
litigation and has not a financial interest in its outcome. The second, an objective
test, seeks to determine whether, when a judge is not, in fact, a party to the litigation
and does not have a financial interest in its outcome, his conduct or behaviour does
not raise suspicion that he is not impartial in some other way.257 According to case
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law, in order to satisfy the requirement for a tribunal to be impartial, the tribunal
must comply with both subjective and objective test.258 In applying the first test,
impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary. In
applying the second test, even appearances may be of a certain importance.259
Violations of the requirement for a tribunal to be impartial have been found in such
cases as Piersack v. Belgium260, Hauschildt v. Denmark261 and Rudnichenko v.
Ukraine262.
Human rights tribunals have addressed the requirement for a tribunal to be
impartial much more than the requirement for a tribunal to be independent. Perhaps it
is so because these two requirements actually overlap. If tribunal is not independent,
it is also not impartial, at least under objective test of impartiality. Consequently, it is
enough to talk only about impartiality of a tribunal.
2.5.4. Presumption of Innocence
Art. 11(1) of UDHR states: “Everyone charged with a penal offence has the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law [...]”. Art. 14(2) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6(2) of the European
Convention on Human Rights, Art. 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, Art. 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights and Art.
7(1)(b) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in principle, repeat
Art. 11(1) of UDHR.
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It means that public officials must refrain from saying or doing anything what
indicates that they believe a person is guilty of a criminal offence, unless guilt has
been proven. Whether a statement of a public official is in breach of the presumption
of innocence must be determined in the context of the particular circumstances in
which the impugned statement was made.263 For example, in the case of Allenet de
Ribemont v. France ECtHR found the violation of the presumption of innocence,
where shortly after the arrest of Mr. de Ribemont – suspect for murder of Mr. De
Broglie, a Member of French Parliament – a high-ranking police officer, addressing a
press conference, referred to Mr. de Ribemont, without any qualification or
reservation, as one of the instigators of the murder.264
Presumption of innocence is highly linked to the issue of burden of proof.
Eggleston has even stated:
‘Every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty’ is only another way
of saying that the burden of proof in a criminal case is on the prosecution.265

Observed together with the standard of proof for criminal liability – the standard
“beyond a reasonable doubt” – the statement of Eggleston means: if there is a
reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or defence,
as to whether the alleged offender is guilty, it must be concluded that prosecution has
not made out the case and the alleged offender is entitled to an acquittal.266 In other
words, in principle, all situations when prosecution is fully or partly relieved of its
burden of proof in a criminal case are in breach of presumption of innocence. Inter
alia, it means that also framing criminal offences as strict liability offences (when
prosecution is relieved from its burden to prove subjective elements of an offence) or
half-way house offences (when burden of proof of subjective elements of an offence
is shifted from prosecution to defence) is in breach of presumption of innocence.
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However, it must be kept in mind that presumption of innocence is not among
human rights from which derogation is never allowed. Thus, in some amount,
presumption of innocence may be sacrificed in favour of other legitimate objectives,
presumably also objectives which states pursue by introducing strict liability or halfway house offences in their penal systems.
Human rights tribunals have observed the issue of the interaction of
presumption of innocence with strict liability offences267 from the perspective of
presumptions of fact or of law. Indeed, strict liability can be easily associated with
the presumption of a fact that an alleged offender acted with a guilty mind. In the
case of Salabiaku v. France ECtHR noted:
Presumptions of fact or of law operate in every legal system. Clearly, the Convention does
not prohibit such presumptions in principle. It does, however, require the Contracting States
to remain within certain limits in this respect as regards criminal law. [...]
Article 6 para. 2 [...] does not therefore regard presumptions of fact or of law provided for in
criminal law with indifference. It requires States to confine them within reasonable limits
which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain right of the defence.

Requirement “to take into account the importance of what is at stake” basically
means that presumption of innocence cannot be sacrificed in regards to serious
offences, because a lot is at stake in such cases. Requirement “to maintain right of
the defence” basically means that, even when relatively little is at stake (as in cases
of minor offences), only the half-way house approach is acceptable.268
2.5.5. Right to Defence
Art. 11(1) of UDHR states that everyone charged with a penal offence must
be provided with the guarantees necessary for his defence. Similar very general
statements can be found in Art. 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union and Art. 7(1)(c) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights.
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Art. 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights lists
specific procedural rights. The same is done in Art. 6(3) of the European Convention
on Human Rights and Art. 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights. All
of these listed procedural rights are necessary for effective defence. Consequently, all
these procedural rights can be observed as a part of the wider concept of the right to
defence. Alternatively, they can be observed as separate rights themselves, what is
also done further on in this dissertation.
2.5.6. Right to Be Informed of Charges
Art. 14(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states: “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled […] to be informed of the […] charge against him.” Art. 6(3)(a) of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Art. 8(2)(b) of the American
Convention on Human Rights basically state the same. This right was already
analysed earlier (under the right to liberty), because, when a person is deprived of his
liberty within the proceedings, the right to be informed of charges is guaranteed not
only under the right to fair trial, but also under the right to liberty.
2.5.7. Right to Have Adequate Time and Facilities for the Preparation of Defence
Art. 14(3)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states: “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled […] to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
[…]”. Art. 6(3)(b) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Art. 8(2)(c) of
the American Convention on Human Rights basically state the same.
Right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence
means that the person charged of a criminal offence must be given the opportunity to
organise his defence in an appropriate way and without restriction as to the
possibility to put all relevant defence arguments before the trial court and thus to
influence the outcome of the proceedings. The issue of adequacy of time and
facilities afforded to an accused must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of
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each particular case.269 For example, in the case of Moiseyev v. Russia ECtHR found
that Mr. Moiseyev – person charged of having disclosed classified information to a
South Korean intelligence agency – was detained in extremely cramped conditions,
without adequate access to natural light and air or appropriate catering arrangements.
Consequently, he could not read or write. The suffering and frustration which Mr.
Moiseyev must have felt on account of the inhuman conditions of confinement,
undoubtedly, impaired his faculty of concentration. It excluded any possibility for the
advance preparation of defence.270
Right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence, inter
alia, includes the right to have adequate time and facilities to communicate with the
legal counsel. Art. 14(3)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights even makes special reference to this aspect of the right.
2.5.8. Right to Be Tried Without Undue Delay
Art. 14(3)(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states: “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled […] to be tried without undue delay”. The corresponding right is
incorporated, also, in Art. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art.
47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 8(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights and Art. 7(1)(d) of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The time frame which must be considered in relation to the right to be tried
without undue delay starts from the moment a person is charged and lasts until the
rendering of a judgment. “Until rendering of a judgment” indicates that the right to
be tried without undue delay relates, not only to the time by which a trial should
commence, but also the time by which it should end. Furthermore, “until rendering
of a judgment” means “until the final determination of the case”. Thus, appeal or
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cassation proceedings are also covered by the safeguard and, consequently, must be
carried out without undue delay.271
Another important question to be asked in relation to the right to be tried
without undue delay is the question – What constitutes “undue delay”? In other
words – How long is too long? ECtHR and IACtHR construct the answer to this
question slightly differently. Case law of ECtHR does not set any strictly-defined
quantitative standard saying that after a particular period (“reasonable time”), for
example, 3 years, undue delay starts. “Undue delay” is linked, not simply to a
particular lapse of time, but to a lapse of time which in the circumstances in question
is longer than it should have been (because it is recognised that the delay may be as
well justified). Whether the proceedings lasted longer than they should have is
assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case, having regard in particular
to the complexity of the issue, the conduct of the parties and what was at stake for
the accused person.272 For example, the following reasons have been recognised as
speaking for the argument that the state acted within reasonable time limits:
•

attempts to ensure the attendance of a witness273;

•

complexity of the proceedings due to the number of participants274;

•

complexity of the proceedings due to the international aspect275.

On the other hand, the following reasons have been recognised as speaking against
the argument that the state acted within reasonable time limits:
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•

belated decision to decide the case without hearing particular witnesses276;

•

frequent remittals of the case from higher courts to lower courts for fresh
examination277;

•

lengthy periods of inactivity278;

•

“chronic overload” of a court or other institution279.280
Also under the case law of IACtHR above-mentioned reasons are taken into

consideration when assessing the reasonableness of the period of criminal
proceedings. However, in addition, case law of IACtHR sets a rather strict
quantitative standard as a starting point of the assessment. It says that the period
which exceeds 5 years is prima facie unreasonable.281 Such a “starting point” makes
assessment simpler.
2.5.9. Right to Be Tried in Presence
Art. 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states: “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled […] to be tried in his presence […]”. Violations of the right to be tried in
presence may expose itself in two broad forms: first, when a hearing is held in the
absence of a person; second, when a hearing is held with the presence of a person,
but the person is not, indeed, “heard”.
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Right to be tried in presence does not carry the same significance at the first
instance trial or at the appeal or cassation. While the accused should always be
entitled to be present at the first instance hearing of his case282, during appeal or
cassation it might be justified not to hear the accused, in person. In order to assess
whether it was justified not to hear the accused, in person, during appeal or cassation,
regard must be given, among other considerations, to the specific features of the
proceedings in question and to the manner in which the interests of the accused were
actually presented and protected before the court, particularly in the light of the
nature of the issues to be decided by it.283 Most probably, not hearing the accused, in
person, will be recognised as justified if proceedings in front of an appeal or
cassation court involve only questions of law. Most probably it will not be
recognised as justified if the proceedings involve not only questions of law, but also
questions of fact.284
2.5.10. Right to Defend Oneself in Person or Through Legal Assistance
Art. 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states: “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled […] to defend himself in person or through legal assistance […]”. Similar
legal norm can be found in Art. 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art.
8(2)(d) of the American Convention on Human Rights and Art. 7(1)(c) of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
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The above-mentioned international and regional human rights instruments
only set the general right to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance.
They do not specify the manner of exercising this right. Thus, states have wide
discretion in deciding upon the exact means of how to secure the right, for instance,
at what stage to allow engagement of a legal assistant and how often to allow for a
legal assistant to visit the accused, who is under detention. In practice, human rights
tribunals in this regard in each case will assess whether the restrictions of legal
assistance imposed by the state, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, have
deprived the accused of a fair hearing.285 For example, in the case of Chaparro
Alvarez and Lapo Iniguez v. Ecuador IACtHR found the violation of the right to
defend oneself through legal assistance under conditions when Mr. Chaparro, in the
pre-trial statement, was required to justify his action for juridical protection, himself,
despite the fact that he would have preferred his lawyer to do so.286
International and regional human rights instruments secure not only, simply,
the right to legal assistance. They also secure the right to legal assistance of one’s
own choosing.287 It means that a state may not force the person charged of a criminal
offence to be assisted by the lawyer provided by the state, if the charged person
wants to be assisted by a particular lawyer of his own choosing.288
If a person charged of a criminal offence does not defend himself personally
or engage legal assistance of his own choosing, he has a right to be assisted by the
legal assistant provided by the state.289 Legal assistance provided by the state must be
effective. If an appointed lawyer does not provide effective assistance, he must be
285
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either replaced or caused to fulfil his obligations. In other words, what is guaranteed
is, indeed, “assistance” and not mere “nomination” of a representative.290
Furthermore, public legal assistance must be provided without payment if a person
does not have sufficient means to pay for it.291
The general right to legal assistance also incorporates the more specific right
to communicate with a legal assistant freely and privately.292 Under the right, the
term “freely” can be linked to the number and length of the visits of a legal assistant.
Usually, communication with a legal assistant is not interfered when a person
charged of a criminal offence is not deprived of his liberty while awaiting trial. When
the person is deprived of his liberty while awaiting trial, visits of a legal assistant
may be limited. However, they can be limited only as far as limitations do not
deprive the person of a fair hearing. For example, in the case of Ocalan v. Turkey
ECtHR found a rhythm of two one-hour meetings per week as inadequate for
preparing for a trial of a case of high magnitude – a case with highly complex
charges which generated an exceptionally voluminous case file.293 The term
“privately”, under the right, means that the person charged of a criminal offence must
be allowed to communicate with his legal assistant outside the hearing of third
parties.294 For instance, in the case of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia ECtHR
found the violation of the right to fair trial when written communications (working
papers) between accused persons and their lawyers were regularly seized and
checked by prison administration.295
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2.5.11. Right of a Charged Person to Examine Witnesses Against Him and to
Obtain the Examination of Witnesses on His Behalf
Art. 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled […] to
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.

Art. 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Art. 8(2)(f) of the
American Convention on Human Rights contain similar rule.
In relation to human rights, “witness” means any statement produced at the
pre-trial stage or during the trial and taken account of.296 Such statements can be
made not only by witnesses, strictly speaking, but also, for example, by the coaccused, victims or experts, either orally or in written form. Taking into
consideration this explanation of the meaning of the word “witness” in the human
rights context, hereinafter the author will talk about “statements” instead of
“witnesses” – as the term “statement” reflects the content of the right in the question
more precisely than the term “witness”.
A general principle is: before a person charged of a criminal offence can be
convicted, all evidence against him must be produced in his presence at a public
hearing with a view to adversarial argument.297 Consequently, human rights tribunals
may find the violation of the right to fair trial based on the mere failure of a state to
show good reason for not examining, at public hearing, a person who has previously
made statements against the person charged of a criminal offence.298 However, more
often, human rights tribunals will look a little bit further – they will assess whether
these untested statements, indeed, negatively affected the person charged of a
criminal offence. In other words, they will assess the significance of the untested
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statements.299 For example, in the case of Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia
ECtHR found the violation of the right under such circumstances:
•

Russian national court refused the plea of the defence to hear at the trial
experts who had prepared several reports at the request of the prosecution. In
this regard ECtHR noted that there is an extensive case law which guarantees
to the defence a right to study and challenge not only an expert report, as
such, but also the credibility of those who have prepared it, through their
direct questioning;

•

Russian national court refused the plea of the defence to admit as evidence
the audit reports relevant to the case prepared by Ernst and Young, and Price
Waterhouse Coopers. In this regard, ECtHR noted that it may be hard to
challenge a report by an expert without the assistance of another expert in the
relevant field. Thus, the defence must have opportunity to introduce their own
“expert evidence”.300
2.5.12. Right to Have the Assistance of an Interpreter
Art. 14(3)(f) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

states:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled […] to
have the […] assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used
in court.

Similar legal norm is incorporated in Art. 6(3)(e) of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Art. 8(2)(a) of the American Convention on Human Rights.
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The right to have the assistance of an interpreter applies not only to oral
statements but also to documentary materials.301 However, it must be noted that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on
Human Rights refer to an “interpreter”, not a “translator”. It means that these human
rights instruments do not go so far as to require a written translation of all documents
in the case file. Oral linguistic assistance may be recognised as sufficient.302 The
American Convention on Human Rights refers not only to the “assistance of an
interpreter” but also to the “assistance of a translator”. However, the author has not
found any case of IACtHR addressing issues related to the assistance of an
interpreter or translator. Consequently, it is hard to determine the exact scope of the
American Convention on Human Rights in this regard.
The quality of the interpretation provided need not be perfect. However,
interpretation

must

be:

continuous,

precise,

impartial,

competent

and

contemporaneous.303 Moreover, competent authorities are always obliged to provide
the assistance of an interpreter free of charge.304
2.5.13. Right Not to Incriminate Oneself
Art. 14(3)(g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
states: “In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled […] not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”. Art.
8(2)(g) of the American Convention on Human Rights contains similar rule. The
European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly refer to the right not to
incriminate oneself. However, ECtHR has stated: although not specifically
mentioned in the European Convention on Human Rights, the right not to incriminate
301
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oneself is generally recognised international standard which lies at the heart of the
notion of a fair procedure.305
The right not to incriminate oneself safeguards against the practice that the
prosecution in a criminal case seeks to prove the case against the person by resorting
to evidence obtained through methods of compulsion.306 The right implies absence of
any direct or indirect physical or psychological pressure from the investigating
authorities on the person charged of criminal offence, with a view to obtain a
confession of guilt.307
However, not every compulsion applied against an accused with the aim to
collect evidence automatically constitutes the violation of the right to incriminate
oneself. Whether there, indeed, has been violation must be determined by looking not
only into the fact of compulsion, as such, but also into other relevant factors, such as
the nature and degree of the compulsion and the use to which any material obtained
through the compulsion is put.308 Furthermore, the right not to incriminate oneself
does not safeguard against the use in criminal proceedings of material which may be
obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an
existence independent of the will of the suspect, such as, inter alia, documents
acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples or bodily tissue for
the purpose of DNA testing.309
The right not to incriminate oneself is not confined to statements of
admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which are directly incriminating. It is
applicable also to any other evidence – even the evidence which appears on their face
to be of a non-incriminating nature. What is of the essence, in this context, is the use
to which evidence obtained under compulsion is put in the course of the criminal
trial. For example, exculpatory remarks, or mere information on questions of fact,
may also be later deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution case
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to contradict or cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or to otherwise
undermine his credibility.310
2.5.14. Right to the Review of Conviction and Sentence
Art. 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
“Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence
being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law”. Art. 8(2)(h) of the American
Convention on Human Rights contains similar legal norm. In Europe the right to the
review of conviction and sentence is guaranteed by the case law as well as Art. 2(1)
of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
According to Art. 2(2) of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on
Human Rights, in Europe some exceptions to the right to the review of conviction
and sentence are allowed. Exceptions are allowed:
[...] in regard to offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the
person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted
following an appeal against acquittal.

In regards to the exceptions to the right to the review of conviction and sentence,
IACtHR does not walk hand in hand with its European colleagues. IACtHR does not
recognise above-mentioned exceptions. The issue was addressed, for example, in the
case of Mohamed v. Argentina. In this case, Mr. Mohamed – person accused of
manslaughter – was acquitted by the court of the first instance, convicted by the court
of the second instance, and, after that, not given the appropriate opportunity to appeal
his conviction (such opportunity was not secured under Argentinian national law).
IACtHR found that such a system violates the right to the review of conviction and
sentence. The court stated that it is contrary to the purpose of that particular right that
it should not be guaranteed to someone who is convicted in judgment that overturns
an acquittal. To interpret it otherwise would leave the convicted person without the
right to an appeal against the conviction.311
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In addition, case law of IACtHR has clearly stated that the right to review of
conviction and sentence must be, not only always existing, but also easily accessible,
that is, it should not involve great complexities that render this right illusory.
Formalities required for the appeal to be admitted should be minimal and should not
constitute an obstacle to the remedy fulfilling its purpose of examining and resolving
grievances argued by the appellant.312 Review, itself, may not be carried out
superficially, in a merely formal manner. It must be effective, comprehensive review
which allows extensive control of the contested aspects of the particular conviction
and sentence.313
2.5.15. Right Not to Be Tried or Punished Twice for the Same Offence
Art. 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each
country.

In some jurisdictions this right is known as ne bis in idem or as guarantee against
double jeopardy.
Art. 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union contains
similar rule as in Art. 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, with the one difference – while the Covenant safeguards against double
jeopardy only within the limits of one particular country, the Charter safeguards
against double jeopardy within the limits of the whole EU. Art. 8(4) of the American
Convention on Human Rights states: “An accused person acquitted by a
nonappealable judgment shall not be subjected to a new trial for the same cause”.
Thus, differently from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the American Convention
on Human Rights does not set any geographical limitations in relation to the right not
to be tried or punished twice for the same offence.
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The American Convention on Human Rights differs from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union in other aspects, also. First of all, the American Convention on
Human Rights refers only to “acquittals” and not to both “acquittals and
convictions”. It means that the person may be tried again after conviction. Such a
system is beneficiary to the convicted person. It gives possibility for the negative
judgement to be overturned in favour of the convicted person. Despite the fact that it
is not mentioned directly in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union or the European Convention on Human Rights, in fact, reopening of cases is
also permitted under the European system. It is evident from Art. 4 of Protocol No. 7
to the European Convention on Human Rights. This article states:
1.

No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally
acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State.

2.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the re-opening of the case in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence
of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the
previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case.

Another difference between the American Convention on Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union is that the American Convention on
Human Rights refers to the “same cause”, not to the “same offence”. It precludes
possibility to try a person again for, in principle, the same activities simply by
formally changing the qualification of these activities.314 Yet, again, despite the fact
that the European human rights instruments do not refer to “the same cause” as the
American Convention on Human Rights does, in fact, the systems in this respect do
not differ. Case law of ECtHR has evened the systems. For example, in the case of
Asadbeyli and others v. Azerbaijan ECtHR stated:
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The Court notes that its case-law in respect of the ne bis in idem principle has developed
since the Oliveira judgment […] Whereas there had been several approaches to this issue in
the earlier case-law […], the Court attempted to harmonise those approaches in the Sergey
Zolotukhin judgment […] and took the view that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be
understood as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second “offence” in so far as it arises
from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same.315

2.6. Right to Non-Discrimination
Art. 2 of UDHR states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Similar legal norm is incorporated in Art. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Art.
21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 1(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights and Art. 2 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights.
All the above-mentioned rules safeguard that the rights incorporated in
respective human rights instruments (so, only human rights themselves) can be
enjoyed without discrimination. The only exception in this regard is Art. 21(1) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which safeguards against any
discrimination. It states:
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin,
genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a
national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.

However, the limited scope of the other above-mentioned rules does not mean that
the human rights instruments within which these rules are situated do not safeguard
against all forms of discrimination. They do – through the right to equity before the
law.
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Art. 7 of UDHR states: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to equal protection of the law”. Art. 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, Art. 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights and
Art. 3 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights basically repeat Art. 7
of UDHR. Only the European Convention on Human Rights does not contain the
legal norm on the right to equity before the law. Consequently, ECtHR has addressed
the right to non-discrimination only in conjunction with particular other human rights
(as Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights prescribes).316
Differently from ECtHR, IACtHR has looked at the right to nondiscrimination both ways – in conjunction with particular human rights (as Art. 1(1)
of the American Convention on Human Rights prescribes) and separately from
particular human rights (as Art. 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights
prescribes). IACtHR, inter alia, has clearly explained the difference between these
two Articles of the Convention. In the judgment of the case Barbani Duarte et al. v.
Uruguay it stated:
The Court recalls that, while the general obligation under Article 1(1) refers to the State’s
obligation to respect and guarantee “without discrimination” the rights contained in the
American Convention, Article 24 protects the right to “equal protection of the law.” If it is
alleged that a State discriminates in the respect or guarantee of a convention-based right, the
fact must be analyzed under Article 1(1) and the material right in question. If, to the contrary,
the alleged discrimination refers to unequal protection by domestic law, the fact must be
examined under Article 24 of the Convention.317

Importantly, IACtHR has also concluded that:
At the current stage of the evolution of international law, the fundamental principle of
equality and non-discrimination has entered the realm of jus cogens. [...] This principle is
fundamental for the safeguard of human rights in both international and national law; it is a
principle of peremptory law. Consequently, States are obliged not to introduce discriminatory
regulations into their laws, to eliminate regulations of a discriminatory nature, to combat
practices of this nature, and to establish norms and other measures that recognize and ensure
the effective equality before the law of each individual. A distinction that lacks objective and
reasonable justification is discriminatory.318
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The above citation shows how high the right to non-discrimination is valued. At the
same time, it is clear from the end of this citation that not any distinction is
discriminatory. Discriminatory is only such a distinction that “lacks objective and
reasonable justification”. Also ECtHR has stressed this point in a number of
judgments. For example, in the case of Petrovic v. Austria ECtHR stated:
Under the Court’s case-law, a difference in treatment is discriminatory for the purposes of
Article 14 if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is if it does not pursue a
“legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the
means employed and the aim sought to be realised”.319

Thus, under certain circumstances distinct treatment is allowed. However,
justification for such treatment must be very strong. ECtHR in this regard has noted:
States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment. However, very
weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of
treatment [...] as compatible with the Convention.320
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3. UNCLOS
3.1. Introduction
UNCLOS was adopted by the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea on
30 April 1982 by 130 votes to four, with 17 abstentions.321 It entered into force on 16
November 1994. As of August 2016, 167 states as well as the EU had become Parties
to this convention.322
Apart from Annexes, UNCLOS is divided into 17 parts. Part I is the
introduction. Parts II to XI provide legal regimes governing different geographical
areas: territorial sea and contiguous zone, straits used for international navigation,
archipelagic states, EEZ, continental shelf, high seas, islands, enclosed or semienclosed seas, land-locked states and the Area. Parts XII to XV provide legal regimes
governing specific issues: protection and preservation of the marine environment,
marine scientific research, development and transfer of marine technology and
settlement of disputes. Parts XVI and XVII are devoted to general and final
provisions.
The majority of rules of UNCLOS govern only general matters. In other
words, UNCLOS is a framework (or, an “umbrella”) convention.323 However, this
“framework” is extremely comprehensive. Therefore, UNCLOS is often called “a
constitution for the oceans”.324
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Robin Rolf Churchill and Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd edition, Manchester:
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 at p. 29.
322
See actual information on the status of UNCLOS at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en#1.
323
See, for example, Agustin Blanco-Bazan, “IMO Interference with the Law of the Sea Convention”,
paper presented at the Twenty-Third Annual Seminar of the Center for Ocean Law and Policy,
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Further on in this chapter, those legal norms of UNCLOS, which can be
linked to criminal procedures or sanctions applicable against seafarers after largescale ship-source oil pollution accidents, are identified and analysed in detail. It is
done from a human rights perspective. Where above-mentioned legal norms of
UNCLOS are unclear or inconsistent with human rights, recommendations are made
regarding the interpretation of these legal norms.

3.2. Right to Liberty and UNCLOS
3.2.1. Introduction
Only some articles of UNCLOS address deprivation of liberty directly, for
example, Art. 27, which talks about arrest of persons on board a foreign ship passing
through territorial sea. However, UNCLOS rather often refers to such things as
“proceedings” or “powers of enforcement”, for example, Art. 217, 218 and 220 talk
about enforcement by flag States325, port States326 and coastal States327 in relation to
prevention, reduction and control of ship-source pollution. Deprivation of liberty fits
within such broader terms as “proceedings” or “powers of enforcement”. Thus,
actually, UNCLOS also addresses deprivation of liberty rather extensively.
Some rules of UNCLOS can be labelled “procedural rules of deprivation of
liberty”. Deprivation of liberty without following “procedural rules of deprivation of
liberty” is arbitrary, and thus constitutes violation of the right to liberty (if in the
circumstances in question respective procedural flaw can be considered as
serious).328 Consequently, deprivation of liberty of a seafarer after large-scale shipsource oil pollution accident without following “procedural rules of deprivation of
liberty” incorporated in UNCLOS is, also, arbitrary, and thus constitutes violation of
the right to liberty of this seafarer (if in the circumstances in question respective
325

Flag State is the state whose nationality a particular ship has. Nationality is conferred to the ship by
her registration in particular country and displayed by rising on board the ship flag of this country.
326
Port State is the state in one of whose ports a particular ship lies.
327
Coastal State is the state in one of whose maritime zones a particular ship lies.
328
This conclusion stems from Sub-chapter 2.2.2.2, “Deprivation of Liberty not in Conformity with
Existing Law”.
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procedural flaw can be considered as serious). Sub-chapter 3.2.2 below will
introduce relevant procedural rules of UNCLOS. It will, inter alia, analyse whether
failure to comply with respective rules can be considered as serious flaw.
There is some basis for the opinion that, apart from “procedural rules of
deprivation of liberty” incorporated in UNCLOS, also Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b),
together with Art. 292 of UNCLOS (legal norms of UNCLOS which set prompt
release obligations in regards to ship-source pollution violations) are linked to the
right to liberty. Whether such link indeed exists will be analysed in Sub-chapter
3.2.3.
3.2.2. Procedural Rules of UNCLOS Related to Deprivation of Liberty
3.2.2.1. Requirement to Facilitate Involvement of Others into Proceedings
Art. 27(3) of UNCLOS requires in the case when in accordance with
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article coastal State wants to apply criminal jurisdiction on
board a foreign ship passing through its territorial sea, if the master so requests:
•

to notify a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State before taking
any steps or, in case of emergency, while the measures are being taken;

•

to facilitate contact between a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag
State and the ship’s crew.

Art. 223 of UNCLOS requires states to facilitate the attendance at any proceedings
instituted in relation to ship-source pollution violation of official representatives of
the competent international organisation, the flag State and any State affected by
pollution arising out of the violation. Art. 231 of UNCLOS contains specific
notification requirements regarding cases when a coastal State or port State applies
enforcement measures on board a foreign ship in relation to ship-source pollution
violations. Art. 231 of UNCLOS reads as follows:
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States shall promptly notify the flag State and any other State concerned of any measures
taken pursuant to section 6 against foreign vessels, and shall submit to the flag State all
official reports concerning such measures. However, with respect to violations committed in
the territorial sea, the foregoing obligations of the coastal State apply only to such measures
as are taken in proceedings. The diplomatic agents or consular officers and where possible
the maritime authority of the flag State, shall be immediately informed of any such measures
taken pursuant to section 6 against foreign vessels.

“Section 6” mentioned in the article is the section on enforcement measures in case
of ship-source pollution violations.
The first sentence of Art. 231 of UNCLOS is clear – it requires coastal States
and port States, irrespectively where enforcement measures are taken:
•

to notify promptly the flag State and any other State concerned of any
measures taken;

•

to submit to the flag State all official reports concerning measures taken.

Yet, the purpose of the second and the third sentence of Art. 231 of UNCLOS is not
clear.
The general idea of the second sentence must have been to lessen the burden
of notification obligations of a coastal State in case of ship-source pollution violation
in its territorial sea. However, as all enforcement measures are taken within some
kind of “proceedings” (criminal or administrative), legal norm which requires to
perform notification obligation only in case of such measures “as are taken in
proceedings”, without giving some specific (more narrow) meaning to the word
“proceedings”, is useless – it is not capable to exclude any case from the notification
obligation. It seems that the second sentence of Art. 231 of UNCLOS is simply an
unfortunate result of poor debate on particular rule during the drafting process of
UNCLOS. This rule was introduced by Japan. After its introduction, it was stated
that respective proposal is one which requires further study. However, nothing
indicates that such study was ever carried out.329
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Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary,
Volume IV, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991 at pp. 374-375.

112

Wording of the third sentence of Art. 231 of UNCLOS suggests that, parallel
to the “prompt” notification to “the flag State and any other State concerned” (in
accordance with the first sentence of the article), “immediate” notification to
“diplomatic agents or consular officers and where possible the maritime authority of
the flag State” must be carried out. However, diplomatic agents, consular officers
and maritime authorities of the flag State also fall within the broader concept of “a
flag State”. Does it mean that the third sentence of the article, in fact, does not set
new obligation, but simply specifies the one in the first sentence of the same article?
The Drafting Committee of the Conference preparing UNCLOS also expressed its
concerns regarding the issue. Nordquist indicates that:
[...] the Drafting Committee noted that there was a lack of uniformity with regard to the
recipient of the notification; article 231 requires notification to “the flag State or any other
State concerned” of measures taken, and in the case of violations in the territorial sea
notification is to be made to “the consular officers or diplomatic agents, and where possible
the maritime authority of the flag state”.330

It is worth noting here that, as it is evident from the citation above, the Drafting
Committee of the Conference preparing UNCLOS interpreted the third sentence of
Art. 231 of UNCLOS as linked only to its second sentence – the one addressing
violations in territorial sea. Such an interpretation is questionable, because initial
drafts of the article contained only legal norms which later became respectively the
first and the third sentence of Art. 231 of UNCLOS (so, they were directly linked).
The legal norm which later became the second sentence of Art. 231 of UNCLOS was
introduced just afterwards.331 However, the above-mentioned interpretation of the
Drafting Committee one more time proves that the whole article is poorly drafted
and, consequently, may trigger different interpretations.
Furthermore, the question may arise how the whole Art. 231 of UNCLOS
correlates with Art. 27(3) and Art. 223 of UNCLOS, which were introduced earlier.
These articles are not in full harmony, for example:

330
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NORDQUIST, ibid. at p. 374.
NORDQUIST, ibid. at pp. 373-374.
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•

Art. 231 does not require to notify diplomatic agent or consular officer of the
flag State “before taking any steps”, Art. 27(3) does;

•

Art. 231 requires to notify “maritime authority of the flag State”, Art. 27(3)
does not contain such obligation.

As if Part XII of UNCLOS, in which also Art. 223 and 231 are located, governs
specific subject matter (protection and preservation of the marine environment).
Therefore, by applying conflict of law principle lex specialis derogate legi generali,
it can be concluded that Art. 223 and 231 override general rule in Art. 27(3).
However, Art. 223 and 231 incorporate notification and attendance facilitation
requirements regarding any enforcement measures, while Art. 27(3) incorporates
respective requirements regarding only those enforcement measures which are
applied as a part of criminal proceedings. From this perspective, Art. 27(3) becomes
one which regulates specific subject matter as compared to Art. 223 and 231.
Taking into consideration all the above mentioned, this author suggests to
interpret Art. 231 of UNCLOS in system with Art. 27 and 223 of UNCLOS as
follows: when a coastal State or port State in regards to ship-source pollution
violation as a part of criminal proceedings applies enforcement measures against a
foreign ship or persons on board this ship, respective coastal State or port State must:
1) if master of the ship so requests:
•

notify a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State of a ship in
question before taking any steps or, in case of emergency, while the
measures are being taken;

•

facilitate contact between a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the
flag State of a ship in question and the ship’s crew;

2) if master of the ship has not expressed request as mentioned above,
immediately notify a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State of
a ship in question about any measures taken (the “immediately” requirement
can be easily associated with the “while the measures are being taken”
requirement);
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3) where possible, immediately notify the maritime authority of the flag State of
a ship in question about any measures taken;
4) in any case:
•

promptly notify any State other than the flag State of a ship in question,
which can possibly be concerned about measures taken, for example,
other affected coastal State or the state, which national a seafarer against
whom measures have been applied is (the “promptly” requirement is less
stringent than the “immediately” requirement; consequently, notification
should not be made while the measures are being taken, however, the
“promptly” requirement does not allow for notifications to be made long
after measures have been taken);

•

submit to the flag State of a ship in question all official reports concerning
measures taken;

•

facilitate the attendance at proceedings of official representatives of the
competent international organization, the flag State and any State affected
by pollution.

Research of this author did not reveal any case in the practice of human rights
tribunals where it would be assessed whether the failure to comply with the
requirement to notify a diplomatic agent or consular officer, or anybody else, about
the deprivation of liberty of a particular person or the requirement to facilitate
contact between a diplomatic agent or consular officer, or anybody else, and the
person deprived of liberty amounts to arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Nevertheless,
in the opinion of this author, failure to exercise notification and contact facilitation
requirements with respect to the flag State and the state, of which a seafarer deprived
of liberty is a national, has high potential to be recognised as constituting arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, because such notification and contact facilitation, inter alia,
secures full defence of a person deprived of liberty, but right to defence is one of the
most important human rights under the right to a fair trial umbrella.332
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3.2.2.2. Requirement to Pay Due Regard to Other Interests when Exercising
Powers of Enforcement
Art. 225 of UNCLOS states:
In the exercise under this Convention of their powers of enforcement [...] States shall not
endanger the safety of navigation or otherwise create any hazard to a vessel, or bring it to an
unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the marine environment to an unreasonable risk.

Although Art. 225 is situated in Part XII of UNCLOS (the Part on the protection and
preservation of the marine environment), case law of ITLOS indicates that the
respective article actually has general application.333
In regards to safety (safety of navigation, safety of ship) Art. 225 of
UNCLOS sets the obligation in a categorical way – establishes that “States shall not
endanger [...]”. It does not provide any exceptions to this obligation. However,
application of enforcement measures is never absolutely free from the risk of
endangering safety, for example, just like risk exists when police chase a car on a
high-way, it will also exist when a warship chases a ship at sea. Consequently, Art.
225 of UNCLOS should be read subject to general principles of necessity and
proportionality, and not as a blanket prohibition. In other words, it is more
appropriate to read Art. 225 of UNCLOS as one of its earlier drafts stated. This
earlier draft, instead of being categorical, required states to exercise their
enforcement powers “to the extent that there is no excessive danger to the vessel in
question and that no unreasonable risks are created for navigation or the marine
environment”.334
Does the failure to pay due regards to such interests as safety of navigation
and clean environment when depriving of liberty a person on board a ship constitute
arbitrary deprivation of liberty of this person? In the opinion of this author it will
constitute arbitrary deprivation of liberty only in one specific case – when together
with endangering such interests as safety of navigation and clean environment,
without justified reason, also the life or health of a person who is deprived of liberty
333

See The M/V “VIRGINIA G” (No. 19) Case (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau), Judgment of 14 April
2014, ITLOS, paragraph 373.
334
Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary,
Volume IV, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991 at p. 332.

116

is directly endangered; for example, when after deprivation of liberty of a seafarer a
ship is left without duly qualified people navigating her and the seafarer who has
been deprived of liberty remains on this now unsafe ship. In other cases, for example,
when after deprivation of liberty of a seafarer a ship is left without duly qualified
people navigating her, but the seafarer who has been deprived of liberty does not stay
on this now unsafe ship, deprivation of liberty of a person will not be arbitrary. Not
because in these cases failure to pay due regard to such interests as safety of
navigation and clean environment becomes insignificant (it is always significant and
can be considered as such in separate processes against officials), but because in
these cases respective failure does not negatively affect a person deprived of liberty.
It only negatively affects safety of other persons, property rights of other persons and
the marine environment.
3.2.3. Legal Norms of UNCLOS on Prompt Release from Detention
Art. 218 and 220 of UNCLOS under certain circumstances permit a port State
and a coastal State to detain a foreign ship alleged of committing ship-source
pollution violation. Yet, under Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) of UNCLOS, a state should
release the detained ship if bond or other appropriate financial security has been
assured. Both Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) talk only about prompt release of ships
(property), not crew (people). The conclusion emerging from this statement is that
Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) of UNCLOS are not linked to the right to liberty, because
holders of the right to liberty (just like any other human right) are humans, not
property.
However, it is not absolutely clear whether, indeed, the crew is not covered
by Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) of UNCLOS, particularly because a majority of
scholars have treated respective rules as encompassing not only prompt release of
ships, but also prompt release of crew. For example, Lindpere has done so. For
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justification of such a position, he has referred to Art. 292 of UNCLOS.335 Similarly,
Pozdnakova has stated:
Article 226 does not refer expressly to the crew and only mentions that the “vessel” shall be
promptly released. However, the wording of other provisions in UNCLOS implies that the
crew is covered by the prompt release requirement (see Article 292).336

Art. 292 of UNCLOS is procedural counterpart of Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b)
of UNCLOS. It establishes the right of a flag State, in cases when other states do not
follow substantive prompt release provisions of UNCLOS, to seek respective release
through the relevant tribunal. Differently from Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b), Art. 292
explicitly addresses, not only prompt release of ships, but also prompt release of
crew. It, indeed, points towards the conclusion that also Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b)
cover, not only prompt release of ships, but also prompt release of crew.
However, correctness of such a conclusion can be questioned. It must be kept
in mind that Art. 292 of UNCLOS sets the prompt release safeguard not only in
regards to Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) of UNCLOS (ship-source pollution violations),
but also in regards to Art. 73(2) of UNCLOS (violations of fisheries regulations).
Differently from Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b), Art. 73(2) explicitly addresses, not only
prompt release of ships, but also prompt release of crew. Consequently, it might be
the case that the reference to crew in Art. 292 is linked only to Art. 73(2). In practice,
Art. 292 of UNCLOS, so far, has been invoked only in relation to alleged violations
of fisheries regulations. Thus, there is no case law which addresses the issue whether
Art. 292 of UNCLOS can be invoked, at all, in regards to prompt release of crew
members deprived of their liberty after alleged ship-source pollution violation.
Consequently, this issue remains, to a very large extent, unclear.
335

Heiki Lindpere, “Prompt Release of Detained Foreign Vessels and Crew in Matters of Marine
Environment Protection”, in International Journal of Legal Information, Volume 33, Issue 2, Summer
2005 at p. 243.
336
Alla Pozdnakova, Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators of Ship-Source Pollution: International
Law, State Practice and EU Harmonisation, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012 at p. 165. See
also pp. 174-175 as well as Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012 at pp. 418; Proshanto K. Mukherjee and Mark Brownrik, Farthing
on International Shipping, Berlin: Springer, 2013 at p. 188 and Erik Jaap Molenaar, Coastal State
Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998 at p. 489, where
the authors link Art. 220(7) and Art. 226(1)(b) of UNCLOS, not only to prompt release of ships, but
also to prompt release of crew.
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This author leans towards the position that Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) of
UNCLOS may not be interpreted as addressing prompt release of crew, because:
1) Literal (philological) interpretation of respective legal norms gives a clear
result – that crew is not covered.
2) Systemic interpretation (such as invoked by Lindpere and Pozdnakova) is not
capable to “disprove” the result of literal (philological) interpretation. Rather
the opposite, the fact that Art. 73(2) of UNCLOS (violations of fisheries
regulations) explicitly refers to both ships and crew, but Art. 220(7) and
226(1)(b) of UNCLOS (ship-source pollution violations) refer only to ships,
leads one to believe that, in regards to prompt release, drafters of UNCLOS
did not treat a ship as also, naturally, encompassing persons on board this
ship. Otherwise, reference to crew would have been omitted in regards to
both types of violations.337
3) Also recourse to travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS is not capable to
“disprove” the result of literal (philological) interpretation. In this regard it
can be noted that drafters of UNCLOS initially suggested that UNCLOS
should protect against prolonged detention of not only ships but also crew,
and even passengers.338 Yet, it is not clear why, exactly, the reference to crew
and passengers was ultimately not included in Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) of
UNCLOS – was it simply a drafting mistake, was it assumed that reference to
a ship naturally encompasses also persons on board this ship, or was it, as a
result of discussions on the balance of powers between a flag State, coastal
State and port State, ultimately decided that persons on board a ship should
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In general, though, the word “ship” in UNCLOS must be understood as also encompassing her
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not be covered by the UNCLOS prompt release safeguard in cases of alleged
ship-source pollution violations.339
After all, it seems illogical simply to read the word “crew” into the word “ship”
when talking about detention and prompt release, because detention of a ship and
detention of a crew are two rather distinct things (one is predominantly linked to civil
proceedings, another to criminal proceedings). Detention of a ship is allowed for
such purposes for which detention of a crew is not allowed (for example, for securing
civil claims). Detention of a crew is allowed for such purposes for which detention of
a ship is not allowed, or even is irrelevant (for example, for securing person’s
presence at trial). Also conditions under which, respectively, ship and crew can be
released consequently differ. For example, for securing civil claim it will always be
enough simply to “replace” the ship with some other appropriate financial security,
yet for securing a person’s presence at trial it will not always be enough simply to
“replace” the person with the financial security. Other measures might still be
necessary. It is evident from case law of ITLOS that some states also prefer to treat
prompt release of ships and prompt release of crew as two, possibly linked, but still
distinct things. For example, in the Volga case, Australia clearly distinguished
between release of the ship on bond and release of the crew on bail.340
Some scholars argue that Art. 292 of UNCLOS can be invoked not only in
relation to Art. 73, 220 and 226 of UNCLOS, as described above, but in any case
when ship or crew is detained contrary to UNCLOS, for example, Treves has stated:
[…] if a vessel or its crew has been detained in contravention of a provision of the
Convention which prohibits detention, it seems reasonable to hold that the most expeditious
procedure available should be resorted to in order to ensure the release of the vessel or crew,
independently of the question of international responsibility for the violation of the
Convention. It would seem absurd to me that the prompt release procedure should be
available in cases in which detention is permitted by the Convention, such as those of Article
73, 220 and 226, and not available in cases in which it is not permitted by it.341
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If to follow this understanding, then Art. 292 of UNCLOS still might come into play
also in regards to crew members deprived of their liberty in relation to alleged shipsource pollution violation, for example, in cases when crew members are deprived of
their liberty by the state which does not have jurisdiction to do it. This author agrees
with Treves in the sense that, since UNCLOS has established prompt release
procedure, it would be reasonable to utilise this procedure fully, allowing invoking it
in any case when detention of ship or crew is believed to be contrary to UNCLOS.
However, it is quite clear from the mere text of Art. 292 itself as well as from
travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS that this “reasonable variant” was not the
intention of drafters of UNCLOS.342 In other words, on this particular issue the
author agrees with the conclusion of Lindpere, who has stated that such application
of prompt release procedure as suggested by Treves “will definitely undermine the
whole concept of Article 292 and compromises reached in it”.343
Taking into consideration all the above-mentioned arguments, this author
maintains the conclusion which was made at the very beginning of this sub-chapter,
namely, that rules of UNCLOS which set prompt release obligations in regards to
ship-source pollution violations do not cover crew, and consequently are not linked
to the right to liberty. Thus, they are also of no interest for the purpose of this
dissertation.
At the same time, this author sees the topic of prompt release of ships and
crews under UNCLOS as a topic on which, in general, further research is highly
necessary. There are still many unanswered or poorly answered important questions
in this area, starting from very theoretical questions, such as whether the existence of
the regime is justified at all, whether the regime is well balanced with other relevant
systems (for example, human rights and general principles of criminal procedures),
and ending with very practical questions, such as how to execute the prompt release
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order of an international court or tribunal when national procedures do not envisage
such execution.

3.3. Right to Be Free from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment
and UNCLOS
When introducing the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment, ultimately, all issues were organised around two broad questions,
namely, what conduct can be criminalised (question of criminal liability) and how
severe imposed sanctions can be (question of amount). The same can be done here –
in the sub-chapter addressing interaction of UNCLOS with the right to be free from
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
Regarding the question of criminal liability Pozdnakova has rightly pointed
out:
[…] States that […] decide to enact criminal penalties for pollution will not find any
guidance in UNCLOS concerning the substantive scope of their criminal liability provisions.
The treaty does not specify what pollution should be considered unlawful (a “violation”) and,
as such, potentially criminally punishable.344

Consequently, one may also not find in UNCLOS the answer to the question, when a
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident should be criminalised, if ever. The
only legal norms in UNCLOS which can be discussed in relation to criminal liability
in the light of large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are those legal norms
which prescribe specific duties on the side of the state or other actors, not observance
of which potentially can be the true cause of the large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accident (instead of the conduct on the side of the seafarer). Such duties are, for
instance:
•

duty of a coastal State to give appropriate publicity to any danger to
navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea (Art. 24(2));

•

duty of a coastal State to give due notice of the artificial islands, installations
or structures in EEZ (Art. 60(3));
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•

duty of a coastal State to maintain permanent means for giving warning of the
presence of artificial islands, installations or structures in EEZ (Art. 60(3));

•

duty of those who carry out activities in the Area to give due notice of the
erection, emplacement and removal of installations used for carrying out
activities in the Area (Art. 147(2)(a));

•

duty of those who carry out activities in the Area to maintain permanent
means for giving warning of presence of installations used for carrying out
activities in the Area (Art. 147(2)(a));

•

duty of those who carry out activities in the Area to establish around
installations used for carrying out activities in the Area safety zones with
appropriate markings to ensure the safety of navigation (Art. 147(2)(c));

•

duty of those who carry out scientific research to secure that scientific
research installations or equipment in the marine environment have adequate
internationally agreed warning signals to ensure safety at sea (Art. 262);

•

duty of States to develop and promote contingency plans for responding to
pollution incidents in the marine environment (Art. 199).

All these duties should be kept in mind when assessing the objective element of the
crime “causation”, because, if the true cause of the large-scale ship-source oil
pollution accident is the conduct of a particular state authority or some other actor, as
described above, a seafarer cannot be held criminally liable for causing pollution.
However, all above-mentioned legal norms of UNCLOS are linked to the right to be
free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment only indirectly.
Directly linked to the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment (specifically, right not to be exposed to disproportionate sanctions) are
those rules of UNCLOS which address severity of sanctions (question of amount).
There are several such rules. Those which are linked to ship-source pollution
violations are analysed in detail below.
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Before moving into respective analysis, one more note should be made.
Although rules of UNCLOS on severity of sanctions are primarily linked to the right
to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, at the same time, indirectly,
they are also linked to the right to liberty. It becomes clear if one recalls that persons
can be deprived of liberty only on specific recognised grounds. Even if, in principle,
a recognised ground for deprivation of liberty exists, particular deprivation of liberty
can still be arbitrary – in case one or more additional conditions are not met. Among
these conditions is also the requirement to deprive a person of liberty only if such
measure is proportional under the circumstances in question. Among factors to be
taken into consideration when assessing whether it is proportional to deprive a
person of liberty under the circumstances in question is severity of an alleged
offence. Severity of an alleged offence in its turn can be determined by severity of
applicable sanction for this offence. Thus, severity of applicable sanction for a
particular offence is one of the factors which determine whether deprivation of
liberty of a person in relation to this offence has been arbitrary or not. This
conclusion also accords with what was stated by ITLOS in the M/V “VIRGINIA G”
case, namely that “[...] in applying enforcement measures due regard has to be paid
to the particular circumstances of the case and the gravity of the violation.”345
Art. 217(8) of UNCLOS contains very generally formulated obligation of flag
States in regards to severity of sanctions for ship-source pollution violations. This
legal norm states: “Penalties provided for by the laws and regulations of States for
vessels flying their flag shall be adequate in severity to discourage violations
wherever they occur.” It can be disputed whether this particular legal norm strives
for general proportionality of penalties (stresses the need to adopt such penalties
which are neither too mild, nor too severe), or it simply strives for utilitarian benefit
(stresses the need to adopt such penalties which “discourage violations”, but does not
say that these penalties may not be disproportionately severe). However, this dispute
has little practical importance, because, anyway, Art. 217(8) of UNCLOS should be
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read subject to human rights346 thus also subject to principle of proportionality of
sanctions.
Apart from Art. 217(8) of UNCLOS, other legal norms in UNCLOS which
talk about severity of sanctions for ship-source pollution violations are Art. 230(1)
and (2), which state:
1. Monetary penalties only may be imposed with respect to violations of national laws and
regulations or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution of the marine environment, committed by foreign vessels beyond the
territorial sea.
2. Monetary penalties only may be imposed with respect to violations of national laws and
regulations or applicable international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution of the marine environment, committed by foreign vessels in the territorial
sea, except in the case of a wilful and serious act of pollution in the territorial sea.

Basically, these two paragraphs, if read in system with each other as well as Section
3 “Innocent passage in the territorial sea” of Part II “Territorial sea and contiguous
zone” of UNCLOS, say that different kinds of punishment other than monetary (for
example, imprisonment) may be applied by a coastal State only for such ship-source
pollution violations in its territorial sea which render passage of a foreign ship
through this territorial sea non-innocent. Later it will be explained that none of the
ship-source pollution accidents renders passage of a foreign ship which caused the
pollution non-innocent. Thus, in principle, under Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS, a
ship-source pollution accident can never result in any sanctions other than monetary.
Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS provide a very strong safeguard for seafarers
on board foreign ships. It may trigger, and indeed has triggered, the conclusion that
these rules were drafted with the purpose, inter alia, to secure human rights of
respective seafarers, particularly their right not to be exposed to disproportionate
sanctions. For example, Murray has concluded that Art. 230 of UNCLOS constitutes
an internationally agreed balance between public concerns about pollution on the one
hand, and the recognised rights of the accused on the other.347 Mukherjee has
concluded that Art. 230 of UNCLOS “is consistent with the fundamental tenet of
346
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penal law that the punishment must be commensurate with the offence”.348 This
author is of the opinion that Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS safeguard the right not
to be exposed to disproportionate sanctions only accidentally. Travaux preparatoires
of UNCLOS show that the primary, if not only, balance for which drafters of
UNCLOS were striving was balance between powers of flag States, coastal States
and port States. Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS were not exceptions in this regard –
also they were drafted primarily to secure balance between powers of flag States,
coastal States and port States, not the balance of sanctions as it is understood under
general principles of punishment.349 As a result, this second type of balance has not
been fully met by respective rules.
First of all, at least in regards to one specific offence, it can be seriously
questioned whether Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS secure balance between the
offence and sanction for this offence (Comparison 1 within the tripartite test of
proportionality of sanctions as it was depicted in Figure 4 of this dissertation). From
systemic interpretation of Art. 230(1) and (2) it must be concluded that a coastal
State cannot punish serious pollution in its EEZ by any penalties other than monetary
even if this pollution is caused intentionally. It is hard to see the balance between
offence and sanction in this situation. Today, society is highly concerned about
environmental protection, therefore monetary penalty only for intentional and serious
pollution is not a proportional sanction (it is too mild a sanction). Intentional and
serious pollution should be strongly discouraged by applying harsh punishment,
irrespective of where this pollution occurs and who causes it. As if the flag State of a
ship in question may apply relatively harsh punishment for intentional and serious
pollution in EEZ of another state. However, exercise of such right would mean that
seafarers who have, in fact, committed the same offence are exposed to different
348
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sanctions just because an investigation is carried out by different states (either a
coastal State, or flag State). It again may raise doubts about proportionality of
sanctions imposed, because, ideally, sanctions must be proportional across countries.
In addition, it may raise doubts about observance of the right to non-discrimination,
because, as it was explained earlier, for any divergent treatment under, in fact,
similar circumstances very strong justification is required.
Secondly, Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS do not secure balance of sanctions
for different offences (Comparison 2 within the tripartite test of proportionality of
sanctions as it was depicted in Figure 4 of this dissertation). Art. 230(1) and (2)
safeguard against penalties other than monetary only in the cases of “violations of
law for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment”
(“marine pollution violations”). They do not safeguard against penalties other than
monetary in the cases of a “maritime safety violations” or other types of violations,
for example, non-observance of rules of navigation, causing danger to a ship or
persons on board a ship, failure to comply with directions given by coastal State
authorities, taking charge of a ship whilst under the influence of alcohol or
overloading a ship.350 Yet, after a ship-source pollution accident a seafarer may also
be charged with these violations. Pollution is only the end – harm. Harm always
results from some conduct. Also this conduct, as such, might be defined in national
law as an offence. Similarly, pollution might not be the only harm caused by the
conduct. Also causing of this other harm might be defined in national law as an
offence. In principle, nothing forbids states to do so. Consequently, if after a shipsource pollution accident a seafarer is charged with a “maritime safety violation” or
another type of violation, not a “marine pollution violation”, he still may face
penalties other than monetary,351 even if this “maritime safety violation” or another
type of violation, per se, is relatively petty. Thus, severity of sanctions to which
350
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seafarers can be exposed for, in fact, one and the same conduct becomes dependent
on such technicality as the actual framing of offences in national law.352 Is there any
“cure” for this anomaly? Theoretically – yes. Practically – no (apart from such
radical methods as amendments to UNCLOS or development of relevant new legal
instruments).
Similarly as Art. 217(8) of UNCLOS, also Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS
must be read subject to general human rights considerations thus also subject to the
principle of proportionality of sanctions, which, inter alia, strives to secure
proportionality between sanctions for different offences. So, proportionality between
sanctions for “marine pollution offences”, “maritime safety offences” and other types
of offences should also be secured. If a state fails to follow this requirement when
developing and enforcing its national penal law, theoretically, it can be claimed that
this state violates the human right not to be exposed to disproportionate sanctions.
Possibly, exactly the above-mentioned considerations are those based on which Gold
has concluded:
[...] states, which only have monetary penalties for pollution offences provided in their
maritime legislation, use other legislation, such as marine resource, fisheries, environmental
and coastal protection regulations, to impose criminal sanctions that may include
imprisonment. It is quite clear that such procedures are all in breach of UNCLOS.353

Yet, actually, the issue is not as straightforward as Gold poses, because to succeed
with the claim that the sanction for a particular “maritime safety offence” or other
type of offence is not proportional to the sanction for a particular “marine pollution
offence” is almost impossible. Why “almost impossible”? Because, as we know
already, there is no international standard which allows to put all offences in an
unquestionable hierarchy of seriousness and to apportion sanctions for them
accordingly. Only extremely disproportionate sanctions can be detected and proven
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relatively easily. Proportionality of other sanctions is, as ECtHR puts it, “the subject
of rational debate and civilised disagreement”.
Furthermore, it is impossible, and even absurd, to subordinate all national
penal law systems to two very specific sectoral international penal law provisions
(what Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS are). While such subordination, perhaps, is
still possible (although, doubtfully) in regards to all violations in the maritime
domain, it is absolutely impossible in regards to violations in other domains, because
UNCLOS cannot dictate for these other fields. Yet, balance between sanctions for
violations in different fields is also essential for securing a truly proportional
sanctioning system. In other words, Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS are pulled out of
a broader penal law system, and, as a result, destroy this system. Any very specific
sectoral international penal law provision does so.354 Consequently, such provisions
are very rare. Usually, development of specific sanctions is left to the national level.
As de la Rue and Anderson have put it:
Generally the international community has been slow to adopt laws which encroach on the
sovereignty of states in respect of criminal proceedings, and this is particularly so in relation
to penalties.355

Due to the above-mentioned reasons, this author is of the opinion that the very
existence of Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS is an unfortunate fact.
All the above criticisms addressing Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS does not
mean that this author does not support the general idea for necessity to safeguard
seafarers against too severe sanctions (what Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS among
other things, intentionally or unintentionally, nevertheless do). This author simply
does not support such safeguarding with the methods which are detrimental to other
important interests, such as a balanced overall penal law system. One may argue that
the balanced overall penal law system is not of direct importance for people within
the maritime sector; consequently, the maritime industry should not care about the
354
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respective system. However, this is not true. The maritime industry, as a responsible
player of a global society, must look to its sector in context, it must have a crosssectoral (wider) view in mind when developing its own rules.
All the above criticisms of Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS also does not
mean that respective legal norms can be ignored. For State Parties to UNCLOS they
are binding international law, but under the general principle pacta sunt servanda
(“agreements must be observed”) binding international law should be followed, until
it is changed. Results of relevant studies suggest, though, that many states do ignore
Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS. For example, after analysis of the results of the
CMI study on fair treatment of seafarers,356 Mukherjee has concluded: “What
becomes clear when the various responses are reviewed is that the strictures of
Article 230 of UNCLOS are often ignored”.357 Presumably, this is attributable to the
drawbacks of that Article.

3.4. Right to Fair Trial and UNCLOS
3.4.1. Introduction
There are not many rules in UNCLOS which are directly linked to specific
rights under the fair trial umbrella. However, there are some, also such which relate
to ship-source pollution accidents. Thus, Art. 228(2) is linked to the right not to be
tried without undue delay. This linkage is analysed in Sub-chapter 3.4.2. Art. 223 is
linked to the right of a charged person to examine witnesses against him and to
obtain the examination of witnesses on his behalf. This linkage is analysed in Subchapter 3.4.3. Finally, Art. 218(4) and 228 are linked to the right not to be tried or
punished twice for the same offence. This linkage is analysed in Sub-chapter 3.4.4.
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3.4.2. Right to Be Tried Without Undue Delay
Sub-chapter 2.5.8 above explained the general content of the right to be tried
without undue delay. One of the instruments which helps to secure this right is
negative prescription. Negative prescription is “the extinction of a title or right by
failure to claim or exercise it over a long period”.358 UNCLOS sets one such negative
prescription in regards to ship-source pollution violations. Art. 228(2) of UNCLOS
states: “Proceedings to impose penalties on foreign vessels shall not be instituted
after the expiry of three years from the date on which the violation was committed
[...]”. Consequently, if this negative prescription is not followed in national law and
practices of the State Party to UNCLOS, this state violates not only UNCLOS, but
also the human right to fair trial.
3.4.3. Right of a Charged Person to Examine Witnesses Against Him and to
Obtain the Examination of Witnesses on His Behalf
Sub-chapter 2.5.11 above explained the general content of the right of a
charged person to examine witnesses against him and to obtain the examination of
witnesses on his behalf. It, inter alia, explained that the term “witness” in relation to
human rights means any statement produced at the pre-trial stage or during the trial
and taken account of.
Art. 223 of UNCLOS sets the obligation on states instituting proceedings
against the person for pollution violation to take measures to facilitate the hearing of
witnesses and the admission of evidence submitted by authorities of another state, or
by the competent international organization. These witness statements and other
evidence submitted by authorities of another state or by the competent international
organization may as well be favourable to the seafarer accused for the violation. If
so, their non-admission violates not only UNCLOS but also the human right to fair
trial.
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3.4.4. Right Not to Be Tried or Punished Twice for the Same Offence
Sub-chapter 2.5.15 above explained the general content of the right not to be
tried or punished twice for the same offence. It, inter alia, explained that under the
majority of human rights instruments the right not to be tried or punished twice is
limited to a particular geographical area – either one country, or all EU countries.
Only the American Convention on Human Rights does not set any geographical
limitations. Therefore, it can be assumed that in the Americas it is not permissible for
a state to try a person already sentenced for the same offence by a court in this
particular country as well as any other country.
Art. 218(4) and 228 of UNCLOS establish when a coastal State or port State
should suspend or terminate proceedings in regards to pollution violation upon taking
of these proceedings by another state. On the one hand, respective legal norms strive
to preclude double jeopardy across all countries in the world. Under specific
circumstances described by these legal norms: if a flag State (wherever in the world
it is located) pre-empts proceedings initiated by a coastal State or port State, this
coastal State or port State should suspend and later terminate its proceedings; if a
coastal State (wherever in the world it is located) pre-empts proceedings initiated by
a port State, this port State must terminate its proceedings. In this regard, UNCLOS
is beneficial to seafarers – it safeguards seafarers against double jeopardy similar to
the American Convention on Human Rights (without geographical limitations).
On the other hand, Art. 228(1) of UNCLOS allows not to follow the general
obligation to suspend proceedings on request of the flag State:
1) if proceedings relate to a case of major damage to the coastal State;
2) if the flag State in question has repeatedly disregarded its obligation to
enforce effectively the applicable international rules and standards in respect
to violations committed by its ships.
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What constitutes “major damage to the coastal State” or “flag State which has
repeatedly disregarded its obligations” must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Unfortunately, there are no clear-cut standards. Non-existence of the clear-cut
standard of “major damage to the coastal State” is understandable – as what is small
damage in regards to a wealthy state might be major damage in regards to a poor
state. Thus, the concept of “major damage to the coastal State”, indeed, is relative.
Yet, the concept of “flag State which has repeatedly disregarded its obligations” is
not so relative. Nevertheless, there is also no relevant standard in this regard. As
Dzidzornu has put it:
It is not clear what may constitute a standard of ineffective enforcement by a flag state. Nor
is it clear how many times or under what circumstances the failure of a flag state to punish its
offending vessels would come within the criterion of repeated disregard by the flag state of
“its obligations to enforce effectively the applicable international rules and standards in
respect of violations committed by its vessels” so as to constitute a bar to its right to pre-empt
further enforcement actions taken by coastal states against its vessels.
[…] it appears that a claim that a flag state should lose its right of pre-emption regarding any
future violations involving its vessels cannot be sustained.359

Pozdnakova is not so pessimistic in her conclusions. She argues that, in principle, it
is possible to identify “a flag State which has repeatedly disregarded its obligations”,
for example, by finding out that a particular state is on “blacklists” prepared under
different MoUs on Port State Control (such as Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU).360 The
above-mentioned “blacklists”, indeed, indicate bad performance of particular flag
States. However, these lists are not created directly for the purpose of Art. 228 of
UNCLOS. Consequently, their utilisation for the respective purpose still risks to be
considered by others as “self-serving and insufficient to sustain enforcement”.361 In
the opinion of this author, a helping hand for determining “flag States which have
repeatedly disregarded their obligations” could be provided by IMO – by clearly
identifying such states after carrying out audits in accordance with the IMO Member
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State Audit Scheme. Anyway, both exceptions from the general obligation to
suspend proceedings on request of the flag State – the exception of “major damage to
the coastal State” and the exception of “flag State which has repeatedly disregarded
its obligations” – if applied in practice, may lead to parallel proceedings in different
states. Furthermore, Art. 228(3) states that nothing can preclude a flag State to take
any measures, including proceedings to impose penalties, according to its laws
irrespective of prior proceedings by another State. Also this rule, if applied in
practice, may lead to double jeopardy.
However, Art. 228(3) of UNCLOS states that a flag State may take any
measures, including proceedings to impose penalties, irrespective of prior
proceedings by another State only “according to its laws”, but for the State Party to
the American Convention on Human Rights this convention is “its law” and for the
State Party to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union this charter
is “its law”. Furthermore, as it will be explained later, Art. 300 of UNCLOS requires
State Parties to exercise any rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in the
Convention subject to human rights (thus, also the right not to be tried or punished
twice for the same offence). Consequently, despite the fact that Art. 228(1) of
UNCLOS contains exceptions to the general rule to suspend proceedings and Art.
228(3) of UNCLOS contains an exception to the general rule not to initiate
proceedings, if the state is bound by the American Convention on Human Rights, it
must, anyway, suspend or not initiate proceedings once another state has delivered
final judgment in the case, and if the state is bound by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, it must, anyway, suspend or not initiate proceedings
once another EU Member State has delivered final judgment in the case. 362
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3.5. Right to Non-Discrimination and UNCLOS
In some of its legal norms UNCLOS directly requires observance of the right
to non-discrimination; for example, in Art. 227 and 234. Yet, respective requirements
have little added value – predominantly they serve just as reminders of the right
which should be observed anyway, because it is a general human right.
Consequently, there is not much to discuss in regards to respective requirements. The
only thing, perhaps, which can be stressed in this regard is that, to some extent,
discrimination within the maritime domain, indeed, exists. It is evident, for example,
from the M/V “VIRGINIA G” case, in which ITLOS noted that Guinea-Bissau
arrested and confiscated Virginia G – the ship alleged of illegal bunkering – while
other ships which had basically committed the same violation were just fined or were
not punished at all.363
Separate discussion deserves the fact that by some of its rules UNCLOS itself
triggers discrimination. For instance, it triggers discrimination on the basis of
nationality (nationality of a ship). Many articles in Section 7 “Safeguards” of Part
XII “Protection and preservation of the marine environment” of UNCLOS provide
safeguards only to foreign ships. For example:
•

Art. 224 states that the powers of enforcement against foreign vessels may
only be exercised by officials or by warships, military aircraft, or other ships
or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service
and authorized to that effect;

•

Art. 225 states that in the exercise of their powers of enforcement against
foreign vessels, States shall not endanger the safety of navigation;

•

Art. 227 states that in exercising their rights and performing their duties,
States shall not discriminate in form or in fact against vessels of any other
State;
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•

Art. 228(2) states that proceedings to impose penalties on foreign vessels
shall not be instituted after the expiry of three years from the date on which
the violation was committed;

•

Art. 230(1) and (2) state that monetary penalties only may be imposed with
respect to particular pollution violations committed by foreign vessels;

•

Art. 230(3) states that in the conduct of proceedings in respect to particular
pollution violations committed by a foreign vessel which may result in the
imposition of penalties, recognised rights of the accused shall be observed.

It is rather clear why the above-mentioned rules refer only to foreign ships – because
the general purpose of these rules is to minimize extensive enforcement against
foreign ships.364 This purpose is understandable and valid. However, linking of
respective rules only to foreign ships can trigger the conclusion that it is allowed to
not provide the given safeguards to non-foreign ships and persons on board these
ships. In other words, that in relation to non-foreign ships it is allowed:
•

to exercise powers of enforcement by officials who are not authorized to that
effect;

•

to exercise powers of enforcement by endangering the safety of navigation;

•

to exercise rights and duties by discriminating in form or in fact against nonforeign ships;

•

to impose penalties other than monetary for the same offences for which
persons on board foreign ships cannot be exposed to penalties other than
monetary;

•
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Rather obviously, such interpretation, triggered by mere wording of legal norms in
Section 7 of Part XII of UNCLOS, is unacceptable. It can lead to the situation when
in relation to an, in fact, one and the same alleged violation one group of seafarers is
left without relevant safeguards compared to another group of seafarers solely on the
basis of the nationality of the ship they are serving on.365
However, again, it must be kept in mind that the rights, jurisdiction and
freedoms recognized in UNCLOS should be exercised subject to human rights (so,
also the right to non-discrimination). Consequently, the above-mentioned legal
norms from Section 7 of Part XII of UNCLOS must be interpreted as providing the
safeguards incorporated in these legal norms to all ships, not only to foreign ships.366
It was possible for drafters of UNCLOS not to cause any doubt that respective legal
norms, indeed, apply to all ships, not only to foreign ships. It could be done by
supporting relevant proposals expressed during the drafting process, for example, the
proposal by the Soviet Union to incorporate in UNCLOS a new Part XIV bis titled
“General Safeguards”, or the proposal by Kenya to include in UNCLOS following
general rule: “States shall ensure that marine pollution control measures shall not
discriminate in form or fact between States or persons”. Unfortunately, these
proposals were not supported.367
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3.6. Human Rights and Legal Norms of UNCLOS on Jurisdiction
3.6.1. Introduction
Application of any criminal procedure or sanction against a seafarer after a
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident by the state which does not have
jurisdiction to do it or by the official who does not have jurisdiction to do it
constitutes violation of human rights of this seafarer – the right to fair trial and,
where applicable, also the right to liberty.368 UNCLOS indicates which states have
criminal jurisdiction over large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents (see Subchapter 3.6.2 below). To some extent, it also indicates officials who have jurisdiction
over respective accidents (see Sub-chapter 3.6.3 below).
3.6.2. Criminal Jurisdiction of States
Before starting to examine, in detail, rules of UNCLOS which indicate which
states have criminal jurisdiction over large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents,
it is necessary to have a brief look into the classification of this jurisdiction.
First of all, on the basis of specific competencies what particular jurisdiction
entails, any jurisdiction can be divided into two broad groups: legislative (or
prescriptive) jurisdiction, that which gives competence to prescribe law, and
enforcement jurisdiction, that which gives competence to enforce law. Competence
to enforce law can be further divided into several sub-competencies, such as
competence to arrest (arrest jurisdiction) and competence of the court to deal with
alleged breaches of the law (judicial jurisdiction).369 Legislative jurisdiction and
enforcement jurisdiction are inseparably linked. As Brownlie puts it: “The one is a
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function of the other.”370 Indeed, law without corresponding enforcement is useless,
consequently, enactment of any law carries with it a presumption of future
enforcement,371 but enforcement without corresponding law is impossible (or rather –
physically still possible, but unlawful), because enforcement is determined by law.
Secondly, on the basis of the status of the state exercising jurisdiction,
jurisdiction in maritime domain can be divided into three broad groups: flag State
jurisdiction, coastal State jurisdiction and port State jurisdiction.
Thirdly, jurisdiction in maritime domain can be divided on the basis of the
maritime zone in regards to which jurisdiction is exercised. Maritime zones are
several: internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, archipelagic waters, EEZ,
high seas, continental shelf and the Area. Internal waters comprise those parts of the
sea that lie on the landward side of the baselines from which a state’s territorial sea is
measured.372 Territorial sea is a belt of sea adjacent to internal waters of a state. In
accordance with Art. 3 of UNCLOS the breath of territorial sea may not exceed 12
nautical miles. In addition, Art. 12 explains:
Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unloading and anchoring of ships, and
which would otherwise be situated wholly or partly outside the outer limit of the territorial
sea, are included in the territorial sea.

Contiguous zone is a belt of sea adjacent to territorial sea of a state. In accordance
with Art. 33(2) of UNCLOS the breath of contiguous zone may not exceed 24
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured. In this zone state may exercise the control necessary to prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws within its territory
(including, territorial sea).373 Ship-source oil pollution accidents are not infringement
of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws. Therefore, jurisdiction of states in
regards to activities in their contiguous zones will not be addressed further in this
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sub-chapter. Archipelagic waters are waters of an archipelagic state enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines.374 Although some uncertainties exist in this regard, this author
agrees with the opinion of Shearer who has concluded that regarding jurisdiction
over ship-source pollution violations regime of archipelagic waters should be
equated with the regime of territorial sea.375 Consequently, further in this sub-chapter
archipelagic waters will not be addressed separately, but, simply, anything what will
be said regarding jurisdiction in territorial sea should also be associated with
jurisdiction in archipelagic waters. Similarly as is a contiguous zone, EEZ is an area
adjacent to territorial sea of a state. However, EEZ exists for other purposes than a
contiguous zone. In accordance with Art. 56(1) of UNCLOS, in its EEZ a state has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.

In accordance with Art. 57 of UNCLOS, the breath of EEZ may not exceed 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured. High seas are all parts of the sea that are not included in EEZ, territorial
sea, archipelagic waters or internal waters of a state.376 A continental shelf is the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.377 The Area is the seabed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.378
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Jurisdiction of states in regards to activities in their continental shelf and the Area
will not be addressed further in this sub-chapter, because respective jurisdiction does
not embody rights directly related to ship-source pollution.
In practice there might be situations when a maritime accident, itself, occurs
in one maritime zone, but afterwards a ship involved in this accident proceeds to
another maritime zone (outwards or inwards). This practicality is taken into
consideration when further in this sub-chapter enforcement jurisdiction is addressed,
because in some instances enforcement jurisdiction of a state changes from this mere
fact that after the accident a ship in question proceed outwards or inwards.
3.6.2.1. Legislative Jurisdiction of a Flag State
Under customary international law, a flag State has legislative jurisdiction
over ships of its nationality,379 irrespectively of where these ships are located at a
particular point of time.380 UNCLOS obliges a flag State to exercise this jurisdiction.
In regards to ship-source pollution, relevant obligation is incorporated in Art. 211(2)
of UNCLOS, which reads as follows:
States shall adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
of the marine environment from vessels flying their flag or of their registry. Such laws and
regulations shall at least have the same effect as that of generally accepted international rules
and standards established through the competent international organization or general
diplomatic conference.

Art. 211(2) of UNCLOS does not specify exactly what measures flag States may
prescribe for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine
environment from their ships. Consequently, in principle, these measures may as
well be criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against seafarers after a largescale ship-source oil pollution accident.
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3.6.2.2. Enforcement Jurisdiction of a Flag State
Pozdnakova asserts: “Flag States have unlimited jurisdiction to enforce their
laws vis-a-vis their own ships.”381 Even if one disagrees with Pozdnakova that
enforcement jurisdiction of flag States vis-a-vis their ships is unlimited, he still must
agree that this jurisdiction is very wide. It is evident from the flag State enforcement
obligations incorporated in UNCLOS. In regards to ship-source pollution, relevant
obligations are incorporated in Art. 217(1) of UNCLOS, which reads as follows:
States shall ensure compliance by vessels flying their flag or of their registry with applicable
international rules and standards, established through the competent international
organization or general diplomatic conference, and with their laws and regulations adopted in
accordance with this Convention for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the
marine environment from vessels and shall accordingly adopt laws and regulations and take
other measures necessary for their implementation. Flag States shall provide for the effective
enforcement of such rules, standards, laws and regulations, irrespective of where a violation
occurs.

Similarly as Art. 211(2) of UNCLOS does not specify exactly what measures flag
States may prescribe for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the
marine environment from their ships, Art. 217(1) of UNCLOS does not specify
exactly what enforcement measures flag States may apply to ensure that their ships
comply with relevant rules, standards, laws and regulations. Consequently, again, in
principle, these measures may as well be criminal procedures and sanctions
applicable against seafarers after a large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident.
Yet, an important aspect to note is that enforcement jurisdiction of the flag
State is geographically limited to its land territory, internal waters, territorial sea,
EEZ, high seas and EEZs of other states, because exercise of enforcement measures
in the territorial sea or internal waters, or land territory of another state would mean
infringement of the sovereignty of this state.382
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3.6.2.3. Legislative Jurisdiction of a Coastal State over Violations in Its Internal
Waters
UNCLOS does not address the issue of legislative jurisdiction of a coastal
State over violations in its internal waters. Yet, customary international law grants to
a coastal State, in principle, unrestricted legislative jurisdiction over foreign ships383
in its internal waters. As Pozdnakova has put it: “[...] a coastal State generally has
unrestricted sovereignty under international law to adopt [...] rules concerning
foreign vessels in its internal waters [...].”384 It means that, generally, a coastal State
may also adopt rules on criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against
seafarers on board foreign ships alleged of causing a large-scale ship-source oil
pollution accident in internal waters of a respective coastal State.
3.6.2.4. Enforcement Jurisdiction of a Coastal State over Violations in Its
Internal Waters
Scenario “internal waters – internal waters”
A foreign ship is alleged to have carried out in the internal waters of the state
conduct resulting in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the
pollution is the internal waters of this state (in addition, possibly also other areas) and
the ship in question is still in the internal waters of the state.
Similarly as a coastal State has, in principle, unrestricted legislative
jurisdiction over foreign ships in its internal waters, it also has, in principle,
unrestricted enforcement jurisdiction over foreign ships in its internal waters. As
Pozdnakova has put it: “[...] a coastal State generally has unrestricted sovereignty
under international law to [...] apply rules concerning foreign vessels in its internal
waters [...].”385 Thus, also under the Scenario “internal waters – internal waters”,
generally, a coastal State may apply different kinds of enforcement measures against
383

As it was explained already earlier, also in regards to coastal State jurisdiction word “ship”
generally must be understood as encompassing not only ship itself, but also every thing on it, and
every person involved or interested in its operations.
384
POZDNAKOVA, supra note 381 at p. 240. See also MOLENAAR, supra note 382 at p. 186.
385
POZDNAKOVA, ibid. at p. 240. See also Robin Rolf Churchill and Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law
of the Sea, 3rd edition, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999 at p. 65.

143

a foreign ship in question, including criminal procedures and sanctions against
seafarers on board this ship.
As a matter of comity, coastal States exercise their enforcement jurisdiction
against foreign ships in their internal waters only in cases where the interests of a
particular coastal State are engaged. Matters relating solely to “internal economy”
(internal matters) of the ship tend, in practice, to be left to the authorities of the flag
State.386 Yet, large-scale oil pollution in internal waters of a particular state
undoubtedly affects the interests of that state. Consequently, it cannot be reasonably
expected that under the Scenario “internal waters – internal waters” a coastal State
will refrain from exercising its enforcement jurisdiction.
Scenario “internal waters – territorial sea”
A foreign ship is alleged to have carried out in the internal waters of the state
conduct resulting in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the
pollution is the internal waters of this state (in addition, possibly also other areas),
but the ship in question has already left the internal waters and is now in the
territorial sea of the state (is outward-bound).
Art. 27(2) of UNCLOS states that the limitations of criminal jurisdiction on
foreign ships in territorial sea mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this article
[...] do not affect the right of the coastal State to take any steps authorized by its laws for the
purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial
sea after leaving internal waters.

The above-mentioned legal norm, inter alia, indicates that the coastal State in its
territorial sea may exercise criminal jurisdiction over a foreign ship alleged of
committing crime in its internal waters just like this ship would still have been
present in internal waters – as limitations of criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships
otherwise applicable in territorial sea are not applicable in a situation when a ship is
passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters (is outward-bound).
386
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O’Connel has referred to such a situation as prolongation of the sojourn in internal
waters.387 In other words, it is recognised that there is a certain persistence of the
rights of a coastal State in its internal waters, even when the ship alleged to commit a
crime in these waters ceases to be within them.388 Thus, also under the Scenario
“internal waters – territorial sea” a coastal State may apply enforcement measures
against the foreign ship in question, just like this ship would still have been present
in internal waters.
3.6.2.5. Legislative Jurisdiction of a Coastal State over Violations in Its
Territorial Sea
In accordance with Art. 2 of UNCLOS, a coastal State has sovereignty over
its territorial sea. However, this sovereignty should be exercised subject to UNCLOS
and other rules of international law.389
Art. 17 of UNCLOS states that foreign ships have the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea. In accordance with Art. 19(1) of UNCLOS,
passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal State. Art. 19(2)(h) explicitly indicates what acts of pollution are
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State – acts of wilful
and serious pollution contrary to UNCLOS. Large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents cause “serious pollution”. However, they are still just accidents, so not
“wilful” conducts. Consequently, none of the large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents will render passage of a ship which caused pollution non-innocent. Yet, it
does not automatically mean that a coastal State has no legislative jurisdiction over
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents in its territorial sea.
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Art. 21(1) as well as Art. 211(4) of UNCLOS give to a coastal State right to
adopt laws and regulations in respect of the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution in its territorial sea, including pollution from foreign ships exercising their
right of innocent passage. Art. 21(4) imposes on foreign ships exercising the right of
innocent passage obligation to comply with all such laws and regulations. Similarly
as Art. 211(2) of UNCLOS does not specify exactly what measures flag States may
prescribe for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from their ships, Art.
21(1) and 211(4) of UNCLOS do not specify exactly what measures coastal States
may prescribe for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from foreign
ships in their territorial seas. Consequently, again, in principle, coastal States may
adopt different kinds of laws and regulations, including ones on criminal procedures
and sanctions applicable against seafarers on board a foreign ship alleged of causing
a large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident.
Yet, it must be kept in mind that there exist some specific limitations of
legislative jurisdiction of a coastal State over foreign ships in its territorial seas. One
of such limitations is incorporated in Art. 21(2) of UNCLOS, which provides that
laws which a coastal State adopts in regards to innocent passage through its territorial
sea shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign
ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or
standards (what should be understood by “generally accepted international rules or
standards” will be explained later). Another specific limitation of legislative
jurisdiction of a coastal State over foreign ships in its territorial sea is incorporated in
Art. 42(1)(b) of UNCLOS, which provides that, where the territorial sea consists of a
strait subject to the regime of transit passage, pollution regulations may be adopted
only if they give effect to applicable international regulations (what should be
understood by “applicable international regulations” also will be explained later).
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3.6.2.6. Enforcement Jurisdiction of a Coastal State over Violations in Its
Territorial Sea
Scenario “territorial sea – territorial sea”
A foreign ship is alleged to have carried out in the territorial sea of the state conduct
resulting in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the pollution is
the territorial sea of this state (in addition, possibly also other areas) and the ship in
question is still in the territorial sea of the state.
As it was already stated above, Art. 211(4) of UNCLOS gives a coastal State
the right to adopt laws and regulations in respect to the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution in its territorial sea, including pollution from foreign ships
exercising their right of innocent passage. Nevertheless, the same legal norm notes
that these laws and regulations shall not hamper innocent passage. Similarly, Art.
220(2) of UNCLOS, on the one hand, gives a coastal State right to undertake
physical inspection of the foreign ship navigating in its territorial sea (when there are
clear grounds for believing that during its passage the ship has violated laws and
regulations in respect to prevention, reduction and control of pollution) and, where
the evidence so warrants, to institute relevant proceedings, including detention of the
ship.390 On the other hand, the same legal norm retains general limitation of not
hampering innocent passage (by stating that all above-mentioned enforcement
measures should be carried out “without prejudice to the application of the relevant
provisions of Part II, section 3”, that is, provisions on innocent passage through the
territorial sea). Yet, such enforcement measures like physical inspection and
detention of the ship or arrest of crew always hampers innocent passage (or rather –
any passage, innocent on non-innocent). Pozdnakova thinks alike. She has stated:
“Clearly, the exercise of an enforcement measure such as the physical inspection of a
ship in transit would (at least temporarily) interrupt the vessel’s passage for the
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duration of the inspection.”391 If so, do Art. 211(4) and Art. 220(2) of UNCLOS, in
fact, say that a coastal State has the right to apply such enforcement measures like
physical inspection and detention of the ship, or arrest of crew only against those
foreign ships whose passage through the territorial sea of a respective coastal State is
non-innocent?
The question becomes even more complicated after reading Art. 24(1) of
UNCLOS. Art. 24(1) contains what seems to be a cross-reference to Art. 211(4) and
Art. 220(2) – it obliges a coastal State not to hamper innocent passage of foreign
ships through the territorial sea, yet, allows to do so “in accordance with the
Convention” (presumably also Art. 211(4) and Art. 220(2) of the Convention). In
other words, there are mutual saving clauses at both sides of the units to be
interpreted, what just sends the interpreter of these units back and forth, without
giving clear answers. “Saving clause” is a provision in a legal document containing
an exemption from one or more of its conditions or obligations.392
Despite the above-described “tangle” of Art. 24, 211 and 220 of UNCLOS, in
the opinion of this author, it is still possible to conclude that, at least in cases when
particular ship-source pollution in territorial sea is defined as a crime under national
law of the coastal State, this coastal State has the right to apply against the foreign
ship in its territorial sea alleged of causing respective pollution also such
enforcement measures which hamper the passage (like physical inspection and
detention of a ship or arrest of crew), regardless of whether the pollution in question
was caused wilfully and is serious (what renders the passage non-innocent), or was
caused unintentionally and is not serious (what does not render the passage noninnocent). The article that allows making such a conclusion is Art. 27 of UNCLOS,
which deals specifically with criminal jurisdiction on board foreign ships. This
article first of all sets the general rule of non-applicability of criminal jurisdiction of
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the coastal State on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea. Art. 27(1)
states:
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign ship
passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in
connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage [...]

However afterwards, the same article lists exceptions to this general rule. Among
these exceptions are the following cases:
•

cases when consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;

•

cases when the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the
good order of the territorial sea;

•

cases when the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the
master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag
State.

At least one of the above-mentioned exceptions from the general rule of nonapplicability of criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State on board a foreign ship
passing through the territorial sea will always be present in case of ship-source
pollution – consequences of the crime (pollution) will extend to the coastal State (at
least its territorial sea). Consequently, in case of ship-source pollution the abovementioned general rule of non-applicability of criminal jurisdiction does not work.
Art. 27(1) of UNCLOS is comparatively clear. Also, its underlying idea is
clear – from the commentary of the International Law Commission on its draft article
on arrest on board a foreign ship. This draft article, with only minor additions, later
became Art. 27 of UNCLOS. The commentary stats:
This article enumerates the cases in which the coastal State may stop a foreign ship passing
through its territorial sea for the purpose of arresting persons or conducting an investigation
in connexion with a criminal offence committed on board the ship during the said passage. In
such a case a conflict of interests occurs; on the one hand, there are the interests of shipping,
which should suffer as little interference as possible; on the other hand, there are the interests
of the coastal State, which wishes to enforce its criminal law throughout its territory. The
coastal State's authority to bring the offenders before its courts (if it can arrest them) remains
undiminished, but its power to arrest persons on board ships which are merely passing
through the territorial sea is limited to the cases enumerated in the article.393
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It can be assumed that in regards to criminal jurisdiction also the limitations
on the application of specific enforcement measures due to the need not to hamper
innocent passage (as incorporated in Art. 211(4) and Art. 220(2) of UNCLOS) as
well as the exception from the general rule of not hampering innocent passage (as
incorporated in Art. 24(1) of UNCLOS), in fact, predominantly refer to Art. 27 of
UNCLOS – former to its general rule of non-applicability of criminal jurisdiction,
later to its exceptions from this general rule. This link can be depicted as follows:
Art. 211(4)
Art. 220(2)

General rule

Art. 24(1)

Art. 27(1)

Exceptions

Figure 5 – Flow of references in UNCLOS establishing the competence of a coastal State to apply
such criminal enforcement measures which hamper innocent passage through territorial sea.

Many authors have drawn similar conclusions. For example, Shearer has stated:
[...] negligent or less serious acts of pollution, which the coastal State may proscribe under
Articles 21(1)(f) and 211(4), may not make passage non-innocent but may justify the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, including stopping, boarding, arrest and prosecution.394

It means that also under the above-given Scenario “territorial sea – territorial sea” a
coastal State, in principle, may exercise its criminal jurisdiction over the foreign ship
in question; inter alia, it may apply such criminal procedures against the ship and her
crew which hamper innocent passage.
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At the end, a separate note should be made about enforcement jurisdiction of
a coastal State in its territorial sea, where this territorial sea consists of a strait used
for international navigation. Art. 34(1) of UNCLOS states:
The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation [...] shall not in other
respect affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States
bordering the strait of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters [...]

This rule suggests that everything that was said previously regarding enforcement
jurisdiction of a coastal State in the territorial sea is applicable also when territorial
sea forms the strait used for international navigation. There exists discussion on how,
exactly, Art. 233 of UNCLOS “Safeguards with respect to straits used for
international navigation” shall be interpreted – either as limiting jurisdiction of states
bordering the strait over ships in transit passage only to cases when major damage or
the threat of major damage to the marine environment of the strait is caused, or as not
setting such a limitation.395 However, this discussion is irrelevant for the purposes of
this dissertation, because a large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident during
transit passage through the strait will probably always cause major damage or the
threat of major damage to the marine environment of the strait. Consequently, in case
of such accidents, anyway, the general system of jurisdiction will apply.
Scenario “territorial sea – internal waters”
A foreign ship is alleged to have carried out in the territorial sea of the state conduct
resulting in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the pollution is
the territorial sea of this state (in addition, possibly also other areas), but the ship in
question has already left the territorial sea and is now in the internal waters of the
state (is inward-bound).
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Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS states:
When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State
may [...] institute proceedings in respect of any violation of its laws and regulations adopted
in accordance with this Convention or applicable international rules and standards for the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels when the violation has occurred
within the territorial sea [...] of that State.

Literal (philological) interpretation of Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS suggests that in cases
when after alleged ship-source pollution violation in territorial sea of the state
foreign ship proceeds into internal waters of this state (is inward-bound) a coastal
State may exercise its enforcement jurisdiction against this ship only if she is “within
a port or at an off-shore terminal” and only if she is within this port or at this offshore terminal “voluntarily”. It means that a coastal State may not exercise its
enforcement jurisdiction when the ship is in some other place in its internal waters
other than a port or an off-shore terminal and, even if the ship is within a port or at an
off-shore terminal, a coastal State still may not exercise its enforcement jurisdiction
if the ship is there because of force majeure or distress (for what any maritime
accident most probably will qualify).396 Some scholars and judges prefer to adopt the
above-mentioned literal (philological) interpretation of Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS.397
However, the above-given purely literal (philological) interpretation of Art.
220(1) of UNCLOS makes enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State over shipsource pollution violations in its territorial sea extremely restrictive and illogical.
Under respective interpretation, a coastal State is basically forbidden to enforce its
laws and regulations if after an alleged violation a ship has proceeded into the
maritime zone of wider jurisdiction of this state (internal waters), while it could
enforce its laws and regulations if after an alleged violation a ship stayed in the
maritime zone of narrower jurisdiction of this state (territorial sea). From the
396
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perspective of a ship, it means that a foreign ship can escape liability for ship-source
pollution violation in territorial sea of the state just by proceeding into internal waters
of this state after the violation has been committed which appears to be absurd.
Furthermore, enforcement powers given to a coastal State by Art. 220(2) of
UNCLOS, such as power to conduct physical inspection of a ship alleged of shipsource pollution violation in the territorial sea and power to detain this ship and her
crew, if evidence so warrants, at least in some instances, can be realized only by
bringing the ship into a port of the coastal State. Yet, if a coastal State is allowed to
exercise its enforcement jurisdiction only when the ship in question is “voluntarily”
within a port, then any activity of a coastal State related to bringing the ship into a
port as well as any further enforcement measures will become illegal once the ship
crosses the territorial sea - internal waters borderline, which again is plainly absurd.
In the opinion of this author, these “arguments of absurdity”, alone, are enough to
prove that under the Scenario “territorial sea – internal waters” a coastal State may
exercise its enforcement jurisdiction just like under the Scenario “territorial sea –
territorial sea”. Yet, for those who do not see “argument of absurdity” as a strong
enough argument to prove something, systemic interpretation of relevant rules of
UNCLOS can be provided in addition.
In similar cases to the Scenario “territorial sea – internal waters”, when after
an alleged ship-source pollution violation a ship is inward-bound (thus, proceeds into
the maritime zone of wider jurisdiction of a coastal State), UNCLOS recognizes the
right of a coastal State to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction over the ship just as if
this ship was still present in the maritime zone where alleged violation took place, for
example, when after the violation in EEZ a ship is now in territorial sea (see Scenario
“EEZ – EEZ or territorial sea” below). Even in cases when after an alleged shipsource pollution violation a ship is outward-bound (thus, proceeds into the maritime
zones of narrower jurisdiction of a coastal State) UNCLOS recognises the right of a
coastal State to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction over the ship just as if this ship
was still present in the maritime zone where alleged violation took place, for
example, when after the violation in internal waters ship is now in territorial sea (see
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Scenario “internal waters – territorial sea” above) or when after the violation in
internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ ship is now in EEZ, on high seas or in EEZ of
another state, and a coastal State is exercising hot pursuit (see Sub-chapter 3.6.2.9,
“Enforcement Jurisdiction of a Coastal State in Case of Hot Pursuit” below). If so, it
would be logical also in cases when after an alleged ship-source pollution violation
in the territorial sea of the state a ship is now in internal waters of this state to allow
said coastal State to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction over the ship just as if this
ship was still present in the territorial sea.
Travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS are of little help for understanding
whether the above-mentioned power of a coastal State, existence of which is
suggested by common sense and systemic interpretation of UNCLOS, indeed, exists.
Initial drafts of UNCLOS parallel to legal norm which later became Art. 220(1) in
the same article contained legal norm which stated: “Nothing in this Article shall be
construed as affecting the right of States to apply their laws and regulations for
vessels within their internal waters.”398 This legal norm is not present in later drafts.
It suggests that the ultimate intention of the drafters was to “affect the right of states
to apply their laws and regulations for vessels within their internal waters”. Existence
of such intention can be proven also by reference to the fact that during the drafting
of UNCLOS, at informal negotiations, states expressed the view that rule which later
became Art. 220(1) constitutes “an undue interference with the rights of the coastal
State”.399 If it would not be intended by Art. 220(1) to put strong limits on coastal
State jurisdiction in its internal waters, states most probably would not have
expressed the above-mentioned concern. However, it is not clear as to exactly why
initial drafts were changed – it might have been because of deliberate will to limit
coastal State jurisdiction in its internal waters, but it might have, also, well been
because of the belief that nothing can affect coastal State jurisdiction in its internal
waters, where it exercises full sovereignty, and, therefore, it is simply not necessary
to construct additional rules about it. In such case, Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS should
398
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not be seen as a restriction of general regime of coastal State jurisdiction in its
internal waters, but as an “addition” to it. This author supports this conclusion,
because common sense and systemic interpretation of UNCLOS, as described above,
points towards it. At the same time, this author wishes that UNCLOS was clearer on
the issue in question, because, without that, different interpretations are still possible.
What “addition” may Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS possibly bring to the general
regime of coastal State jurisdiction in its internal waters? It must be assumed that
such “addition” indeed exists, because, otherwise, Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS would be
“empty” rule. This author can imagine only one scenario for accommodation of
which Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS exists – the scenario when just after committing an
alleged ship-source pollution violation in the territorial sea a foreign ship proceeds
outwards (not inwards), without hot pursuit being exercised, leaving respective
waters, and, then, after a shorter or longer period returns. It is hard to find strong
evidence, either in UNCLOS, itself, or in other sources, proving that, indeed, Art.
220(1) of UNCLOS exists for accommodation of the above-mentioned scenario.
Consequently, authoritative clarification in this respect is desirable. However, there
is at least one legal norm in UNCLOS – Art. 27(2) – which points towards a
respective conclusion.
Art. 27(2) of UNCLOS prescribes that a coastal State may carry out an arrest
or investigation on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea “after
leaving internal waters”. Such wording of Art. 27(2) suggests that:
•

on the one hand, this legal norm extends coastal State jurisdiction over
violations in its internal waters, as it was described under Scenario “internal
waters – territorial sea” above, but

•

on the other hand, this legal norm limits coastal State jurisdiction over
violations in its internal waters – it forbids a coastal State to carry out an
arrest or investigation on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial
sea if this ship, just after the alleged violation in internal waters, left these
waters as well as territorial sea of the particular state and has now come back
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(is passing through the territorial sea “after leaving EEZ” or other area,
except internal waters of particular state).
Such construction of Art. 27(2) of UNCLOS, in turn, suggests that the intention of
drafters of UNCLOS was to allow a coastal State to apply on-board a foreign ship
enjoying the right of innocent passage such enforcement measures as arrest or
investigation (measures which clearly hamper innocent passage) only when the state
reacts to the alleged violation quickly, but when the state fails to react quickly (when
a ship just after an alleged violation leaves jurisdiction of the particular state, without
hot pursuit being exercised) – to reduce enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State,
presumably, to the limits established by Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS (basically, port
State jurisdiction).
3.6.2.7. Legislative Jurisdiction of a Coastal State over Violations in Its EEZ
As was earlier stated, in accordance with Art. 56(1) of UNCLOS, in its EEZ,
a coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to, among other things, the protection and
preservation of the marine environment. However, this jurisdiction is limited: in
accordance with Paragraph 2 of the same article, in exercising its rights and
performing its duties in EEZ the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of
UNCLOS.
Limitation of legislative jurisdiction of a coastal State over ship-source
pollution violations in its EEZ can be found in Art. 211(5) of UNCLOS. This rule
prescribes that a coastal State may, in respect of its EEZ, adopt only such laws for
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships which conform to and
give effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established
through the competent international organization or general diplomatic conference
(hereinafter – “generally accepted international rules and standards”, or GAIRAS).
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Unfortunately, the concept of GAIRAS is so vague that views on its exact
content differ. Some scholars simply associate GAIRAS with IMO standards.400
Others limit GAIRAS to only those IMO standards which are widely ratified.401 This
author, however, tends to follow the explanation of GAIRAS given by the
International Law Association, specifically its Committee on Coastal State
Jurisdiction Relating to Marine Pollution, because the final report of this Committee
seems to be the document which, at least so far, has analysed the concept of
GAIRAS in the most comprehensive manner. In accordance with this report,
GAIRAS are rules and standards supported by sufficient state practice.402 Exactly the
practice of states is the central element for determining whether a particular rule or
standard may be considered as generally accepted.403 Consequently, there might be
rules and standards which formally are not binding law (for example, rules of
particular IMO resolution), but are still GAIRAS, because, in practice, states widely
apply this soft law. Also the opposite is true – there might be rules and standards
which formally are binding law for a particular state (for example, rules of particular
IMO convention), but, nevertheless, are not GAIRAS, because either the legal
instrument in question is poorly ratified or it has not been implemented wide enough,
despite being widely ratified. A case might also be that some parts of the single
instrument are implemented wide enough (and consequently constitute GAIRAS),
but other parts of the same instrument are not implemented wide enough (and
consequently do not constitute GAIRAS).404
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The main problem in regards to GAIRAS is non-existence of clear-cut criteria
for determining whether a particular degree of acceptance of a rule or standard is
high enough to reach the threshold of “generally accepted”. The Committee on
Coastal State Jurisdiction Relating to Marine Pollution, in its report, concluded that
the concept of GAIRAS was intentionally kept vague to allow flexibility to changing
practices and that this vagueness should not be considered as impediment. Despite
this conclusion, this author agrees with those members of the Committee who urged
for more precision, through the establishment of the internationally agreed minimum
requirements to be met for a rule or standard to be considered as “generally
accepted”.405 Without such internationally agreed criteria, it is almost impossible for
a coastal State to legislate upon activities of foreign ships in its EEZ, without fearing
to overstep limits of its legislative jurisdiction established by UNCLOS.
The concept of GAIRAS stands very close to the concept of customary
international law. Just like GAIRAS, customary international law is generally
accepted practice.406 Yet, GAIRAS may be less generally accepted than customary
international law.407 Thus, customary international law, in fact, is one of the subtypes of GAIRAS – those GAIRAS which have reached a very high level of
acceptance. Presumably, it is relatively easy to identify such a high level of
acceptance. Consequently, a coastal State can legislate upon those GAIRAS which
have reached the level of customary international law more safely.
It can be argued that the general prohibition of ship-source oil pollution (as it
is incorporated in Reg. 15 and 34 of Annex I of MARPOL) has reached the level of
customary international law, or at least “ordinary” GAIRAS. Similar argument can
be made in regards to those legal norms in IMO “safety conventions” (such as
SOLAS, COLREG, STCW) non-observance of which can potentially lead to shipsource oil pollution. Consequently, if national law on criminal procedures and
sanctions applicable against seafarers on-board a foreign ship alleged of causing a
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large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident in EEZ of the state conforms to and
gives effect to the above-mentioned legal norms of MARPOL and IMO “safety
conventions”, the respective state most probably has not overstepped the limits of its
legislative jurisdiction under UNCLOS.
At the end of this sub-chapter, a separate note should be made about icecovered areas within the limits of EEZ, because UNCLOS contains special rule –
Art. 234 – on such areas. Art. 234 states:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations
for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered
areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic
conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment
could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws
and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the
marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.

The exact content of Art. 234, particularly its correlation with the general regime of
coastal State jurisdiction, is not fully clear, and, consequently, requires further
research.408 However, the mere existence of Art. 234 suggests that in regards to shipsource pollution in specific ice-covered areas within the limits of its EEZ (icecovered areas, “where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice
covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance”) a coastal State has wider
jurisdiction compared to other areas within the same maritime zone. Thus, it should
be concluded that in regards to ship-source pollution in respective ice-covered areas
a state may legislate beyond GAIRAS as long as the adopted law is “nondiscriminatory” and pays due regard to “navigation and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific
evidence”.
408
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3.6.2.8. Enforcement Jurisdiction of a Coastal State over Violations in Its EEZ
Scenario “EEZ – EEZ or territorial sea”
A foreign ship is alleged to have carried out in the EEZ of the state conduct resulting
in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the pollution is the EEZ
of this state (in addition, possibly also other areas) and the ship in question is either
still in the EEZ of the state or has left the EEZ and is now in the territorial sea of the
state (is inward-bound).
Similar to the legislative jurisdiction of a coastal State over ship-source
pollution violations in its EEZ, enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State over shipsource pollution violations in its EEZ is also limited. Limitations of respective
enforcement jurisdiction can be found in Art. 220(3), (5) and (6) as well as Art.
228(1) of UNCLOS. Limitations in Art. 220(3) and Art. 228(1) are not applicable to
situations which involve large-scale pollution. Thus, in relation to the Scenario “EEZ
– EEZ or territorial sea” only Art. 220(5) and (6) of UNCLOS should be considered.
Art. 220(5) states:
Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the exclusive
economic zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone,
committed a violation referred to in paragraph 3 resulting in a substantial discharge causing
or threatening significant pollution of the marine environment, the State may undertake
physical inspection of the vessel for matters related to the violation if the vessel has refused
to give information or if the information supplied by the vessel is manifestly at variance with
the evident factual situation and if the circumstances of the case justify such inspection.

Art. 220(6) states:
Where there is clear objective evidence that a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic
zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a
violation referred to in paragraph 3 resulting in a discharge causing major damage or threat
of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, or to any resources
of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone, that State may [...], provided that the
evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, in accordance
with its laws.
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The difference between Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 6 is that Paragraph 5 talks about
situations when discharge causes or threatens “significant pollution of the marine
environment”, but Paragraph 6 talks about situations when discharge causes or
threatens “major damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, or to
any resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone”. Unfortunately,
UNCLOS does not give any guidelines on how to distinguish the “situation of
significant pollution” from the “situation of major damage”. Many commentators
have acknowledged this fact.409 As a result, Churchill and Lowe concluded that, in
practice, states simply will tend to assume that any significant discharge falls into
“situation of major damage” category.410 If so, only Art. 220(6) of UNCLOS retains
practical importance in relation to the Scenario “EEZ – EEZ or territorial sea”.
Differently from Paragraphs 3 and 5, Paragraph 6 of Art. 220 does not
contain specific limitations of enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State; under
Paragraph 6 of Art. 220 a coastal State may institute any proceedings.411 However,
Paragraph 6 retains one general limitation. It, just like Paragraphs 3 and 5, covers
only “violations of applicable international rules and standards for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution from vessels or laws and regulations of that state
conforming and giving effect to such rules and standards”. Thus, what a coastal State
may enforce under Art. 220(6) of UNCLOS are only “applicable international rules
and standards”.
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“Applicable international rules and standards” are international rules and
standards which, at the time of the violation, are operational in the direct relationship
between the flag State on the one hand, and the coastal State on the other. In other
words, “applicable international rules and standards” is a relative term: which rules
and standards are “applicable” depends on the various rights and obligations
accepted by the states involved in the enforcement situation. Consequently, before
exercising enforcement jurisdiction under Art. 220(6) of UNCLOS, a coastal State
must determine whether the flag State of a ship involved in the enforcement situation
has accepted certain rights or obligations (in other words, whether rights and
obligations under flag State jurisdiction “match” with rights and obligations under
coastal State jurisdiction). Acceptance of rights and obligations can occur through
various processes, including formal adherence to the legal instrument.412
If both states involved in the enforcement situation are State Parties to
UNCLOS, “applicable international rules and standards” can be nothing else but
GAIRAS, as far as by national law of the coastal State they are required to be
observed in EEZ of this state. It is so because if both states involved in the
enforcement situation are State Parties to UNCLOS:
•

on the one hand, in accordance with Art. 94(5) and Art. 211(2) of UNCLOS,
a flag State is required to observe all GAIRAS. It is obliged to do so even if it
has not formally adhered to the legal instruments containing these GAIRAS –
as the very purpose of introducing the concept of GAIRAS in UNCLOS is to
make compulsory for all states certain rules which had not taken the form of
an international convention in force for the states concerned but which are,
nevertheless, respected by most states.413

•

on the other hand, a coastal State is permitted to adopt only such laws for the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships in its EEZ, which
conform to GAIRAS. So, nothing more, but possibly less, than GAIRAS may
be adopted.
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Here, near the end of this section, again, a separate note should be made
about ice-covered areas. According to Art. 234 of UNCLOS, similarly as legislative
jurisdiction, also enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State in regards to ship-source
pollution in specific ice-covered areas within the limits of its EEZ is wider than
compared to other areas within the same maritime zone. Consequently, it should be
concluded that in regards to ship-source pollution in respective ice-covered areas a
state may enforce not only “applicable international rules and standards” but also
other rules and standards as long as respective enforcement is “non-discriminatory”
and pays due regard to “navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment based on the best available scientific evidence”.
Scenario “EEZ – internal waters”
A foreign ship is alleged to have carried out in the EEZ of the state conduct resulting
in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the pollution is the EEZ
of this state (in addition, possibly also other areas), but the ship in question has left
the EEZ as well as the territorial sea and is now in the internal waters of the state (is
inward-bound).
Scenario “EEZ – internal waters” is very similar to Scenario “territorial sea –
internal waters”, already analysed above. Everything that was said regarding
Scenario “territorial sea – internal waters”, by analogy, is true in regards to Scenario
“EEZ – internal waters”. The difference between the scenarios is only one: coastal
State jurisdiction over ship-source pollution violations in its territorial sea is not
limited by the requirement of “applicable international rules and standards” as
described under Scenario “EEZ – EEZ or territorial sea” (consequently, this
limitation, also, does not apply when a ship enters internal waters after committing
an alleged violation in the territorial sea), while coastal State jurisdiction over shipsource pollution violations in its EEZ is limited by the requirements of “applicable
international rules and standards” as described under Scenario “EEZ – EEZ or
territorial sea” (consequently, this limitation also applies when a ship enters internal
waters after committing an alleged violation in the EEZ; just like in accordance with
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Art. 220(6) of UNCLOS, it applies when a ship enters the territorial sea after
committing an alleged violation in the EEZ).
3.6.2.9. Enforcement Jurisdiction of a Coastal State in Case of Hot Pursuit
Art. 111(1) of UNCLOS states:
The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the
coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations
of that State.

Consequently, if competent authority of the coastal State has good reason to believe
that by causing large-scale ship-source oil pollution in its internal waters or territorial
sea a foreign ship has violated laws and regulations of the state, for example, its
Criminal Code, that state may commence hot pursuit of the ship in question. Art.
111(2) states: “The right of hot pursuit shall apply mutatis mutandis to violations in
the exclusive economic zone [...]”. Consequently, hot pursuit can be commenced also
after an alleged ship-source pollution violation in EEZ. Hot pursuit can be exercised
as far as EEZ of another state. Such conclusion can be derived from Art. 111(3)
which reads as follows: “The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued
enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State”.
However, it must be kept in mind that who may carry out hot pursuit and
how, is strictly regulated by Art. 111 of UNCLOS. If a state does not follow these
rules, it loses its right to hot pursuit. Rules of hot pursuit under Art. 111 are as
follows:
•

pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is
respectively within internal waters, territorial sea or EEZ of the pursuing
state;

•

outside the territorial sea, pursuit may be continued only if it has not been
interrupted;

•

pursuit may be commenced only after a visual or auditory signal to stop has
been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the ship to be
pursued;
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•

pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships
or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being in government service and
authorised to that effect.

For example, in the M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) case, ITLOS found that in stopping and
arresting Saint Vincent and the Grenadine’s ship Saiga on high seas, Guinea acted in
contravention of Art. 111 of UNCLOS, inter alia, because no visual or auditory
signals were given to Saiga before the alleged pursuit began and because the alleged
pursuit was interrupted.414
Art. 111 of UNCLOS does not explicitly talk about specific enforcement
measures that can be applied against a foreign ship after hot pursuit of that ship.
However, the right of hot pursuit would be an “empty” right if not to assume that
after “catching” the ship as a result of hot pursuit a coastal State has jurisdiction over
this ship mutatis mutandis as in the maritime zone in which an alleged violation took
place.
3.6.2.10. Enforcement Jurisdiction of a Port State
Scenario “high seas – port or off-shore terminal”
A foreign ship is alleged to have carried out on the high seas conduct resulting in
large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the pollution is high seas
(in addition, possibly also other areas) and now the ship in question is within a port
or at an off-shore terminal of the state.
Art. 218(1) of UNCLOS states:
When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State
may [...] undertake investigations and, where the evidence so warrant, institute proceedings
in respect of any discharge from the vessel outside the internal waters, territorial sea or
exclusive economic zone of that State in violation of applicable international rules and
standards established through the competent international organisation or general diplomatic
conference.
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The jurisdictional regime incorporated into Art. 218 of UNCLOS is innovative
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which even has some similarities to universal
jurisdiction.415 Based on this article, the state, in principle, may “undertake
investigations” and “institute proceedings”416 also in case of the above-given
Scenario “high seas – port or off-shore terminal”.
However, port State jurisdiction under Art. 218 of UNCLOS is still strongly
limited by a number of conditions. First, this jurisdiction may not be exercised if the
ship in question is not “voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a
State”.417 Secondly, this jurisdiction may not be exercised if the ship in question has
not violated “applicable international rules and standards”.418 Thirdly, upon request,
the records of the investigation carried out under port State jurisdiction in accordance
with Art. 218 of UNCLOS shall be transmitted to the flag State of a ship in
question.419 Fourthly, if within six months of the date on which proceedings to
impose penalties for ship-source pollution violation were first instituted the flag State
of a ship in question takes the proceedings in respect to corresponding charges,
proceedings applied under port State jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 218 of
UNCLOS shall be suspended. In other words, the flag State may pre-empt respective
proceedings. When proceedings instituted by the flag State have been brought to a
conclusion, the suspended proceedings shall be terminated. Any bond posted or other
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financial security provided in connection with the suspended proceedings shall be
released.420
Scenario “EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of other state – port or off-shore
terminal”
A foreign ship is now within a port or at an off-shore terminal of the state, but
conduct of this ship which resulted in large-scale ship-source oil pollution took place
in EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of another state. The area affected by the
pollution is also respectively EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of this other state
(in addition, possibly also other areas).
Art. 218(1) of UNCLOS does not talk only about ship-source pollution
violations on high seas. It talks about ship-source pollution violations “outside the
internal waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone” of a particular state,
consequently, also about ship-source pollution violations in EEZ, territorial sea or
internal waters of other state.
All limitations of port State jurisdiction in respect to ship-source pollution
violations on high seas, introduced above, under Scenario “high seas – port or offshore terminal” are applicable also in respect to ship-source pollution violations in
EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of other state. However, regarding violations in
EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of another state port State jurisdiction is limited
even further. First, in this case port State jurisdiction cannot be exercised if it is not
requested either by flag State of the ship in question, or by state in EEZ, territorial
sea or internal waters of which the violation took place, or by the state damaged or
threatened by the violation. Without such request, port State jurisdiction can be
exercised only if the violation has caused or is likely to cause pollution in the internal
waters, territorial sea or EEZ of the state instituting the proceedings.421 Secondly,
upon request of the coastal State, records of the investigation carried out under port
State jurisdiction shall be transmitted to the coastal State.422 Thirdly, upon request of
420
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the coastal State, proceedings applied under port State jurisdiction shall be
suspended. The evidence and records of the case, together with any bond or other
financial security posted with the authorities of port State shall be transmitted to the
coastal State. Such transmittal shall preclude the continuation of proceedings in the
port State.423 It must be stressed here that suspension arrangements are slightly
different in cases when a flag State pre-empts proceedings and in cases when a
coastal State pre-empts proceedings. In case when a flag State pre-empts
proceedings, any bond or other financial security which has been already applied can
be kept and lifted only when a flag State has finalised investigation. Such
construction suggests that a port State may re-establish proceedings if a flag State
fails to execute its investigation (although it is not clear under what conditions,
exactly, proceedings in port State may be re-established). In cases when a coastal
State pre-empts proceedings, a port State does not maintain parallel control over the
case – bond or other financial security together with the evidence and records of the
case must be transferred to the coastal State and, after this transfer, proceedings in
the port State must be terminated. In other words, a port State is allowed to control
performance of a flag State, but not a coastal State.424
3.6.2.11. Legislative Jurisdiction of a Port State
The title of Art. 218 of UNCLOS refers only to enforcement. It does not refer
to legislation. There are no other articles in UNCLOS addressing specifically
legislative jurisdiction of a port State in regards to ship-source pollution violations on
high seas or in EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of other state. It may lead to the
conclusion that, in regards to respective violations, a port State has only enforcement
jurisdiction.
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However, Art. 218 of UNCLOS allows a port State to “undertake
investigations”

and

“institute

proceedings”

against

an

alleged

offender.

Consequently, a port State needs national law which accommodates these rights.
Furthermore, not in every case is a port State required, after “undertaking
investigation” and “instituting proceedings”, to pass proceedings on to other state
(flag State or coastal State in question). Consequently, it must be assumed that in
those cases, a port State can bring an alleged offender before its own court. Yet, it is
impossible to do so without existence of national law which defines ship-source
pollution violation on high seas and in EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of
another state as an offence and determines punishment for this offence. Because of
the above-mentioned reasons this author agrees with the position of McDorman, who
has stated:
[...] port State enforcement presupposes that the port State may enact domestic law to deal
with discharges on the high seas or in the waters of another State. Thus, the port State
provision necessarily involves a prescriptive authority.425

3.6.2.12. UNCLOS and General Principles of Criminal Jurisdiction of States
Under general public international law there are several distinct principles
based on which a state may exercise its criminal jurisdiction, such as territorial
principle, nationality principle, protective principle, passive personality principle and
universality principle. Territorial principle allows the state to exercise jurisdiction
over any crime committed within the state’s territory. This principle is universally
recognised. There are two extended forms of territorial principle – subjective
territorial principle and objective territorial principle. Subjective territorial principle
allows the state to exercise jurisdiction over a crime commenced within the state’s
territory but completed or consummated outside the state’s territory. Objective
territorial principle allows the state to exercise jurisdiction over a crime, when effects
of this crime are felt within the state’s territory, even though the crime, itself, (or at
least its initiation or substantial elements) is committed outside the state’s
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territory.426 Nationality principle allows the state to exercise jurisdiction over any
crime committed by its national, irrespectively of whether it is committed within or
outside the state’s territory. Nationality principle, just like territorial principle, is
generally recognised. Yet, some states are more likely than others to exercise their
jurisdiction based on the nationality principle in cases where a crime is committed
outside the state’s territory.427 Protective principle allows the state to exercise
jurisdiction over a crime committed by an alien outside the state’s territory yet
affecting security of the state. Also this principle is rather widely recognised.
However, interpretation of the concept of security may vary from state to state.
Usually, the protective principle is invoked in regards to such offences as political,
national security, currency, immigration and economic offences.428 Passive
personality principle allows the state to exercise jurisdiction over a crime committed
by an alien outside the state’s territory, yet harmful to nationals of the state. This
principle has been accepted by different states at different times. However, it is not
widely recognised. Scholars have described the respective principle as controversial
and least justifiable.429 The universality principle allows a state with no territorial,
nationality or other connection with a crime assert jurisdiction over that crime.
Crimes attracting universal jurisdiction are those considered to be offensive to the
international community as a whole. Within the maritime domain a classical example
of crimes giving rise to universal jurisdiction are crimes encompassed by the term
“piracy”.430

426

Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998 at pp. 303-304; Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and
Perspectives, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012 at pp. 251-252.
427
BROWNLIE, ibid. at p. 306; BOAS, ibid. at pp. 255-256.
428
BROWNLIE, ibid. at p. 307; BOAS, ibid. at pp. 256-257.
429
BROWNLIE, ibid. at pp. 306-307; BOAS, ibid. at pp. 257-258.
430
BROWNLIE, ibid. at pp. 307-308; BOAS, ibid. at pp. 258-259.

170

National laws usually do not directly refer to different general principles of
jurisdiction as they are introduced above. These principles serve only as evidence of
the reasonableness of the particular national jurisdictional regime. Furthermore, in
practice various principles interweave.431 Similarly, rules of UNCLOS related to
criminal jurisdiction over large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents do not
directly refer to the general principles of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, these rules are
based on respective principles, at times on several of them simultaneously. For
example, jurisdiction over pollution violations in internal waters or territorial sea of a
state is clearly linked to the territorial principle. Jurisdiction over pollution violations
in EEZ of a state can be labelled “quasi-territorial”, but, at the same time, it can be
linked to the protective principle. Similarly, port State jurisdiction over pollution
violations on high seas can be labelled “universal”, or at least “quasi-universal”, but,
at the same time, it can be linked to the passive personality principle. Flag State
jurisdiction may be associated with the territorial principle by those who still treat
ships as “floating islands” of a state in which they are registered, but, most probably,
it will be associated with the nationality principle by those who know that ships, just
like people, have nationality.
Attempts to find linkages between specific legal norms of UNCLOS and
general principles of jurisdiction, as it is done above, obviously, can be good exercise
for the mind. However, such “exercise” has little practical importance. States have
agreed on rules of UNCLOS, consequently, they should follow them, regardless of
what underlying principles they are based on. Yet, interaction of UNCLOS with the
general principles of jurisdiction may still cause practical problems – in situations
when the general principles of jurisdiction allow but UNCLOS is silent. For
example, general principles of jurisdiction (specifically, the nationality principle)
allow the state to exercise jurisdiction over any crime committed by its national.
UNCLOS is largely silent on jurisdictional competence of the state of nationality of
an alleged offender. Similarly, UNCLOS is largely silent on situations covered by
the subjective territorial principle and objective territorial principle, although such
431
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situations are rather likely to happen also in the maritime domain. For instance, there
might be the situation when cargo is loaded on board a ship within the state in such a
manner as to cause a ship-source pollution accident, but the accident, itself, happens
when the ship is abroad (situation covered by the subjective territorial principle).
There might also be the situation when a ship-source pollution accident, itself,
happens on high seas, but pollution affects the state’s territory (situation covered by
the objective territorial principle). This situation is covered by Art. 221 of UNCLOS
and related to this article is the International Convention Relating to Intervention on
the High Seas in Case of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969 (hereinafter – Intervention
Convention). However, it is highly questionable whether Art. 221 of UNCLOS and
the Intervention Convention cover criminal jurisdiction. Art. I(1) of the Intervention
Convention states:
1. Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as may be
necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or
related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil; following upon a
maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to
result in major harmful consequences.

Reference to “imminent danger” in this provision indicates that the Intervention
Convention covers only the right of a coastal State to take operational (self-defencetype) measures; it does not cover application of criminal liability, which is a
relatively complex, long-term measure. Tanaka is of a similar opinion. He has stated
that measures taken in accordance with Art. I of the Intervention Convention “must
not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the end mentioned in Article I
and shall cease as soon as the end has been achieved”432.
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The essential question which arises is – should the “silence” of UNCLOS, as
introduced above, be understood as restricting application of the general principles of
jurisdiction or not? Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this essential question,
neither in UNCLOS itself, nor in its travaux preparatoires. Also scholars are not
absolutely united on the issue. There are those who say that UNCLOS limits
application of the general principles of jurisdiction, at least the objective territorial
principle in regards to ship-source pollution violations. For example, McDorman has
argued that respective limits are established implicitly through Art. 218 (article on
port State jurisdiction).433 However, there are also those who say that UNCLOS does
not set such limitations.434 This author does not see strong arguments allowing to
take one or another position – either to treat UNCLOS as restricting the application
of the general principles of jurisdiction or not. Both positions can be justified. It,
inter alia, means that states are largely free to choose which one of the two passes to
follow. Obviously, it can trigger disputes among the states.
3.6.3. Criminal Jurisdiction of Officials
Art. 224 of UNCLOS states:
The powers of enforcement against foreign vessels under this Part may only be exercised by
officials or by warships, military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and
identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.

“This Part” mentioned in the article is Part XII of UNCLOS, which addresses
protection and preservation of the marine environment including protection and
preservation of the marine environment from ship-source oil pollution. Thus, Art.
224 of UNCLOS indicates that not everybody can apply enforcement measures
against a foreign ship alleged to commit ship-source pollution violation. In fact, it
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goes without saying. What is less clear is to which officials, exactly, Art. 224 of
UNCLOS gives the powers of enforcement.
Art. 224 of UNCLOS gives the powers of enforcement to “officials” or
“warships, military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable
as being on government service and authorized to that effect”. Under the rules of
logic, the conjunction “or” (the conjunction which in Art. 224 is used to link officials
with specific transport units) indicates logical summing: A or B means A+B.435 It
indicates, inter alia, that both requirements should not be present in a particular
enforcement situation, it is enough for one to be present. Thus, if an enforcement
measure is applied by an “official”, it is not absolutely necessary that this official
acts from the “warship, military aircraft, or other ship or aircraft clearly marked and
identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect”. Similarly,
if enforcement measures are applied from the “warship, military aircraft, or other
ship or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and
authorized to that effect”, it is not absolutely necessary that they are applied by an
“official”.
To establish the system of enforcement jurisdiction as described above could
not have been the intention of the drafters of Art. 224 of UNCLOS. The purpose of
the article is clearly to give some amount of confidence to the persons against whom
enforcement measures are applied that those who apply these measures are
authorised to do so. For reaching this purpose:
1) interception of a ship at sea can be done only by “warships, military aircraft,
or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on
government service and authorized to that effect”, otherwise persons on board
the ship which is intercepted can easily assume that those who try to intercept
the ship are not authorised to do it, but are actually, for example, robbers,
hijackers or murderers;
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2) enforcement measures can be applied only by “officials”, enforcement
measures cannot be applied by anybody on a “warship, military aircraft, or
other ship or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government
service”, for example, a cook on a warship most probably will not be
authorized to apply enforcement measures against alleged violators.
Whether a particular ship or aircraft is authorised to intercept ships at sea in
case of an alleged ship-source pollution violation will be determined in the national
law of the state intercepting the ship. It cannot be excluded that in practice on an ad
hoc basis there might be the need for one authority (which is authorised to enforce
measures against alleged ship-source pollution violators at sea) to use transport units
of another authority (which strictly speaking is not authorised to enforce measures
against alleged ship-source pollution violators at sea). People on a ship which is
intercepted cannot know, in detail, these national, at times ad hoc, arrangements.
And existence of them cannot be displayed on an intercepting transport unit. What
can be displayed is only affiliation to a certain authority – by type of ship or aircraft
as such (military) or by distinctive markings, such as flags and ensigns. Therefore, in
direct relation between the ship which is being intercepted and the transport unit
which is intercepting the ship in a specific enforcement situation, exactly existence of
relevant marking of transport unit which is intercepting the ship is essential element.
Anything in regards to authorisation can be assured only once the ship has already
been intercepted and officials have come on board.
In regards to officials, the situation is rather opposite. In direct relation
between persons on board against whom enforcement measures are applied and the
official who applies these measures, exactly the ability of the official to show his
authorisation to act is essential and his “marking” is less important. Although
“marking”, such as uniform, can add confidence that the person has relevant power
of enforcement, “marking” alone does not say anything about scope of authorisation.
Furthermore, officials of some authorities might not even be required to wear
uniforms, for example, some police units. The instrument which is usually used for
showing the scope of authorisation of the official, at least in broad terms, is his
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service card. Consequently, also before applying enforcement measures against
persons on board an official can be asked to show his service card and, if necessary,
to give further explanations regarding his authorisation.
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned arguments regarding the
purpose of Art. 224 of UNCLOS as well as specific practicalities regarding marking
and authorisation of officials and transport units, this author suggests that Art. 224 of
UNCLOS be read as follows:
1) that enforcement measures against persons on board a foreign ship alleged of
committing ship-source pollution violation can be applied only by officials
duly authorised to that effect and capable to prove this authorisation by
showing the relevant service card;
2) that enforcement measures at sea against persons on board a foreign ship
alleged of committing ship-source pollution violation can be applied only
from warship, military aircraft, or other ship or aircraft on government service
duly authorised to that effect and with the help of its marking clearly
identifiable as indeed being warship, military aircraft, or other ship or aircraft
on government service.
It is worth noting that issues surrounding Art. 224 of UNCLOS have also
been indirectly addressed in one of the ITLOS cases – the M/V “VIRGINIA G” case.
In this case, Panama alleged that the officials of Guinea-Bissau who boarded the
Virginia G bore no identification. Yet, ITLOS concluded that this allegation was
unfounded, as the boats used by the Guinea-Bissau National Fisheries Inspection and
Control Service (FISCAP) inspectors were clearly marked, inspectors who boarded
the Virginia G were dressed in a way identifying them as FISCAP officials and the
Navy infantry were wearing military uniform.436
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3.7. Human Rights and Articles 230(3) and 300 of UNCLOS
Art. 230(3) of UNCLOS states:
In the conduct of proceedings in respect of such violations committed by a foreign vessel
which may result in the imposition of penalties, recognized rights of the accused shall be
observed.

“Violations” here must be understood only to include ship-source pollution
violations, because Art. 230 is incorporated into Part XII of UNCLOS which deals
specifically with protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Art. 230(3) of UNCLOS does not define “recognised rights of the accused”.
It has caused some discussions. Yet, the majority of scholars have ultimately
concluded that respective legal norm requires states to observe all human rights of
accused persons. For instance, Pozdnakova, inter alia by reference to the opinion of
other authors, has concluded:
[...] although the expression “recognised rights of the accused” is not the subject of any
authoritative interpretation on the record, the provision should be understood as referring to
the human rights of the persons involved in the proceedings, as guaranteed under
international treaties and customary law.437

Thus, Art. 230(3) of UNCLOS embraces all human rights about which this
dissertation is concerned.
Such conclusion may lead to think that Art. 230(3) of UNCLOS is of great
importance for the purpose of this dissertation. However, this is very questionable. It
is even questionable whether this legal norm has any value at all. Human rights of
the accused should be observed anyway. General human rights instruments require
that. In addition, Art. 300 of UNCLOS requires that (as it will be explained later). If
so, then Art. 230(3) of UNCLOS is tautology. Oxman has expressed similar
opinion.438 He has noted three possible purposes of respective legal norm, though:
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One purpose, of course, is to serve as a reminder. Another could be to influence courts or
legislatures in those states where the human rights norms of customary international law or
human rights treaties are not otherwise directly executed by the courts and have not
otherwise been enacted as municipal law. Yet another purpose could be to subject
compliance with the relevant human rights requirements to compulsory arbitration or
adjudication under the Convention.439

Relevant travaux preparatoires of UNCLOS does not help to find out the true
purpose of including Art. 230(3) in UNCLOS, as the norm simply “originated with
the Informal Group of Juridical Experts and was carried forward in subsequent
texts”.440 Yet, it is very likely that the legal norm originated to serve the first two
purposes proposed by Oxman. Oxman’s third proposed purpose (or perhaps just
unnoticed consequence) of including Art. 230(3) in UNCLOS (to subject compliance
with the relevant human rights requirements to compulsory arbitration or
adjudication under UNCLOS), in the opinion of this author, deserves to be analysed
in the separate research – to find out whether, indeed, UNCLOS grants specific law
of the sea arbitration and adjudication bodies very wide authority to also deal with
human rights, and, if it does, whether such granting is adequate; for instance, are
respective arbitrators and judges competent enough to deliver qualitative judgment
on human rights?
Also Art. 300 of UNCLOS, presumably, grants to specific law of the sea
arbitration and adjudication bodies authority to deal with human rights. Art. 300 of
UNCLOS provides:
State Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and
shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner
which would not constitute an abuse of rights.
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It seems that the intention of the drafters of UNCLOS was by Art. 300 to preclude
abuse of rights by one state to the disadvantage of another state, not to preclude
abuse of rights by the state to the disadvantage of individuals.441 Yet, the term “abuse
of rights” in Art. 300 is left unqualified. Thus, respective rule can be interpreted as
forbidding not only abuse of rights in relation to states, but also abuse of rights in
relation to individuals, which naturally also includes abuse of rights to the detriment
of human rights. Similar opinion was expressed by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
in the M/V “LOUISA” case.442
Case law, so far, has set only one limitation in regards to application of Art.
300 of UNCLOS, namely, that this article may not be invoked on its own.443 As
ITLOS stated it in the M/V “VIRGINIA G” case:
In the view of the Tribunal, it is not sufficient for an applicant to make a general statement
that a respondent by undertaking certain actions did not act in good faith and acted in a
manner which constitutes an abuse of rights without invoking particular provisions of the
Convention that were violated in this respect.444

However, all previous analysis of UNCLOS showed that there are rather many
provisions within UNCLOS which are linked to human rights. Consequently, Art.
300 of UNCLOS, in principle, may be invoked for safeguarding also human rights.
Will law of the sea arbitration and adjudication bodies, indeed, get involved into
adjudicating not only specific law of the sea issues, but also general human rights
issues, is still an open question.
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4. MARPOL
4.1. Introduction
MARPOL is a combination of two legal instruments adopted in 1973 and
1978, respectively. On 2 November 1973 the International Conference on Marine
Pollution (convened by IMO) adopted the initial Convention (MARPOL 73). On 17
February 1978 the International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution
Prevention (also convened by IMO) adopted the Protocol, which modified the initial
Convention (1978 MARPOL Protocol). The Protocol absorbed its parent
Convention. Consequently, the Protocol and its parent Convention became one single
instrument – MARPOL 73/78, or simply MARPOL.
MARPOL is the main international convention regulating the prevention of
ship-source pollution. Apart from general provisions incorporated into the main text
of the Convention and its protocols, MARPOL is divided into six, rather
comprehensive, annexes which cover, respectively: pollution by oil (Annex I),
pollution by noxious liquid substances in bulk (Annex II), pollution by harmful
substances carried by sea in packaged form (Annex III), pollution by sewage (Annex
IV), pollution by garbage (Annex V) and air pollution (Annex VI).
Each of the above-mentioned Annexes has entered into force at different
times. Annex I, which is obligatory for all contracting parties of MARPOL, entered
into force together with the main text of the Convention on 2 October 1983. Annex
II, which is also obligatory, entered into force on 6 April 1987, in accordance with
Article II of the 1978 MARPOL Protocol. Annexes III to VI are optional.
Consequently, their entrance into force was dependent on how many states, at
particular point of time, opted to bind themselves with the provisions of a particular
annex. Annex III entered into force on 1 July 1992. Annex IV – on 27 September
2003. Annex V – on 31 December 1988. Annex VI – on 19 May 2005.
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As of August 2016, 154 states were State Parties to MARPOL, including its
obligatory annexes – Annex I and Annex II. 146 states were State Parties to Annex
III; 138 states – to Annex IV; 151 states – to Annex V; 87 states – to Annex VI.445
Further in this sub-chapter, similarly as in the sub-chapter on UNCLOS, those
rules of MARPOL, which can be linked to criminal procedures or sanctions
applicable against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents, are
identified and analysed in detail. Again, this is done from a human rights perspective.
Where respective rules of MARPOL are unclear or inconsistent with human rights or
UNCLOS, recommendations are made regarding their interpretation.

4.2. Right to liberty and MARPOL
Earlier it was stated that one of the procedural rules of UNCLOS which must
be followed in case of deprivation of liberty of a seafarer, and non-observance of
which potentially may amount to the violation of the right to liberty of a particular
seafarer, is the requirement to facilitate involvement of other States (particularly flag
State of a ship in question) into proceedings. MARPOL contains similar requirement:
•

Art. 5(3) of MARPOL requires: if a State takes any action against a foreign
ship for the reason that the ship does not comply with the provisions of
MARPOL, this State shall immediately inform the consul or diplomatic
representative of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly, or if this is
not possible, the Administration of the ship concerned.

•

Art. 6(3) of MARPOL requires: if a State detects possible violation of
MARPOL from the side of a foreign ship, this State shall furnish relevant
evidence to the Administration of the ship concerned.
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The above-mentioned rules of MARPOL must be applied in the system with
the similar rules in UNCLOS. It, inter alia, means that in cases where a State
deprives a seafarer of his liberty because of the alleged violation of MARPOL:
•

this State is not only under the obligation to inform “immediately” the consul
or diplomatic representative of the flag State of the ship in question (as
required by Art. 5(3) of MARPOL as well as Art. 231 of UNCLOS) but, also,
under the obligation, if master of the ship so requests, to notify the consul or
diplomatic representative of the flag State “before taking any steps”, and only
in case of emergency, while measures are being taken (as required by Art. 27
of UNCLOS);

•

this State should, where possible, immediately notify the maritime authority
(or, Administration) of the flag State in question always (as required by Art.
321 of UNCLOS), not only when it is impossible to provide respective
notification to the consul or diplomatic representative of the flag State (as
required by Art. 5(3) of MARPOL).

4.3. Right to Be Free From Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment
and MARPOL
4.3.1. Introduction
The previous sub-chapter showed that MARPOL is linked to the right to
liberty in a very similar way as is UNCLOS. Also to the right to be free from cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment MARPOL is linked in a similar way as is
UNCLOS.
First of all, similar to UNCLOS, MARPOL prescribes to other persons than
seafarers specific duties, non-observance of which potentially can be the true cause
of a large-scale ship-source oil pollution accident (instead of the conduct on the side
of seafarer). Such duties are, for instance:
•

duties related to the construction, design, equipment and machinery of a ship,
so called “CDEM standards” (see, for example, Parts A and B of Chapter 3
and Parts A and B of Chapter 4 of Annex I);
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•

supportive duties for ensuring stability of a ship (Reg. 27(3), Reg. 28(5) and
Reg. 37(4) of Annex I);

•

duty of the operators of ships to prepare:
-

oil pollution emergency plan for every oil tanker of 150 GT and above
and every ship other than an oil tanker of 400 GT and above (Reg. 37 of
Annex I);

-

ship to ship operations plan for every oil tanker of 150 GT and above
engaged in the transfer of oil cargo between oil tankers at sea (Reg. 41 of
Annex I).

As it was already stated in relation to UNCLOS, these duties of other persons than
seafarers must always be kept in mind when examining an objective element of a
crime – “causation”.
Secondly, similarly to UNCLOS, MARPOL directly addresses the question
of severity of sanctions for ship-source pollution violations. The legal norm of
MARPOL addressing this question will be analysed in Sub-chapter 4.3.2 below.
Differently from UNCLOS, MARPOL directly addresses, not only the
question of severity of sanctions (question of amount), but, also, the question of
liability (including criminal liability) for ship-source pollution violations. It does so
by defining exceptions from liability. Legal norms of MARPOL which set such
exceptions in regards to oil pollution will be analysed in Sub-chapter 4.3.3 below.
4.3.2. Legal Norm of MARPOL on Severity of Sanctions
Art. 4(4) of MARPOL (the article which, inter alia, requires states to define
MARPOL violations as offences in their national law) states:
The penalties specified under the law of a Party pursuant to the present Article shall be
adequate in severity to discourage violations of the present convention and shall be equally
severe irrespective of where the violations occur.

This rule accords with Art. 217(8) of UNCLOS. Consequently, everything which
was said in regards to Art. 217(8) of UNCLOS in Sub-chapter 3.3, “Right to Be Free
from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment and UNCLOS”, by analogy, is also
true in regards to Art. 4(4) of MARPOL.
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Different from UNCLOS, Art. 4(4) of MARPOL, apart from the requirement
for penalties to be adequate in severity, also incorporates the requirement for
penalties to be equally severe irrespective of where the violations occur.
Interpretation of the requirement for penalties to be equally severe irrespective of
where the violations occur by using only a literal (philological) method of
interpretation may trigger the conclusion that this requirement is in conflict with Art.
230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS which allow to apply different penalties for, in fact, the
same violation in different maritime zones – monetary penalties only for intentional
and serious pollution in EEZ and also penalties other than monetary for intentional
and serious pollution in territorial sea; monetary penalties only for unintentional and
non-serious pollution in EEZ or territorial sea and also penalties other than monetary
for unintentional and non-serious pollution in internal waters. Yet, conflict between
MARPOL and UNCLOS does not exist. It can be concluded from the travaux
preparatoires of MARPOL that the only thing which the requirement for penalties to
be equally severe irrespective of where the violations occur asks for is: not to apply
penalties of different severity for, in fact, the same violation in the same maritime
zone of different states (for example, territorial sea of one state and territorial sea of
another state). As Timagenis has explained it:
The intention of the provision was to oblige flag States to protect adequately the coasts of
third States. At that time there existed an apprehension that flag States tend to impose severe
penalties for violations committed within their own territorial sea but not in the territorial
seas of third States. To cover this situation the provision under consideration was included in
the draft. [...] This language does not mean that the same penalty should be imposed for a
certain discharge close to the coast of a State as for a similar discharge on the high seas far
from any coast or any fishing ground etc.446
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One more note worth making in regards to MARPOL and principles for
determining severity of sanctions is that Art. 11 of MARPOL sets several obligations
in regards to collecting and circulating among the states text of laws, orders, decrees
and regulations and other instruments which have been promulgated in individual
states on the various matters within the scope of MARPOL (thus, also on the matters
on severity of sanctions for MARPOL violations). Particularly, Art. 11(1)(a) requires
states to send the relevant information to IMO and Art. 11(2) requires IMO to
circulate the received information to all other State Parties to MARPOL. Such an
exchange of information has potential to enhance cross-border proportionality of
sanctions applied for ship-source pollution violations and, thus, help to secure the
human right to be free from disproportionate sanctions, especially, if after receiving
the information IMO organises it in adequate user-friendly form, for example, a table
which compares sanctions for similar offences in different countries. Unfortunately,
currently rules on reporting to IMO are largely disregarded by states447 and IMO
does not organise the received information in user-friendly form with the purpose to
enhance proportionality of sanctions across countries. This, however, may change,
for example, if the issue is raised and addressed within the on-going discussion on a
future IMO web-portal.448
4.3.3. Legal Norms of MARPOL on Exceptions from Liability
4.3.3.1. Introduction
Art. 4(1) and (2) of MARPOL state:
(1) Any violation of the requirements of the present Convention shall be prohibited and sanctions
shall be established therefor under the law of the Administration of the ship concerned
wherever the violation occurs. [...]
(2) Any violation of the requirements of the present Convention within the jurisdiction of any
Party to the Convention shall be prohibited and sanctions shall be established therefor under
the law of that Party. [...]
447
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Reg. 15(1) of Annex I states: “any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures from
ships shall be prohibited”. Reg. 34(1) of Annex I prescribes similar prohibition in
regards to cargo areas of oil tankers. It states: “any discharge into the sea of oil or
oily mixtures from the cargo area of an oil tanker shall be prohibited.”449 Yet, there
are situations when discharges of oil or oily mixtures (hereinafter – oil) are allowed.
First of all, discharges of small quantities are allowed under particular conditions
strictly defined by Reg. 15 and 34 of Annex I themselves. Secondly, specific types of
discharges are allowed in accordance with Reg. 4 of Annex I.
As if both – Reg. 15 and 34 as well as Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL – set
exceptions from the general prohibition of discharges of oil as established in Art.
4(1) and (2) and Reg. 15 and 34 of Annex I of MARPOL. However, from the point
of view of criminal liability, there is a rather important difference between these two
exceptions. Exceptions under Reg. 15 and 34 of Annex I are part of the description of
the offence. Exceptions under Reg. 4 of Annex I are not part of the description of the
offence. When in a legal act exception is construed as a part of the description of the
offence, burden is on the prosecution to prove that in the given situation a particular
exception did not exist. When in a legal act exception is not construed as a part of the
description of the offence, burden is on the alleged offender to prove that in the given
situation a particular exception existed.450 Thus, it can be concluded that exceptions
under Reg. 15 and 34 of Annex I of MARPOL must be disproved by prosecution, but
exceptions under Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL must be proved by an alleged
offender (in our case, the seafarer). Due to this fact, only the exceptions under Reg. 4
of Annex I should be treated as “true exceptions”, or defences.451
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Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL states:
Regulations 15 and 34 of this Annex shall not apply to:
.1 the discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture necessary for the purpose of securing the
safety of a ship or saving life at sea; or
.2 the discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture resulting from damage to a ship or its
equipment:
.1 provided that all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence of
the damage or discovery of the discharge for the purpose of preventing or
minimizing the discharge; and
.2 except if the owner or the master acted either with intent to cause damage, or
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result; or
.3 the discharge into the sea of substances containing oil, approved by the Administration,
when being used for the purpose of combating specific pollution incidents in order to
minimize the damage from pollution. Any such discharge shall be subject to the approval of
any Government in whose jurisdiction it is contemplated the discharge will occur.

Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL is not easy to follow. First of all, it has many layers.
Secondly, it compiles rather divergent forms of exceptions. Thirdly, exact scope and
content of respective exceptions are often not clear. Fourthly, at times, respective
exceptions are not fully in line with the general principles for determining criminal
liability. Consequently, at least to some extent, also the compatibility of Reg. 4 of
Annex I of MARPOL with the principle of legality – the principle which, inter alia,
requires States not to accuse and convict a person for a crime under insufficiently
clear law – may be questioned.
All the above-sketched drawbacks of Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL will
become evident from further sub-chapters in which respective Regulation will be
analysed in detail. This detailed analysis will be carried out from the perspective of
general principles for determining criminal liability. Such approach is adopted with
the aim to transform the rather hard to follow Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL into
language which is more familiar to people who are supposed to implement and
enforce the respective Regulation, that is, to people who draft and enforce national
criminal law.
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4.3.3.2. MARPOL Exceptions from Liability and Defence of Necessity
Reg. 4(1) of Annex I of MARPOL
According to Reg. 4(1) of Annex I of MARPOL, a person may not be
exposed to liability for the discharges into the sea of oil necessary for the purpose of
securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea. In regards to the respective
exception, Timagenis has stated:
The exception is based on humanitarian reasons. Human life is among the highest values in
the modern world and, therefore, in case of a direct and immediate conflict between the
protection of the environment and human life, the latter is preferred. […] Similarly, the
safety of a ship is so closely connected with human life that it is treated in the same
manner.452

The citation shows that the MARPOL exception “discharges necessary for the
purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea” is the result of weighing
different valid interests (protection of the environment, safety of a ship and human
life) and allowing to infringe upon the less important (protection of the environment)
to preserve the more important (safety of a ship and human life). In other words, this
exception is, in fact, the defence of necessity as it was introduced in Sub-chapter
2.4.2.11 of this dissertation.
However, the MARPOL exception “discharges necessary for the purpose of
securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea” is drafted in a manner which is not
fully in line with the principles associated with the defence of necessity under
general criminal law. The MARPOL exception is left unqualified. It may trigger the
interpretation that under any circumstances (including when people from the ship are
already in safety and only the ship, herself, remains to be saved) any amount of
discharge of oil is justified. Defence of necessity under general criminal law is
always qualified – because damage can be recognised as justified only when the
principle of balancing of harm and benefit is observed.453 Consequently, the
MARPOL exception should also be interpreted as encompassing the general
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condition that the balance between harm and benefit must be observed. This
conclusion can also be reached by systemic interpretation of relevant rules; under
Art. V of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, a similar exception from liability as MARPOL
exception “discharges necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or
saving life at sea” is applicable only if:
•

discharge appears to be the only way of averting the threat, and

•

there is every probability that the damage consequent upon such discharge
will be less than would otherwise occur.454

Reg. 4(3) of Annex I of MARPOL
According to Reg. 4(3) of Annex I of MARPOL, a person may not be
exposed to liability for the discharge into the sea of substances containing oil,
approved by the flag State as well as the State in whose jurisdiction it is
contemplated the discharge will occur, when being used for the purpose of
combating a specific pollution incident in order to minimize the damage from
pollution. Also this MARPOL exception, in fact, talks about “choosing between two
evils”, consequently, – about the defence of necessity. It is allowed to infringe upon
the less important interest (protection of the environment from relatively minor
pollution resulting from discharge into the sea of substances containing oil) to
preserve the more important interest (protection of the environment from relatively
severe pollution, which can be minimised by discharge into the sea of substances
containing oil). Although it is not explicitly stated in MARPOL, it can be assumed
that exactly the above-mentioned balancing test is the one which the flag State as
well as the State in whose jurisdiction it is contemplated the discharge will occur are
supposed to carry out when deciding upon allowing or not allowing the use of
particular substances for combating particular pollution.
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4.3.3.3. MARPOL Exceptions from Liability and Corpus Delicti
Objective element “damage to a ship or its equipment”
According to Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL, a person may not be
exposed to liability for the discharge into the sea of oil resulting from damage to a
ship or its equipment. Therefore, it is essential to understand in which specific cases
oil pollution results from “damage to a ship or its equipment” and in which specific
cases oil pollution results from some other things.
Damage is “physical harm caused to something in such a way as to impair its
value, usefulness, or normal function.”455 There are discharges of oil which rather
obviously are not result of physical harm to a ship or its equipment and,
consequently, are not covered by the respective MARPOL exception from liability,
for example, intentional pumping of oil out into the sea from the cargo tanks of a
ship. However, in regards to many other cases involving discharge of oil, uncertainty
exists. For instance, it can be questioned whether the expression “damage to a ship or
its equipment” in Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL covers only clearly evident and
sudden damage or, also, such damage which results from latent defects, faulty design
or wear and tear. This issue was addressed by the Australian courts in the case of
Morrison v. Peacock (M.V. Sitka II) – the case in which it was examined as to
whether or not the rupture of a hydraulic hose on the unloading crane caused by wear
and tear constitutes “damage to a ship or its equipment” in the meaning of Reg. 4(2)
of Annex I of MARPOL. The Australian High Court concluded that “damage to a
ship or its equipment” means a sudden change in the condition of the ship or its
equipment that was the instantaneous consequence of some event, whether the event
was external or internal to the ship or its equipment.456
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However, there are those who look to the judgment of the Australian High
Court in the case of Morrison v. Peacock (M.V. Sitka II) with some dose of criticism.
For example, White in his notes regarding the case has stated:
The High Court holding that the meaning and intent of the ‘damage’ defence relates to the
speed of the event (a ‘sudden’ change) still leaves many fact situations that may be
unclear.457

Indeed, open questions still remain, for instance: should the expression “damage to a
ship or its equipment” be interpreted as covering any case involving sudden damage
(also such cases when the damage has resulted from navigational error or other
human mistake), or should this expression be interpreted as covering only such cases
when the “primary” cause of the discharge of oil is respective damage?458 In fact, the
whole argument which brought the Australian High Court in the case of Morrison v.
Peacock (M.V. Sitka II) to the conclusion that only sudden damage to a ship or its
equipment is covered by Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL seems not very
convincing. For example, the Court held that the use of the term “occurrence” in the
respective rule of MARPOL implies that the detriment or harm was the result of a
sudden event and not caused by a gradual process.459 However, the term “occur”
means simply “happen, take place”.460 Any phenomenon can “occur” (or “happen”,
or “take place”) both ways – suddenly as well as gradually.
The reality, unfortunately, is that nobody can be absolutely sure what specific
cases drafters of Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL intended to cover by the phrase
“damage to a ship or its equipment” – travaux preparatoires of MARPOL do not
allow us to identify this intent. Therefore, until relevant clarifications are made
through amending MARPOL itself, it seems more appropriate to give the dictionary
meaning to the term “damage” whenever applying Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of
MARPOL, particularly so, because of the need to follow the rule of lenity (the rule
which requires to interpret any unclear law in favour of the alleged offender). If the
457
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dictionary meaning is given to the term “damage”, people in relatively many factual
situations will be exempted from the liability (which is favourable to an alleged
offender). If another meaning is given for the term “damage”, people in relatively
few factual situations will be exempted from the liability (which is unfavourable to
an alleged offender).
Subjective elements “intent”, “recklessness” and “knowledge”
According to Reg. 4(2)(2) of Annex I of MARPOL, not any discharge of oil
resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment is exempted from the liability.
When the damage to a ship or its equipment is caused either with intent, or
recklessly, and with knowledge that damage would probably result, the person who
caused the damage can still be held liable. In other words, the MARPOL exception
“discharges resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment” covers only such cases
when damage to a ship or its equipment is caused negligently, occurs due to the pure
accident, or is caused without knowledge that damage would probably result. What
should be understood by intent, recklessness, negligence and pure accident was
already explained earlier. Therefore, here, it remains to be found out what
“with/without knowledge that damage would probably result” means.
The very existence of the expression “with knowledge that damage would
probably result” in Reg. 4(2)(2) of Annex I of MARPOL suggests that this
expression provides some additional safeguard to people alleged of causing the
discharge of oil. Such a conclusion can also be made from the writings of scholars,
who have stressed the need to prove both – intent, or recklessness, and knowledge –
before a person can be held liable for specific pollution. For example, Mukherjee has
stated: “If there is evidence of intent, or recklessness coupled with knowledge – a
two-fold requirement – then it must be treated as a criminal offence […].”461 This
author, however, sees the expression “with knowledge that damage would probably
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result” in Reg. 4(2)(2) of Annex I of MARPOL as tautology. Reasoning leading to
such conclusion is as follows:
•

Under general criminal law, reference to knowledge is usually made in
relation to conduct – specific facts or circumstances forming part of the
definition of the offence,462 because knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of
particular facts or circumstances may significantly increase (or diminish)
blameworthiness of the conduct, for example, if the crime is “handling stolen
goods knowing them to be stolen”, a person cannot be held liable if he did not
know the fact that the goods he was handling were indeed stolen.

•

Under general criminal law, knowledge in relation to consequences
(knowledge that the consequences will certainly occur or knowledge that it is
likely that the consequences will occur) is treated as an integral part of the
notions of intent and recklessness. In fact, this knowledge is exactly one of
the features which allow distinguishing intent and recklessness from
negligence and pure accident. That is why scholars have sometimes even
talked about “knowing violations” and “negligent violations”, instead of
“intentional, reckless and negligent violations.”463 In other words, reference
to the existence of knowledge in relation to consequences parallel to
reference to intent or recklessness does not give any added value.

•

Reg. 4(2)(2) of Annex I of MARPOL refers to the existence of knowledge in
relation to consequences (“knowledge that damage would probably result”)
parallel to reference to intent and recklessness. Consequently, reference to the
existence of knowledge in the respective rule of MARPOL is tautology. It
does not give any added value.
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The fact that the expression “with knowledge that damage would probably result” in
Reg. 4(2)(2) of Annex I of MARPOL is tautology, inter alia, means that, in fact, the
MARPOL exception “discharges resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment”
covers only such cases when damage to a ship or its equipment is caused negligently
or occurs due to pure accident.
The respective MARPOL exception from liability is limited even further.
Even when damage to a ship or its equipment is caused negligently or occurs due to
pure accident, a person can still be held liable – if after the occurrence of the damage
or discovery of the discharge this person did not take all reasonable precautions for
the purpose of preventing or minimizing the discharge. Such conclusion can be
derived from Par. 2.1 of Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL read in system with Par. 2.2
of the same Regulation. These two paragraphs are linked with the conjunction “and”.
It means that requirements in both paragraphs must exist simultaneously for a person
to benefit from them. It is not enough that a person did not act intentionally or
recklessly (Par. 2.2) if he failed to exercise due diligence after the accident (Par. 2.1).
Similarly, it is not enough that a person exercise due diligence after the accident (Par.
2.1) if the accident, itself, was caused by his intentional or reckless conduct (Par.
2.2). Stated another way, in regards to negligent conduct failure to exercise due
diligence before the accident is excusable simply because a person exercised due
diligence after the accident; in regards to intentional and reckless conduct failure to
exercise due diligence before the accident is not excusable simply because a person
exercised due diligence after the accident (although, such “proper response” to the
accident most probably will be treated as a mitigating factor when deciding upon
specific sanctions to be imposed for the crime).
Under general criminal law: on the one hand, failure to exercise due diligence
after “setting the train of events in motion” serves as an aggravating factor or even
forms a separate crime (under the duty arising from the creation of a dangerous
situation); on the other hand, exercise of due diligence after “setting the train of

194

events in motion” serves as a mitigating factor.464 Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL
seems to be in line with this idea. However, under general criminal law exercise of
due diligence after “setting the train of events in motion” is not usually seen as
mitigating the guilt of a person as far as to exclude his liability completely. Reg. 4(2)
of Annex I of MARPOL does so – in regards to negligent discharges of oil.
Release from liability of a person who has caused discharge of oil by simple
negligence, if after the accident this person responds properly, may raise relatively
little objections. Yet, release from liability of a person who has caused discharge of
oil by gross negligence, just because after the accident this person responds properly,
may raise many objections and questions. For example, it can be questioned – is it
appropriate not to allow to expose the master of a ship to any type of liability when
this master, at first, has failed to take even the most simple precautions to avoid
collision with another ship (in other words, has blatantly failed to exercise his
duties), but after the collision this master takes all reasonable precautions for the
purpose of preventing or minimizing the discharge. Particularly, such a question
arises, because it has been argued that the very purpose of Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of
MARPOL is to exempt from liability “unintentional discharges which could not be
prevented”;465 discharges which result despite the fact that people “have done their
best, before and after the damage and/or discharge, for the purpose of preventing or
minimizing pollution.”466 It is clear that a number of actual discharges could be
prevented, if persons had done their best (acted without gross negligence) not only
after the damage and/or discharge but, also, before it. Therefore, the more
appropriate MARPOL exception from liability than the one in regards to discharges
of oil seems the one which is established in regards to discharges of sewage and
garbage. In regards to these pollutants, MARPOL sets the following discharge free
from liability: the discharge of sewage/garbage resulting from damage to a ship or its
equipment if all reasonable precautions have been taken before and after the
464

Michael Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 11th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 at
pp. 32-33.
465
Gregorios J. Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution, New York: Oceana
Publications, 1980 at p. 454.
466
TIMAGENIS, ibid.

195

occurrence of the damage for the purpose of preventing or minimising the
discharge.467 Indeed, with today’s high concern with a clean environment it seems
disproportionate to absolutely exclude from liability grossly negligent conduct
resulting in marine pollution. The possibility to treat such conduct as, at least,
regulatory offence with relatively low possible sanctions should be given to States.
The idea that grossly negligent conduct in the maritime domain, in principle, should
not be excluded from liability is evident also from Rule 2(a) of COLREG. It reads as
follows:
Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master or crew thereof, from
the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any
precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special
circumstances of the case.

In short, this author agrees with the opinion of Pozdnakova that literal interpretation
of Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL leads to a rather illogical result.468 Systemic
and teleological interpretation of relevant legal norms points to the conclusion that
Reg. 4(2) of Annex I does not exclude from liability grossly negligent conduct.
However, because of the rather simplistic text of Reg. 4(2) of Annex I, itself,
ambiguity still remains.
With regard to the legislative history of Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL
Kopela has stated:
The condition related to intention, recklessness and knowledge was arguably introduced in
order to ensure that even when precautions had been taken, any discharge due to damage
stemming from such behaviour would still be prohibited. The legislative history of this
provision does not give evidence that it was the intention of the drafters to allow accidental
discharges due to negligence.469
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This author agrees with Kopela. However, relevant legislative history, also, does not
give absolutely clear evidence that it was not the intention of the drafters to exempt
from liability accidental discharges due to negligence, if, after the accident, a person
responds properly. Thus, the situation stays ambiguous, but, as we already know, in
cases of ambiguity, the rule of lenity must be applied, meaning that the reading
which is more favourable to an alleged offender must be employed. Obviously, the
reading which exempts negligent discharges of oil from liability is more favourable
to an alleged offender than the reading which implies such liability. Thus, the
conclusion that Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL, in principle, exempts from the
liability negligent discharges of oil still stands, and, consequently, State Parties of
MARPOL are obliged to incorporate respective exception from liability in their
national criminal law.
Pozdnakova might still disagree with this conclusion, as she has invoked the
following argument in favour of those who are willing to ignore liability-related rules
of MARPOL:
In this author’s view, States should shape their national provisions on fault in such a way as
to conform with MARPOL to the greatest possible extent. At the same time, MARPOL does
not, in the author’s view, attempt to national criminal law provisions (including those
regulating the applicable standard of fault), thereby leaving considerable legislative
discretion in this respect to the States.470

This author cannot agree with this statement. Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL is
clearly linked to criminal law, criminal law functions through national Criminal
Codes and similar national legal instruments, consequently Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of
MARPOL “attempts to national criminal law provisions”. It seems that Pozdnakova
has artificially invoked the respective argument – just to overcome “illogical”
MARPOL regime. However, as Tan has rightly pointed out: any ambiguity within
MARPOL cannot simply be rectified by states unilaterally moving in to fill the
gaps.471 Just like State Parties to UNCLOS should follow Art. 230(1) and (2) of
UNCLOS although, at least to some extent, these paragraphs seem to be
inappropriate, State Parties to MARPOL should follow Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of
470
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MARPOL although, at least to some extent, this paragraph seems to be inappropriate.
Only relevant adjustments of MARPOL can “cancel” the obligation to follow its
Reg. 4(2) of Annex I. Despite that, several studies show that, in practice, states often
ignore Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL.472
Before proceeding to the next sub-chapter, one more clarifying note should
be made in regards to Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL. Reg. 4(2)(2) talks only
about one group of seafarers – masters. It may trigger the conclusion that seafarers
other than masters are not covered by the MARPOL exception “discharges resulting
from damage to a ship or its equipment” and, consequently, differently from masters,
they can also be exposed to liability for negligent conduct or pure accident even if
after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the discharge they take all
reasonable precautions for the purpose of preventing or minimizing the discharge.
However, to provide the safeguard from the liability to masters and, under similar
factual circumstances, not to provide the same safeguard to other seafarers would be
discrimination of these other seafarers. Therefore, the respective MARPOL
safeguard from the liability should be interpreted as applicable to all seafarers.
Advocate General Kokott in her opinion in the INTERTANKO case expressed a
similar view. The Advocate General stated that MARPOL exemptions are to be
construed as referring to the master merely “by way of example” and that the
exemptions are to apply equally to other persons who may be prosecuted for
discharges resulting from damage to the ship or its equipment.473 Yet, there are also
those with a different view, for example, Ringbom has stated:
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The main regime of Marpol is [...] one of prohibition in the absence of express exception. If
other persons are not specifically exempted, the main discharge prohibition following from
Marpol Regulations I/15 and 34 [...] remains the starting point. This, in combination with
Article 4(2) [...], seems to suggest that other persons who have been found to cause a
violation are, if not automatically liable under Marpol, at least subject to the liability rules for
such persons established by individual State Parties.474

Among other things, the above quotation mentions “automatic liability”. This
phrase creates associations with strict liability. The next sub-chapter examines closer
the correlation between MARPOL exceptions from liability and strict liability.
4.3.3.4. MARPOL Exceptions from Liability and Strict Liability
Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL has linked exceptions from liability for
discharges of oil to existence or non-existence of certain objective and subjective
elements (“damage to a ship or its equipment”, “intent”, “recklessness” and
“knowledge”). It is very unusual to see such kind of objective and subjective
elements (crucial elements) formulated as exceptions from liability. Usually such
elements are used to define offence, not defence. It is done so with good reason – to
safeguard the human right of an alleged offender to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty (presumption of innocence). As it was stated earlier, if some elements
of a conduct are formulated as defence, burden of proof of these elements shifts from
prosecution to defence, but presumption of innocence requires to limit such shifting
of the burden of proof as much as possible. Thus, Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL,
in fact, seriously limits the human right of alleged offenders (in our case – seafarers)
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. By shifting the burden of proof of nonexistence of certain subjective elements of the offence (“intent”, “recklessness” and
“knowledge”) to the alleged offender, Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL, inter alia,
has, in fact, made all discharges of oil resulting from the damage to a ship or its
equipment half-way house offences.
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Henrik Ringbom, The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
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Scholarly literature suggests that limitations on presumption of innocence of
alleged offenders resulting from MARPOL do not stop there. The mere fact that
there exist MARPOL exceptions from liability has triggered the interpretation that
any MARPOL violation which does not fall under these exceptions should be treated
as a strict liability offence. For instance, de la Rue and Anderson have stated:
Save in cases where an exemption from liability applies, violations of international laws to
prevent pollution are in general strict liability offences, proof of which does not depend on
whether breach of the controls was deliberate or accidental, nor on the degree of fault
involved in an accidental breach, the extent of damage or other factors.475

This author does not find such a conclusion well founded. MARPOL exceptions
from liability identify cases when liability cannot be applied at all. It does not
automatically mean that cases when liability, in principle, can be applied should be
treated as strict liability offences. In other words, the following syllogism is wrong:
Premise 1: X cannot be treated as offence.
Premise 2: Y is not X.
Conclusion: Y is strict liability offence.
The only conclusion which can be made in this case: Y can be treated as an offence.
There are also scholars apart from this author who disagree with the opinion
that, in general, MARPOL violations should be treated as strict liability offences. For
example, Pozdnakova has stated:
The exceptions contained in MARPOL aim to introduce a common standard of care to be
met by responsible actors in order to avoid accidental pollution from ships. The relevant
provisions suggest inter alia that in general the application of sanctions for accidental
pollution should be conditional on some degree of fault. [...] Thus, in this author’s view,
MARPOL discourages the application of strict liability for pollution violations.476

475

Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment, London: Informa, 2009
at p. 1099. See also p. 1114 and Henrik Ringbom, The EU Maritime Safety Policy and International
Law, ibid., at p. 405.
476
Alla Pozdnakova, Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators of Ship-Source Pollution: International
Law, State Practice and EU Harmonisation, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012 at p. 226.

200

Perhaps the most truthful position is that MARPOL neither encourages, nor
discourages the application of strict liability. It simply fails to address the issue
clearly, thus, causing uncertainty, which in turn may cause further negative
consequences. As Cartner, Fiske and Leiter have put it:
[…] allowing the shipmaster to be liable regardless of his fault seems an oddity. […] But the
lack of clear guidance in the Convention subjects the shipmasters to a disparity of regimes, so
it is fair to say that the shipmaster’s fate hinges entirely on the laws of the arresting state. The
broad language provided by the MARPOL Convention can have grave implications
regarding the shipmaster.477

Although the above citation talks only about “shipmasters” and only about “arrest”,
worries expressed in it can be easily associated with all seafarers and their criminal
liability, in general.
Allen has stated that, if drafters of law did their job properly, there should
never be any room for doubt whether or not an offence is one of strict liability:
If mens rea is required this could be expressly stated by using one of the long list of words
(e.g. intentionally, knowingly, wilfully, permitting, etc.) which impose this requirement.
Alternatively, if the offence is intended to be one of strict liability, this could be expressly
stated […]478

When “broad language” is used, as it is done in MARPOL, those who implement and
enforce the law are forced to apply different rules of interpretation to understand
what the real intention of the drafters was – to make an offence strict liability offence
or not. However, such interpretation may bring different results, because, at times,
relevant rules of interpretation are conflicting, themselves.479 Nevertheless, keeping
in mind the need to follow the rule of lenity and presumption of innocence of an
alleged offender, in any case, a good starting point for the above-mentioned
interpretation is the presumption of mens rea requirement, which means that: “The
absence of express words imposing a requirement of proving mens rea is not
conclusive that the offence is one of strict liability.”480
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4.3.3.5. General Scope of MARPOL Exceptions from Liability
Unfortunately, uncertainties related to Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL do not
end at the above-described issues. Also unclear is such the essential question as the
general scope of this regulation. For example, it can be questioned whether the
respective Regulation covers only operational discharges or any type of discharges.
It is evident from the mere text of Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL that this
Regulation covers only those discharges of oil which are addressed in Reg. 15 and 34
of the same Annex. However, it is not fully clear as to whether Reg. 15 and 34
address only operational discharges or any type of discharges. On the one hand, the
respective regulations are incorporated into the parts of MARPOL titled “Control of
operational discharges of oil” (which suggests that only operational discharges are
covered). On the other hand, specific paragraphs within the respective regulations
prohibit “any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures” (which suggests that all
types of discharges are covered). Also scholars have not been absolutely consistent
on this issue. For instance, Osante, even in one and the same single article, first,
states that Reg. 9 and 10 of Annex I of MARPOL cover only operational discharges,
but just after this statement, he treats Reg. 11 of Annex I of MARPOL as covering
any type of discharges.481
Yet, the absolute majority of scholars treat Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL as
covering any type of discharges. Most often they do it straight away, without even
mentioning the possible interpretation that the respective regulation covers only
operational discharges. It leads one to believe that Reg. 15 and 34 in conjunction
with Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL should be read as follows: Reg. 15 and 34 set
general prohibition of all types of discharges of oil in the first place, and, then, list
those operational discharges which are allowed (in other words, respective
481
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regulations cover all types of discharges in the first place, and operational discharges
secondary); consequently, Reg. 4 also covers all types of discharges of oil, not only
operational discharges of oil.
Another question which can be asked regarding the general scope of Reg. 4
of Annex I of MARPOL is – should coastal States observe exceptions from liability
incorporated into this Regulation in regards to discharges in any maritime zone or
only in regards to discharges beyond its territorial sea? Particularly serious disputes
on this issue have arisen in relation to Directive 2005/35. Therefore, this issue will be
addressed in the next chapter – the chapter on Directive 2005/35.
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5. Directive 2005/35
5.1. Introduction
In December 1999 the Erika accident happened off the coast of France
resulting in large-scale oil pollution.482 This accident, inter alia, triggered the EC to
embark upon an analysis of the adequacy of the existing international system of
liability for ship-source oil pollution. The focus of this analysis was on civil liability.
However, to some extent, penal liability was also analysed. Based on this analysis,
on 6 December 2000 (as a part of the so called “Erika 2 package”) the EC made the
proposal for a “Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the
establishment of a fund for the compensation of oil pollution damage in European
waters and related measures.”483 Art. 10 of the draft Regulation proposed to
introduce a financial penalty to be imposed on any party, whether ship-owner,
charterer, classification society or anybody else, who has contributed to the oil
pollution by his grossly negligent conduct.484 The proposed Regulation was not
adopted. Consequently, the above-mentioned proposal regarding penal liability also
did not advance at that time. Yet, in November 2002 another large-scale ship-source
oil pollution accident happened in European waters – the Prestige accident off the
coast of Spain.485 It triggered new proposals regarding penal liability. On 5 March
2003 the EC made the proposal for a “Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, including
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criminal sanctions, for pollution offences.”486 The proposed Directive prescribed
enforcement measures, including criminal sanctions, to be applied to ships suspected
of being engaged in illegal discharge of oil or noxious liquid substances in bulk.487
On 2 May 2003 the EC made the proposal for a “Council Framework Decision to
strengthen the criminal-law framework for the enforcement of the law against shipsource pollution.”488 Based on what was in more general terms said in the earlier
proposed Directive, the proposed Framework Decision, inter alia, prescribed specific
penalties (such as fines of a certain amount of money and imprisonment of a certain
length of time) to be imposed for specific ship-source pollution offences.489 On 12
July 2005 the proposed Framework Decision was adopted (Framework Decision
2005/667/JHA)490 and on 7 September 2005 the proposed Directive was adopted
(Directive 2005/35).491 Both of these legal instruments entered into force on 1
October 2005, after their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
In accordance with Art. 11 of the Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA, EU Member
States were obliged until 12 January 2007 to adopt the measures to comply with the
provisions of the Decision. In accordance with Art. 16 of Directive 2005/35, EU
Member States were obliged until 1 March 2007 to bring into force the national laws
necessary to comply with the Directive. In February 2006 the term for the
transposition of Directive 2005/35 into national law of EU Member States was
changed from 1 March 2007 to 1 April 2007.492
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On 23 October 2007 the ECJ annulled Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA in
its entirety on the grounds that the Council, by adopting Art. 2, 3 and 5 of the
Decision concerning the definition of criminal offences and the nature of penalties,
encroached on the competences of the Community.493 To fill the gap which arose
after the judgment, on 11 March 2008 the EC made the proposal to amend Directive
2005/35. Substantially, the proposal was to supplement Directive 2005/35 with the
legal norms which were previously incorporated into annulled Framework Decision
2005/667/JHA. Yet, not absolutely everything was taken over. For instance, those
rules of annulled Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA which prescribed specific
criminal penalties (such as fines of a certain amount of money and imprisonment of a
certain length of time) were not there in the proposal.494 Such approach was in line
with what the ECJ had said in its judgment, namely, that “the determination of the
type and level of the criminal penalties to be applied does not fall within the
Community’s sphere of competence.”495 On 21 October 2009 amendments to
Directive 2005/35 were adopted.496 Amendments entered into force on 16 November
2009 and EU Member States were obliged until 16 November 2010 to bring into
force the national laws necessary to comply with the amendments.497
This author has not carried out review of the national laws of EU Member
States to assess whether and how these states have transposed Directive 2005/35. For
such comprehensive review separate research is needed. However, relevant review
has been carried out by EMSA. Report of this review has not been published.
However, an unpublished draft version of the report suggests that, in principle, all
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EU Member States have transposed Directive 2005/35 into their national law.498 In
other words, presumably, now national laws of all EU Member States reflect
Directive 2005/35.
Generally speaking, Directive 2005/35, as it is in force now, prescribes to EU
Member States:
•

what kind of ship-source discharges of oil and noxious liquid substances in
bulk should be treated as infringements (Art. 3, 4, 5 and 5b);

•

which of the infringements should be treated as criminal offences (Art. 5a and
5b);

•

when not only natural persons but also legal persons should be held liable for
the infringements (Art. 8b);

•

what kind of penalties should be imposed for the infringements (Art. 8, 8a
and 8c);

•

what enforcement measures should be applied to ships within a port of a
Member State suspected of being engaged in illegal discharge of oil or
noxious liquid substances in bulk (Art. 6);

•

what enforcement measures should be applied by a Member State to ships in
transit suspected of being engaged in illegal discharge of oil or noxious liquid
substances in bulk (Art. 7).

Art. 1(1) of Directive 2005/35 states that the purpose of the Directive is:
[…] to incorporate international standards for ship-source pollution into Community law and
to ensure that persons responsible for discharges of polluting substances are subject to
adequate penalties […], in order to improve maritime safety and to enhance protection of the
marine environment from pollution by ships.
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Despite its laudable purpose, Directive 2005/35 has faced severe criticism.
First of all, it has been argued that the Directive has not brought those positive
changes which it potentially could have brought. For instance, Pozdnakova has
argued that international standards for ship-source pollution in many aspects, indeed,
are not absolutely clear, therefore their clarification with the help of EU law, in
principle, is advisable. However, relatively little is clarified with Directive
2005/35.499 Secondly, it has been argued that Directive 2005/35, instead of helping to
incorporate into EU law international standards for ship-source pollution (as claimed
in its Art. 1(1)), actually conflicts with those standards, which, obviously, makes the
overall regulation of the subject even more confusing.500 Compatibility of Directive
2005/35 with relevant international law will be analysed in Sub-chapter 5.2 below. It
will be done through the prism of the INTERTANKO case. Afterwards, in Subchapter 5.3, legal norms of Directive 2005/35 on the severity of sanctions will be
analysed separately. Throughout the analysis compatibility of Directive 2005/35 with
relevant human rights will also be assessed.

499

Alla Pozdnakova, Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators of Ship-Source Pollution: International
Law, State Practice and EU Harmonisation, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012 at pp. 252253. See also INTERTANKO and others v. Secretary of State for Transport, Grounds of the
Application dated 23 December 2005, High Court of Justice of England and Wales (unpublished
document on file with author), paragraphs 122 and 123; INTERTANKO and others v. Secretary of
State for Transport, Witness Statement of Colin Maxwell de la Rue dated 23 December 2005, High
Court of Justice of England and Wales (unpublished document on file with author), paragraphs 84c
and 93.
500
See, for example, Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment,
London: Informa, 2009 at pp. 1119-1121; European Parliament, Committee on Regional Policy,
Transport and Tourism, Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on
ship-source pollution and on the introduction of sanctions, including criminal sanctions, for pollution
offences, 14 July 2003, COM (2003) 92 – C5-0076/2003/0037(COD).

208

5.2. INTERTANKO Case
5.2.1. General Description of INTERTANKO Case
On 23 December 2005 (that is, when Directive 2005/35 had already entered
into force, but the term for its transposition into national law had not yet expired)
five maritime industry bodies – INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, the Greek
Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd’s Register and the International Salvage
Union – filed an application to the High Court of Justice of England and Wales for
judicial review of Directive 2005/35. Applicants claimed that Directive 2005/35 is
inconsistent with the international law, particularly MARPOL and UNCLOS. They
also claimed that Directive 2005/35 fails to define the standard of liability with
sufficient legal certainty. After giving reasons of such opinion, applicants asked the
High Court of Justice of England and Wales to refer the matter to the ECJ for
preliminary ruling under Art. 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community.501 The Court satisfied this request; with the decision on 4 July 2006 it
stayed the national proceedings and referred the following questions to the ECJ:
(1) In relation to straits used for international navigation, the exclusive economic zone or
equivalent zone of a Member State and the high seas, is Article 5(2) of Directive 2005/35/EC
invalid in so far as it limits the exceptions in Annex I Regulation 11(b) of Marpol 73/78 and
in Annex II Regulation (6)(b) of Marpol 73/78 to the owners, masters and crew?
(2) In relation to the territorial sea of a Member State:
(a) Is Article 4 of the Directive invalid in so far as it requires Member States to treat serious
negligence as a test of liability for discharge of polluting substances; and/or
(b) Is Article 5(1) of the Directive invalid in so far as it excludes the application of the
exceptions in Annex I Regulation 11(b) of Marpol 73/78 and in Annex II Regulation
(6)(b) of Marpol 73/78?
(3) Does Article 4 of the Directive, requiring Member States to adopt national legislation which
includes serious negligence as a standard of liability and which penalises discharges in
territorial sea, breach the right of innocent passage recognised in UNCLOS, and if so, is
Article 4 invalid to that extent?
(4) Does the use of the phrase “serious negligence” in Article 4 of the Directive infringe the
principle of legal certainty, and if so, is Article 4 invalid to that extent?502
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On 3 June 2008 (that is, when the term for transposition of Directive 2005/35
into national law had already expired) the ECJ delivered its judgment on the case. In
the judgment the ECJ stated that, in principle, the validity of any directive of the
Community may be affected by the fact that this directive is incompatible with
international law. However, this general rule is subjected to two conditions:
1) the Community must be bound by respective international law;
2) the Court can examine the validity of a directive in the light of an
international treaty only where the nature and the broad logic of the latter do
not preclude this and, in addition, the treaty’s provisions appear, as regards
their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise.503
The ECJ further ruled that:
•

it cannot assess validity of Directive 2005/35 in the light of MARPOL,
because the Community is not a party to MARPOL (thus, the first of the
above-mentioned conditions is not met);504

•

it cannot assess validity of Directive 2005/35 in the light of UNCLOS,
because, although the Community is a party to UNCLOS, the nature and
broad logic of UNCLOS prevents the Court from being able to assess the
validity of Directive 2005/35 in the light of UNCLOS (thus, the second of the
above-mentioned conditions is not met).505

Thus, the ECJ did not even start to analyse whether Directive 2005/35 is in conflict
with MARPOL and UNCLOS or not. Consequently, the first three questions referred
to the ECJ by the High Court of Justice of England and Wales were left completely
unanswered. The fourth question – the one regarding legal certainty of the phrase
“serious negligence” – was answered by the ECJ. Yet, the respective answer did not
declare any of the rules of Directive 2005/35 invalid.506 Consequently, the Directive
stayed as it was.
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Obviously, the maritime industry bodies which initiated the case were not
satisfied with such an outcome (an almost-zero outcome) of all their efforts to clarify
the issues. The disappointment was expressed in common statement.507 Also this
author thinks that the ECJ judgement in the INTERTANKO case is disappointing. It
was possible for the ECJ to interpret the conditions which should be met to assess
validity of a directive of the Community in the light of an international law so as to
carry out the long awaited and highly necessary assessment of the validity of
Directive 2005/35 in the light of MARPOL and UNCLOS;508 yet, unfortunately, the
ECJ interpreted the respective conditions so as not to carry out the assessment.
Sub-chapters 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 below will attempt to do what the ECJ refused to
do – to answer questions regarding the compatibility of Art. 4 and 5 of Directive
2005/35 with MARPOL and UNCLOS. Although, only Questions 2 and 3 referred to
the ECJ in the INTERTANKO case will be analysed in this regard, as Question 1 does
not concern seafarers and, thus, stands outside the scope of this dissertation.
Similarly, taking into consideration the scope of this dissertation, analysis will be
carried out only from the perspective of discharges of oil, despite the fact that
Directive 2005/35 also covers discharges of noxious liquid substances in bulk. Subchapter 5.2.4 will be dedicated to the closer analysis of Question 4 referred to the
ECJ in the INTERTANKO case, that is, the question on legal certainty of the phrase
“serious negligence”.
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5.2.2. Question 2 Referred to the ECJ in the INTERTANKO Case: Question on the
Compatibility of Directive 2005/35 with MARPOL
Question 2 referred to the ECJ in the INTERTANKO case was:
In relation to the territorial sea of a Member State:
(a) Is Article 4 of the Directive invalid in so far as it requires Member States to treat serious
negligence as a test of liability for discharge of polluting substances; and/or
(b) Is Article 5(1) of the Directive invalid in so far as it excludes the application of the
exceptions in Annex I Regulation 11(b) of Marpol 73/78 […]?

The essence of this question is: do Arts. 4 and 5 of Directive 2005/35, read together,
conflict with Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL?
Art. 4 of Directive 2005/35 prescribes:
1. Member States shall ensure that ship-source discharges of polluting substances, including
minor cases of such discharges, into any of the areas referred to in Article 3(1) are regarded
as infringements if committed with intent, recklessly or with serious negligence.
2. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any natural or legal
person having committed an infringement within the meaning of paragraph 1 can be held
liable therefor.

With “discharges of polluting substances” here must be understood discharges as per
MARPOL.509 With “areas referred to in Article 3(1)”:
(a) the internal waters, including ports, of a Member State, in so far as the
MARPOL regime is applicable;
(b) the territorial sea of a Member State;
(c) straits used for international navigation subject to the regime of transit
passage, as laid down in Part III, section 2 of UNCLOS, to the extent that a
Member State exercises jurisdiction over such straits;
(d) EEZ or equivalent zone of a Member State, established in accordance with
international law; and
(e) the high seas.510
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In relation to large-scale discharges (the type of discharges about which this
dissertation is concerned), the term “infringements” within Art. 4 of Directive
2005/35 can be read as “criminal offences”. It will be explained later why such
reading can be applied. The term “serious negligence” within Art. 4 of Directive
2005/35 must be read as “gross negligence”. Again, it will be explained later why
such a reading must be applied.
Art. 5 of Directive 2005/35 states:
1. A discharge of polluting substances into any of the areas referred to in Article 3(1) shall
not be regarded as an infringement, if it satisfies the conditions set out in Annex I,
Regulations 15, 34, 4,1 or 4,3 [...] of Marpol 73/78.
2. A discharge of polluting substances into the areas referred to in Article 3(1)(c), (d) and (e)
shall not be regarded as an infringement for the owner, the master or the crew, if it satisfies
the conditions set out in Annex I, Regulation 4,2 [...] of Marpol 73/78.

In other words, Art. 5 of Directive 2005/35 states that MARPOL exceptions from
liability “discharges necessary for the purposes of securing the safety of a ship or
saving life at sea” (Reg. 4(1) of Annex I of MARPOL) and “discharges necessary for
the purposes of combating specific pollution incident” (Reg. 4(3) of Annex I of
MARPOL) should be followed by EU Member States in regards to discharges of oil
in any maritime zone. Yet, the MARPOL exception from liability “discharge
resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment” (Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of
MARPOL) should be followed by EU Member States only in regards to discharges
of oil in straits used for international shipping, EEZs and on the high seas; in regards
to discharges of oil in internal waters and territorial sea of a Member State the
MARPOL exception from liability “discharge resulting from damage to a ship or its
equipment” (Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL) should not be followed.
MARPOL is applicable to all maritime zones. Only limitations on
applicability of MARPOL are related to specific ships, not specific territories. For
example, Art. 3(3) of MARPOL states that MARPOL shall not apply to any warship,
naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time
being, only on government non-commercial service. Thus, Directive 2005/35, by
requiring EU Member States not to follow the MARPOL exception from liability
“discharge resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment” in regards to discharges
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of oil in their internal waters and territorial sea, clearly deviates from MARPOL.
Nobody really denies that it is indeed so. However, great debate exists on the issue
whether the deviation in question is lawful or unlawful. Figuratively speaking, there
are two strongly opinionated camps – “supporters of the deviation” and “adversaries
of the deviation” – in conflict with each other.
“Supporters of the deviation” assert that, while for coastal States and port
States in regards to discharges outside their internal waters and territorial sea
MARPOL constitutes maximal standard (or limitation), for coastal States in regards
to discharges in their internal waters and territorial sea, similarly as for flag States,
MARPOL constitutes just a minimal standard (or starting point). Consequently, in
regards to discharges in their internal waters and territorial sea, coastal States may
raise the standard, inter alia, by ignoring MARPOL exceptions from liability. The
flow of arguments of “supporters of the deviation” is as follows:
1) Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL state that MARPOL is not to prejudice the
general jurisdictional regime established by UNCLOS;
2) in accordance with the general jurisdictional regime established by UNCLOS,
in regards to discharges in straits used for international navigation, EEZs and
on high seas coastal States and port States may adopt only such laws which
conform to and give effect to GAIRAS or applicable international rules and
standards (Art. 42(1)(b), Art. 211(5) and Art. 218(1) of UNCLOS) –
consequently, in regards to these discharges MARPOL (GAIRAS, an
applicable international rule and standard) constitutes maximal standard;
3) in accordance with the general jurisdictional regime established by UNCLOS,
in regards to discharges in territorial sea, coastal State jurisdiction is not
limited to GAIRAS or applicable international rules and standards (Art.
211(4) of UNCLOS) – consequently, in regards to these discharges

214

MARPOL constitutes just a minimal standard.511
In other words, “supporters of the deviation” say that Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL
allow deviation from MARPOL, if such deviation is allowed by UNCLOS. Art.
211(4) of UNCLOS allows coastal States to deviate from MARPOL standards in
regards to ship-source pollution in their territorial sea. Consequently, the deviation
incorporated in Directive 2005/35 is lawful. This position can be depicted as follows:

MARPOL,
Annex I,
Reg. 4(2)
Deviation allowed,
if this deviation is
allowed by UNCLOS
(MARPOL, Art. 9)

Deviation

Directive
2005/35,
Art. 4 and 5

Allowed

UNCLOS,
Art. 211(4)

VALID

Figure 6 – Position of “supporters of the deviation” regarding validity of Art. 4 and 5 of Directive
2005/35.
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2007, ECJ, paragraphs 26, 123, 126-127, 130 and 133-137.
Despite the fact that Directive 2005/35 requires to deviate from MARPOL in regards to both
discharges in internal waters and discharges in territorial sea, discussions between “supporters of the
deviation” and “adversaries of the deviation” usually are only on discharges in territorial sea. Most
probably it is so because these discussions are based on legal norms of UNCLOS, but UNCLOS does
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“Adversaries of the deviation” disagree. They assert that for coastal States
MARPOL never constitutes just a minimal standard. Instead, it constitutes uniform
rules, which may never be ignored. Consequently, MARPOL exceptions from
liability may also never be ignored.512
First of all, “adversaries of the deviation” argue that the Preamble of
MARPOL states that the Convention is establishing rules of universal purport, but
[…] the universality of applicability of MARPOL […] supports the view that the thresholds
of MARPOL, until amended, are binding on the States parties; moreover these thresholds are
the very basis of the integrity of that Convention.513

Secondly, “adversaries of the deviation” argue that also travaux
preparatoires of MARPOL show that the aim of the drafters of MARPOL was to
develop uniform rules from which State Parties of this Convention (including coastal
States in regards to discharges in their territorial sea) may never depart. In this
regard, “adversaries of the deviation” point to the fact that, during the process of
drafting of MARPOL, proposals were made to allow coastal States a degree of
flexibility to depart from MARPOL; however, these proposals were opposed with the
argument that such “flexibility” will undermine the whole point of the Convention –
to ensure the balance between the interests of flag States and coastal States.514
“Supporters of the deviation” do not accept this argument. They say that, during the
process of drafting of MARPOL, states actually did not completely reject the
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possibility for coastal States to adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL, they
simply left the issue to be decided later by UNCLOS and exactly because of this
reason Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL were adopted.515 “Adversaries of the
deviation” give counter argument to this statement. They say that Art. 9(2) and (3) of
MARPOL were already in the draft Convention long before the debate on allowing
or not allowing coastal States to adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL took
place. Consequently, Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL are not linked to that debate.516
Thirdly, “adversaries of the deviation” argue that, differently from what
“supporters of the deviation” say, MARPOL actually does not prejudice the general
jurisdictional regime established by UNCLOS. For example, Embiricos has stated:
MARPOL Article 9(2) simply provides that nothing in the MARPOL Convention shall
prejudice the debate at the UN Conference, which subsequently led to the UNCLOS
Convention; and indeed there is no conflict between MARPOL and UNCLOS. UNCLOS
Article 211(4) provides that coastal states may, in the exercise of their sovereign rights
within their territorial sea, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and
control of marine pollution. Yet it is precisely in the exercise of their sovereign rights that the
EU Member States agreed to be bound by the terms of MARPOL. It is important to note that
there is nothing in UNCLOS, which even purports to change MARPOL or effect it in any
way. Thus, the Commission’s argument that the implementation of the Directive by the
Member States is a legitimate exercise of sovereign rights under UNCLOS, is invalidated by
the fact that such sovereign rights were already freely exercised when the Member States
entered into a binding agreement with other States, which created the MARPOL
Convention.517

De la Rue and Anderson have expressed similar view:
If MARPOL standards were less stringent than others which states could have adopted
without exceeding their sovereign powers, this did not mean that the Convention had
prejudiced those powers: it remains open to contracting states to agree to amend the
Convention by raising the relevant standard or, if they preferred, to denounce it and thereby
free themselves to exercise their powers unilaterally.518
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In other words, “adversaries of the deviation” say that Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL
allow deviation from MARPOL only when there is a conflict between MARPOL and
UNCLOS. Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL does not conflict with Art. 211(4) of
UNCLOS. Consequently, the deviation incorporated in Directive 2005/35 is
unlawful. This position can be depicted as follows:

Deviation allowed
if MARPOL conflicts
with UNCLOS
(MARPOL, Art. 9)

MARPOL,
Annex I,
Reg. 4(2)

No conflict

Deviation

UNCLOS,
Art. 211(4)

Directive
2005/35,
Art. 4 and 5

NOT VALID
Figure 7 – Position 1 of “adversaries of the deviation” regarding validity of Art. 4 and 5 of Directive
2005/35.

For the sake of the completeness of discussion it should be noted here that at
times “adversaries of the deviation” follow a different path of thinking as depicted
above. At times, similarly as “supporters of the deviation”, they say that Art. 9(2)
and (3) of MARPOL, indeed, allow deviation from MARPOL if such deviation is
allowed by UNCLOS (even if there is no conflict between MARPOL and UNCLOS),
just, differently from “supporters of the deviation”, they assert that the only states to
which UNCLOS grants the right to deviate from MARPOL are flag States. To
support this opinion “adversaries of the deviation” point to the difference between
legal norm of UNCLOS which addresses flag State jurisdiction to adopt national law
on ship-source pollution (Art. 211(2)) and legal norms of UNCLOS which address
corresponding coastal State and port State jurisdiction. “Adversaries of the
deviation” argue that, while Art. 211(2) of UNCLOS explicitly states that laws of
flag States shall at least have the same effect as GAIRAS (which, in their view,
indicates that any flag State, even the one which is State Party to MARPOL, is
allowed to legislate beyond MARPOL), there is no such statement in legal norms
addressing coastal State and port State jurisdiction. Consequently, the deviation
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incorporated in Directive 2005/35 – deviation regarding coastal States, not flag
States – is unlawful.519 This position of “adversaries of the deviation” can be
depicted as follows:

MARPOL,
Annex I,
Reg. 4(2)

Deviation

Deviation allowed,
if this deviation is
allowed by UNCLOS
(MARPOL, Art. 9)

Directive
2005/35,
Art. 4 and 5

UNCLOS,
Art. 211(4)
Not allowed

NOT VALID

Figure 8 – Position 2 of “adversaries of the deviation” regarding validity of Art. 4 and 5 of Directive
2005/35.

Often it is hard to understand from the argumentation of “adversaries of the
deviation” which position in regards to interpretation of Art. 9(2) and (3) of
MARPOL they actually take – Position 1 (as depicted in Figure 7) or Position 2 (as
depicted in Figure 8). It seems that at least some “adversaries of the deviation” take
both of these positions simultaneously. Such practice, however, makes overall
argumentation inconsistent, and thus weaker.
The above description of positions of “supporters of the deviation” and
“adversaries of the deviation” shows that the core of the controversy between these
two sides is different opinions on whether Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL allow
deviation from MARPOL (even when there is no conflict between MARPOL and
UNCLOS) or not, and if allow, then to what extent. Exact wording of Art. 9(2) and
(3) of MARPOL is as follows:
519
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(2) Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the codification and development of the
law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened pursuant to
resolution 2750 C(XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations nor the present or
future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea and the nature and
extent of coastal and flag state jurisdiction.
(3) The term “jurisdiction” in the present Convention shall be construed in the light of
international law in force at the time of application or interpretation of the present
Convention”.

Literal (philological), systemic and teleological methods of interpretation of Art. 9(2)
and (3) of MARPOL are not capable of providing a clear answer to the abovementioned question on which “supporters of the deviation” and “adversaries of the
deviation” have different opinions. Consequently, the recourse by “adversaries of the
deviation” to relevant travaux preparatoires of MARPOL is the step in the right
direction for resolving the controversy.
During the drafting process of MARPOL, rules which ultimately became Art.
9(2) and (3) of MARPOL (initially they constituted Art. 10(2) and (3)) were
negotiated as a package with Art. 4(2) of MARPOL – rule which sets coastal State
jurisdiction to cause proceedings in regards to MARPOL violations. The purpose of
adding Art. 9(2) and (3) to Art. 4(2) was to ascertain that the wide jurisdictional
powers given to coastal States by Art. 4(2) are ultimately exercised in line with the
limits of these powers which will be determined later – by UNCLOS. As Timagenis
has put it:
[…] what could be generally said is that Article 4(2) should be interpreted (and it can be so
interpreted) consistently with the general law of the sea concerning coastal State jurisdiction.
Thus, for example, Article 4(2) may not be interpreted as meaning that coastal State may
always cause proceedings for all violations in all of the areas under their jurisdiction.520

During the drafting process of MARPOL, rules which ultimately became Art. 9(2)
and (3) of MARPOL were not debated extensively. It was not done so because these
rules were considered as sufficiently clear. They were considered as sufficiently
clear, because the debate on a similar regulation – Art. XIII of the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972
(hereinafter – Dumping Convention) – was already accomplished. If to reflect the
outcome of this debate in short, it can be said that states agreed that Art. XIII of the
520
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Dumping Convention prescribes: first, that nothing in the Convention should be read
as limiting states during the envisaged development of UNCLOS to negotiate
whatever jurisdictional regime they want; second, if respective negotiations lead to
legal norms of UNCLOS which are in conflict with the Dumping Convention, to
follow UNCLOS.521 Thus, it can be concluded that the purpose of Art. 9(2) and (3)
of MARPOL is similar to that of Art. XIII of the Dumping Convention. It, inter alia,
means that “adversaries of the deviation” are right when they say that the
development of Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL is not linked to the specific debate on
allowing or not allowing coastal States to adopt more stringent standards than
MARPOL. This specific debate, indeed, took place during the drafting process of
MARPOL, moreover this debate was extensive. However, it was linked to other rules
than to those which ultimately became Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL. These “other
rules” (draft Art. 8, later draft Art. 9) in the latest stages of the negotiations read as
follows:
(1) Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as derogating from the powers of
any Contracting State to take more stringent measures where specific circumstances so
warrant, within its jurisdiction, in respect of discharge standards.
(2) A Contracting State shall not, within its jurisdiction, in respect of ships to which the
Convention applies other than its own ships, impose additional requirements with regard to
ship design and equipment in respect of pollution control. The requirements of this paragraph
do not apply to waters the particular characteristics of which, in accordance with accepted
scientific criteria, render the environment exceptionally vulnerable.
(3) States which adopt special measures in accordance with this Article shall notify them to
the Organization without delay. The Organization shall inform Contracting States about these
measures.

The respective draft article did not receive sufficient support – because of the use of
such vague phrases as “where specific circumstances so warrant”, “waters the
particular characteristics of which render the environment exceptionally vulnerable”
and “accepted scientific criteria”. Consequently, the respective draft article was
deleted from the draft Convention.522
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However, “supporters of the deviation” are right when they say that, during
the process of drafting of MARPOL, states, actually, did not completely reject the
possibility for coastal States to adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL.
Despite the fact that the above-introduced draft article was deleted from the draft
Convention, many states remained convinced that it does not deprive them from the
right within their jurisdiction to adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL.
Some of these states, for example, Australia, Canada and the Philippines, even made
direct statements in this regard.523 Thus, in fact, during the drafting process of
MARPOL, the very important issue of possibility for State Parties to MARPOL to
adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL was simply left unsolved, with
conflicting views still present. These conflicting views have surfaced again now
within the discussions on the legality of Art. 4 and 5 of Directive 2005/35.
Consequently, it can be concluded that the root cause of the controversy between
“supporters of the deviation” and “adversaries of the deviation”, actually, is this
failure of the drafters of MARPOL to agree on the issue when, if ever, State Parties
to MARPOL may adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL. It, inter alia,
means that, if the international maritime community wants to overcome the
controversy between “supporters of the deviation” and “adversaries of the deviation”,
fundamentally, it needs to return to the above-mentioned debate which was
abandoned during the drafting process of MARPOL, and ultimately include in
MARPOL clear legal norms reflecting results of this debate.
At the same time, it is rather clear that, even if the international maritime
community returns to the above-mentioned debate, the satisfactory result of this
debate will not come soon. Maybe it will never come. Consequently, there is also a
need for the short-term solution – the interpretation of the law as it is in force now.
This interpretation is provided further along in this sub-chapter.
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Art. 237(1) and 311(2) of UNCLOS state that UNCLOS shall not alter the
rights and obligations of State Parties which arise from other agreements compatible
with UNCLOS. Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL essentially state the same, just in
reverse form and specifically in regards to MARPOL, namely, that in case MARPOL
is incompatible with UNCLOS, UNCLOS shall alter the rights and obligations under
MARPOL. Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL is compatible with UNCLOS, as
nothing in UNCLOS directly forbids States to exempt from liability discharges of oil
resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment. Consequently, neither UNCLOS
nor MARPOL sets State Parties to MARPOL (be they flag States, coastal States or
port States) free from their obligation to follow Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL.
Even if one disagrees that Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL should be
interpreted as permitting deviation from MARPOL only when MARPOL comes into
conflict with UNCLOS, he must admit that such interpretation, in principle, is
possible. In other words, he must admit that the content of Art. 9(2) and (3) of
MARPOL is at least ambiguous. This conclusion is supported by the very fact that
highly distinguished scholars have interpreted the respective legal norms of
MARPOL differently. If so, the rule of lenity comes into play again – interpretation
which is more favourable to an alleged offender should be followed. Obviously, the
interpretation which leaves to an alleged offender all defences from liability
incorporated in MARPOL (the interpretation of “adversaries of the deviation”) is
more favourable to an alleged offender than the interpretation which takes away
some of these defences (the interpretation of “supporters of the deviation”).
For those who, even after this argument, stay convinced that in regards to
discharges in their internal waters and territorial sea coastal States (even those which
are State Parties to MARPOL) may adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL,
one more counter-argument can be invoked, namely, that just because more stringent
standards than MARPOL are allowed in regards to respective discharges does not
automatically mean that exceptions from liability incorporated in Reg. 4 of Annex I
of MARPOL can be removed, because it can be questioned which standards, exactly,
are “more stringent standards” in regards to Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL:
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•

such standards which remove safeguards for alleged offenders incorporated in
the Regulation – thus, by more extensive application of liability, securing
“higher standard than minimal” in regards to protection of environment (as
“supporters of the deviation” claim), or

•

such standards which provide even more safeguards for alleged offenders
than the Regulation does – thus, securing “higher standard than minimal” in
regards to protection of alleged offenders.

In the opinion of this author, both above-given interpretations are justifiable. The
first one can be justified by reference to the general purpose of MARPOL, which is
to secure a clean environment. The second one can be justified by reference to the
very nature of Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL, itself. This Regulation, by setting
different defences from liability, predominately provides protection to alleged
offenders, not the marine environment. If both interpretations are possible, again, the
rule of lenity should be applied. Thus, interpretation which is favourable to alleged
offenders (second interpretation), not disadvantageous to them (first interpretation)
should be followed.
Due to the above-given reasons, this author is of the view that under the law,
as it is in force now, the requirement of Directive 2005/35 to treat as infringements
discharges of oil which are exempted from liability under Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of
MARPOL conflicts with this rule of MARPOL. Consequently, particularly taking
into consideration that the claimed purpose of Directive 2005/35 is to incorporate
international standards for ship-source pollution (thus, also MARPOL) into EU law,
the EU shall align Directive 2005/35 with MARPOL, for example, by deleting Art. 5
of the Directive. If the EU fails to make the relevant alignment, others may return to
challenging the validity of the requirement of the Directive to deviate from
MARPOL. Several dispute settlement mechanisms are still available for this purpose.
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One of the options is to involve an Arbitration Tribunal established in
accordance with Art. 10 of MARPOL (hereinafter – Arbitration Tribunal under
MARPOL). Arbitration Tribunal under MARPOL may be established to settle the
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of MARPOL. The controversy
between “supporters of the deviation” and “adversaries of the deviation” involves
such disputes – dispute on the interpretation of Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL and,
related to it, dispute on the application of MARPOL to discharges of polluting
substances in internal waters and territorial sea of a coastal State. For example, the
following questions could be referred to an Arbitration Tribunal under MARPOL:
•

Do Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL give State Parties to MARPOL the right to
adopt law which deviates from MARPOL in cases when there is no conflict
between MARPOL and UNCLOS?

•

If no, does national law of State X (State Party to MARPOL, national law of
which does not follow Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL in regards to
discharges of oil in its internal waters and territorial sea) violate MARPOL?

Proceedings under Art. 10 of MARPOL could be initiated by those State Parties to
MARPOL which are not EU Member States and are of the opinion that Art. 9(2) and
(3) of MARPOL do not give State Parties to MARPOL the right to adopt national
law which deviates from MARPOL (except when there is a conflict between
MARPOL and UNCLOS) against those State Parties to MARPOL which are EU
Member States and, consequently, by implementing Directive 2005/35 in their
national law, willingly or unwillingly, but follow the opinion that Art. 9(2) and (3) of
MARPOL give State Parties to MARPOL the right to adopt standards which deviate
from MARPOL (even when there is no conflict between MARPOL and UNCLOS).
Proceedings under Art. 10 of MARPOL may not be initiated directly against the EU,
because the EU is not Party to MARPOL. Thus, the validity of Directive 2005/35
(EU law) may not be assessed within the respective proceedings. However, the
decision of an Arbitration Tribunal under MARPOL regarding the interpretation of
Art. 9(2) and (3) of MARPOL has high potential to influence an EU decision to
amend Directive 2005/35 or not.
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Another option for challenging the validity of the requirement of Directive
2005/35 to deviate from MARPOL is to involve a court or tribunal (ITLOS, ICJ,
arbitral tribunal or special arbitral tribunal) in accordance with Part XV of UNCLOS.
A court or tribunal under Part XV of UNCLOS may be involved to settle the disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, and the controversy
between “supporters of the deviation” and “adversaries of the deviation” involves
also such dispute – the dispute on the interpretation and application of Art. 211(4),
Art. 237(1) and Art. 311(2) of UNCLOS. For example, the following questions could
be referred to a court or tribunal under Part XV of UNCLOS:
•

Does Art. 211(4) of UNCLOS, read in system with Art. 237(1) and Art.
311(2) of UNCLOS, give states which are State Parties to both UNCLOS and
MARPOL the right to deviate from legal norms of MARPOL in cases where
legal norms in question are not in conflict with UNCLOS?

•

If no, do Directive 2005/35 and national law of State X (State Party to both
UNCLOS and MARPOL national law of which does not follow Reg. 4(2) of
Annex I of MARPOL in regards to discharges of oil in its territorial sea)
violate UNCLOS?

Similar to proceedings under Art. 10 of MARPOL, proceedings under Part XV of
UNCLOS could be initiated by those State Parties to both UNCLOS and MARPOL
which are not EU Member States and are of the opinion that Art. 211(4) of UNCLOS
does not give states which are State Parties to both UNCLOS and MARPOL the right
to deviate from rules of MARPOL (except when there is a conflict between
MARPOL and UNCLOS) against those State Parties to both UNCLOS and
MARPOL which are EU Member States and, consequently, by implementing
Directive 2005/35 in their national law, willingly or unwillingly, but follow the
opinion that Art. 211(4) of UNCLOS does give states which are State Parties to both
UNCLOS and MARPOL the right to deviate from rules of MARPOL (even when
there is no conflict between MARPOL and UNCLOS). Differently from proceedings
under Art. 10 of MARPOL, proceedings under Part XV of UNCLOS may also be
initiated directly against the EU. In accordance with Art. 1 and 7 of Annex IX of
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UNCLOS, Part XV of UNCLOS is applicable not only to states which are State
Parties to UNCLOS but also to intergovernmental organizations Parties to UNCLOS.
The EU is such an intergovernmental organisation.524 Thus, within the proceedings
under Part XV of UNCLOS the validity of Directive 2005/35 may also be assessed.
However, cases against the EU may only be referred to an arbitral tribunal construed
in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS, because the EU has not submitted
written declaration regarding its choice of one or more of the means for the
settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, but
in such cases, in accordance with Art. 287(3), (4) and (5) of UNCLOS, disputes shall
be referred to an arbitral tribunal construed in accordance with Annex VII of
UNCLOS, unless the parties otherwise agree.525
One more option which can be considered for challenging the validity of the
requirement of Directive 2005/35 to deviate from MARPOL is to involve a national
constitutional court in one of the EU countries. It can be done so because it is
possible to argue that the requirement of Directive 2005/35 to treat as criminal
offences particular discharges of polluting substances which are exempted from
liability under MARPOL, not only conflicts with MARPOL, but also infringes upon
human rights, particularly the principle of legality, which states that no one shall be
held criminally liable for any act which do not constitute a crime at the time when it
was committed. Constitutions of some EU countries prescribe that a particular
country only accepts supremacy of EU law so long as this law guarantees human
rights. Consequently, in these countries, when it is believed that human rights are
violated by the national implementation of specific EU law, the issue can be referred
to national constitutional court. For example, in Germany, it was done so in regards
to the national implementation of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of
13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between
524
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Member States.526 On 18 July 2005 the German national law implementing this
Framework Decision was declared void by the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany on the grounds that it violates human rights under Art. 2 (Personal
Freedoms) and 16 (Citizenship-Extradition) of the Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany.527 Among other things, a national constitutional court within
its proceedings may refer specific questions to the ECJ for preliminary ruling. In
regards to Directive 2005/35, the relevant question for referral to the ECJ in this case
would be: do Art. 4 and 5 of Directive 2005/35, by requiring EU Member States in
regards to discharges of polluting substances in their internal waters and territorial
sea not to follow certain exceptions from liability under MARPOL, violate Art. 7 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and/or Art. 49(1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (principle of legality)? While the ECJ
within the INTERTANKO case refused to assess Directive 2005/35 in the light of
MARPOL and UNCLOS, it will be very hard for the ECJ to refuse to assess
Directive 2005/35 in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, because in accordance with
Art. 6 of the Treaty on European Union and Par. 1 of the accompanying Declaration
concerning provisions of the Treaties both the European Convention on Human
Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are assimilated
to the primary law of the EU.528
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5.2.3. Question 3 Referred to the ECJ in the INTERTANKO Case: Question on the
Compatibility of Directive 2005/35 with the Right of Innocent Passage
Question 3 referred to the ECJ in the INTERTANKO case was:
Does Article 4 of the Directive, requiring Member States to adopt national legislation which
includes serious negligence as a standard of liability and which penalises discharges in
territorial sea, breach the right of innocent passage recognised in UNCLOS, and if so, is
Article 4 invalid to that extent?

In accordance with Art. 4 of Directive 2005/35, the mental state (mens rea)
which should accompany ship-source pollution in the territorial sea for this pollution
to be treated as infringement is “intent, recklessness or serious negligence”. In
accordance with Art. 19(2)(h) of UNCLOS the mental state (mens rea) which should
accompany ship-source pollution in the territorial sea for this pollution to be treated
as non-innocent is “will”, that is “intent” (in addition, the pollution caused should be
serious). This decoupling has raised concerns about the compatibility of Art. 4 of
Directive 2005/35 with the right of innocent passage of foreign ships through the
territorial sea. For example, Mensah has stated:
Article 211(4) of UNCLOS, on which is the Directive appears to base itself, provides
expressly that the laws and regulations adopted by a coastal state in exercise of its
sovereignty within its territorial sea for the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution “shall … not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.” In this connection, it is
worth noting that pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 2(h) of UNCLOS, the only act of
pollution which can deprive a foreign ship of the right of innocent passage in the territorial
sea is an “act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention”. Hence, in the
absence of a wilful and serious act of pollution, passage by a foreign vessel in the territorial
sea of a coastal state must be considered to be “innocent passage”. The EC Directive, on the
other hand, lowers the requirement for the application of sanctions to a discharge from a
foreign vessel involving, inter alia, “serious negligence”. This lower criterion is not to be
found in either MARPOL or UNCLOS. In doing this the EC Directive adopts a standard
whose effect is to hamper innocent passage of a foreign vessel through the territorial sea.529
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However, many commentators say that the above-described concern is
unfounded. For instance, Pozdnakova has stated:
[…] Article 4 of Directive does not prohibit foreign vessels from transiting Member States’
waters, but merely criminalizes certain (intentional, reckless and seriously negligent) conduct
that is not necessarily for passage.530

Similarly, Konig argues:
Even if a passage through the territorial sea leading to an accidental discharge caused by
serious negligence still had to be considered as innocent, a more stringent liability standard
does not per se hamper the right of innocent passage.531

This author agrees with Pozdnakova and Konig. Indeed, what Art. 4 of
Directive 2005/35 requires from EU Member States is nothing more than to define in
their national law as offences particular ship-source pollution. The mere defining of
some conduct as offence in no way can hamper innocent passage. Innocent passage
can be hampered only by specific enforcement measures, such as physical inspection
and detention of the ship or her crew. Such enforcement measures are not addressed
by Art. 4 of Directive 2005/35. They are addressed by Art. 6 and 7 of the Directive,
and these articles, inter alia, require coastal States to apply Art. 4 of the Directive in
a manner which does not hamper the right of innocent passage of a foreign ship
through the territorial sea.
One more thing which does not speak in favour of the argument that Art. 4 of
Directive 2005/35 breaches the right of innocent passage is that those who make the
respective assertion, in a hidden way, contradict themselves. They base their
argument on the wording of Art. 19(2)(h) of UNCLOS, which talks only about
“wilful” (or “intentional”) pollution. Yet, at the same time, they contest lawfulness of
Art. 4 of Directive 2005/35 just in regards to pollution caused by serious negligence.
Lawfulness of Art. 4 of Directive 2005/35 in regards to pollution caused by
recklessness is not contested, despite the fact that recklessness, similarly as serious
530
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negligence, is also not intent. It is rather clear why lawfulness of Art. 4 of Directive
2005/35 in regards to pollution caused by recklessness is not contested – because
reckless pollution, differently from seriously negligent pollution, is clearly
recognised as illegal by MARPOL. It means, if to admit that defining reckless
pollution as an offence breaches the right of innocent passage, one must admit that
not only Directive 2005/35 but also MARPOL breaches this right. Seemingly nobody
is willing to make such an assertion. Yet, without doing so, the argument is
inconsistent.
5.2.4. Question 4 Referred to the ECJ in the INTERTANKO Case: Question on
Legal Certainty of the Term “Serious Negligence”
Question 4 referred to the ECJ in the INTERTANKO case was:
Does the use of the phrase “serious negligence” in Article 4 of the Directive infringe the
principle of legal certainty, and if so, is Article 4 invalid to that extent?

When answering this question in its judgment, the ECJ acknowledged the existence
of the general principle of legal certainty as well as the more specific principle of
legality.532 However, the ECJ ruled that the use of the phrase “serious negligence” in
Directive 2005/35 does not infringe upon the above-mentioned principles. Two
distinct arguments were given to justify this ruling. First of all, the ECJ argued that
the phrase “serious negligence” in Directive 2005/35 is sufficiently clear and precise,
because this phrase can only be understood as entailing “unintentional act or
omission by which the person responsible commits a patent breach of the duty of
care which he should have and could have complied with in view of his attributes,
knowledge, abilities and individual situation.”533 Secondly, the ECJ argued that it is
acceptable that the term “serious negligence” in Directive 2005/35 is not absolutely
clear and precise, because this Directive (just like any EU directive) is not directly
applicable to individuals; consequently, it is the Directive together with the national
law implementing this Directive (not the Directive alone) which should ultimately
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fully satisfy the requirement of legal certainty.534 This author tends to agree with the
second argument of the ECJ and, thus, also to its ruling that the lack of the definition
of the term “serious negligence” in Directive 2005/35 does not infringe upon the
general principle of legal certainty and the more specific principle of legality.
It is not to say, however, that the definition of the term “serious negligence”
should not be there in Directive 2005/35. Such definition would be very helpful for
harmonized and fair implementation of the Directive. This author, in general, sees
inclusion in any legal instrument clear definitions of all not absolutely self-evident
terms used in this instrument as extremely important work to do, because huge
practical problems may arise from even small disagreements on the content of
specific terms. The term “serious negligence” is not absolutely self-evident.
The explanation of the term “serious negligence” given by the ECJ (the
explanation that serious negligence is “an unintentional act or omission by which the
person responsible commits a patent breach of the duty of care which he should have
and could have complied with in view of his attributes, knowledge, abilities and
individual situation”) largely accords with the explanation of the term “gross
negligence.”535 Also scholars have treated the phrase “serious negligence” in
Directive 2005/35 as synonymous with the phrase “gross negligence”; for example,
Pozdnakova has stated: “The directive criminalises pollution from ships, including
pollution caused by recklessness or gross negligence.”536 Osante has stated:
Discharges involving negligence not considered ‘serious’ (slight negligence, culpa levissima,
simple negligence, etc) are not considered as offences and are therefore not subject to
sanctions under the Directive.537
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However, there is also the different view – the one which does not associate “serious
negligence” with “gross negligence”. For example, Embiricos has stated:
[...] the addition of the word “serious” adds nothing to the word “negligence”. [...] The
Commission tends to convey the false notion that serious negligence involves acts or
omissions involving culpability at an intermediate level, between ordinary negligence and
recklessness. In fact, no such level of culpability is recognized by law and it would be
difficult if not impossible to define. In practice, serious negligence will tend to be found
when ordinary negligence has caused or contributed to serious consequences. As virtually all
pollution is nowadays considered serious, the Directive will, in practice, result in criminal
sanctions for pollution caused by ordinary negligence.538

This author agrees with the ECJ, Pozdnakova and Osante that the phrase
“serious negligence” should be interpreted as “gross negligence”. It is rather hard to
interpret the phrase “serious negligence” other than “something more than ordinary,
simple or civil negligence”, that is, “gross negligence”. If drafters of Directive
2005/35 would have wanted to define as infringement ordinary negligence, there
would not be the word “serious” before the word “negligence”. If drafters of
Directive 2005/35 would have wanted to associate the word “serious” with
something other than the mens rea element “negligence” (for example, the actus reus
element “harm”), the word “serious” would be explicitly linked with this other
element, not negligence. Consequently, this author disagrees with the statements of
Embiricos that the word “serious” adds nothing to the word “negligence” and that
there is no level of culpability between ordinary negligence and recklessness.
However, the statements of Embiricos to some extent are true. First of all, the
practice shows that states, indeed, tend to link the term “serious negligence” to the
actus reus element “harm”.539 Secondly, criminal law systems of states differ
significantly. Not all of these systems operate with such terms as “ordinary
negligence”, “gross negligence” and “recklessness” (as scholarly literature
predominantly does) and, indeed, not all of these systems recognise the level of
538

Presentation by Epaminondas Embiricos, in London Shipping Law Centre, The Eighth
Cadwallader Annual Memorial Lecture, “The Extra Territorial Jurisdiction in Criminalisation Cases:
Sovereign Rights in Legislation and New Risks for the Shipping Industry”, Transcript of the Lecture,
4 October 2005, available at: http://www.shippinglbc.com/content/uploads/documents/8_cad.pdf
[accessed 4 October 2015] at p. 34.
539
For example, see the case study in this dissertation which indicates that after Prestige accident the
Spanish Supreme Court, when assessing whether the negligence of the master of Prestige – Captain
Mangouras – was serious or not, among other things, referred to “the importance of the legally
protected asset affected”.

233

culpability between ordinary negligence and recklessness. For example, Art. 10 of
the Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia talks about “criminal self-reliance”
instead of “recklessness” and about “criminal neglect” instead of “negligence”, both
“criminal self-reliance” and “criminal neglect” are treated as “criminal offences
through negligence”; but the concept directly reflecting the term “gross negligence”
cannot be found within the Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia, at all.540 Quite
naturally, states whose general criminal law systems, in principle, do not distinguish
the level of culpability between ordinary negligence and recklessness might be
tempted to interpret the term “serious negligence” (the term with which even
scholarly literature does not operate) whichever way seems fit, according to the
existing system. Lack of the definition of the term “serious negligence” in Directive
2005/35, in principle, allows them to do so. As a result, the standard of criminal
liability for ship-source oil pollution may turn out to be different in different EU
Member States, inter alia, in some states ordinary negligence might be criminalised,
in others not.
Is it a problem that some states may interpret the term “serious negligence” in
Directive 2005/35 as incorporating ordinary negligence, but others not? It does not
seem like a problem, if one looks solely at the rules of Directive 2005/35, itself. Art.
1(2) of the Directive states: “This Directive does not prevent Member States from
taking more stringent measures against ship-source pollution in conformity with
international law”. This legal norm has led to the following conclusion of Advocate
General Kokott:
[...] the directive does not lay down a definitive, uniform standard but merely minimum
requirements which by their nature do not call for uniform transposition in the Member
States.541
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Thus, in principle, Directive 2005/35 allows states to criminalise ordinary negligence
anyway. Whether a particular state does so based on Art. 1(2) or through the
interpretation of the term “serious negligence”, practically, is of no difference.
The fact that some states may interpret the term “serious negligence” in
Directive 2005/35 as incorporating ordinary negligence, but others not, appears more
like a problem if, apart from looking solely at the rules of Directive 2005/35, one
looks also at its Preamble. Recital 3 of the Preamble of Directive 2005/35 basically
states that one of the aspirations of the Directive is to harmonise penal systems of EU
Member States in regards to ship-source pollution. Leaving to EU Member States, in
fact, the freedom to choose whether or not to criminalise ship-source pollution
caused by ordinary negligence hardly contributes to the above-mentioned aspiration.
The fact that some states may interpret the term “serious negligence” in
Directive 2005/35 as incorporating ordinary negligence, but others not, appears even
more like a problem if one looks beyond Directive 2005/35. As it was explained
earlier, criminalisation of ordinary negligence goes against the general principles of
punishment and with that also against the human right to be free from cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment. In other words, it was explained there that criminalisation
of ordinary negligence is unfair. Directive 2005/35, by not clearly indicating that
ship-source pollution caused by ordinary negligence may not be criminalised, has
lost an opportunity to diminish this unfairness.
Although Directive 2005/35, in principle, allows EU Member States to
criminalise ship-source pollution caused by ordinary negligence, fortunately, it at
least does not set an obligation to do so. Consequently, when implementing Directive
2005/35, states may still develop such national criminal law systems which are in
line with the general principle of punishment that ordinary negligence should not be
criminalised.
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5.3. Legal Norms of Directive 2005/35 on Severity of Sanctions
Art. 8 of Directive 2005/35 prescribes: “Each Member State shall take
necessary measures to ensure that infringements within the meaning of Articles 4 and
5 are punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties”. This rule of
Directive 2005/35 accords with the general rules on severity of sanctions for shipsource pollution violations incorporated in UNCLOS and MARPOL (Art. 217(8) of
UNCLOS and Art. 4(4) of MARPOL respectively). As one will recall, respective
rules of UNCLOS and MARPOL state that penalties imposed for ship-source
pollution violations should be “adequate in severity to discourage violations”.
From the perspective of safeguarding rights of accused persons, Art. 8 of
Directive 2005/35 can be said to be worded slightly better than corresponding legal
norms of UNCLOS and MARPOL, as the Directive, differently from UNCLOS and
MARPOL, inter alia, expressly refers to the requirement for penalties to be
proportionate. Thus, Art. 8 of Directive 2005/35 can be considered as a rule which
slightly clarifies corresponding legal norms of UNCLOS and MARPOL. By doing
so, Art. 8 of Directive 2005/35 works for the claimed purpose of the Directive – to
incorporate international standards for ship-source pollution into EU law.
However, Art. 5a(1) of Directive 2005/35 prescribes: “Member States shall
ensure that infringements within the meaning of Article 4 and 5 are regarded as
criminal offences”. Art. 8a prescribes: “Each Member State shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that the offences referred to in Article 5a (1) […] are punishable
by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties”. Thus, through Art. 5a
and 8a of Directive 2005/35, the EU asserts that the only “effective, proportionate
and dissuasive” penalty for basically all intentional, reckless or grossly negligent
ship-source pollution violations is criminal penalty. In accordance with Art. 5a(2) of
Directive 2005/35, the only exception in this regard is minor cases, where the act
committed does not cause deterioration in the quality of water. Such minor cases,
however, are outside the scope of this dissertation.
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Art. 5a and 8a of Directive 2005/35 deviate from the spirit of Art. 230(1) and
(2) of UNCLOS. One will recall that Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS allow coastal
States to impose penalties other than monetary (for example, imprisonment) only for
wilful and serious ship-source pollution in territorial sea. For other ship-source
pollution violations penalties other than monetary are prohibited. Such prohibition
points into direction that ship-source pollution violations which are not committed
with intent (“wilfully”) should be treated as relatively minor violations (presumably,
just as regulatory offences). Yet, Art. 5a and 8a of Directive 2005/35 require EU
Member States to treat such violations as criminal offences. At the same time, it can
be concluded that Art. 5a and 8a of Directive 2005/35 do not deviate from the letter
of Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS, because Art. 9 of Directive 2005/35 states that
all provisions of the Directive should be applied in accordance with Section 7 of Part
XII of UNCLOS – the section of UNCLOS in which Art. 230 is also situated. Thus,
EU Member States are simply left to work out, themselves, how in their national law
to merge what is seemingly going in different directions: Art. 4 and 5 of Directive
2005/35 and Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS.
Pozdnakova has expressed an interesting argument in regards to the
requirement of Directive 2005/35 to criminalise almost every intentional, reckless
and seriously negligent ship-source pollution violation. She says that this
requirement is not, actually, strict, that “logically the Member States will be allowed
a certain margin of appreciation in this respect.”542 The argument of Pozdnakova is
based on actual practice. Actual practice indicates that, despite the existence of
Directive 2005/35, within EU Member States, in regards to ship-source pollution
violations “[c]riminal sanctions are still generally less common than administrative
fines.”543 Yet, the requirement of Directive 2005/35 to criminalise almost every
intentional, reckless and seriously negligent ship-source pollution violation is rather
straightforward. It does not leave any margin of appreciation to EU Member States.
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Consequently, nobody can be sure that the EU is following the logic of Pozdnakova,
and, thus, slight deviations from Directive 2005/35 are actually allowed.
Nevertheless, this author agrees with the general idea of Pozdnakova that EU
Member States shall enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in deciding whether to
treat a specific violation as administrative or as criminal offence, because strict
dictation in this regard encroach upon sovereignty of states.544 Unfortunately, Art. 5a
and 8a of Directive 2005/35 strictly dictate that almost any intentional, reckless or
seriously negligent ship-source pollution violation must be treated as a criminal, not
administrative, offence. Thus, Art. 5a and 8a of Directive 2005/35, actually, encroach
upon the sovereignty of EU Member States. Consequently, the respective articles
should be deleted from the Directive.
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6. Case Study
6.1. Introduction
Within the case study, four large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are
analysed: the sinking of Erika off the coast of France on 11-14 December 1999 (Subchapter 6.2), the sinking of Prestige off the coast of Spain on 13-19 November 2002
(Sub-chapter 6.3), the grounding of Tasman Spirit in the access channel to the port of
Karachi in Pakistan on 27 July 2003 (Sub-chapter 6.4) and the collision of Hebei
Spirit and Samsung No.1 near the port of Daesan in South Korea on 7 December
2007 (Sub-chapter 6.5). Each of the sub-chapters consists of two big parts – factual
and analytical. In the factual part, facts of the case, starting from the development of
the accident itself and ending with the criminal procedures and sanctions applied
against seafarers after the accident, are described. Facts are described in the form of
numbered paragraphs, for easy referencing later, in the analytical part. In the
analytical part: first of all, by using the human rights compliance check-lists
incorporated in Annex I of this dissertation, unfair application of criminal procedures
and sanctions against seafarers is identified; secondly, some positive practice is
identified; thirdly, some examples of unfair national law are identified.

6.2. Sinking of ERIKA
6.2.1. Facts
1. The ship involved in the accident
Erika – 37,283 dwt (19,666 GT) tanker: registered in Malta, owned by Malta-based
Tevere Shipping Company, under technical management of Italy-based Panship
Management and Services (hereinafter – Panship).545
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2. Seafarers and other persons alleged to be guilty of causing the accident
2.1. Captain Karun Sunder Mathur – Indian master of Erika.546
2.2. Apart from Captain Mathur, 14 other natural and legal persons were alleged to
be guilty for causing the accident. Among them were owners, managers, charterers
and the classification society of Erika as well as officials responsible for controlling
the traffic off the coast of France.547
3. Sinking and events before it
3.1. On 8 December 1999, at 19:45, Erika left Dunkirk (France) with the cargo of
approximately 31,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil on board. The ship was bound for the
Mediterranean Sea.548
3.2. At the time of departure from Dunkirk, wind was force 7 on the Beaufort scale,
but weather was deteriorating. In the afternoon of 9 December wind force was
already 8 to 9, and there was heavy swell. The sea was similarly rough throughout 10
and 11 December. Erika was rolling and pitching heavily in the rough seas.549
3.3. On 11 December, at around 12:40, when Erika was already passing the Bay of
Biscay, Captain Mathur noticed that the ship was listing to starboard. At around
13:40 deballasting was started.550
3.4. At 14:08 Erika transmitted a distress alert. However, the nature of distress was
not stated in the alert message.551
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3.5. Soon after transmitting the distress alert, Captain Mathur tried to contact
Panship. However, he failed to reach Panship at that point in time.552
3.6. At 14:15 Captain Mathur contacted Nautic (the ship in the vicinity). He asked
Nautic to assist Erika in case of emergency as well as to send to Panship the
following message: “Listing heavily to starboard, very rough sea. Can see oil
coming out into sea from forward Manifold. Presently trying to correct list by
ballast.” Nautic failed to send the message. However, conversations between Erika
and Nautic were heard by another nearby ship – Sea Crusader. Thus, when Nautic
failed to send the message, Sea Crusader offered her assistance.553
3.7. At 14:16 and 14:18 CROSS Etel tried to contact Erika by phone, but without
success.554
3.8. At around 14:18 Captain Mathur turned Erika by 180º (from 210 to 30) – to
clear the deck from the wind and make verifications in the front part of the ship.
During the verifications internal fuel leakage as well as several cracks on the deck
were observed.555
3.9. At 14:30 Sea Crusader managed to send Erika’s message to Panship. The
message included the following words: “Heavy listing on starboard. Very rough sea.
Leak of oil into the sea visible from the front of the distributor. Now trying to correct
the listing with ballast, suspect hull failure. Sent a distress signal on SAT C.”556
3.10. At 14:34 Captain Mathur contacted CROSS Etel and said that Erika is still
listing, the evaluation of the situation is still ongoing, and immediate assistance is not
required.557
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3.11. At around 15:02 Erika was upright. Consequently, at 15:14 a telex was sent to
CROSS Etel stating: “situation under control, ship and the entire crew safe aboard,
please cancel my distress call and reconsider the message as a security message”.558
3.12. Between approximately 16:10 and 17:00 Captain Mathur communicated with
Panship. Among other things, it was agreed that Erika should now proceed for refuge
at Donges in the port of Nantes - Saint Nazaire (France).559
3.13. At 17:25 Erika sent the following telex to CROSS Etel: “situation under
control, ship and the entire crew safe aboard – please cancel the security message,
the ship is going to a port of refuge”. At 17:44 CROSS Etel requested the
information about the new destination (port of refuge). At 18:05 Captain Mathur
replied that he is heading to Donges.560
3.14. At around 19:00 Panship contacted Pomme maritime agency with the request to
help organize Erika’s stop at Donges. The agency started arrangements. It, inter alia,
involved the circulation of the information about oil leakages and cracks of the deck.
At 22:15 CROSS Etel sent the following telex to Erika: “your agent has contacted
Saint-Nazaire port authorities and told them that you had a leak in your tanks. Could
you inform us about the situation now? Please could you answer immediately?”561
3.15. At 22:27 Captain Mathur replied. He gave details of the situation, confirming
the internal leak, and also making it clear that Erika had developed cracks on the
main deck.562
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3.16. At around 00:00 Captain Mathur observed that Erika was again listing to
starboard, that the size of the cracks on deck had increased in width and that the ship
was down by the head. Deballasting was started again. However, it was not giving
any effect.563
3.17. On 12 December, at around 3:00, Captain Mathur observed that the oil was
leaking into the sea, that the cracks on deck were getting even bigger and that the
ship was hard to steer. In addition, abnormal metal rattling noises were heard.564
3.18. At 3:30 and 3:50 CROSS Etel unsuccessfully tried to reach Erika on HF radio.
At 3:50 it sent the telex to Erika requesting to give the ship’s position, course and
speed. At 4:05 Captain Mathur provided the requested information. Information
about the latest developments of the overall situation was not passed on to CROSS
Etel.565
3.19. At around 5:15 Captain Mathur observed that half the side shell plating of no. 2
starboard tank was partially detached. At that time it had already become impossible
to maneuver the ship, and oil was leaking heavily from the hull. The Captain
sounded the general alarm.566
3.20. At 5:54 Erika transferred a distress message “May-Day Erika – position 47
deg. 10N – 04 deg. 36 W – total rupture of the hull – requests immediate assistance –
26 crew members aboard – route to the North – speed 2.5 knots”. Given position is
in EEZ of France, around 55 km south of Penmarch.567
3.21. At around 8:00 a French naval rescue helicopter arrived on the scene and began
winching up the crew members of Erika.568
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3.22. At around 8:08 Erika suffered complete structural failure and broke in two. The
two parts of the ship started to drift away from each other. The majority of the crew
was still on board the ship – on the stern section of the wreck.569
3.23. At around 8:25, when five crew members had been taken off the wreck, the
helicopter’s winch broke down. The helicopter was forced to go back to the base for
repairs. Two other helicopters were ordered to take off.570
3.24. At around 9:06 the port lifeboat of Erika was lowered with 13 crew members in
it. The starboard lifeboat could not be launched. As a result, 9 people (8 crew
members and a rescue diver) still remained on the wreck.571
3.25. At around 9:12 the second French naval helicopter arrived and winched up 6
crew members. At around 10:05 the helicopter came back and picked up the last
three stranded people – the master, chief mate and rescue diver. At around 10:15
another helicopter arrived on the scene and started to winch up the 13 crew members
in the lifeboat. By 10:43 all people had been winched up to safety unharmed.572
3.26. Afterwards, French authorities decided to take the stern section of Erika to
deep waters – to avoid it drifting towards the French island of Belle-Ile. Towing
operations started at around 14:15. They continued until 14:15 the next day when the
wreck, increasingly leaning, tilted vertical. At 14:53 it sank. During the night
between 13 and 14 December the bow section of Erika also sank.573
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4. Consequences
4.1. In total, approximately 20,000 tonnes of oil were spilled as a result of the
accident.574
4.2. Response operations at sea met with little success owing to the poor weather
conditions and widespread fragmentation of the slick. Ultimately less than 3% of the
total spill volume was collected during these operations.575
4.3. On 26 December a considerable amount of oil began stranding around the mouth
of the River Loire (in Loire-Atlantique department). Intermittent oiling subsequently
occurred over some 400 km of shoreline between the Finistere department in northwest France and the Charente-Maritime department in south-west France. Areas of
important coastal fisheries, mariculture (oysters and mussels), tourism resources as
well as salt production were affected. Severe environmental impact was on sea birds.
Ultimately, almost 65,000 oiled birds were collected from beaches, of which almost
50,000 were dead.576
5. Criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers
5.1. On 13 December Captain Mathur was detained by police in Brest (France) – the
place where he was taken ashore after the accident. There, Captain Mathur
underwent initial questioning. Afterwards, he was transferred to Paris.577
5.2. On 15 December the Public Prosecutor with the Court of First Instance of Paris
opened a judicial investigation of the case on the counts of endangerment of others
and pollution by hydrocarbons.578

574

IOPC Funds, Erika, ibid.; CEDRE, Erika, ibid.
ITOPF, Erika, West of France, 1999, available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/casestudies/case-study/erika-west-of-france-1999/ [accessed 3 November 2015].
576
ITOPF, Erika, West of France, 1999, ibid.; CEDRE, Erika, supra note 573; Judgment of the Case
No.9934895010, Paris Court of First Instance, 16 January 2008 (unpublished English translation on
file with author) at pp. 86-87.
577
Judgment of the Paris Court of First Instance, ibid. at p. 97; Virginie Terrier, “Are “Black Tides”
Inevitable?”, in Coventry Law Journal, Volume 6, Issue 2, 2001 at p. 30; Olivia Murray, “Fair
Treatment of Seafarers – International Law and Practice”, in the Journal of International Maritime
Law, Volume 18, Issue 2, March-April 2012 at p. 156; “France: Erika Master Charged as Pollution
Hits”, Lloyd’s List, 16 December 1999.
578
Judgment of the Paris Court of First Instance, ibid. at p. 87.
575

245

5.3. The same day – 15 December – Captain Mathur was referred to the investigating
judge for a judicial review of his detention. The public prosecutor had advised to
release the Captain, and simply keep him under judicial supervision. However, the
investigating judge made the decision to continue detention.579
5.4. Captain Mathur appealed against the decision. On 22 December he was released
from detention and put under judicial supervision. On 2 February 2000 Captain
Mathur submitted the request to cancel his judicial supervision. On 4 February this
request was partly satisfied. The Captain was allowed to leave France.580
5.5. On 1 February 2006 the investigating judge referred the case to the Court of First
Instance of Paris.581
5.6. For the investigating judge Captain Mathur was guilty of exposing other persons
to an immediate risk of death or injury and for causing pollution. More specifically
the Captain was accused of:
5.6.1. leaving the port of Dunkirk on 8 December 1999 in dangerous conditions
while knowing the poor condition of the ship;
5.6.2. making many navigational errors starting from 11 December;
5.6.3. failing to apply the safety rules, for instance, to implement SOPEP and to
inform the coastal authorities about the nature and severity of the difficulties Erika
faced.582
5.7. Pollution charges against Captain Mathur were based on following rules:
5.7.1. Art. 1 of the Law No. 83-583 – this article prescribed punishment (fine of F
100,000 to 1,000,000 and/or imprisonment for three to ten years) for a master of a
French ship guilty for an oil pollution in violation of MARPOL;
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5.7.2. Art. 7 of the Law No. 83-583 – this article prescribed that Art. 1 is applicable
also to foreign ships in EEZ, territorial sea and internal waters of France, however, in
such a case only the fine may be imposed for offences in EEZ;
5.7.3. Art. 8 of the Law No. 83-583 – this article prescribed punishment (half of that
laid down in Art. 1) for causing, by imprudence, negligence or failure to observe the
laws and regulations, a maritime casualty, as defined by the Intervention Convention,
if this casualty has resulted in the pollution of French territorial sea or internal
waters583;
5.7.4. Art. 10 of the Law No. 83-583 – this article prescribed:
•

that the court may, in view of the factual circumstances, in particular the
working conditions of a master of a ship, decide that the payment of fine
imposed on the master under the preceding articles, shall be wholly or
partially borne by the operator or owner of a ship in question;

•

that the natural person convicted under the preceding articles also incurs, as a
supplementary punishment, the penalty of public display or publication of the
pronounced decision;

5.7.5. Art. L218-10, L218-21, L218-22 and L218-24 of the Environmental Code –
these articles incorporated respectively Art. 1, 7, 8 and 10 of Law No. 83-583, when
this Law was abrogated in 2000;
5.7.6. Art. L213-12 of the Penal Code – this article prescribed that French criminal
law is applicable to offences committed beyond territorial sea, when international
conventions and the law provide for that;
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5.7.7. Art. L121-3 of the Penal Code – this article prescribed that a misdemeanour
exists not only in the case of intent, but also in cases of recklessness, negligence or
failure to observe an obligation of due care or precaution imposed by any law or
regulation.584
5.8. On 12 February 2007 the public hearing of the case started.585
5.9. At the beginning of the proceedings, several parties raised the issue of the
compliance of French national law with MARPOL and UNCLOS. It was argued that:
5.9.1. French Law No. 83-583 conflicts with MARPOL in that the liability standard
of “imprudence” (provided in Art. 8 of French Law No. 83-583) differs significantly
from the liability standard of “intent or recklessness with knowledge that damage
was likely to result” (provided in Reg. 11(b) of Annex I of MARPOL586);
5.9.2. irrespective of such conflict, French Law No. 83-583 may not be applied to a
discharge in the EEZ, because French Law No. 83-583 is a national rather than
international regime, but under Art. 211(5) of UNCLOS the legislative jurisdiction of
a coastal State in its EEZ is limited to the adoption of laws conforming with and
giving effect to GAIRAS.587
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5.10. At least 20 expert and study reports were examined during the judicial
investigation. In regards to the guilt of Captain Mathur these reports were rather
diverse. For example, the Expert Report Ordered by the Investigating Authorities
indicated that the Captain can be held liable for several conducts (this report largely
accorded with the findings of the prosecution); yet, the Expert Report of the Board
Appointed by the Commercial Court of Dunkirk indicated that the true cause of the
disaster was the actual state of corrosion of Erika and, consequently, none of the
potential intervening parties, including the Captain, was in a position to have any
effect on the fate of the ship.588
5.11. Arguments of the attorneys of Captain Mathur accorded with the findings of the
Expert Report of the Board Appointed by the Commercial Court of Dunkirk and
other studies which came to similar conclusions. Specifically, attorneys argued that
many scientists, sailors, and specialists in navigation and maritime safety had
acknowledged that Erika had sustained major structural damage and was irreparably
condemned, that Captain Mathur had taken the right decisions and, thus, the charges
against him were irrelevant.589
5.12. On 13 June 2007 the oral hearing of the case came to a close.590
5.13. On 16 January 2008 the Court delivered the judgment.591
5.14. Regarding the issue of compliance of French national law with MARPOL and
UNCLOS the Court ruled that:
5.14.1. Art. 8 of French Law No. 83-583 is not in conflict with Reg. 11(b) of Annex I
of MARPOL, because these two legal norms have different scope of application.
MARPOL deals with discharges as defined in Art. 2(3) of MARPOL (operational
pollution), whereas Art. 8 of French Law No. 83-583 deals with discharges resulting
from a maritime casualty as defined in the Intervention Convention (accidental
pollution);
588
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5.14.2. French Law No. 83-583 can be applied to discharges in the EEZ, because Art.
56(1)(b) iii) of UNCLOS gives to the coastal State jurisdiction in its EEZ for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.592
5.15. Regarding merits of the case, the Court held the following four parties
criminally liable for causing pollution: the representative of the shipowner (Tevere
Shipping), the president of the management company (Panship), the classification
society (RINA) and the voyage charterer (Total). The representative of the shipowner
and the president of the management company were found guilty of lack of proper
maintenance leading to general corrosion of the ship. RINA was found guilty of
imprudence in renewing the Erika’s classification certificate on the basis of an
inspection that fell below the standards of the profession. Total was found guilty of
imprudence when carrying out its vetting operation prior to the chartering of
Erika.593
5.16. All other accused persons, including Captain Mathur, were found not guilty on
any account. Captain Mathur was found not guilty, because due to the contradictory
pieces of information (including, contradictory expert reports) it was not possible to
establish with certainty that the Captain’s conduct was erroneous and, supposing it
was, that it played a causal role during the shipwreck of Erika. In other words, even
though some amount of suspicion of the Captain’s guilt remained, it was not possible
to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, he was not
convicted.594
5.17. Several parties appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal in
Paris.595
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5.18. On 5 October 2008 the appeal case began.596
5.19. On 30 March 2010 the Court of Appeal rendered its judgment. Regarding the
criminal liability of Captain Mathur, the Court of Appeal confirmed the judgment of
the Court of the First Instance.597
5.20. Yet, the Court of Appeal adopted a different approach to the Court of the First
Instance for reaching the conclusion that Art. 8 of French Law No. 83-583 is not in
conflict with Reg. 11(b) of Annex I of MARPOL and that French Law No. 83-583
can be applied to discharges in the EEZ. In this regard the Court of Appeal ruled that:
5.20.1. Indeed, as the defendants claimed, the definition of discharge in Art. 2(3) of
MARPOL does not make a distinction between voluntary and accidental discharges.
Thus, MARPOL also covers accidental pollution. However, reading of Reg. 11(b) of
Annex I of MARPOL in such a way as to, in principle, allow negligent discharges of
oil is contrary to the objective of MARPOL as identified in its Preamble.
Consequently, Reg. 11(b) of Annex I of MARPOL does not signify that the
discharge is illegal only when the owner or the master acted with intent or recklessly
and with knowledge. Thus, criminalisation of the negligent discharges by Art. 8 of
French Law No. 83-583 is consistent with the letter and spirit of MARPOL.
5.20.2. Indeed, as the defendants claimed, in accordance with Art. 211(5) of
UNCLOS, a coastal State in regards to discharges in its EEZ may only adopt laws
and regulations “conforming to and giving effect to GAIRAS”. However, this
provision shall be interpreted in a purposive way – as referring not only to
international rules and standards per se, but also national laws rendering effective
respective international rules and standards. In this respect, French Law No. 83-583
is compatible with MARPOL, whose purpose is to provide severe sanctions in order
to prevent the occurrence of pollution incidents.598
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5.21. Several parties also appealed the judgment of the Court of Appeal – to the
French Supreme Court (Court of Cassation).599
5.22. On 25 September 2012 the Court of Cassation rendered its judgment. In this
judgment, the earlier judgment of the Court of Appeal was fully confirmed.600
6.2.2. Analysis
Violation of the right to liberty: deprivation of liberty without existence of
recognised ground
After the Erika accident, master of Erika – Captain Mathur – was detained (see
paragraph 5.1 above). Later he was brought forth for the automatic judicial review of
the detention. During this automatic judicial review, the public prosecutor expressed
opinion that there is no need to continue to detain the Captain; instead simply judicial
supervision can be applied. However, the investigating judge made the decision to
continue detention (see paragraph 5.3 above). The opinion of the public prosecutor
gives strong belief that such severe measure as detention was not necessary in the
circumstances in question. If so, the decision of the investigating judge to continue to
detain the Captain violated his right to liberty.
Was the detention of the seafarer necessary measure either for
securing fulfilment of the legal obligation or for securing nonabsconding or for securing that the seafarer would not take
action to obstruct the proceedings?

No

X
Violation

Yes

Observance of the right to liberty: prompt automatic judicial review of the
deprivation of liberty
In the Erika case, Captain Mathur was deprived of his liberty on 13 December 1999
(see paragraph 5.1 above). He was brought forth for the automatic judicial review of
his deprivation of liberty two days later – on 15 December 1999 (see paragraph 5.3
above). Thus, the automatic judicial review of the deprivation of liberty of Captain
Mathur was carried out promptly.
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Was the seafarer after his deprivation of liberty brought for an
automatic judicial review of his deprivation of liberty
promptly?

No
Yes

X

Observance of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment: the
principle that a person may not be held liable for a particular crime if all elements of
this crime are not present or proven beyond a reasonable doubt
After the Erika accident, Captain Mathur was charged for exposing other persons to
an immediate risk of death or injury and for causing pollution (see paragraph 5.6
above). There was basis for reasonable suspicion that particular harm (risk of death
or injury and pollution), at least partly, was caused by the conduct of the Captain, for
example: by his belated and not full reporting of the accident. Nevertheless, in its
judgment the Court of First Instance did not find Captain Mathur guilty on any
account, because his guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see paragraph
5.16 above). The Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation confirmed this ruling
(see paragraphs 5.19 and 5.22 above). Thus, the general principle of punishment that
a person may not be held liable for a particular crime if all elements of this crime are
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt was observed.
Was the seafarer convicted for the crime without proof of all
elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

No
Yes

X

National law violating the principle of legality and rule of lenity
After the Erika accident, pollution charges against Captain Mathur, inter alia,
were based on Art. L218-22 of the French Environmental Code, which prescribed
punishment for any negligently caused maritime casualty, if this casualty has resulted
in the pollution of French territorial sea or internal waters (see paragraphs 5.7.3 and
5.7.5 above). This French national law conflicted with Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of
MARPOL, which, as explained earlier, taking into consideration the principle of
legality and, related to this principle, rule of lenity, must be interpreted as exempting
from liability basically all negligent discharges of oil resulting from damage to a ship
or its equipment.
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On 1 August 2008 the French Environmental Code was amended so that the
rule prescribing punishment for any negligently caused maritime casualty moved
from Art. L218-22 to Art. L218-19. Yet, in essence, this rule was not changed.601
Thus, still today, the French Environmental Code violates the principle of legality
and, related to this principle, rule of lenity.
It is worth to stress here that nothing was changed in Art. L218-22 of the
French Environmental Code in years 2005-2007, for transposing Directive 2005/35
into French national law. Similarly, nothing was changed in Art. L218-19 of the
French Environmental Code in years 2009-2010, for transposing amendments to
Directive 2005/35 into French national law. France considered that its national law in
place already before the adoption of Directive 2005/35 and its amendments set
equivalent requirements to the ones in the respective EU instruments. In 2012, the
National Report for France “Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive
2009/123/EC on amending Directive 2005/35/EC on ship-source pollution and on the
introduction of penalties for infringement” confirmed that Art. 218-19 of the French
Environmental Code, in principle, is in line with Directive 2005/35, as amended,
although “the French legislation is more stringent than the Directive, since it
considers as a criminal offence any negligent discharge of polluting substances [...]
while the Directive only provides criminal offences for discharges of polluting
substances carried out with [...] serious negligence”.602 The fact that the French
national law which violates the principle of legality and, related to that principle, rule
of lenity has been acknowledged as, in principle, being in line with Directive
2005/35, as amended, indicates that the Directive has failed to give to the EU
Member States clear guidelines how to implement relevant legal norms from the
international maritime conventions without breaching human rights.
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National law violating the right to non-discrimination
When Erika accident was investigated and adjudicated, Art. L218-21 of the French
Environmental Code prescribed that only fines may be imposed for a MARPOL
violation committed by a foreign ship in French EEZ. This rule reflected Art. 230(1)
of UNCLOS. Yet, Art. L218-10 of the French Environmental Code left the
possibility to impose imprisonment as a sanction for, in principle, the same violation,
just committed by a master of a French ship (see paragraphs 5.7.1, 5.7.2. and 5.7.5
above). Thus, French national law was discriminatory towards masters of French
ships. This deficiency of French national law was averted by the 1 August 2008
amendments to the French Environmental Code. As a result of these amendments,
the Code now contains the general legal norm (Art. L218-22) stating that, where a
ship-source pollution offense is committed beyond the territorial sea, only fines may
be imposed.603 Consequently, both masters of foreign ships and masters of French
ships are subjected to identical potential sanctions (fines) for MARPOL violations
committed in French EEZ. However, the very existence of Art. L218-10 and L21821 of the French Environmental Code in the first place proves that the earlier
expressed concern of this author that the wording of Art. 230 of UNCLOS may
trigger discrimination of seafarers on non-foreign ships is well founded.

6.3. Sinking of PRESTIGE
6.3.1. Facts
1. The ship involved in the accident
Prestige – 81,589 dwt (42,820 GT) tanker: registered in Bahamas; de facto owned by
Greece-based Universe Maritime (although, according to the registry details the
owner of the ship was Liberia-based Mare Shipping); operated by the same Greecebased Universe Maritime (although, with the help of several intermediaries);
chartered by Swiss-based energy trading concern Crown Resources, which at the
time of the accident was the part of one of Russia’s largest private investment groups
603

Environmental Code, supra note 601.
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Alfa Group Consortium.604
According to the certificates issued by the American Bureau of Shipping
(classification society of Prestige), at the time of the accident Prestige complied with
all required standards. However, she was disqualified by several energy companies
(for example, Repsol and BP) due to her extensive age (at the time of the accident
Prestige had been in service for 26 years), due to non-existence of her maintenance
program as well as failure to meet other safety standards of these companies.605
2. Seafarers and other persons alleged to be guilty of causing the accident
2.1. Captain Apostolos Ioannis Mangouras – Greek master of Prestige.
2.2. Nikolaos Argyropoulos – Greek chief engineer of Prestige.
2.3. Ireneo Maloto – Filipino chief officer of Prestige.
2.4. Jose Luis Lopez-Sors Gonzalez – General Director of the Spanish General
Directorate of Merchant Marine.606
2.5. None of the legal persons which potentially could be held liable for causing the
accident (such as owner or classification society of Prestige) were charged in relation
to the accident. They were not charged because, when the accident occurred, under
Spanish law it was not possible to claim criminal liability of legal persons; it was
only possible to claim civil liability of the said persons and also only after the final
judgment in the criminal case had been rendered.607
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3. Sinking and events before it
3.1. On 31 October 2002 Prestige left St. Petersburg (Russia) with the cargo of heavy
fuel oil on board. Cargo was completed in Ventspils (Latvia), and ultimately
constituted 76,972 tonnes (some 2,150 tonnes in excess weight).608
3.2. On 5 November Prestige left Ventspils and proceeded to Gibraltar, where the
instructions regarding final port of destination were to be received.609
3.3. On 13 November Prestige was navigating in Spanish EEZ: in the Atlantic
Ocean, within the Traffic Separation Scheme off Cape Finisterre. Weather conditions
were adverse: there was a storm in the area. The ship was rolling heavily in the rough
sea.610
3.4. At around 15:10611 the crew of Prestige heard a loud noise, similar to an
explosion. Structural failure occurred in the starboard side of the ship. This structural
failure resulted in a considerable opening in the hull, which in turn resulted in
spillage of a large part of the cargo into the sea as well as shifting of the entire cargo
towards the said side. It placed the ship at risk of capsizing.612
3.5. At 15:15 CZCS Finisterre received a SOS message from Prestige. At 15:33
evacuation of the crew was requested.613
3.6. To correct the list of the ship, Captain Mangouras decided to take on sea water.
This operation allowed him to right the ship in hours. However, at the same time, it
worsened the ship’s structural condition.614
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3.7. At 16:50 Captain Mangouras contacted Universe Maritime (operator and de
facto owner of Prestige) to inform it about the situation. After the talk with the
Captain, Universe Maritime immediately activated its Emergency Response Plan,
began to look for suitable salvage and towing assistance as well as appointed the
agent at A Coruna (Spain) to look after the ship’s interests in Spain and liaise with
the Spanish authorities.615
3.8. At around 17:00 the first rescue helicopter arrived on the scene and lifted off 7
of the crew. The second rescue helicopter arrived at around 17:30 and lifted off a
further 17 of the crew. Three – the master, chief engineer and chief officer –
voluntarily remained on the ship.616
3.9. During the conversation which started at 18:17 CZCS Finisterre gave Captain
Mangouras the order to allow the ship to be towed away from the coast by the tug
Ria de Vigo. The order was expressed several times with increasing forcefulness. In
response, Captain Mangouras repeatedly said that his owners are arranging towage
and, therefore, he needs to talk with them before allowing the tow. Ultimately, the
Spanish authorities agreed that the Captain talks with his owners first.617
3.10. At around 19:20 Universe Maritime advised Captain Mangouras that a salvage
agreement was about to be completed. Shortly before 20:00 an agreement was
reached. It was that Smit Salvage would be salvor, Tecnosub co-salvor and
Remolcanosa would provide tugs. Also the tug Ria de Vigo, which was already on
the scene, was one of the Remolcanosa.618

615

Report of the Bahamas Maritime Authority, supra note 610, paragraph 2.4.4.
Report of the Bahamas Maritime Authority, ibid., paragraph 2.4.5; Judgment of the Case
No.00511/2013, Provincial Court of A Coruna, 13 November 2013 (unpublished English translation
on file with author) at pp. 99-100.
617
Report of the Bahamas Maritime Authority, ibid., paragraph 2.4.7 and Appendix I; Judgment of the
Provincial Court of A Coruna, ibid. at p.100; Judgment of the Case No.865/2015, Spanish Supreme
Court, 14 January 2016 at pp. 9., 145-146.
618
Report of the Bahamas Maritime Authority, ibid., paragraph 2.5.2.
616

258

3.11. At 19:49 Smit Salvage sent a facsimile to Universe Maritime requesting that
they instruct Captain Mangouras to accept a tow from Ria de Vigo. Universe
Maritime then telephoned the Captain. Yet, he was engaged in the works on deck,
and, therefore, could not be reached at that point in time. The conversation between
the Captain and Universe Maritime took place at around 20:35.619
3.12. At 21:01 Captain Mangouras called Spanish authorities and confirmed that a
salvage agreement had now been concluded and that he was ready to accept a
towline.620
3.13. At around 21:30 the operation of connecting a towline begun. However, altered
sea conditions and intrinsic difficulty to manoeuvre led to many unsuccessful
attempts even after several other tugs arrived at the scene and even after additional
personnel was landed on board Prestige to assist the operation. Consequently,
Prestige continued drifting towards the Spanish coast. By the morning of 14
November she was only 4 km from shore.621
3.14. On 14 November, at around 10:50, five Filipino crew members of Prestige –
the second engineer, third engineer, electrician, oiler and pump man – returned to the
ship by helicopter to assist operations.622
3.15. At around 13:40 making fast the tow finally was successful. Tugs then were
ordered to follow course of 330 degrees, i.e. towards a storm from the north-west that
was approaching.623
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3.16. Realising that Prestige was being towed away from the coast, and towards
more severe weather, Captain Mangouras asked the ship to be taken to a place of
refuge. This was refused. The Captain then suggested a course of 270 degrees, but
this was also refused.624
3.17. The Spanish engineer, who had landed on board Prestige together with her
returning crew members, ordered to start up the engine. Captain Mangouras was
against this – he was of the opinion that the vibration of the engine would cause
further damage to the hull. However, after a while, the Captain agreed to follow the
order. After necessary repairs, at around 16:30 the engine was started. The Spanish
engineer was then lifted off Prestige.625
3.18. At around 19:00, a salvage contract was signed between the Harbour Master of
A Coruna and salvage company Smit Salvage. According to this contract Smit
Salvage promised never to bring Prestige closer than 120 nautical miles from
Spanish jurisdiction. It was also agreed that the course of Prestige would be escorted
by Spanish navy vessels, which would prevent entry of the ship within the
aforementioned 120 nautical miles zone. Head of Smit Salvage later argued that he
did not agree with the 120 nautical miles requirement but had no other option than to
sign the contract.626
3.19. On 15 November, at around 3:50, a salvage team (9 people) from Smit Salvage
boarded Prestige.627
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3.20. Salvors then decided to stop the engine of Prestige and set a south-west course
of 220 degrees. After establishing that the breach in the starboard side of the ship
was of some 35 metres and that this was below the water line, despite the
aforementioned salvage contract with the Harbour Master of A Coruna, salvors asked
the Spanish authorities for a port of refuge. This request was refused.628
3.21. In the afternoon of 15 November the weather deteriorated. The salvage master
decided that all personnel should be evacuated from Prestige for the night. Starting
from around 15:30 proceedings to totally evacuate Prestige were carried out. At
around 18:40 the helicopter with evacuated people landed at A Coruna airport.629
3.22. After total evacuation, Prestige continued on her course towed in a southerly
direction. Structural damage to the ship became more and more evident and serious.
Prestige also continued to leak a considerable volume of oil.630
3.23. On 16 November, at around 9:00, the salvage team returned to Prestige.631
3.24. In the late hours of 18 November the Prestige towing convoy came close to
Portuguese EEZ. Portuguese frigate informed the convoy that it could not enter
Portugese EEZ. Thus, the convoy was obliged to change course to the west.632
3.25. On 19 November, at around 8:00, Prestige split into two.633
3.26. At 11:45 the stern section of Prestige sank. At 16:18 the bow section of
Prestige sank. Position of the sinking was approximately 260 km west of Vigo
(Spain).634
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4. Consequences
4.1. In total, approximately 63,000 tonnes of oil were spilled as a result of the
accident.635
4.2. Despite the enormous effort at sea, extensive coastal contamination occurred.
Altogether, approximately 200 km of shoreline – the Spanish northern and north
western coasts as well as the French western coast – was affected. Some light and
intermittent contamination was also experienced on the French and English coasts of
the English Channel. Areas of fishing, shell fishing and tourism were, inter alia,
affected.636
5. Criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers
5.1. On 15 November, at around 14:00, while he was still on board Prestige, the
Office of A Coruna Harbour Master reported Captain Mangouras to the Court for
obstruction.637
5.2. The same day, at around 18:45, that is immediately after the rescue helicopter
with people from Prestige landed at A Coruna airport, Captain Mangouras was
arrested by the Spanish Civil Guard.638
5.3. After arrest, Captain Mangouras was taken directly for questioning. Questioning
continued for several hours until approximately 2:00 the following morning. Chief
Engineer Argyropoulos and Chief Officer Maloto were also brought forth for
questioning. They were questioned after the Captain, approximately from 2:00 to
4:45. Captain Mangouras repeatedly asked to be allowed to rest (all three men had
been continuously occupied by duty and questioning for around 60 hours, without
proper rest, food and normal facilities), but his requests were denied. After
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questioning, Chief Engineer Argyropoulos and Chief Officer Maloto were allowed to
go to a hotel. Captain Mangouras was kept in custody.639
5.4. On 16 November the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 4 of A Coruna
commenced preliminary proceedings of the case.640
5.5. On 17 November the Court ruled that Captain Mangouras should be remanded in
custody, but this custody could be avoided by posting a bail of EUR 3,000,000.641
5.6. The Court gave the following arguments to justify its decision:
5.6.1. there is sufficient evidence that the Captain is likely to be criminally liable for
crime against natural resources and the environment as well as crime of resistance
and disobedience (in this regard it should be noted that in the other place of the
decision the Court formulated, in principle, the same argument in a slightly different
way; there, it stated that the evidence show that Prestige was hit by a large wave,
which was unforeseeable and caused serious damage, but, after that, certain conduct
– repeated ignorance of orders given by the port authorities – took place, which could
be regarded as involving criminal liability);
5.6.2. the above-mentioned crimes carry heavy penalties;
5.6.3. the liberty of the Captain can obstruct the investigation;
5.6.4. public opinion;
5.6.5. large sums of money involved in civil claims;
5.6.6. complete lack of any roots of the Captain in Spain and the ease with which he
could leave the country and, thus, have the possibility of avoiding the course of
justice.642
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5.7. On 18 November the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 4 of A Coruna
remitted the case to the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 3 of A Coruna. On 19
November the case was remitted to the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 2 of
Corcubion. The same day the case was remitted even further – to the Court of
Preliminary Investigation no. 1 of Corcubion. On 20 November the Court of
Preliminary Investigation no. 1 of Corcubion commenced Investigation no.
960/2002, under which the preliminary investigation was subsequently carried out.643
5.8. On 19 November, while remittal of the case from one Spanish court to another
was still going on, Captain Mangouras requested his release or, in the alternative, the
reduction of bail to EUR 60,000.644
5.9. In a decision on 27 November the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 1 of
Corcubion dismissed the Captain’s request, basically by giving the same arguments
as the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 4 of A Coruna in its decision of 17
November.645
5.10. Captain Mangouras appealed this decision to the same judge who issued it
(recurso de reforma). In a decision on 7 December the judge confirmed his decision
of 27 November thus rejecting the Captain’s appeal.646
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5.11. Captain Mangouras then appealed the decision to the Provincial Court of A
Coruna – a higher court (recurso de apelacion). In a decision on 3 January 2003 the
Provincial Court of A Coruna dismissed the appeal, again, basically by giving the
same arguments as the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 4 of A Coruna in its
decision of 17 November.647
5.12. On 20 January 2003 Captain Mangouras appealed for protection of his human
rights, particularly the right to liberty, to the Spanish Constitutional Court (recurso
de amparo). Appeal was submitted on the grounds that firstly, the lower courts had
failed to take into account personal circumstances of the Captain when determining
the amount of bail, and secondly, the bail was set so high that it was impossible for
the Captain to pay it, and therefore the sum of EUR 3,000,000 was unreasonable and
arbitrary.648
5.13. On 6 February 2003, the London Steamship Owners’ Mutual Insurance
Association (London Club) (insurer of Prestige) put up the bail. The London Club
announced that it did so on wholly humanitarian grounds, despite having no legal
obligation to do so.649
5.14. The next day – on 7 February – the Court of Preliminary Investigation no. 1 of
Corcubion ordered the release of the Captain, subject to the following conditions:
5.14.1. that the Captain supplies an address in Spain;
5.14.2. that he reports every day before 13:00 to the police headquarters
corresponding to the address supplied;
5.14.3. that he be prohibited from leaving the country and surrenders his passport to
the Court’s registry.650
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5.15. In a decision on 29 September 2003 the Spanish Constitutional Court declared
the above-mentioned (in paragraph 5.12) appeal of Captain Mangouras inadmissible.
The Court ruled that various decisions by which the Captain was remanded in
custody gave ample reasons for the amount of bail demanded, such as, the overriding
objective of securing the Captain’s presence at the trial, the seriousness of the
offences, the disastrous situation caused by the spillage of the ship’s cargo both
domestically and abroad, the fact that the Captain is a non-national and the fact that
he has no ties whatsoever in Spain. In addition to that, it was specifically noted in the
decision that the Captain’s financial and other personal circumstances, including his
“professional environment”, were taken into consideration.651
5.16. On 25 March 2004, Captain Mangouras lodged a claim against Spain with
ECtHR, similarly as in his appeal to the Spanish Constitutional Court alleging that
Spain had violated his right to liberty. Specific arguments given in the claim were the
following:
5.16.1. when remanding the Captain in custody on bail, Spanish judicial authorities
repeatedly referred to criteria which were not relevant to support the decision of
detention on bail or the amount of the bail;
5.16.2. an extraordinarily high amount of bail (EUR 3,000,000) was set for the
release of the Captain; it is prima facie evident that an ordinary citizen is not capable
of paying such an amount of money, and none of the decisions of the Spanish
judicial authorities contained the information suggesting that, due to some reasons,
the Captain is, nevertheless, capable of facing the bail;
5.16.3. an extraordinarily high amount of bail was fixed solely on the nature of the
alleged offence and its harmful consequences without taking into consideration any
personal circumstances of the Captain, except the fact that he is a foreigner; thus, the
bail was fixed not in accordance with the real risk of absconding;
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5.16.4. Spanish judicial authorities did not take into consideration two circumstances
which were evident even without any inquest, and which made the interest of the
Captain to abscond really minimal; first, that the Captain was 68 years old (Art. 92 of
the Spanish Criminal Code stipulates that those sentenced who have reached the age
of 70, or who will reach that age during their sentence, can be released from prison);
second, that due to the safeguards incorporated in Art. 230 of UNCLOS the Captain
faced monetary penalty only;
5.16.5. Spanish judicial authorities also never assessed the possibility of replacing
the detention on bail with other less onerous measures such as prohibition to leave
the country and police supervision, even though such measures were perfectly
feasible in the circumstances in question and were repeatedly suggested by the
representative of the Captain;
5.16.6. keeping the Captain in custody most probably was inspired simply by the
desire of the Spanish authorities to keep someone in prison and, with that, to placate
the public indignation caused by the accident.652
5.17. On 27 April 2004, that is soon after ECtHR proceedings were initiated, Spain
reviewed the bail conditions of Captain Mangouras, but only on 19 November of that
year was he permitted to return to his home country, Greece. At that point in time, he
was permitted to go to Greece for a period of three months. On 4 March 2005 he was
permitted to return to Greece permanently, subject to undertaking to return to Spain
for the trial and subject to reporting to a local police station in Greece every two
weeks.653

652

Mangouras v. Spain, Judgment of 8 January 2009, ibid., paragraphs 1, 3 and 21; Mangouras v.
Spain, Judgment of 28 September 2010, ibid., paragraphs 3, 56, 58, 61 and 63.
653
Mangouras v. Spain, Judgment of 8 January 2009, ibid., paragraph 19; Mangouras v. Spain,
Judgment of 28 September 2010, ibid., paragraph 26; Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson,
Shipping and the Environment, London: Informa, 2009 at p. 1110; Olivia Murray, “Fair Treatment of
Seafarers – International Law and Practice”, in the Journal of International Maritime Law, Volume 18,
Issue 2, March-April 2012 at p. 157; Response of Mr. Jose Maria Ruiz Soroa - defence lawyer of
Captain Mangouras - to the authors request for respective information.

267

5.18. On 8 January 2009 the Chamber of ECtHR delivered its judgment,
unanimously ruling that Spain had not violated the right to liberty of Captain
Mangouras. The Chamber gave the following arguments to justify its judgment:
5.18.1. that the bail was paid by London Club; that under the insurance contract
between London Club and the owner of Prestige (who was also the Captain’s
employer) the Club undertook to cover civil liability for damage arising from
pollution attributable to the ship; consequently, the security was paid by virtue of
pre-existing contractual legal relationship;
5.18.2. that the Court cannot overlook the growing and legitimate concern about
offences against the environment; that the seriousness of the natural disaster in
question justified the domestic courts’ concern to determine who was responsible for
this disaster; consequently, it was reasonable for domestic courts to try to ensure that
the Captain would appear for trial by fixing a high level of bail;
5.18.3. that the Captain was deprived of his liberty for a shorter time than the
applicants in other cases examined by the Court, even notwithstanding the fact that
the offences in question in these other cases were not against the important interests
of the marine environment, as in this case.654
5.19. On 7 April 2009 Captain Mangouras requested that the case be referred to the
Grand Chamber of ECtHR. On 5 June 2009 a panel of the Grand Chamber granted
the request.655
5.20. On 23 September 2009 the Grand Chamber of ECtHR heard the case at an oral
hearing.656
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5.21. On 28 September 2010 the Grand Chamber of ECtHR delivered its judgment,
similar to the Chamber ruling that Spain had not violated the right to liberty of the
Captain Mangouras. The Grand Chamber gave following arguments to justify its
judgment:
5.21.1. the amount set for bail exceeded the Captain’s own capacity to pay, however,
it is clear that in fixing the amount the domestic courts sought to take into account, in
addition to the Captain’s personal situation, the seriousness of the offence of which
he was accused and also his “professional environment”, circumstances which lent
the case an “exceptional” character;
5.21.2. since the Neumeister judgment the Court has consistently held that “[the
accused’s] relationship with the persons who are to provide the security” is one of
the criteria to be used in assessing the amount of bail;
5.21.3. the Court cannot overlook the growing and legitimate concern both in Europe
and internationally in relation to environmental offences, among other things a
tendency to use criminal law as a means of enforcing environmental obligations;
5.21.4. the present case is of an exceptional nature and has very significant
implications in terms of both criminal and civil liability; in such circumstances it is
hardly surprising that the judicial authorities should adjust the amount required by
way of bail in line with the level of liability incurred, so as to ensure that the persons
responsible have no incentive to evade justice and forfeit security;
5.21.5. putting aside the considerations – “humanitarian”, contractual or other –
which may have motivated London Club to pay the bail, the very fact that payment
was made would seem to confirm that the Spanish courts, when they referred to the
Captain’s “professional environment”, were correct in finding – implicitly – that a
relationship existed between the Captain and the persons who were to provide
security;
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5.21.6. the domestic courts, in fixing the amount of bail, took sufficient account of
the Captain’s personal situation, and in particular his status as an employee of the
ship’s owner, his professional relationship with the persons who were to provide the
security, his nationality and place of permanent residence and also his lack of ties in
Spain.657
5.22. Yet, the judgment of the Grand Chamber of ECtHR was not made
unanimously. It was a majority judgment (by 10 votes to 7). 7 judges who disagreed
with the majority, inter alia, stated in their joint dissenting opinion that:
5.22.1. as it appears from the terms of Article 5(3) of the European Convention on
Human Rights, itself, the setting of bail as a condition of release is designed to
ensure not the reparation of any loss suffered in consequence of the suspected
offence but only the presence of the accused at the trial; the sum set cannot
accordingly be fixed by reference to the amount of any loss which might eventually
be imputable to the accused or his employers but must be assessed principally by
reference to him, his assets and his relationship with those persons, if any, who offer
themselves as sureties to guarantee his appearance;
5.22.2. domestic courts must adduce sufficient arguments to justify the amount of
bail fixed;
5.22.3. the seriousness of the charge not only cannot be the sole factor justifying the
amount of the bail it cannot be the decisive factor; nor can the danger of absconding
be evaluated solely on the basis of considerations relating to the gravity of the
penalty likely to be imposed, other factors must also be taken into account, including:
the character of the person involved, his morals, his home, his occupation, his assets,
his family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which he is being
prosecuted; regard should also be given to the use of other preventative measures,
alone or in conjunction with bail, to reduce the risk of absconding;
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5.22.4. although, in setting and upholding the amount of bail, no assessment appears
to have been made by the Spanish courts of the Captain’s personal assets, the sum of
EUR 3,000,000 fixed self-evidently bore no relation to the personal means of the
Captain;
5.22.5. in fixing the bail, the investigating judge made no reference to the owners or
insurers of Prestige, or to any obligation on the part of either to meet any bail which
might be set, the only suggestion that the financial support of the owners or insurers
of the ship played a part in the decisions of the courts in setting or upholding the
amount of the bail is in the delphic statement of the Constitutional Court that the
Captain’s “professional environment” had been taken into account, a phrase which is
interpreted in the judgment as embracing the Captain’s relationship with the
shipowners;
5.22.6. London Club had no legal responsibility (whether by binding conventions,
custom, practice or contractual arrangements) to indemnify the owners of Prestige in
respect of the bail bond of a ship’s Master who had been detained by the maritime
authorities in the circumstances of the present case;
5.22.7. the fact that the bail was eventually posted by London Club is of limited
importance in terms of Article 5(3) of the European Convention of Human Rights, of
more significance is the fact that, in setting bail, the national courts based themselves
on what was, at best, an unsupported assumption that the shipowners or their insurers
would feel morally obliged to come to the Captain’s rescue by posting bail;
5.22.8. the national courts do not appear to have taken account, when setting and
upholding the bail, of the Captain’s personal circumstances other than his Greek
nationality and his lack of ties to Spain; there is no reference to his assets, the fact
that he was 67 years old and of good character, the fact that he was a citizen of
another EU Member State or his family circumstances, all of which had relevance to
the risk that he might abscond;
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5.22.9. the national courts do not appear to have given any consideration, when
setting and upholding the bail, to the possibility to combine bail with other measures
designed to secure the applicant’s attendance at trial, such as those which were
imposed when the Captain was eventually released and when he was subsequently
allowed to return to Greece.658
5.23. On 30 November 2011 proceedings in Spain on the merits of the case were
remitted to the Provincial Court of A Coruna.659
5.24. On 30 July 2012 the ruling was made to open the oral trial. This ruling
contained a detailed list of charges.660
5.25. Captain Mangouras, Chief Engineer Argyropoulos and Chief Officer Maloto
were all accused by an enormous number of persons (public institutions, NGOs,
private companies and individuals). Many of these persons were primarily concerned
about civil claims (under Spanish law, civil claims may be submitted in the criminal
proceedings). However, all of them also brought forward their own criminal charges
and requests for specific punishment.661 These various criminal charges and requests
for punishment will not be described here. Only charges brought forward by the
Spanish Public Prosecution Service, the Spanish State and French State will be
described.
5.26. The Spanish Public Prosecution Service accused Captain Mangouras on
primary basis for a crime against natural resources and the environment (punishable
under Art. 325, Art. 326, sections b) and e), and Art. 338 of the Criminal Code),
requesting to sentence him to 7 years’ imprisonment, a fine of 40 months with a daily
quota of EUR 24 and special disqualification from being a ship’s master for 5
years.662
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5.27. The Spanish State accused:
5.27.1. Captain Mangouras on primary basis for a crime against natural resources and
the environment (punishable under Art. 325, Art. 326, sections b) and e), and Art.
338 of the Criminal Code) and a crime of resistance and disobedience (punishable
under Art. 556 of the Criminal Code), requesting to sentence him to 6 years’
imprisonment, a fine of 36 months with a daily quota of EUR 24 and special
disqualification from his profession or office for 4 years and 6 months;
5.27.2. Chief Engineer Argyropoulos for a crime of resistance and disobedience
(punishable under Art. 556 of the Criminal Code), requesting to sentence him to 6
months’ imprisonment.663
5.28. The French State accused:
5.28.1. Captain Mangouras for a crime against natural resources and the environment
(punishable under Art. 325, Art. 326, sections b) and e), and Art. 338 of the Criminal
Code) and a crime of resistance and disobedience (punishable under Art. 556 of the
Criminal Code), requesting to sentence him: for the first crime – to 6 years’
imprisonment, a fine of 36 months with a daily quota of EUR 150 and special
disqualification from his profession for 4 years; for the second crime – to 10 months’
imprisonment;
5.28.2. Chief Engineer Argyropoulos and Chief Officer Maloto for a crime against
natural resources and the environment (punishable under Art. 325, Art. 326, sections
b) and e), and Art. 338 of the Criminal Code), requesting to sentence them to 5 years’
imprisonment, a fine of 30 months with a daily quota of EUR 100 and special
disqualification from their profession for 4 years.664
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5.29. Relevant articles of the Spanish Criminal Code read as follows:
5.29.1. Art. 325:
“Whoever, breaking the laws or other provisions of a general nature that protect the
environment, directly or indirectly causes or makes emissions, spillages, radiation,
extractions or excavations, filling with earth, noises, vibrations, injections or
deposits, in the atmosphere, the ground, the subsoil or the surface water, ground
water or sea water, including the high seas, even those affecting cross border spaces,
as well as the water catchment basins, that may seriously damage the balance of the
natural systems, shall be punished with a sentence of imprisonment from two to five
years, a fine from eight to twenty-four months and with special barring from his
profession or trade for a period from one to three years. Should there be risk of
serious damage to the health of persons, the sentence of imprisonment shall be
imposed in its upper half.”
5.29.2. Art. 326, sections b) and e):
“A punishment higher in one degree shall be imposed [...], when commission of any
of the acts described in the preceding Article takes place with any of the following
circumstances concurring:
b) When the specific orders by the administrative authority on correction or
suspension of the activities defined in the preceding Section have been disobeyed;
e) When a risk of irreversible or catastrophic deterioration has ensued.”
5.29.3. Art. 338:
“When the conduct defined in this Title affects any protected natural space, the
penalties shall be imposed higher by one degree to those respectively foreseen.”
5.29.4. Article 556:
“Those who [...] resist the authority or its agents, or seriously disobey them, while
carrying out the duties of office, shall be punished with a sentence of imprisonment
of six months to one year.”665
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5.30. Public hearing of the case lasted from 16 October 2012 to 10 July 2013. On 13
November 2013 the Court delivered the judgement.666
5.31. In its judgment, the Court, at once, excluded from any further consideration the
liability of Chief Officer Maloto, due to procedural aspects. In accordance with
Spanish law, cases cannot be heard in absentia. Mr. Maloto was in default. He had
not been heard during the preliminary investigations and also did not appear for the
trial. Consequently, all petitions for his sentencing were inadmissible.667
5.32. Regarding the cause of the accident the Court ruled that, despite the lengthy
investigation, a multitude of expert reports and various hypotheses, it is still
impossible to determine with exactitude the true cause of the accident. Similarly, the
Court was of the opinion that it is impossible to determine what should have been the
appropriate response to the accident.668
5.33. The most discussed “hypothesis” regarding the cause of the accident was the
structural failure of a bulkhead due to defective maintenance or due to defective
repair of the ship. In this regard the Court noted that, naturally, nobody can deny the
structural failure; however, at the same time, nobody has been able to show beyond a
reasonable doubt where exactly this took place or for what reason. Furthermore, even
if, indeed, defective maintenance or defective repair was the cause of the failure, the
crew members of Prestige cannot be held liable because this defective maintenance
or defective repair was hidden from them (at least there is no evidence to the
contrary).669
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5.34. “Hypotheses” regarding the appropriate response to the accident were, for
example, that:
5.34.1. Captain Mangouras, just after the list of Prestige occurred, needed to start the
internal transfer of cargo, instead of flooding the tanks – because after the flooding of
the tanks the ship carried excessive weight and the value of the bending moment was
above the limit. At the same time, a number of experts stated that the Captain acted
within the limits of acceptable risk.670
5.34.2. Spanish authorities, throughout the response to the accident, needed to
consult relevant experts more – because decisions they actually took were not
professional. In this regard the Court noted: “It is not that there was no professional
advice, which there was and which was extraordinarily competent, and, if today
some experts maintain a different thesis, it is not very clear that they are the correct
ones, or better [...] or more explicit, or better founded, the situation is that there was a
possibility of consulting other experts and this was not done, but that does not mean
that there was failure to consult, nor that that consultation was compulsory or prudent
or that the advice collected was insufficient.”671
5.34.3. Spanish authorities, once Prestige was firmly under tow and without
imminent risk of grounding, needed to take the ship to a place of refuge, instead of
sending her away from the coast – because sending the ship away from the coast
massively increased the area affected by the spill. At the same time, a number of
experts stated that the decision to grant a place of refuge was technically risky and
even illegal. The Court from its side added that the decision to send the ship away
from the coast, although might look like a wrong decision now post factum (when
everyone knows what occurred as a consequence), is debatable but does not look like
an absolutely wrong decision from an ante factum perspective, for example, because:
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the area where the accident happened is largely dependent on currents, winds

•

and tide that are not absolutely predictable; thus the logical thing according to
which the greater the distancing the greater the extent of pollution is not
undisputed and pollution actually could have evolved in many different ways;
many claim that the slick degrades, fragments and loses its polluting capacity

•

in contact with the sea; it is also claimed that the slick further out to sea
simply gives more time to respond to it before it reaches the coast;
•

the experts, who criticised Spanish authorities after the accident, during the
time of the accident mostly remained silent about its possible consequences,
which indicates that nobody actually believed from a scientific perspective
that the massive arrival of oil at very distant places is immediate possibility,
although perhaps they needed to foresee such possibility.672

5.35. As a result, the Court made two broad conclusions, one of a procedural, another
of a substantive nature, namely:
5.35.1. That, in principle, it was possible to investigate some important aspects of the
accident, in detail, which has not been done. In this regard it should also be noted
that the Court throughout its judgment addressed rather reproachful words towards
technical experts and institutions which carried out preliminary investigation of the
case.673
5.35.2. That it is difficult/impossible to attribute responsibility to any of the accused
persons for the crime against natural resources and the environment (neither intent,
nor recklessness, nor negligence of any of the accused persons has been proven in
this regard). Consequently, all accused, including Captain Mangouras and Chief
Engineer Argyropoulos, should be absolved of this crime.674
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5.36. The Court not only absolved Captain Mangouras and Chief Engineer
Argyropoulos of the crime against natural resources and the environment, it even
praised them for their actions during the accident – by stating that their initial actions
after the failure demonstrated bravery and commitment above the normal.675
5.37. However, the Court found Captain Mangouras guilty of the crime of resistance
and disobedience, more precisely, of the refusal to make fast the tow when such
order repeatedly, imperatively and unequivocally was given by the Spanish maritime
authority.676
5.38. The Court acknowledged that Captain Mangouras had the right to question the
appropriateness of the order from the safety and environmental protection point of
view, but at the same time the Court noted that it was not the case in this particular
situation (as the Captain did not refuse towing as such). In this particular situation the
Captain refused to follow the order for merely economic reasons – negotiations of
economically better terms of towing or salvage services to be provided.677
5.39. The penalty imposed upon Captain Mangouras for the crime of resistance and
disobedience was 9 months imprisonment with a reduction in sentence of the time
already spent in prison due to this crime.678
5.40. The Court justified the imposing of such a rather high penalty upon the Captain
by saying: “If a blatant, cold and malicious failure to comply with the authorities is
already one of notable gravity, when that is linked with the urgency of avoiding or
reducing the scope of a spillage of fuel that caused immense losses, this gravity
becomes even clearer.”679
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5.41. Also Chief Engineer Argyropoulos was blamed for resistance and
disobedience, more precisely, for disobeying specific orders of authorities to start up
the ship’s engines and even sabotaging the engines to prevent or complicate that
start-up. However, Mr. Argyropoulos was found not guilty for these actions, because
the Court found that the above-mentioned allegations were vague and, even if they
were true, anyway, Mr. Argyropoulos acted under the command of Captain
Mangouras.680
5.42. The process of the notification of the judgment to all parties, which also
entailed the translation of the judgment into Greek, took several months and was
achieved in May 2014.681
5.43. Subsequently, several parties, including the Spanish Public Prosecution Service
and Captain Mangouras, filed the cassation appeal to the Spanish Supreme Court.682
5.44. Part of the appellants complained about incorrect application by the Provincial
Court of A Coruna of Art. 325 and 326 of the Spanish Criminal Code in relation to
Captain Mangouras. Unlike the Provincial Court, the appellants considered that the
Captain acted in a negligent manner in the handling of Prestige and thereby
effectively contributed to the serious danger of pollution which gave rise to
enormous damage to the environment.683
5.45. The hearing of the case at the Spanish Supreme Court was held on 29
September 2015, attended by the lawyers of the appellants; thus, Captain Mangouras
was not present at the trial.684
5.46. On 14 January 2016 the Spanish Supreme Court delivered its judgement.685
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5.47. First of all, the Court noted that, in accordance with human rights, particularly
the right to be heard in presence, it may decide only strictly legal questions,
scrupulously respecting already proven facts; it may not re-evaluate the objective and
subjective elements of the crime.686
5.48. Then, the Court recognised the validity of the findings of the Provincial Court
of A Coruna that the cause of the accident was a structural failure of the ship and that
there is no evidence proving that Captain Mangouras knew about the defective
structural state of the ship prior to the accident.687
5.49. Then, the Court analysed Art. 325 of the Spanish Criminal Code – the article
which defines the crime against natural resources and the environment. The Court
argued that this crime requires the confluence of three essential elements:
5.49.1. causing or directly or indirectly carrying out any of the polluting activities
mentioned in the article;
5.49.2. breach of an environmental regulation of a non-criminal character;
5.49.3. creation of a situation of serious danger for the legally protected asset, as a
consequence of the performance of the unlawful polluting activity.688
5.50. All the above-mentioned elements were found present in the conduct of
Captain Mangouras:
5.50.1. regarding the first element, the Court ruled that it is fulfilled, because spilling
the cargo of fuel oil into the sea falls within the definition of “discharge”, which is
one of the polluting activities mentioned in the article;689
5.50.2. regarding the second element, the Court ruled that it is fulfilled, because with
his conduct the Captain breached MARPOL, UNCLOS, SOLAS, Intervention
Convention, the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 as well as the Spanish
Port States and Merchant Marine Act, 1992;690
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5.50.3. regarding the third element: first of all, the Court explained that this element
indicates that the crime in question is a crime of endangerment (meaning that the
existence of actual damage to the environment is not necessary for the commission of
the crime; it suffices to give rise to a state of risk)691; secondly, the Court ruled that
the Captain created such an endangerment, particularly by the following conduct:
5.50.3.1. he undertook a voyage at a time when it was foreseeable, if not certain, that
he would have to face adverse weather conditions;
5.50.3.2. he did so in a ship which was ageing and was with operational defects
which he knew perfectly well: he had to navigate manually because the automatic
pilot was not working, without the heating pipes that allowed the cargo to be heated
with the intensity necessary to facilitate its transfer and with towing gear that was
difficult to operate since it required at least four men and steam power to move it;
5.50.3.3. he overloaded the ship at the port of Ventspils and added even more weight
to the ship, when, for correcting the list, allowed the entry of sea water into the tanks;
it weakened the ship and greatly hampered her recovery;
5.50.3.4. he acted evasively when Spanish authorities tried to take under control the
uncontrolled ship which was drifting towards the coast.692
5.51. The Court acknowledged that criminally punishable is only serious
endangerment to the environment. The above-mentioned endangerment created by
Captain Mangouras was found to be obviously serious (even more than serious),
inter alia, because of the actual catastrophic result.693
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5.52. Likewise, the Court acknowledged that criminally punishable is only such
endangerment to the environment which is created by intent or serious negligence.
The above-mentioned conduct of Captain Mangouras was found to be carried out
with serious negligence – for the magnitude of the breach of the duty of care, the
importance of the legally protected asset affected and the foreseeability of the risk. In
relation to this finding, the Court ruled that serious negligence is not exempted from
liability under Reg. 11(b) (under current numbering 4(2)) of Annex I of
MARPOL.694
5.53. As a result, unlike the Provincial Court of A Coruna, the Spanish Supreme
Court found Captain Mangouras guilty of the crime against natural resources and the
environment (with aggravated circumstances and without any mitigating
circumstances).695
5.54. Punishment imposed upon the Captain for the above-mentioned crime was: two
years imprisonment (the lowest possible prison term for the given crime), twelve
months fine (EUR 10 per day) and special disqualification from the exercise of the
profession of ship’s captain for one year and six months. The Court noted that the
lowest possible prison term was set taking into consideration amount of time (more
than thirteen years) that has elapsed since the incident occurred.696
5.55. As the Spanish Supreme Court found Captain Mangouras guilty of the crime
against natural resources and the environment (Art. 325 of the Spanish Criminal
Code), the disobedience of the Captain during the accident became one of the
aggravating factors of this crime (Art. 326, section b) of the Spanish Criminal Code).
Consequently, to avoid double jeopardy, the Court acquitted the Captain of the
separate crime of disobedience (Art. 556 of the Spanish Criminal Code).697
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5.56. Captain Mangouras submitted a motion for dismissal of the Spanish Supreme
Court judgment, arguing mainly that the judgment breaches his fundamental rights of
defence, his right to a trial with all the guaranties, and his right to legality. The Court
rejected the Captain’s motion. Afterwards, the Captain expressed the intention to
appeal the judgment to the Spanish Constitutional Court.698
6.3.2. Analysis
Violation of the right to liberty: deprivation of liberty without existence of
recognised ground
After the Prestige accident Spanish authorities detained the master of Prestige –
Captain Mangouras – for 83 days, from 16 November 2002 to 7 February 2003 (see
paragraphs 5.3 and 5.14 above). The following grounds were given for the detention:
1) sufficient evidence (in other words, reasonable suspicion) that the Captain
had committed a crime against natural resources and the environment as well
as the crime of resistance and disobedience;
2) severity of sanctions potentially to be imposed upon the Captain;
3) risk that the Captain will obstruct the proceedings;
4) public opinion;
5) potentially large sums of money involved in civil claims;
6) danger that the Captain will abscond, particularly because he is a foreigner
and lacks any roots in Spain (see paragraphs 5.5-5.6 and 5.9-5.11 above).
The validity of these grounds is analysed below.
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Reasonable suspicion
Although the existence of reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a
particular crime per se is not a recognised ground for the deprivation of liberty, as it
was explained earlier, the existence of at least minimal reasonable suspicion that a
person has committed a particular crime is a pre-condition for the deprivation of
liberty due to the danger of absconding. In this context, the argument of Spanish
authorities that there exists reasonable suspicion that Captain Mangouras committed
a crime against natural resources and the environment as well as a crime of resistance
and disobedience can be considered as a valid argument for the detention of the
Captain.
In addition, the level of suspicion (minimal, medium, high suspicion) that a
person has committed a particular crime is one of the factors to be taken into
consideration when assessing exactly how high the risk is that the person will
abscond proceedings. In this regard, it should be noted that the level of suspicion that
Captain Mangouras committed the crime against natural resources and the
environment could not be high at the time when the decisions to remand him in
custody were taken, because at that time Spanish authorities, themselves, indicated
that the direct cause of the accident was an unforeseeable large wave, thus, not
actions of the Captain (see paragraph 5.6.1 above). Consequently, if Spanish
authorities with their argument of existence of reasonable suspicion that Captain
Mangouras committed the crime against natural resources and the environment,
actually, wanted to indicate that the respective suspicion was high and, therefore, the
risk of absconding was high, the argument must be considered as an invalid
argument for the detention of the Captain.
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Severity of sanctions
Again, although the severity of sanctions to be potentially imposed upon a person per
se is not a recognised ground for the deprivation of liberty, it is one of the factors
which shall be taken into consideration when assessing exactly how high the risk is
that the person will abscond proceedings. In the Prestige case Captain Mangouras
faced severe sanctions under the Spanish Criminal Code (see paragraph 5.29 above).
However, the long term imprisonment sanctions which the Captain faced under this
Code, actually, could not be applied or were unlikely to be applied – due to the
safeguards incorporated in Art. 92 of the Spanish Criminal Code itself and Art. 230
of UNCLOS (see paragraph 5.16.4 above). Consequently, the argument of Spanish
authorities that Captain Mangouras faced severe potential sanctions must be
considered as an invalid argument for the detention of the Captain.
Risk of obstruction of proceedings
Although, in principle, the risk of obstruction of proceedings is recognised ground
for the deprivation of liberty, as explained earlier, authorities may not rely upon this
ground in abstracto. Yet, In the Prestige case, Spanish authorities gave absolutely no
evidence supporting their allegation that, if released, Captain Mangouras will
obstruct the proceedings. Consequently, the argument of Spanish authorities that, if
released, Captain Mangouras will obstruct the proceedings must be considered as an
invalid argument for the detention of the Captain.
Public opinion
Public opinion can never serve as a ground for the deprivation of liberty. Even more,
if an authority bases its decision on public opinion (as Spanish authorities did when
deciding to detain Captain Mangouras), this authority can be considered as being not
impartial, but the right of one’s case to be investigated by impartial tribunal and pretrial institutions is one of the human rights under the fair trial umbrella.
Consequently, the reference of Spanish authorities to public opinion, when deciding
upon the detention of Captain Mangouras, must be considered as absolutely invalid.
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Large sums of money involved in civil claims
Again, although large sums of money involved in civil claims per se are not
recognised ground for the deprivation of liberty, they may be considered as one of
the factors making the danger of absconding from corresponding criminal
proceedings higher, particularly when civil liability is adjudicated together with
criminal liability, as in the Prestige case. Consequently, the argument that the
Prestige case involves civil claims of large sums of money can be considered as
partly valid argument for the detention of the Captain.
Danger of absconding
Although, in principle, the danger of absconding is recognised ground for the
deprivation of liberty, as explained earlier, authorities may not rely upon this ground
without thoroughly examining necessity and proportionality of respective measure.
In the Prestige case, Spanish authorities, when assessing the need to detain Captain
Mangouras, clearly did not consider any factor militating against the detention of the
Captain. All formal factors given (reasonable suspicion, severity of potential
sanctions, public opinion and large sums involved in civil claims) were framed as
unequivocally proving the need to detain the Captain; although, as earlier analysis
showed, these factors also contained the aspects militating against the detention.
Personal factors militating against the detention, such as Captain’s good character
and lack of criminal record, were not considered at all. Only one personal factor,
which was militating for detention was taken into consideration – the fact that the
Captain is foreigner and lacks any roots in Spain. In this regard Spanish authorities
failed to take into consideration that the Captain was an EU citizen and, thus, can be
subjected to relevant co-operation mechanisms which exist within the EU. In other
words, Spanish authorities, when deciding upon detention of the Captain, failed to
assess all relevant factors in their entirety. Consequently, the validity of the argument
of Spanish authorities that there was a high risk that, if released, Captain Mangouras
would abscond proceedings is highly questionable. If all relevant factors would have
been assessed, it would have most probably become clear that the detention of the
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Captain would not be necessary, or at least not proportional, measure for securing his
attendance at ongoing proceedings.
Was the detention of the seafarer necessary measure either for
securing fulfilment of the legal obligation or for securing nonabsconding or for securing that the seafarer would not take
action to obstruct the proceedings?

No

X
Violation

Yes

Violation of the right to liberty: deprivation of liberty without convincingly
demonstrating its justification
Even if one was to agree that the Spanish authorities actually considered all relevant
factors before detaining Captain Mangouras, and thus that the detention was
necessary and proportional measure in the circumstances in question, the right to
liberty of the Captain was still violated, because such a vague and one-sided
assessment of the relevant factors by the Spanish authorities as described above can
hardly be considered as convincing demonstration of the need to detain the Captain.
Yet, the right to liberty requires such demonstration.
Was the justification for the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer convincingly demonstrated by the authorities?

No

X
Violation

Yes
Violation of the right to liberty: due care not taken in fixing amount of bail
In the Prestige case, Spanish authorities ruled that Captain Mangouras could
avoid his pre-trial detention by posting a bail of EUR 3,000,000. The grounds given
for justifying this amount (very high amount) of bail were the same as given for
justifying the need of the detention as such – reasonable suspicion, severity of
potential sanctions, public opinion, large sums of money involved in civil claims and
the fact that the Captain is a foreigner and lacks any roots in Spain (see paragraphs
5.5-5.6 and 5.9-5.11 above). As already shown above, all of these factors were not
evaluated thoroughly, and some of them were not even relevant to be considered
when assessing the danger of absconding and consequently also the bail to be set.
This fact had also been repeatedly noted by the Captain himself as well as 7 judges
of the Grand Chamber of ECtHR in their dissenting opinion (see paragraphs 5.12,

287

5.16, 5.22.1, 5.22.3, 5.22.4, 5.22.6, 5.22.8 and 5.22.9 above). The Spanish
Constitutional Court in its judgment on the case noted that the bail was fixed by also
taking into consideration the Captain’s financial circumstances and his “professional
environment” (see paragraph 5.15 above). Respective argument was repeated and
elaborated in the judgments of ECtHR (see paragraphs 5.18.1, 5.21.1, 5.21.2, 5.21.5
and 5.21.6 above). However, this argument was factually wrong. As the Captain and
7 judges of the Grand Chamber of ECtHR in their dissenting opinion had also rightly
pointed out, when fixing the amount of bail, Spanish authorities never made any
reference, even slightly, to the Captain’s financial circumstances or his “professional
environment” (see paragraphs 5.5-5.6, 5.9-5.12, 5.16.1, 5.22.5 and 5.22.7 above).
Consequently, Spanish authorities did not take due care in fixing the amount of the
bail. If the assets of the Captain and his relationship with the persons who are to
provide the security would have been assessed with due care when fixing the bail, it
would have most probably become clear that the bail of EUR 3,000,000 was
excessive.
ECtHR in its judgments referred to some additional grounds as given by the
Spanish authorities to justify the high amount of bail set for the release of Captain
Mangouras: seriousness of the natural disaster (or harm) in question and growing
concern about offences against the environment (see paragraphs 5.18.2 and 5.21.3
above). These grounds per se are also not relevant grounds either for deprivation of
liberty, as such, or for fixing the amount of bail. Furthermore, respective factors are
normally already taken into consideration when prescribing punishment for specific
offences against the environment. Therefore, to refer to these factors in addition to
the argument that the alleged offender faces severe sanctions seems unfair practice
for proving the need to deprive a person from liberty, or to set high bail for his
release.
Was due care taken in fixing the appropriate amount of bail for
the release of the seafarer?

No
Yes

X
Violation
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Violation of the right to liberty: fixing the amount of bail without convincingly
demonstrating its justification
Even if one was to agree that the Spanish authorities actually considered all
relevant factors when fixing the amount of bail for the release of Captain Mangouras
and, thus, the amount of bail fixed was appropriate in the circumstances in question,
the right to liberty of the Captain was still violated, because justification of the
amount of bail fixed was never convincingly demonstrated by the Spanish authorities
in their relevant decisions. Arguments as if proving that the amount of bail set was
appropriate were given only post factum. Such post factum arguments are not capable
of removing the fact that the amount of bail was fixed arbitrarily, in the first place,
even if later this arbitrary fixed amount of bail accidently appears to be appropriate.
Similar opinion can be found in the dissenting opinion of 7 judges of the Grand
Chamber of ECtHR (see paragraphs 5.22.2 and 5.22.5-5.22.9 above).
Was the justification of the amount of bail fixed convincingly
demonstrated by the authorities?

No

X
Violation

Yes
If to follow the above-given manner of thinking, then a rather lengthy
analysis of ECtHR on whether the insurer of Prestige could be reasonably expected
to cover the bail for the Captain (see paragraphs 5.18.1, 5.21.1, 5.21.2, 5.21.5 and
5.21.6 above) basically becomes pointless for identification of the violation of human
rights in the particular case. However, in general, this analysis is very important,
because if, in principle, there is room for expectation that the owner or insurer of the
ship will cover the bail for a crew member of this ship and, consequently, a relatively
high bail is set yet in the specific case bail is not posted by the owner or insurer,
detained seafarers may remain in custody for very long periods. Therefore, shipowners and insurers must develop uniform practice in this regard. At the moment,
different practice is still evident, inter alia, there have been cases when the bail for a
crew member of the ship was posted by the owner or insurer of this ship.699
699

See, for example, The “VOLGA” (No. 11) Case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Judgment of 23
December 2002, ITLOS, paragraphs 42 and 45.
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Violation of the right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment
In the Prestige case, Spanish authorities carried out initial questioning of the crew
members of Prestige – Captain Mangouras, Chief Engineer Argyropoulo and Chief
Officer Maloto – just after their rescue from the stricken ship. The questioning was
rather lengthy, took place during the night hours and was carried out despite the fact
that all three men had been continuously occupied by duty and questioning for
around 60 hours, without proper rest, food and facilities (see paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3
above). Such treatment of the seafarers can be considered to be at least degrading.
Taking into consideration the cumulative effect of the
conditions, was the treatment of the seafarer by the authorities
at least degrading?

No
Yes

X
Violation

Violation of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment: the
principle of legality and rule of lenity
In the Prestige case, the Spanish Supreme Court found Captain Mangouras guilty of
the crime against natural resources and the environment (see paragraph 5.53 above).
Specifically, the Captain was found guilty of seriously endangering the environment
by his certain seriously negligent conduct (see paragraphs 5.49-5.52). This ruling,
inter alia, was based on the argument that the crime against natural resources and the
environment is a crime for the commission of which causing of the actual damage to
the environment is not necessary (see paragraph 5.50.3 above). However, the
wording of the rule which defines the crime against natural resources and the
environment in Spain – Art. 325 of the Spanish Criminal Code – is not sufficiently
clear in this regard (see paragraph 5.29.1 above). Consequently, taking into
consideration the principle of legality and, related to this principle, rule of lenity, Art.
325 of the Spanish Criminal Code needed to be interpreted as requiring to prove that
a person has caused the actual damage (not only the endangerment) to the
environment before this person can be held liable for the crime. Likewise, as
explained already earlier, Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL is not sufficiently clear
on the issue whether seriously negligent conducts are exempted from liability or not.
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Consequently, again, taking into consideration the principle of legality and, related to
this principle, rule of lenity, Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL needed to be
interpreted as exempting from liability seriously negligent conducts. Yet, the Spanish
Supreme Court adopted the opposite interpretation (see paragraph 5.52 above).
Was the law based on which the seafarer was convicted
sufficiently clear?

No

X
Violation

Yes
Violation of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment: the
principle that a person may not be held liable for a particular crime if all elements of
this crime are not present or proven beyond a reasonable doubt
Even if to agree that under Art. 325 of the Spanish Criminal Code a person can be
held liable merely for the serious endangerment to the environment, the right of
Captain Mangouras to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment was still
violated. In the case of endangerment, elements which needed to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt before the Captain could be found guilty of the crime against
natural resources and the environment were: certain illegal conduct of the Captain
(the required act); serious endangerment of the environment (the required harm);
causal link between the conduct and the harm in question; intent or serious
negligence (required mental state). All these elements needed to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt already at the Provincial Court of A Coruna, because the Spanish
Supreme Court could rule only on strictly legal questions which do not require reevaluation of the objective and subjective elements of the crime (see paragraph 5.47
above). Yet, at the Provincial Court of A Coruna all of the above-mentioned
elements were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly because at this
Court the evidence was examined from the perspective of different harm – the actual
damage (not only the endangerment) to the environment. Also, at the Spanish
Supreme Court all of the above-mentioned elements were not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, for example, regarding the seriousness of the endangerment the
Court ruled that it is “obvious”, without referring to any relevant evidence (see,
paragraph 5.51 above). The reference to the actual catastrophic result was not
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appropriate in this case, because, as it was acknowledged by the Court itself, the
actual damage resulted not solely from the conduct of the Captain, consequently,
solely his certain illegal conduct, if any, could as well cause only relatively minor
risk to the environment.
Was the seafarer convicted for the crime without proof of all
elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

No
Yes

X
Violation

Violation of the right to be tried in presence
In the Prestige case, the Spanish Supreme Court (the cassation court) found Captain
Mangouras guilty of the crime against natural resources and the environment, thus
overturning the earlier not guilty judgment (see paragraph 5.53 and 5.35.2 above).
Captain Mangouras was not present at the cassation trial (see paragraph 5.45 above).
Although, the Court had stressed that, in accordance with human rights, particularly
the right to be heard in presence, it may decide only strictly legal question (see
paragraph 5.47 above), in fact, it involved in the re-evaluation of the objective and
subjective elements of the crime, particularly, the Court invoked, basically, the new
objective element “harm” (“serious endangerment to the environment” instead of
“actual damage to the environment”). Consequently, the fact of endangerment
needed to be established and seriousness of this endangerment assessed. In addition,
all other relevant elements (such as objective element “causation” and subjective
element “serious negligence”) needed to be re-evaluated from the perspective of the
newly invoked harm (see paragraphs 5.49-5.52 above).
Did the proceedings in front of cassation court, at which
seafarer was not present, involve not only questions of law but
also questions of fact?

No
Yes

X
Violation
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Possible violation of the right to be tried without undue delay
In the Prestige case, the proceedings against Captain Mangouras, Chief Engineer
Argyropoulo and Chief Officer Maloto began on 16 November 2002 (see paragraph
5.4 above). The Court of the First Instance rendered its judgment in the case on 13
November 2013, that is, around 11 years after the initiation of the case (see
paragraph 5.30 above). The Court of the Second Instance rendered its judgment in
the case on 26 January 2016, that is, more than 13 years after the initiation of the
case (see paragraph 5.46 above). The Prestige case, undoubtedly, is a very complex
case due to several reasons, including the international aspect, the number of
participants and the fact that civil liability is examined together with criminal
liability (see paragraphs 1, 2.1-2.3, 5.25 and 5.42 above). It indicates that a relatively
long period of investigation and adjudication of this case might still be reasonable.
However, more than 13 years is a strikingly long period of time. It can be concluded
with a great amount of certainty that at least one of the reasons for such a long
investigation and adjudication is the fact that, despite the complexity of the case, its
preliminary investigation was ultimately commenced and carried out by the
investigation bodies in a very small province – Corcubion (around 6,5 km2; around
2000 inhabitants) – which, obviously, has relatively few human and other resources
(see paragraph 5.7 above). Therefore, it can be argued that, by making provincial
bodies investigate such a complex case as the Prestige case, Spain has violated the
human rights of Captain Mangouras, Chief Engineer Argyropoulo and Chief Officer
Maloto to be tried without undue delay.
Was the seafarer tried without undue delay?

No
Yes

X
Violation
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Observance of the right to liberty: prompt automatic judicial review of the
deprivation of liberty
In the Prestige case, Captain Mangouras was deprived of his liberty on 15 November
2002 (see paragraph 5.2 above). He was brought for the automatic judicial review of
his deprivation of liberty two days later – on 17 November 2002 (see paragraph 5.5
above). Thus, the automatic judicial review of the deprivation of liberty of Captain
Mangouras was carried out promptly.
Was the seafarer after his deprivation of liberty brought for an
automatic judicial review of his deprivation of liberty
promptly?

No
Yes

X

Observance of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment: the
principle that a person may not be held liable for a particular crime if all elements of
this crime are not present or proven beyond a reasonable doubt
After the Prestige accident, Captain Mangouras and Chief Engineer Argyropoulos
were charged for the crime against natural resources and the environment (see
paragraphs 5.25-5.28 above). However, in its judgment the Provincial Court of A
Coruna did not find the seafarers guilty of the respective crime. Instead, the Court
ruled that, despite the lengthy investigation, a multitude of expert reports and various
hypotheses, it is still impossible to determine with exactitude the true cause of the
accident. Consequently, all accused, including Captain Mangouras and Chief
Engineer Argyropoulos, should be absolved of the crime against natural resources
and the environment (see paragraphs 5.32-5.35 above). Due to the vagueness of the
charge, Mr. Argyropoulos was also absolved of the crime of resistance and
disobedience (see paragraph 5.41 above). Thus, the Provincial Court of A Coruna
observed the general principle of punishment that a person may not be held liable for
a particular crime if all elements of this crime are not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Was the seafarer convicted for the crime without proof of all
elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

No
Yes

X
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Observance of the right to be tried in presence
After the Prestige accident, one of the persons charged for causing the accident was
the chief officer of Prestige, Mr. Maloto (see paragraphs 5.25 and 5.28 above).
However, Mr. Maloto was in default during the proceedings. The Court ruled that,
due to this fact, all petitions for his sentencing were inadmissible (see paragraph 5.31
above). Thus, the right to be tried in presence was observed.
Was the hearing at the first instance court held in the absence of No
the seafarer?
Yes

X

Observance of the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence
In the Prestige case, the Court of the First Instance found Captain Mangouras guilty
of the crime of resistance and disobedience (see paragraph 5.37 above). The Court of
the Second instance acquitted the Captain of this crime, to avoid double jeopardy
(see paragraph 5.55 above).
Was the seafarer punished again for an offence for which he
had already been convicted in this country?

No
Yes

X

6.4. Grounding of TASMAN SPIRIT
6.4.1. Facts
1. The ship involved in the accident
Tasman Spirit – 87,587 dwt (45,603 GT) tanker: registered in Malta; owned by
Malta-based Assimina Maritime; operated by Greece-based Polembros Shipping; at
the time of the accident, under voyage charter to Pakistan National Shipping
Corporation.700

700

Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report Under Section 470 and 471 of Pakistan Merchant
Shipping Ordinance, 2001 at p. 3; Assimina Maritime Limited v Pakistan Shipping Corporation and
HR Wallingford Limited, [2004] EWHC 3005 (Comm), paragraph 2; “Common Sense Breaks Out!”,
Fairplay, 13 April 2006 at p. 30.
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2. Seafarers alleged to be guilty of causing the accident
2.1. Captain Demitrios Karystinos – Greek master of Tasman Spirit.
2.2. Georgios Meimetis – Greek chief officer of Tasman Spirit.
2.3. Joel Jamero – Philipino third officer of Tasman Spirit.
2.4. Greg Flores – Philipino AB of Tasman Spirit.
2.5. Dionisios Valsamos – Greek chief engineer of Tasman Spirit.
2.6. Roberto Manongsang – Philipino second engineer of Tasman Spirit.
2.7. Georgios Koutsos – Greek third engineer of Tasman Spirit.
2.8. Nikos Pappas – Tsavliris Greek salvage master.
2.9. Captain Muhammad Nasir Javed – Karachi Port Trust (Karachi port authority)
Pakistani pilot who guided Tasman Spirit into the port.701
3. Grounding and events before and after it
3.1. On 22 July 2003 Tasman Spirit left Kharg Island (Iran) with the cargo of 67,532
tonnes of light crude oil on board. The destination of the ship was the port of Karachi
(Pakistan).702
3.2. On 26 July, at 13:30 Tasman Spirit arrived at an anchorage off the port of
Karachi.703
3.3. On 27 July, at 10:47 the pilot boarded Tasman Spirit. However, the ship could
not proceed to the port at once, because tugs were not available.704
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at pp. 8-10; “A Nightmare with No End in
Sight”, Fairplay, 20 November 2003 at p. 31.
702
Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at pp. 3-4; Assimina Maritime Limited v
Pakistan Shipping Corporation and HR Wallingford Limited, supra note 700, paragraph 4.
703
Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at p. 4
704
Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid., Annex C.
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3.4. At 12:19 Tasman Spirit proceeded to the port, up the buoyed approach channel.
Ship’s speed was 8 knots. Her under keel clearance was 2.4 m (as per official data
available at the time of grounding, the channel depth was 12.2 m, height of tide – 2.1
m, i.e. total available depth – 14.3 m, the draft of Tasman Spirit – 11.9 m, i.e. under
keel clearance – 2.4 m).705
3.5. At 12:45 engine speed of Tasman Spirit was reduced to half-ahead and,
subsequently, at 12:48 further reduced to slow ahead.706
3.6. At 12:50 Tasman Spirit started to alter the course to port in order to negotiate the
bend in the channel. However, the ship did not respond effectively, even when the
wheel was put hard over to port (maximum limit of rudder).707
3.7. At 12:53 engine speed of Tasman Spirit was increased to half ahead and
immediately thereafter to full ahead. The pilot asked the master of Tasman Spirit to
ask for maximum revolutions on the engine to get optimum turning affect. Tug
Sohrab was summoned to immediately come and assist Tasman Spirit in turning.708
3.8. The increase in helm and speed responded positively and Tasman Spirit started
to turn gradually towards port to negotiate the bend. However, due to slow response,
the ship came closer to the eastern extremity of the channel.709
3.9. At 12:57 Tasman Spirit grounded.710
3.10. Immediately after the grounding, the engine of Tasman Spirit was stopped and
put to full astern. Harbour control was informed about the grounding.711
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report Under Section 470 and 471 of Pakistan Merchant
Shipping Ordinance, 2001 at pp. 4, 5 and 10, and Annex C; Assimina Maritime Limited v Pakistan
Shipping Corporation and HR Wallingford Limited, [2004] EWHC 3005 (Comm), paragraph 4.
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at p. 5.
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at pp. 5-6.
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at p. 5 and Annex C.
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at p. 5.
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at p. 4; Assimina Maritime Limited v
Pakistan Shipping Corporation and HR Wallingford Limited, supra note 705, paragraph 4.
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid. at p. 6.
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3.11. At 13:05 the tug Sohrab arrived on the starboard bow of Tasman Spirit and
started pushing at full power. Meanwhile tugs Taqatwar and Shehzore were also
called in to get Tasman Spirit afloat and into the centre of the channel. However,
efforts of the tugs failed – Tasman Spirit was not moving, only her head was yawing
approximately 5 degrees on each side.712
3.12. At 16:00 there still was no change in the position of Tasman Spirit. Karachi
Port Trust postponed the operation till the next high water in the evening.713
3.13. The grounded Tasman Spirit was subjected to continuous stress from the heavy
swell of the prevailing south-west monsoon. In the course of inspections on board, it
became apparent that most of the cargo tanks had been ruptured.714
3.14. 11 from 18 crew members of Tasman Spirit were evacuated. 7 – master, chief
officer, third officer, AB, chief engineer, second engineer and third engineer –
volunteered to stay with the ship to assist in the salvage operations.715
3.15. On 31 July owners of Tasman Spirit called in Tsavliris-Russ salvage services.
On 4 August salvage operations were under way. During the next few weeks roughly
half of the crude oil cargo and most of the bunker fuel was successfully transferred
from Tasman Spirit. Yet, in between these transfer operations, on 11 August the
grounded ship started to show signs of breaking up and eventually broke in two
overnight on 13/14 August, spilling several thousand tonnes of cargo. The crew
abandoned the ship.716
3.16. On 22 August the structure of Tasman Spirit collapsed.717
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid., Annex C.
Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report, ibid.
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ITOPF, Tasman Spirit, Pakistan, 2003, available at: http://www.itopf.com/in-action/casestudies/case-study/tasman-spirit-pakistan-2003/ [accessed 13 November 2015].
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“Pressure Pays Off as Karachi Eight Freed”, Fairplay, 22 April 2004 at p.5.
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“Common Sense Breaks Out!”, Fairplay, 13 April 2006 at p. 30; ITOPF, Tasman Spirit, Pakistan,
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3.17. On 23 August salvage operations were taken over by Salvage Master Pappas.718
3.18. On 29 August further release of oil was reported. Progressive break up of
Tasman Spirit continued.719
4. Consequences
4.1. In total, approximately 27,000 tonnes of oil were spilled as a result of the
accident.720
4.2. The shoreline affected was: Clifton Beach next to Karachi, mangrove swamps in
the area as well as some places in the port of Karachi itself.721
4.3. Notified claims included reimbursement of all direct government costs incurred
in responding to the spill, financial losses of income and earning potential
(fishermen, residents, hawkers and businesses) and the natural resource
damage/restoration costs.722
5. Criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers
5.1. On 28 July 2003, upon receiving the report on the grounding of Tasman Spirit
from the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, Principal Officer of Pakistan
Mercantile Marine Department initiated a preliminary inquiry into the accident in
accordance with Section 471(2) of Pakistan Merchant Shipping Ordinance, 2001,
which states: “[…] the Federal Government may appoint any person to hold a
preliminary inquiry respecting any shipping casualty.”723
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“A Nightmare with No End in Sight”, Fairplay, 20 November 2003 at p. 31; Olivia Murray, “Fair
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5.2. Crew members of Tasman Spirit, who had volunteered to stay with the ship to
assist salvage operations, were not allowed to leave Pakistan while preliminary
inquiry into the accident was going on. They co-operated with the inquiry and,
ultimately, were released from any further requirement to contribute to that process.
However, they still were not allowed to leave Pakistan.724
5.3. On 12 September, when salvage operations were finished, Tsavliris personnel
involved in the salvage operations were not allowed to leave Pakistan. After one
week Tsavliris personnel were told that, except for Salvage Master Pappas, they
could leave the country. Pakistani authorities did not explain why the Salvage Master
Pappas could not leave the country. It was also not explained later, despite sending
several requests and reminders.725
5.4. On 3 October the crew members of Tasman Spirit as well as Salvage Master
Pappas (hereinafter – “Karachi Eight”) were detained.726
5.5. On 6 October the crew members of Tasman Spirit secured bail and were
released. However, their travel documents were held by the court and they
themselves were put under “house arrest” in the Pearl Continental Hotel Karachi.
Later Salvage Master Pappas also secured his bail and was released under the same
conditions.727
5.6. Official explanation as to why exactly the “Karachi Eight” were not allowed to
leave Pakistan was never given to them. There were just public announcements from
Pakistani authorities that the “Karachi Eight” would be held in custody until the end
of the inquiry. Pakistani authorities, inter alia, argued that holding the “Karachi
Eight” was the legitimate right of Pakistan, that all seafarers are legitimate targets in
any country and that Pakistan has gone a yard extra in releasing many members of
the crew and the salvor purely on humanitarian grounds.728
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5.7. Many others, however, have argued that the “Karachi Eight” were deprived of
their liberty simply as security for compensation for the damage caused by the
Tasman Spirit accident.729
5.8. The situation in regards to compensation for the damage caused by the Tasman
Spirit accident was difficult, and discussions between involved parties did not evolve
well. When the accident happened, Pakistan was not party to the CLC and Fund
Convention. Consequently, it could not recover the damages through the
compensation mechanisms incorporated into these conventions. An offer from the
American Club (P&I Club of Tasman Spirit) to compensate on the same basis as
CLC was rejected. Karachi Port Trust demanded a much higher compensation of
USD 1,8 billion; and, reportedly, the “Karachi Eight” were intended to be held until
the security of USD 1 billion had been provided. The owner and insurers of Tasman
Spirit refused to negotiate the compensation issues until the “Karachi Eight” are held
on what they described as spurious criminal charges filed by Karachi Port Trust. In
addition, Assima Maritime served the counter-claim of USD 6.5 billion to Karachi
Port Trust, blaming it for not maintaining the announced depth of the approach
channel to the port.730
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5.9. In late October a preliminary inquiry report into the accident was released. As a
cause of the accident the inquiry indicated the combination of multiple reasons:
5.9.1. Slightly late entrance into the channel. It was argued in the report that, since
Captain Karystinos was fully aware of the fact that Tasman Spirit entered the channel
the considerable amount of time after high tide, he could have refused to come
alongside the berth at that time. It was acknowledged in the report that, in general, in
accordance with official data provided by Pakistani authorities, the available depth of
water was still sufficient for Tasman Spirit to safely navigate the channel. However,
it was also pointed to the fact that the Captain needed to take into consideration the
following note which was on the chart used by the ship: “The Dredged Depths in
channel, berths and moorings are generally maintained but silting is liable to occur.
Dredging is in progress continually.”
5.9.2. Delayed actions. It was argued in the report that, considering the severity of
prevalent monsoon conditions, actions taken for negotiating the bend should have
been initiated earlier. The report also noted that progress of Tasman Spirit in the
channel was not properly monitored and, consequently, the ship’s drift towards the
eastern edge of the channel was not noticed by Captain Karystinos and the pilot at
the appropriate time to take remedial actions.
5.9.3. Slow response of engine and rudder. It was argued in the report that Tasman
Spirit failed to provide the desired maximum revolution as per the pilot’s
requirements at the time of turning when the response to helm was found slower. In
this regard the report noted that, since for negotiating the bend the rudder was put to
hard over to port and remained in that position, there was a likelihood that an
increase in speed would be slower because of the drag effect which is common in
these circumstances, and this should have been realized by Captain Karystinos and
the pilot.
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5.9.4. Squat effect. It was noted in the report that Captain Karystinos overlooked the
squat effect, which considering the size of Tasman Spirit could have been in the
region of one meter (squat effect is the hydrodynamic phenomenon by which a ship
moving quickly through shallow water creates an area of lowered pressure that
causes the ship to be closer to the seabed than would otherwise be expected). It was
further argued that this squat effect in combination with the rolling and pinching of
the ship due to heavy swell which was experienced that day (which likely increased
the draft even more) Tasman Spirit was actually navigating with very unsafe level of
under keel clearance which could have been one of the reasons for the slow response
of the engine and rudder while negotiating the bend in the channel.
5.9.5 Prevalent weather conditions. It was acknowledged in the report that, besides
the elements of human error, prevalent weather conditions also played a key role in
the grounding of Tasman Spirit. It was noted that, in accordance with the weather
report obtained from the Pakistani Meteorological Department, an unusual
phenomenon of gusty winds from the South East to East were blowing on the day of
the accident and the state of the sea was reported to be moderate to rough and
occasionally very rough. However, as per statements of Captain Karystinos and the
pilot, the swell continued to be South Westerly. Thus, it is very likely that Tasman
Spirit was caught up with wind blowing from her starboard side whereas the swell
was hitting her on the port. This phenomenon, coupled with an ebb tide, were the
apparent factors preventing the ship from turning as desired.
5.9.6. Ship’s failure to maintain its position in the middle of the channel and its drift
towards eastern extremity. It was noted in the report that the factors mentioned above
resulted in the ship’s drift from the centre of the channel towards its eastern edge.
5.9.7. Unusual siltation. It was noted in the report that the position where Tasman
Spirit grounded is an area which is prone to siltation, and this siltation can be well
imagined because of a bend in the channel.731
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Grounding of M.T. Tasman Spirit Inquiry Report Under Section 470 and 471 of Pakistan Merchant
Shipping Ordinance, 2001, 22 October 2003 at pp. 12-21.
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5.10. Also after the preliminary inquiry report into the accident was released the
“Karachi Eight” remained under house/hotel arrest.
5.11. On 5 January 2004 the third engineer of Tasman Spirit – George Koutsos –
attempted to commit suicide. Mr. Koutsos tried to slit his neck and arm muscles with
sharp pieces of broken glass in his hotel room. He was rushed to hospital with
extensive bleeding. Captain Karystinos as well as the son of Mr. Koutsos later said
that Mr. Koutsos was suffering chronic home sickness, exacerbated when other
detainees were joined by their families over the Christmas period, while his family
members were not able to visit him. The grown-up son of Mr. Koutsos joined him
after the suicide attempt.732
5.12. Under Section 325 of Pakistan Penal Code an attempt to commit suicide is a
criminal offence. Consequently, the charge of an attempt to commit suicide was
added to the charges against Third Engineer Koutsos.733
5.13. On 23 February the Ministry of Communications report leaked to the press,
blaming Captain Karystinos for causing the accident.734
5.14. On 26 March the new Minister of Communications signalled a U-turn, saying
he will treat the case sympathetically. He appointed a powerful review committee to
decide the fate of the “Karachi Eight”. The Committee was headed by the city’s
dominant political force, the MQM party, the dynamic parliamentary leader Farooq
Sattar.735
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5.15. Pakistan was under constant international pressure to release the “Karachi
Eight”. Several bodies intervened directly, for example, the IMO and EU, the Greek
Foreign Ministry and the Union of Greek Shipowners. In addition to the direct
interventions in support of the “Karachi Eight”, many commentators expressed
severe critique towards Pakistan for holding the “Karachi Eight”. Some of the
commentators even labelled the deprivation of liberty of the “Karachi Eight” as
hostage-taking.736
5.16. On 17 April, literally hours before the scheduled Karachi magistrate’s court
hearing on the issue, the above-mentioned (in paragraph 5.14) committee
recommended the release of the “Karachi Eight”. Consequently, the court released
travel documents of the “Karachi Eight”, thus allowing them to return home. It has
been argued that it was done in return for specific benefits to Pakistan, such as Greek
support for Pakistan in the upcoming voting at the European Parliament regarding
the adoption of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.737
6.4.2. Analysis
Violation of the right to liberty: deprivation of liberty without convincingly
demonstrating its justification
In the Tasman Spirit case, 7 crew members of Tasman Spirit and Salvage Master
Pappas were deprived of their liberty by Pakistani authorities for over 8 and over 7
months, respectively. First, they were put on the Exit Control List, then detained and
then put under house/hotel arrest (see paragraphs 5.2-5.5 and 5.16 above). Yet,
justification for the deprivation of liberty of the “Karachi Eight” was never
convincingly demonstrated, even after several requests and reminders. Pakistani
736
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authorities gave only very general public announcements in this regard, such as that
the men would be held until an inquiry was held (see paragraphs 5.3 and 5.6 above).
Was the justification for the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer convincingly demonstrated by the authorities?

No

X
Violation

Yes
Violation of the right to liberty: deprivation of liberty without existence of
recognised ground
The facts of the Tasman Spirit case point towards the conclusion that the real
reason for the deprivation of liberty of the “Karachi Eight” was to secure the best
possible deal with related third parties regarding civil claims (see paragraph 5.8
above). Yet, civil claims are not recognised ground for the deprivation of liberty of a
person.
The fact that at one point in time the “Karachi Eight” were released from
their detention and put under house/hotel arrest upon securing bail (see paragraph 5.5
above) as well as the content of general public announcements of the Pakistani
authorities about deprivation of liberty of the “Karachi Eight” (see paragraph 5.6
above) point towards the conclusion that the formal ground for the deprivation of
liberty was the danger of absconding. However, for the deprivation of liberty on the
ground of danger of absconding to be justified, first of all, there must be reasonable
suspicion that the person deprived of liberty has committed the crime. The possibility
there existed reasonable suspicion that the “Karachi Eight” committed the crime is
analysed below.
Captain Karystinos
Conclusions in the preliminary inquiry report into the accident suggested that there
could be reasonable suspicion that the accident was caused by reckless or negligent
conduct of Captain Karystinos (see paragraphs 5.9.1-5.9.4 and 5.9.6-5.9.7 above).
Yet, this suspicion could not be great, because Tasman Spirit grounded, although not
in the middle, but still, within the limits of the channel which in accordance with the
official data was deep enough for the ship to pass (see paragraphs 3.4, 3.8 and 3.9
above). In such a case, the decision to proceed through the channel, despite
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information suggesting that in some places the channel might not be as deep as
officially claimed, still seems to be within the limits of justified professional risk and,
thus, not a reckless or negligent decision.
Chief Officer Meimetis, Third Officer Jamero, AB Flores, Chief Engineer Valsamos,
Second Engineer Manongsang and Third Engineer Koutsos
There could not be reasonable suspicion that the accident was caused by Mr.
Valsamos, Mr. Manongsang and Mr. Koutsos (engineers of Tasman Spirit), because
engineers are not responsible for navigating a ship. Also Mr. Meimetis, Mr. Jamero
and Mr. Flores could not be reasonably suspected for causing the accident, because
they also acted under the command of Captain Karystinos (master of the ship).
Salvage Master Pappas
There could also not be reasonable suspicion that the accident was caused by Salvage
Master Pappas, because salvage operations were taken over by him only on 23
August 2003, when the structure of Tasman Spirit had already collapsed and further
break up and release of oil were irreversible (see paragraphs 3.15-3.18 above).
Was the detention of the seafarer necessary measure either for
securing fulfilment of the legal obligation or for securing nonabsconding or for securing that the seafarer would not take
action to obstruct the proceedings?

No

X
Violation

Yes

Violation of the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal
The facts of the Tasman Spirit case point towards the conclusion that the decisions in
regards to the deprivation of liberty of the “Karachi Eight” first and foremost were
made politically and, only afterwards, just formally, by judicial bodies (see
paragraphs 5.13, 5.14 and 5.16 above). It indicates that the rights of the “Karachi
Eight” to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal were violated.
Was there justified basis for suspicion that the judge
adjudicating the seafarers’ case was bias in some way (for
example, that he in practice was in a subordinate relationship to
some other organ of the state)?

No
Yes

X
Violation
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6.5. Collision of HEBEI SPIRIT and SAMSUNG NO.1
6.5.1. Facts
1. Ships involved in the accident
1.1. Hebei Spirit – 269,605 dwt (146,848 GT) VLCC: registered in Hong Kong
(China); owned by Hebei Spirit Shipping Company (Hong Kong, China); operated
by V-Ships (Isle of Man, United Kingdom).
1.2. Samsung No.1 – 11,828-ton ocean crane barge: registered in South Korea;
owned and operated by Samsung Corporation and its subsidiary Samsung Heavy
Industries, which belong to the Samsung Group (South Korea).
1.3. Samsung T-5 – 311-ton tug owned and operated by Samsung Corporation and its
subsidiary Samsung Heavy Industries, which belong to the Samsung Group (South
Korea).
1.4. Samho T-3 – 182-ton tug owned and operated by Samsung Corporation and its
subsidiary Samsung Heavy Industries, which belong to the Samsung Group (South
Korea).
1.5. Samsung A-1: an around 89-ton anchor boat owned and operated by Samsung
Corporation and its subsidiary Samsung Heavy Industries, which belong to the
Samsung Group (South Korea).738
2. Seafarers and others alleged to be guilty of causing the accident
2.1. Captain Jasprit Singh Chawla – Indian master of Hebei Spirit.
2.2. Shyam Chetan – Indian chief officer of Hebei Spirit.
2.3. Masters of Samsung No.1, Samsung T-5 and Samho T-3.
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2.4. Hebei Spirit Shipping Company – the owner of Hebei Spirit.
2.5. Samsung Heavy Industries – the owner and operator of Samsung No.1, Samsung
T-5, Samho T-3 and Samsung A-1.739
3. Collision and events before and after it
3.1. On 26 November 2007, prior to proceeding to the works occurring at the
Incheon Grand Bridge construction site (Incheon, South Korea), a towing capability
inspection of the towing convoy consisting of Samsung No.1, Samsung T-5, Samho
T-3 and Samsung A-1 was carried out in Busan (South Korea). Among other
conditions the inspection recommended that the towing convoy was not to depart if
winds were in excess of Beaufort scale force 5.740
3.2. On 6 December 2007, when the towing convoy was already about to depart from
the Incheon Grand Bridge construction site to head south for Samsung Heavy
Industries at Gohyun port in Geoje (South Korea), the master of Samsung T-5
(person in charge for the planned towing voyage) received an adverse weather
forecast. It was anticipated that during the planned towing voyage wind would
amount to Beaufort scale force 6 to 7 and particularly poor weather would be
occurring in the waters around Daesan (South Korea) in the early morning of 7
December. Yet, the master of Samsung T-5 considered that the forecasted weather
would not affect the voyage, because at the time of departure the wind did not reach
Beaufort scale force 5 and the strong winds forecast was for the sea areas of 20 miles
from the coast, while the towing convoy was planned to navigate only 10 miles away
from the coast. Consequently, at around 14:50 the towing voyage was commenced.
Samsung No.1 was towed stern first by Samsung T-5 and Samho T-3. Samsung A-1
was escorting at the other end of the barge.741
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3.3. Meanwhile, in the afternoon of 6 December, Hebei Spirit arrived at Daesan with
263,541 tonnes of cargo on board.742
3.4. At 17:18 Daesan VTS informed Hebei Spirit to proceed to the assigned
anchorage off Daesan. At 19:18 Hebei Spirit anchored at a position instructed by
VTS. Then, VTS informed Hebei Spirit that the pilot would be boarding the next day
(i.e. 7 December) at 14:00 to take the ship to the port. Captain Chawla informed the
chief engineer accordingly and then left the bridge leaving the third officer and AB
on anchor-watch on the bridge. Later, Captain Chawla still made several brief visits
to the bridge with the last visit at 21:15. The Captain also wrote the night orders that
the watch-keeping officers should follow the company anchor watch standing orders
and call the Captain if they had any concerns or required his attendance.743
3.5. In the early morning of 7 December, as the weather deteriorated, tugs towing
Samsung No.1 started to lose their control over the barge. The whole towing convoy
was moving in a zigzag direction, deviating from the intended course. At around 4:44
the course of the towing convoy was changed to a northern direction, with the aim to
find shelter back in Incheon. However, this manoeuvre was not successful. Even
after changing the course, the towing convoy drifted further south.744
3.6. Despite the fact that the towing convoy was out of control, the master of
Samsung T-5 did not inform about it VTS or ships in the vicinity.745
3.7. At around 5:20, VTS observed the zigzag track of the towing convoy and tried to
reach it on VHF for clarification. There was no response from the towing convoy.746
3.8. At around 5:50, the master of Samho T-3 observed a huge target on the radar
suggesting a risk of collision. This target was Hebei Spirit.747
742
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3.9. At around 6:05, the chief officer of Hebei Spirit, Mr. Chetan, called Captain
Chawla to the bridge telling him that a towing convoy was causing concern. The
barge was shaping up to pass only 0.15 nautical miles (i.e. less than 300 m) ahead of
the bow of Hebei Spirit.748
3.10. At around 6:06 Captain Chawla arrived on the bridge. He, first, sounded more
than 5 blasts in quick succession on the forward whistle, checked the radars to see
how far away the towing convoy actually was, and then, at 6:09, called VTS
informing it that the convoy was fast approaching from a distance of 0.8 nautical
miles (i.e. less than 1,5 km) ahead.749
3.11. VTS told Hebei Spirit that the towing convoy would have difficulty controlling
its manoeuvring due to rough weather. It further requested Hebei Spirit to take some
measures to cope with the situation. In reply, Captain Chawla informed that he was
preparing to use the anchor and the engine.750
3.12. At 6:14 Captain Chawla instructed the deck cadet to call the towing convoy on
VHF radio, ask it what its intentions were and ask it to keep clear of Hebei Spirit, but
the towing convoy did not reply.751
3.13. As the towing convoy did not reply, Captain Chawla told the deck cadet to
inform VTS that the towing convoy would be passing very close to Hebei Spirit. In
reply, VTS told Hebei Spirit to stand-by.752
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3.14. Meanwhile, Captain Chawla ordered the chief engineer to get the engine ready
for manoeuvring as quickly as possible. Chief Officer Chetan and AB were ordered
to go to forecastle to check the anchor. Upon receiving the information that the
anchor cable was almost in an up and down direction, Captain Chawla ordered to
give the engine a kick astern, to get the ship moving astern. At 6:17 engine was put
to a dead slow astern.753
3.15. Around the same time, at 6:17, the first communication with the towing convoy
was established. VTS managed to contact Samsung T-5 via mobile phone.754
3.16. After the conversation, at 6:22, VTS notified Hebei Spirit to heave the anchor
to avoid collision with Samsung No.1. At that time, Samsung No.1 was already
approaching at only 0.3 nautical miles (i.e. around 500 m) from the bow of Hebei
Spirit, and Hebei Spirit had already paid out 9 shackles (i.e. 247 m) of its anchor
chain. For a ship like Hebei Spirit it would take at least 30 minutes to heave up the 9
shackles of cable from the water. Consequently, there was no time to raise the
anchor. Furthermore, if the anchor was heaved, Hebei Spirit would get closer to
Samsung No.1 and thus increase the chance of collision. Captain Chawla clarified the
situation to VTS and, instead of heaving up the anchor, continued to give astern
engine movement and slacken the anchor cable to increase the passing distance.755
3.17. At 6:32 Samsung No.1 uneventfully passed ahead of Hebei Spirit from the
starboard to the port side. The distance between Hebei Spirit and Samsung No.1
slowly started to increase.756
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3.18. After passing, the tugs towing Samsung No.1 increased the engine power,
probably in an attempt to clear from Hebei Spirit. However, at around 6:51 the tow
line connecting Samsung No.1 and Samsung T-5 broke. As a result Samsung No.1
began drifting back towards Hebei Spirit.757
3.19. At 6:52 VTS contacted Hebei Spirit again asking her to pick up the anchor and
move immediately to another safe place. Hebei Spirit reinstated the position that it
would be difficult to raise anchor at such moment as the crane barge was still
crossing ahead.758
3.20. Captain Chawla continued to watch. As Samsung No.1 continued to move
towards Hebei Spirit, at 6:57 the engine of Hebei Spirit was put to dead slow astern
again, followed quickly by slow astern and half astern. At 6:58 Captain Chawla
ordered Chief Officer Chetan to slip the anchor cable. However, a short while later
Mr. Chetan reported that he was having difficulty hammering out the securing pin.759
3.21. From the side of the towing convoy, as the tow wire parted, the master of
Samsung T-5 notified Samsung No.1 about it. The master of Samsung No.1 ordered
his crew to drop the anchor to avoid the collision and requested Samho T-3 to pull
them away from the drifting path. However, it did not help the situation. Due to the
rough weather, the barge continued to drift towards Hebei Spirit.760
3.22. Just after 7:00 Samsung No.1 was already almost upon the port forward of
Hebei Spirit and the crane jibs and hooks were swinging dangerously close above the
forecastle deck. The anchor party quickly left the forecastle. With collision
imminent, Captain Chawla sounded the general alarm.761
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3.23. At around 7:06 Samsung No.1 struck the port side of Hebei Spirit, rupturing
one of the cargo tanks. The crane hooks damaged the foremast of the ship. Just after,
the barge made two more contacts with Hebei Spirit, rupturing two more cargo
tanks.762
3.24. At 7:16 VTS asked Hebei Spirit if they could extend the anchor chain to the
maximum and continued to move astern. Hebei Spirit replied that they had already
done that.763
3.25. At 7:19 Hebei Spirit requested VTS to send a few tugs to help the situation. In
reply VTS said it would be difficult for them to do so because the location was too
far away from their base.764
3.26. At 7:21 the engine of Hebei Spirit was put dead slow ahead and rudder hard to
port to swing away from Samsung No.1. As Samsung No.1 passed clear astern,
Captain Chawla received reports of oil leaking into the sea from the damaged cargo
tanks.765
3.27. At 7:28 Captain Chawla reported the pollution to VTS. At 7:30 he broadcasted
a navigational warning on VHF radio.766
3.28. Thereafter, Captain Chawla gave instructions to carry out ullage and sounding
check of all cargo tanks, ballast tanks, void spaces and the engine room to make sure
there were no leaks other than the ones already identified. This operation was
accomplished at around 9:45.767

762

Marine Accident Investigation Section of the Marine Department of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Report of Investigation into the Collision Between the Hong Kong Registered
Ship “Hebei Spirit” and Korean Crane Barge “Samsung No.1” on 7 December 2007, 10 February
2009, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, 4.1.18, 4.3.4, 6.1, 6.2 and Appendix 1.
763
Hong Kong Report, ibid., paragraph 4.3.4 and Appendix 1.
764
Hong Kong Report, ibid., paragraph 4.3.4 and Appendix 1.
765
Hong Kong Report, ibid., paragraphs 4.1.19, 4.1.20 and Appendix 1.
766
Hong Kong Report, ibid., paragraphs 4.1.20, 4.3.4 and Appendix 1.
767
Hong Kong Report, ibid., paragraph 4.1.21; Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal, Marine Pollution
Accident from the Collision Between Crane Barge Samsung No.1 Towed by Tugboats Samsung T-5
and Samho T-3, and Oil Tanker Hebei Spirit, paragraph 3.2.4.

314

3.29. Meanwhile, at 9:38, an officer from the Korean Coast Guard was winched
down to Hebei Spirit by a helicopter. After consulting with this officer, collision
mats were installed at the damaged areas.768
3.30. Captain Chawla was concerned about the risk of an explosion. Therefore, at
around 10:00, inert gas was blown into all cargo oil tanks, including those leaking
oil.769
3.31. From 10:35 cargo transfer was started – oil from the ruptured port tanks were
transferred into centre and starboard tanks (although, the possibilities for this action
were limited, as Hebei Spirit was almost fully laden). This operation was
accomplished at 11:45.770
3.32. In between, from 11:15, ballasting into starboard side ballast tanks was also
started to list the ship to starboard and thus lower the oil level in the damaged port
tanks.771
3.33. Despite all the response measures taken, the spill continued. It stopped only in
the late evening on 8 December.772
4. Consequences
4.1. In total, approximately 11,000 tonnes of oil was spilled as a result of the
accident.773
4.2. Oil began coming on shore late in the night on 7 December. Ultimately, over 300
km of shoreline was affected. The spill affected aquaculture, fishing, recreational
beaches, national marine park ecology and migratory bird habitats.774
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5. Criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers
5.1. In January 2008 the Public Prosecutor of the Seosan Branch of Daejeon District
Court charged Captain Chawla and Chief Officer Chetan (hereinafter – “Hebei
Two”) of destruction of property (Hebei Spirit herself) and violation of marine
pollution laws. Two officers were particularly blamed for not weighing the anchor
and giving the way to Samsung No.1. Masters of Samsung No.1, Samsung T-5 and
Samho T-3 were also charged.775
5.2. Masters of Samsung T-5 and Samho T-3 were detained. The “Hebei Two” were
not detained, but they were not permitted to leave South Korea.776
5.3. On 23 June 2008 the Seosan Branch of Daejeon District Court delivered its
judgement in the case. The court found that the cause of the accident was the secondhand tow and that there was insufficient reason for Hebei Spirit to have weighed
anchor and moved the ship. Consequently:
5.3.1. master of the tug Samsung T-5 was sentenced to three years imprisonment and
a fine of KRW 2 million;
5.3.2. master of the tug Samho T-3 was sentenced to one year imprisonment;
5.3.3. Samsung Heavy Industries was sentenced to a fine of KRW 30 million;
5.3.4. master of the crane barge Samsung No.1 was found not guilty;
5.3.5. also the “Hebei Two” were found not guilty.777
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5.4. The public prosecutor and Samsung Heavy Industries appealed against this
judgement to the Criminal Court of Appeal (Daejeon Court). Consequently another
trial was expected. Pending this trial, the “Hebei Two” still were not allowed to leave
the country.778
5.5. Legal attempt was made to get the court to lift the departure ban. Monetary and
other guarantees for the return of the “Hebei Two” to South Korea and presence in
court as and when required were offered. By mid-August this legal attempt had
failed.779
5.6. In September 2008 the initial report of the technical investigation of the accident
(the investigation purely into the causes of the accident) was delivered by the
Incheon District Maritime Safety Tribunal. This report, inter alia, stated that the
“Hebei Two” were also partly responsible for the collision.780
5.7. Samsung Heavy Industries, the masters of the tugs and the “Hebei Two” all
appealed against the decision of the Incheon District Maritime Safety Tribunal to the
Korea Central Maritime Safety Tribunal.781
5.8. In December 2008 the Central Maritime Safety Tribunal delivered its decision.
The decision was similar to that of the Incheon District Maritime Safety Tribunal.782
The following causes of the collision and consequent pollution, inter alia, were
indicated in the decision:
5.8.1. towing fleet’s lack of towing ability in the adverse weather conditions;
5.8.2. towing fleet’s failure to take shelter timely;
5.8.3. towing fleet’s failure to notify others about its emergency situation;
5.8.4. towing fleet’s lookout negligence;
5.8.5. Samsung No.1’s failure to anchor at an early stage;
5.8.6. Hebei Spirit’s inappropriate anchor watch;
778
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5.8.7. Hebei Spirit’s failure to maintain readiness of the main engine;
5.8.8. Hebei Spirit’s inappropriate actions to avoid the collision, particularly, failure
to drag the anchor by using the main engine;
5.8.9. Hebei Spirit’s inappropriate actions to prevent large-scale pollution,
particularly, failure to build up optimal conditions to prevent additional oil leakage,
for example, it was argued in the report that the oil leakage areas were blocked and
cargo transfer operations were started too late (only around 3 hours after the
accident) and blowing of inert gas into the damaged tanks, which accelerated the
spill, was not necessary.783
5.9. On 10 December 2008, the Criminal Court of Appeal (Daejeon Court) rendered
its judgement in the case. This judgment largely accorded with the decision of the
Central Maritime Safety Tribunal. The Court:
5.9.1. reduced the sentence against the masters of the two tugs;
5.9.2. overturned the non-guilty judgement for the master of crane barge Samsung
No.1 and imposed on him a 30-month prison sentence along with a KRW 2 million
fine;
5.9.3. overturned the non-guilty judgement for the “Hebei Two” and imposed an 18month prison sentence along with a KRW 20 million fine on the master and an 8month prison sentence along with a KRW 10 million fine on the chief officer;
5.9.4. sentenced the owner of Hebei Spirit – Hebei Spirit Shipping Company – to a
fine of KRW 30 million.784
5.10. The appeal court also considered the “Hebei Two” to be a “flight risk” and
therefore ordered them both to be arrested and taken straight to prison.785
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5.11. When taken out of the court, the “Hebei Two” were handcuffed and paraded
like common criminals to the public.786
5.12. During the detention in prison the “Hebei Two” were held in tiny (barely larger
than a single bed), filthy, freezing individual cells with a hole in the floor for a toilet.
They were let out for one hour a day. Very limited visits were allowed. Captain
Chawla, a Sikh, had his long turban and Kada removed. Furthermore, prison
authorities refused to provide the Captain with food appropriate for his religion
(vegetarian food), thus forcing him to survive just on rice and water. Later detainees
were transferred to the Cheongju Detention Centre. There was heating and also other
conditions were slightly better.787
5.13. Hebei Spirit interests appealed the judgement of the Criminal Court of Appeal
to the Supreme Court.788
5.14. There were significant protests at the conviction and following detention of the
“Hebei Two”. On 14 January 2009 shipping industry bodies announced a major
protest rally to take place at the South Korean Embassy in London on 23 January.789
5.15. Just one day after, on 15 January, the Supreme Court released the “Hebei Two”
on bail pending their appeal. However, the “Hebei Two” were still not allowed to
leave South Korea. Under the conditions of bail, they were obliged to stay under
house arrest at a hotel in Seoul. The Supreme Court said that it took into account
international opinion when replacing the detention with house/hotel arrest.790
5.16. Taking into account the decision of the Supreme Court to release the “Hebei
Two” from detention, it was decided to cancel the previously planned protest rally in
London.791
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5.17. In April 2009, the Supreme Court:
5.17.1. upheld the decision to imprison the master of tug Samsung T-5;
5.17.2. upheld the decision to imprison the master of crane barge Samsung No.1;
5.17.3. confirmed the fines imposed by the Court of Appeal;
5.17.4. cleared the “Hebei Two” from the property destruction charges (charges
giving rise to jail sentences). Also the Court of Appeal’s decision to detain the
“Hebei Two” was annulled. However, officers were not fully exonerated – the
charges of causing pollution and the associated fines were not annulled;
5.17.5. referred the whole case back to the Criminal Court of Appeal (Daejeon
Court) for re-examination.792
5.18. The final hearing by the Criminal Court of Appeal (Daejeon Court) was held on
26 May 2009. On 11 June 2009 judgment from this hearing was released. The case
was dismissed. On this day (after 550 days being deprived of their liberty) the “Hebei
Two” left South Korea.793
6.5.2. Analysis
Violation of the right to liberty: deprivation of liberty without existence of
recognised ground
Just after the Hebei Spirit accident the “Hebei Two” were not detained, yet, to
prevent absconding, they were not permitted to leave South Korea (see paragraph 5.2
above). On 23 June 2008 the Court of First Instance found the “Hebei Two” not
guilty for the accident (see paragraph 5.3 above). With such judgment delivered,
inter alia, suspicion that the “Hebei Two” had committed the crime diminished
considerably. Consequently, the risk of absconding of “Hebei Two” also diminished.
Nevertheless, pending the appeal trial, the “Hebei Two” were still not allowed to
leave South Korea, even after relevant monetary and other guarantees were offered
for their return and presence in court as and when required (see paragraphs 5.4 and
792
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5.5 above). It can be argued that at least at this point in time deprivation of liberty of
the “Hebei Two” became unnecessary, or at least disproportionate, measure.
Was the deprivation of liberty of the seafarer (ban to leave
country after acquittal by the Court of First Instance)
proportional measure for securing non-absconding?

No

X
Violation

Yes

On 10 December 2008 the Court of Second Instance found the “Hebei Two”
guilty for the accident and, inter alia, imposed prison sentences on both seafarers
(see paragraph 5.9.3 above). These sentences were not immediately enforceable,
because the judgment of the Court of Second Instance was also not yet final.
However, the “Hebei Two” were detained and taken to prison immediately after the
judgment was delivered, because the court considered both seafarers to be a “flight
risk” (see paragraph 5.10 above). It is highly doubtful that such severe measure as
detention was necessary measure in the circumstances in question. In fact, later
actions of the South Korean courts themselves indicate that the detention was not
necessary; on 15 January 2009, taking into consideration international opinion, the
South Korean Supreme Court replaced the detention with the house/hotel arrest (see
paragraph 5.15 above). If such replacement was possible under the pressure of
international opinion, one must admit that it was also possible earlier, without such
pressure. Or, it must be concluded that the South Korean Supreme Court is not an
independent and impartial court; that under the pressure of third parties (in our case,
“international opinion”) it makes decisions which in the court’s own opinion are
inadequate.
Was the deprivation of liberty of the seafarer (detention after
conviction by the Court of Second Instance) necessary measure
for securing non-absconding?

No
Yes

X
Violation
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Violation of the right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment
In the Hebei Spirit case, after the Court of Second Instance found the “Hebei Two”
guilty for causing the accident, both seafarers were detained and, when taken out of
court, they were paraded like common criminals to the public (see paragraph 5.11
above). During the detention the “Hebei Two” were held in tiny, filthy, freezing
individual cells with a hole in the floor for a toilet. Very limited visits were allowed.
Captain Chawla, a Sikh, had his long turban and Kada removed. Furthermore, prison
authorities refused to provide the Captain with food appropriate for his religion, thus
forcing him to survive just on rice and water (see paragraph 5.12 above). Such
treatment can be considered at least degrading.
When the seafarer was removed to or from the institution, was
he exposed to public view as little as possible, and were proper
safeguards adopted to protect the seafarer from insult, curiosity
and publicity in any form?

No

X
Violation

Yes

Did the accommodation provided for the use of the detained seafarer meet
requirements of health?
Space
No
X
Violation
Heating

No

Sanitary installations

Yes
No

X
Violation
X
Violation

Yes
Was the seafarer during his detention allowed to communicate
with his family and reputable friends at regular intervals, both
by correspondence and by receiving visits?

No

Were the religious beliefs and moral precepts of the seafarer
respected during his detention?

No

X
Violation

Yes

Yes

X
Violation
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Violation of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment: the
principle that a person may not be held liable for a particular crime if all elements of
this crime are not present or proven beyond a reasonable doubt
In the Hebei Spirit case, the “Hebei Two” were charged and later found guilty of
destruction of property (Hebei Spirit herself) and violation of marine pollution laws.
Masters of Samsung No.1, Samsung T-5 and Samho T-3 were also charged and later
found guilty of causing the accident (see paragraphs 5.1, 5.3, 5.9 and 5.17 above).
Presence of the elements of the alleged crimes in the conduct of the particular
seafarers is analysed below.
Captain Chawla
Captain Chawla took appropriate measures to overcome the first collision risk
situation (the situation when the towing convoy was approaching and shaping to pass
very close ahead of Hebei Spirit): he arrived to the bridge immediately after the
Chief Officer called him there (see paragraphs 3.9 and 3.10 above), evaluated the
situation, sounded blasts on the forward whistle (see paragraph 3.10 above), called
the towing convoy (see paragraph 3.12 above) and cooperated with VTS (see
paragraphs 3.10, 3.11, 3.13 and 3.16 above). The only VTS order which was not
followed in the first collision risk situation was the order at around 6:22 to heave up
the anchor. This order was not followed due to safety reasons (see paragraph 3.16
above). Consequently, particular disobedience was justified.
Similarly, Captain Chawla took appropriate measures to overcome the second
collision risk situation (the situation when the tow line connecting Samsung No.1 and
Samsung T-5 broke and tugs lost control of the barge): he moved Hebei Spirit astern
as much as possible and then made the decision to slip the anchor cable (see
paragraph 3.20 above). It was argued that, instead, Captain Chawla needed to drag
the anchor (see paragraph 5.8.8 above). However, the failure to make the decision to
drag the anchor can be considered as a criminally punishable (grossly negligent)
omission only if in the circumstances in question it was easy to make such a
decision. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that, first of all, the decision needed
to be made in the state of emergency; thus, very quickly. Secondly, dragging of the
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anchor was not the only, obvious, action to take; the measure actually attempted
(slipping of the anchor cable) was similarly adequate.
Also after the collision Captain Chawla acted adequately: he swung Hebei
Spirit away from Samsung No.1, reported to VTS, broadcasted a navigational
warning, carried out ullage and sounding checks, installed collision mats at the
damaged areas, blew inert gas into all cargo tanks, transferred oil from the ruptured
tanks into other tanks and, with the help of ballast water, listed the ship to starboard
to lower the oil level in the damaged port tanks (see paragraphs 3.27-3.32 above). It
was argued that the oil leakage areas were blocked and cargo transfer operations
were started too late and the blowing of inert gas into the damaged tanks, which
accelerated the spill, was not necessary (see paragraph 5.8.9 above). In the opinion of
this author, there is some basis for the allegation that the oil leakage areas were
blocked and cargo transfer operations were started too late. Yet, it is highly doubtful
that there is a casual link between the respective omissions and large-scale pollution
which occurred. Even if respective measures were taken earlier, it would not have
reduced the scale of pollution significantly, particularly, because Hebei Spirit was
almost fully laden (see paragraph 3.31 above). The decision to blow inert gas into the
damaged tanks was made because the Captain was concerned about the risk of
explosion, and consequently even bigger harm (see paragraph 3.30 above). The
respective decision was not manifestly ill-founded, even if the risk of explosion was
actually relatively low.
Chief Officer Chetan
Chief Officer Chetan also took proper measures to overcome the first
collision risk situation: he called the Captain to the bridge (see paragraph 3.9 above)
and then followed his order to go to the forecastle to check the anchor (see paragraph
3.14 above). It was argued that the Chief Officer was not carrying out proper anchor
watch and, consequently, identified the collision risk situation and called the Captain
to the bridge too late (see paragraph 5.8.6 above). However, even if it is true, there is
no causal link between this belated action and collision, because the first collision
risk situation was successfully overcome – Samsung No.1 uneventfully passed ahead
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of Hebei Spirit and the distance between Hebei Spirit and the barge started to
increase (see paragraph 3.17 above). When Chief Officer Chetan called the Captain
to the bridge, he could not be expected to predict that after averting the first collision
risk situation, the second collision risk situation would occur.
In the second collision risk situation Chief Officer Chetan acted fully under
command of the Captain. He complied with all orders: tried to slip the anchor cable
(see paragraph 3.20 above), returned aft when collision was already imminent (see
paragraph 3.22 above) and, after the collision, together with other crew, implemented
response measures (see paragraphs 3.27-3.32 above).
Masters of Samsung No.1 and Samho T-3
The person in charge of the towing voyage was the master of the tug Samsung T-5
(see paragraph 3.2 above). Consequently, he, not the masters of Samsung No.1 and
Samho T-3, was responsible for all decisions taken in regards to the towing voyage.
Furthermore, in the situation when the risk of collision with Hebei Spirit grew
rapidly – when the tow line connecting Samsung No.1 and Samsung T-5 broke and
the tugs lost control of the barge – the masters of Samsung No.1 and Samho T-3 took
appropriate steps to try to avoid the collision. Samsung No.1 dropped the anchor and
requested Samho T-3 to pull the barge away from the drifting path. Samho T-3 tried
to do so (see paragraph 3.21 above).
Was the conduct of the seafarer factual and legal (proximate)
cause of the harm?

No

X
Violation

Yes
Did the seafarer do the conduct intentionally, recklessly or with
gross negligence?

No
Yes

X
Violation
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Violation of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment:
disproportionate punishment
In the Hebei Spirit case, the Court of Second Instance imposed: an 18-month prison
sentence along with a KRW 20 million fine on Captain Chawla, an 8-month prison
sentence along with a KRW 10 million fine on Chief Officer Chetan and a 30-month
prison sentence along with a KRW 2 million fine on the master of Samsung No.1
(see paragraph 5.9 above). Even if to agree that, in principle, the “Hebei Two” and
the master of Samsung No.1 could be held liable for causing the accident, due to the
facts already described in the previous section, there is no basis to argue that the
conduct of the above-mentioned seafarers was so blameworthy as to require the
imposition of such a severe penalty as imprisonment. It should be reminded here,
though, that the Supreme Court later cleared “Hebei Two” from the charges giving
rise to jail sentences (property destruction charges) (see paragraph 5.17.4 above).
Did the sanction imposed upon the seafarer fit the offence?

No
Yes

X
Violation
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7. IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers
7.1. Introduction
The case study incorporated in the previous chapter of this dissertation proves
that the concerns of the international maritime community about the unfair
application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers in the aftermath of
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are well-grounded; as in relation to all
four analysed cases certain derogations from human rights were identified.
Consequently, there is a need for instruments capable of bringing considerable
positive change into practice. The international maritime community sees IMO/ILO
Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers (hereinafter in this chapter – the
Guidelines) as such an instrument, even despite the fact that the Guidelines are only
“soft law”. Such a conclusion can be made from the facts that: calls are made
repeatedly for the implementation and promulgation of the Guidelines,794 surveys are
carried out for understanding how effectively the Guidelines are actually
implemented in particular states and recommendations are given on how to improve
the respective implementation. For example, ITF and IFSMA, in co-operation with
CMI and SRI, have carried out a relevant survey and, as a result, have urged for:
IMO Member States already giving effect to the Guidelines to provide copies of their
relevant laws if approached by other Member States; and IMO Technical
Cooperation Committee to provide technical assistance to those Member States that
have requested assistance to give effect to the Guidelines, inter alia, to develop
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written guidance and training materials on the implementation of the Guidelines as
well as to host regional and/or national workshops on the issue.795
This chapter will analyse the Guidelines from the perspective of human rights
which are treated as a standard of fairness for the purposes of this dissertation with
the aim to find out to what extent, if any, the Guidelines are capable of enhancing
enjoyment of respective human rights and, thus, indeed, bring positive change into
practice.

7.2. Right to Liberty and the Guidelines
Paragraph 1 of the Guidelines states: “It is recommended that these
Guidelines be observed in all instances where seafarers may be detained by public
authorities in the event of a maritime accident”. Thus, the scope of the application of
the Guidelines is linked to seafarers’ potential detention. It indicates that the
safeguarding of the right to liberty of seafarers is one of the priorities of the
Guidelines. Paragraph 2, which defines the objective of the Guidelines, indicates the
same, as, similar to Paragraph 1, it refers directly to detention. Paragraph 2 states:
[...] The objective of these Guidelines is to ensure that seafarers are treated fairly following a
maritime accident and during any investigation and detention by public authorities and that
detention is for no longer than necessary.

The meaning of the term “detention” for the purposes of the Guidelines is
given in Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines:
“detention” means any restriction on the movement of seafarers by public authorities,
imposed as a result of a maritime accident, including preventing them leaving the territory of
a State other than the seafarer’s country of nationality or residence.

This meaning of the term “detention” under the Guidelines is similar to the meaning
of the term “deprivation of liberty” under the human rights instruments. However,
there is one difference. The notion of detention under the Guidelines excludes the
situations when a seafarer is precluded to leave the territory of a state a national or
795
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resident of which he is. The notion of deprivation of liberty under human rights
instruments does not set such a limitation, because the right to liberty is the right to
move wherever a person wants, including out of his own country. Paragraph 4 of the
Guidelines states that these Guidelines do not seek to interfere with the full
enjoyment of the basic rights of seafarers, including those provided by international
human rights instruments. Thus, the definition of the term “detention” within the
Guidelines does not conflict with human rights; it simply excludes the seafarers’
right to move out of his own country from the scope of the Guidelines. Yet, in the
opinion of this author, such exclusion is unjustified.
Paragraph 9.11 of the Guidelines recommends to the port or coastal State, in
the aftermath of a maritime accident, to use all available means to preserve evidence
to minimize the continuing need for the physical presence of any seafarer. In essence,
this Paragraph is merely a call to observe the certain aspect of the right to liberty,
namely, the prohibition of unreasonably long deprivation of liberty, as it was
introduced earlier in this dissertation. Thus, Paragraph 9.11 of the Guidelines has
little, if any, added value; if, in practice, states do not follow the respective
requirement, even despite the fact that they are obliged to do so under binding human
rights instruments, it is unlikely that they will start to follow the respective
requirement simply after an additional rhetorical reminder to do so; more substantial
encouragement is necessary.
Also Paragraphs 9.14, 9.15 and 9.18 of the Guidelines, in essence, are merely
a call to observe certain aspects of the right to liberty, here being, the prohibition of
unnecessary deprivation of liberty. Although, Paragraph 9.15 has slightly higher
added value; it explains to a port or coastal State that, when a seafarer in question is
employed in a regular shipping service to the port or coastal State in question, the
need to deprive this seafarer of liberty diminishes. The author believes that more of
such maritime-specific explanations in the Guidelines would have been appreciated
by law enforcement institutions and courts, which, in practice, need to make
sometimes difficult decisions whether or not under the circumstance in question it is
necessary to deprive a seafarer from liberty.
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Paragraphs 10.9, 11.4 and 12.5 of the Guidelines, in essence, urge the flag
State, the seafarer State and shipowners, respectively, to co-operate with the port or
coastal State which investigates the maritime accident, for example, by assisting in
the return to the investigating state of seafarers subject to their jurisdiction who are
witnesses in the case (Paragraphs 10.9 and 11.4) and by preserving evidence
(Paragraph 12.5). If the flag State, the seafarer State and shipowners follow the
above-mentioned recommendation to co-operate, the necessity to deprive a seafarer
of liberty in the aftermath of a maritime accident may diminish, because reliable
guarantees for the return of the seafarer to the investigating state, if and when
necessary, will be given, necessary evidence will be collected faster and alike.
Consequently, Paragraphs 10.9, 11.4 and 12.5 of the Guidelines have the potential to
enhance the enjoyment of the right to liberty by seafarers. However, in the opinion of
this author, the overall legal framework would have been clearer, and potential
practical benefits even greater, if there were more detailed guidelines on the issue –
the Guidelines on Penal Proceedings Which Involve Seafarers, inter alia, containing
relatively detailed legal norms on co-operation of relevant stakeholders.
Paragraph 10.11 of the Guidelines, inter alia, urges the flag State, in the case
when a port or coastal State which investigates a maritime accident does not
promptly release a crew member involved in the accident, upon the posting of a
reasonable bond or financial security, to utilise international dispute resolution
mechanisms. Obviously, utilization of these mechanisms may ultimately lead to the
release of a seafarer unfairly deprived of his liberty. However, here, it must be
recalled that, in the opinion of this author, the international dispute resolution
mechanism prescribed by Art. 292 of UNCLOS is not available to a flag State in
relation to the release of crews; it is available only in relation to the release of ships.
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7.3. Right to Be Free from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment and the Guidelines
Paragraph 5 of the Guidelines states: “Seafarers are entitled to protection
against coercion and intimidation from any source during or after any investigation
into a maritime accident”. Paragraph 9.4 of the Guidelines prescribes that the port or
coastal State should “ensure that seafarers are treated in a manner which preserves
their basic human dignity at all times”. These Paragraphs reflect the right to be free
from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Yet, again, they are
merely a call to observe the respective human right. Consequently, Paragraphs 5 and
9.4 of the Guidelines have little, if any, added value.
Paragraph 9.1 urges the port or coastal State “to take steps to ensure that
adequate measures are taken to preserve [...] the economic rights of detained
seafarers”. Paragraphs 9.5 and 10.5 urge the port or coastal State and the flag State,
respectively, to “ensure/verify that adequate provisions are in place to provide for the
subsistence of each detained seafarer, including, as appropriate, wages, suitable
accommodation, food and medical care”. Paragraph 9.10, inter alia, urges the port or
coastal State to ensure that all seafarers detained are provided with the means to
communicate privately with their family members. All these recommendations
reflect the certain aspects of the earlier discussed Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners. However, the Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners gives much wider and
detailed recommendations than the Guidelines. Consequently, in the opinion of this
author, for better protection of seafarers, the international maritime community could
join the overall efforts (for example, through human rights NGOs) to enhance the
enforcement of the Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, instead of including in the
Guidelines only a few declarative norms on the subject. Anyway, it is rather naive to
think that the treatment of seafarers deprived of their liberty can be considerably
improved without the gradual improvement of the treatment of persons deprived of
their liberty, in general.
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Paragraph 9.13 of the Guidelines prescribes the following:
promptly conduct interviews with seafarers, when done for a coastal State investigation
following a maritime accident, taking into consideration their physical and mental condition
resulting from the accident.

This author finds the respective Paragraph more helpful than the earlier-mentioned
Paragraphs 5, 9.1, 9.4, 9.5, 9.10 and 10.5, because, differently from the earliermentioned paragraphs, Paragraph 9.13 gives a maritime-specific explanation. The
explanation given is, basically, that a maritime accident is such an event which may
significantly impact the physical and psychological health of involved seafarers;
consequently, lengthy interviews of these seafarers, just after a maritime accident,
has the increased potential to constitute, at least, degrading treatment. This message
is worth being delivered by the maritime community to relevant law enforcement
officials and judges worldwide. Yet, arguably, better means than the Guidelines may
be found for delivering the respective message, for example, personal meetings with
relevant law enforcement officials and judges during which the realities of different
maritime accidents are explained to them, inter alia, with the help of memorable
visual aids, such as films and photos.
Paragraph 11.2 of the Guidelines urges the seafarer State to “monitor the
physical and mental well-being and treatment of seafarers of their nationality
involved in a maritime accident, including any associated investigations”. Obviously,
such a monitoring has potential to diminish ill-treatment of seafarers after maritime
accidents. Thus, the respective rule of the Guidelines has some added value.
Paragraph 12.7 of the Guidelines urges shipowners to “ensure/verify that
adequate provisions are in place to provide for the subsistence of each seafarer,
including, as appropriate, wages, suitable accommodation, food and medical care”.
This recommendation is almost identical to the one given to the port or coastal State
and the flag State in Paragraphs 9.5 and 10.5, respectively. The difference is that the
guideline to shipowners covers all seafarers, while the guideline to the port or coastal
State and flag State covers only detained seafarers. It indicates that the overall
responsibility for ensuring that adequate provisions are in place to provide for the
subsistence of seafarers is thought to be on shipowners, but, in the case of detention,
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also on the detaining State. The same can be concluded from Paragraph 6 of the
Guidelines, where, in a similar context, the shipowner is mentioned before the
detaining State. Paragraph 6 of the Guidelines reads as follows:
The investigation of a maritime accident should not prejudice the seafarer in terms of
repatriation, lodging, subsistence, payment of wages and other benefits and medical care.
These should be provided at no cost to the seafarer by the shipowner, the detaining State or
an appropriate State.

In the opinion of this author, though, responsibility of shipowners incorporated in
Paragraphs 6 and 12.7 of the Guidelines is so important that it must be a part of the
relevant “hard law”, namely, MLC.

7.4. Right to Be Free from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment
and the Guidelines
Paragraph 9.3 of the Guidelines urges the port or coastal State to observe
human rights in general, thus, also the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment. Paragraphs 9.12 and 9.20 of the Guidelines urge the port or
coastal State to observe particular legal norms of MARPOL and UNCLOS, including
the punishment-related legal norms. However, apart from these general calls to
follow certain “hard law”, the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment is not covered by the Guidelines.

7.5. Right to Fair Trial and the Guidelines
Paragraphs 9.1 and 10.1 of the Guidelines prescribe that the port or coastal
State and the flag State, respectively, should take steps to ensure that any
investigation to determine the cause of a maritime accident is conducted in a fair
manner. Paragraphs 9.6 and 9.16 prescribe that the port or coastal State should
ensure that due process protections are provided to all seafarers. Paragraphs 10.7,
11.6 and the introductory part of Paragraph 12 prescribe that the flag State, the
seafarer State and shipowners, respectively, should assist seafarers in securing their
fair treatment. The above-mentioned rules can be considered as general calls to
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observe or facilitate observance of the right to fair trial. Yet, again, such general calls
have little, if any, added value.
Several Paragraphs of the Guidelines can be linked to the right to be tried
without undue delay. All of these Paragraphs can be divided in two big groups:
1) general calls to observe the right to be tried without undue delay;
2) specific calls to co-operate, which may facilitate the expeditious investigation
and, thus, enjoyment of the right to be tried without undue delay.
Within the first group fall the following Paragraphs: Paragraphs 9.1 and 10.1 which
urge the port and coastal State and the flag State, respectively, to take steps to ensure
that any investigation is conducted in an expeditious manner; Paragraph 9.16 which
urges the port and coastal State to conclude its investigation promptly; and Paragraph
9.19 which urges the port and coastal State to “take steps to ensure that any court
hearing, when seafarers are detained, take place as expeditiously, as possible”.
Within the second group fall the following Paragraphs: Paragraph 10.6 which urges
the flag State to “ensure that shipowners honour obligations to co-operate in any flag,
coastal or port State investigation following a maritime accident”; Paragraph 11.6
which urges the seafarer State to “take steps to provide support and assistance [...], to
facilitate the expeditious handling of the investigation”; Paragraph 12.3 which urges
shipowners to “take action to expedite the efforts of a port, coastal, or flag State
investigation”; Paragraph 12.4 which urges shipowners to “take steps to encourage
seafarers and others under their employment [...] to co-operate with any
investigation”; and Paragraph 13.4 which urges seafarers, themselves, to “participate
in an investigation, to the extent possible, [...] with port, coastal or flag State
investigators, by providing truthful information to the best of their knowledge and
belief”. As it was stated earlier, those rules of the Guidelines which address cooperation the author sees as, in principle, valuable. However, for even greater
practical benefits, she advocates the development of wider, more detailed guidelines
covering the issue – the Guidelines on Penal Proceedings Which Involve Seafarers.
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The Guidelines on Penal Proceedings Which Involve Seafarers, inter alia,
could cover two more specific issues addressed by the Guidelines, namely, the issue
of the obligation to pass to the relevant stakeholders the information on the
proceedings initiated against the seafarer and the issue of the right of relevant
stakeholders to visit and privately communicate with the detained seafarer. These
issues are covered by the following Paragraphs of the Guidelines: 9.2, 9.9, 9.10, 10.2,
10.10, 11.1, 11.5 and 12.2. Paragraphs 9.2, 10.2, 11.1 and 12.2 prescribe that the port
or coastal State, the flag State, the seafarer State and shipowners, respectively,
should take steps to provide seafarers’ representative organizations with access to
seafarers. Paragraph 9.9 prescribes that the port or coastal State should:
ensure that the obligations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, including those
relating to access, are promptly fulfilled and that the State(s) of the nationality of all seafarers
concerned are notified of the status of such seafarers as required, and also allow access to the
seafarers by consular officers of the flag State.

Paragraph 9.10 prescribes that the port or coastal State should:
ensure that all seafarers detained are provided with the means to communicate privately with
all of the following parties:
- family members;
- welfare organisations;
- the shipowner;
- trade unions;
- the Embassy or Consulate of the flag State and of their country of residence or nationality;
and
- legal representatives.

Paragraphs 10.10 and 11.5 prescribe that the flag State and the seafarer State,
respectively, should “take steps to ensure that its consular officers are permitted
access to the involved seafarers”. All of these legal norms of the Guidelines, in
principle, are very important; they are, to a large extent, maritime-specific and have
potential to enhance the enjoyment of the right to defence. In addition, they have
potential to enhance the enjoyment of the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, because, as explained earlier, this right, inter alia, is concerned
about detainees’ contact with the outside world, including their family members and
reputable friends. However, in the opinion of this author, the above-mentioned
Paragraphs of the Guidelines could be better linked to the relevant “hard law”
provisions. This dissertation showed that the relevant “hard law” provisions – Art.
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27(3), 223 and 231 of UNCLOS and Art. 5(3) of MARPOL – are not clear and
coherent. The Guidelines have lost an opportunity to help states to interpret the
respective unclear and incoherent “hard law” provisions. Instead, the Guidelines
have added new rules on the respective issues, thus making the overall legal
framework even more complex.
Paragraph 9.7 of the Guidelines addresses, at once, three different rights
under the fair trial umbrella: the right to have the assistance of an interpreter; the
right to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance; and the right not to
incriminate oneself. Paragraph 9.7 prescribes that the port or coastal State shall:
ensure that seafarers are, where necessary, provided interpretation services, and are advised
of their right to independent legal advice, are provided access to independent legal advice,
are advised of their right not to incriminate themselves and their right to remain silent, and, in
the case of seafarers who have been taken into custody, ensure that independent legal advice
is provided.

The right not to incriminate oneself is referred to in the introductory part of
Paragraph 12 of the Guidelines as well. There, shipowners are urged to protect the
right of seafarers to avoid self-incrimination. Yet, again, both Paragraph 9.7 and the
introductory part of Paragraph 12 are nothing more than mere calls to observe or
facilitate observance of general human rights. Paragraph 13 of the Guidelines invites
seafarers, themselves, to take steps to ensure their rights: Paragraph 13.1 – the right
to have the assistance of an interpreter; Paragraph 13.3 – the right to defend oneself
in person or through legal assistance; and Paragraphs 13.2 and 13.4 – the right not to
incriminate oneself. Also Paragraph 13 of the Guidelines is highly declarative.
However, in the opinion of this author, the respective paragraph has some added
value. Seafarers are eagerly asking for informative materials on their rights.796
Paragraph 13 of the Guidelines can be considered as such a material and, thus, must
be welcomed. Although, more detailed information covering all relevant human
rights and their exact content would be more helpful.

796

In this regards see, for example, Nautilus International, Criminalisation of Seafarers Report, 2011
and SRI Criminal Survey, 2013.
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7.6. Right to Non-Discrimination and the Guidelines
Paragraph 9.6 of the Guidelines prescribes that the port or coastal State
should “ensure that due process protections are provided to all seafarers in a nondiscriminatory manner”. This legal norm can be considered as a general call to
observe not only the right to fair trial, as mentioned above, but also the right to nondiscrimination.

7.7. Final Remark on the Guidelines
Previous sub-chapters indicate that this author finds the Guidelines to be, to a
large extent, declaratory and fragmented and, thus, incapable of bringing
considerable positive change into practice. At the same time, these sub-chapters
indicate that the author sees the ideas incorporated in some of the rules of the
Guidelines as good basis for further, more substantial developments. These
developments will be still revisited in the next, final chapter.
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1. Introduction
The starting point of this dissertation was the observation that, since the late
1990s and the early 2000s, the international maritime community has been highly
concerned about the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against
seafarers, particularly after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents. It was
further noted, that such an unfairness is, indeed, worrying, because it may bring
severe negative consequences to individual seafarers as well as the shipping sector in
broader terms. The author acknowledged efforts made by the international maritime
community towards minimising the respective unfairness. At the same time, it was
noted that, unfortunately, despite all efforts, the issue of the unfair application of
criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil
pollution accidents has remained topical and, consequently, it is necessary to explore
new ways of how to address this issue. The dissertation strived to do so.
The following objectives of the dissertation were set:
•

to identify unfair international law, EU law and examples of unfair national
law on criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against seafarers after
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents;

•

to identify unfair enforcement of laws on criminal procedures and sanctions
against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents;

•

to make recommendations for eradication of the identified problems.

For achieving the above mentioned objectives and, with that, facilitating the fair
application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents, the following research questions were analysed in
the dissertation:
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1. What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions are prescribed by
international and regional human rights instruments?
2. What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against
seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are prescribed
by specific international “hard law” instruments (UNCLOS and MARPOL)
and whether relevant legal norms in these instruments are clear and comply
with human rights? If legal norms are unclear or do not comply with human
rights, how they should be interpreted and what can be done to improve
them?
3. What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against
seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are prescribed
by Directive 2005/35 and whether relevant legal norms in this Directive are
clear and comply with human rights, UNCLOS and MARPOL? If relevant
legal norms of Directive 2005/35 are unclear or do not comply with human
rights, UNCLOS or MARPOL, how these legal norms should be interpreted
and what can be done to improve them?
4. What are examples of unfair national laws on criminal procedures and
sanctions applicable against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil
pollution accidents?
5. Does the practical enforcement of laws on criminal procedures and sanctions
against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents comply
with human rights?
6. What rights concerning criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against
seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents are prescribed
by IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers and whether relevant
legal norms in these guidelines are capable to bring significant positive
change in practice?
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In this concluding chapter, the above-mentioned research questions will be
revisited and user-friendly lists of main recommendations related to each of the
questions provided. At the end of the chapter, the potential overall ways forward for
facilitating the fair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers
after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents (and beyond) will be discussed
and relevant recommendations provided.
However, before turning to the research questions (the substantive part of the
dissertation), it is worth noting some important statements which were made already
in Chapter 1 “Introduction” of the dissertation, when clarifying the scope of
dissertation and use of terms:
•

The best available standard of fair criminal procedures and sanctions is
relevant human rights: the right to liberty; the right to be free from torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; the right to be free from cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment; the right to fair trial; and the right to nondiscrimination.

•

Despite the fact that causes of the unfair application of criminal procedures
and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents are diverse, the dissertation focuses only on explaining and
improving relevant law, because the author has a legal background.

•

Despite the fact that rules on criminal procedures and sanctions can
predominantly be found in national law and also enforcement of the
respective procedures and sanctions takes place at national level, the
dissertation focuses on human rights and relevant rules in international and
EU legal instruments, due to limited amount of time to carry out the research
and due to belief of the author that the detailed analysis of relevant
international and EU law is absolutely necessary precondition for further
research on national law and enforcement.

•

The use of the term “criminalisation” in the context of unfair treatment of
seafarers by law enforcement institutions is misleading. It is better to talk
about “unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions” instead.

340

•

The meaning of the term “accidental pollution” is not absolutely clear within
the domain of law of the sea, and the meaning of this term within the domain
of law of the sea differs from its meaning within the domain of criminal law.
This must be kept in mind whenever using this term, to escape
misunderstandings.

8.2. Research Question 1
Research question 1 was: What rights concerning criminal procedures and
sanctions are prescribed by international and regional human rights instruments?
This research question was answered in Chapter 2, where detailed analysis of all
relevant human rights was carried out. Based on the respective analysis, relevant
human rights compliance check-lists were prepared and incorporated into Annex I. It
is recommended for people from all target groups of this dissertation to utilise the
analysis incorporated into Chapter 2 and the human rights compliance check-lists
incorporated into Annex I of this dissertation whenever assessing fairness of criminal
procedures or sanctions against seafarers and making allegations in this regard. It
will lead to more meaningful dialogue on the issue as now, when allegations rather
often are made without referring to any standard of fair criminal procedures and
sanctions.
The analysis of the specific human rights revealed that the content of some of
these human rights is relatively clear, but the content of others of these human rights
is less clear. The content of the right to liberty is relatively clear, particularly because
there is rich case law of human rights tribunals regarding this right. In essence, the
right to liberty prohibits arbitrary deprivation of liberty. For deprivation of liberty not
to be arbitrary, four conditions must be met. First of all, there must be sufficiently
precise law (jurisdictional rules and procedural rules) regulating a particular
deprivation of liberty. Secondly, this law must be complied with. Thirdly, a
particular deprivation of liberty must only be carried out on the basis of a recognised
ground, such as: conviction, non-compliance with a legal obligation, risk that the
accused will fail to appear for trial (danger of absconding) or risk that the accused
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will take action to obstruct the proceedings. Fourthly, the existence of a particular
recognised ground must be convincingly demonstrated. Although deprivation of
liberty after conviction, deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal
obligation, deprivation of liberty on grounds of the danger of absconding and
deprivation of liberty on grounds of the risk of obstruction of the proceedings, in
principle, are recognised as non-arbitrary, to avoid being branded as arbitrary, the
respective deprivations of liberty should still satisfy several specific conditions; for
example, the condition of necessity and proportionality. Apart from the explicit
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, human rights instruments set the
following guarantees for persons deprived of liberty: right to be informed on the
reasons for deprivation of liberty and charges, right to automatic judicial review of
deprivation of liberty and right to actively seek a judicial review of deprivation of
liberty. Failure to provide these guarantees also constitutes the violation of the right
to liberty.
The content of the right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment is less clear than the content of the right to liberty,
predominantly because there is basically no binding international standard which
would allow one to determine which specific treatment is, at least, degrading.
Without developing such a binding international standard, the uncertainty will
remain. However, it would be wrong to say that, at the moment, it is absolutely
impossible to determine the treatment which is, at least, degrading. To a very large
extent, it is possible thanks to the human rights tribunals which, nevertheless, have
adjudicated on the issue. In addition, support is provided by authoritative “soft law”,
for example, the Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which, inter alia, cover such
areas of the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty as: accommodation;
personal hygiene, bedding and clothing; food; exercise and work; medical care;
discipline and punishment; contact with the outside world; religion; and removal to
or from institutions.
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A much harder thing to do than to determine the treatment which is at least
degrading is to determine the punishment which is at least degrading and, thus,
violating the human right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
Again, there is basically no relevant binding international standard (“International
Criminal Code” or similar legal instrument). Furthermore, the relevant case law of
human rights tribunals is also very limited, because human rights tribunals adopt the
position that issues relating to just and proportionate punishment are the subject of
rational debate and civilised disagreement. It was acknowledged in Chapter 2 that
issues related to just and proportional punishment are, indeed, very complex and
debatable; for example, it was shown how hard it is to develop the worldwide scale
of relative seriousness of different offences (the scale which, in fact, is crucial for
setting fully proportional punishment for any given offence). However, at the same
time, it was argued in the Chapter that the above-mentioned very passive position of
human rights tribunals in regards to the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment is not fully justified, because, despite the disagreements, there
are still punishment-related rules regarding which a sufficient degree of consensus
exists. These “rules” are general principles of punishment, such as: the principle that
the application of criminal liability should be kept to an irreducible minimum, the
principle of legality and the principle that criminal liability should not be applied if
corpus delicti of a particular crime is not present or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Consequently, it is recommended for people from all target groups of this
dissertation as well as for the human rights tribunals to utilise general principles of
punishment, as they were introduced in Chapter 2, when assessing whether particular
punishment is at least degrading.
Similar to the content of the right to liberty, the content of the right to fair trial
is relatively clear, particularly because there is rich case law of human rights
tribunals regarding this right. The right to fair trial, actually, is just an “umbrella”
term under which many other rights exist, such as: right to a public hearing; right to
be tried by competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law;
presumption of innocence; right to be informed of charges; right to have adequate
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time and facilities for the preparation of the defence; right to be tried without undue
delay; right to be tried in presence; right to defend oneself in person or through legal
assistance; right of a charged person to examine witnesses against him and to obtain
the examination of witnesses on his behalf; right to have assistance of an interpreter;
right not to incriminate oneself; right to the review of conviction and sentence; and
right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence. The content of all these
rights was disclosed within Chapter 2. For example, it was explained that:
•

the right to a public hearing obliges courts to hold an oral hearing of the case
without excluding the public from this hearing;

•

impartiality of a tribunal means the lack of prejudice or bias of this tribunal;

•

the institution of strict penal liability violates the presumption of innocence;

•

if a person charged with a criminal offence does not defend himself
personally or engage legal assistance of his own choosing, he has a right to be
assisted by the legal assistant provided by the state;

•

the right of a charged person to examine witnesses against him and to obtain
the examination of witnesses on his behalf means that, before a person
charged of a criminal offence can be convicted, all evidence against him must
be produced in his presence at a public hearing with a view to allowing
adversarial argument;

•

the right to have the assistance of an interpreter applies not only to oral
statements but also to documentary materials;

•

the right to the review of conviction and sentence must be, not only always
existing, but also easily accessible, that is, it should not involve great
complexities that render this right illusory.
Also the content of the right to non-discrimination, in principle, is clear. Yet,

this right has different scope under the European Convention on Human Rights and
all other main international and regional human rights instruments. While all other
main international and regional human rights instruments require any right to be
applied without discrimination, the European Convention on Human Rights requires
only the rights incorporated in the Convention (so, only human rights themselves) to
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be applied without discrimination. Consequently, ECtHR has also addressed the right
to non-discrimination, not as an independent right, but only in conjunction with other
particular human rights. Such European practice is unfavourable to people and, thus,
should be changed.
Main recommendations related to research question 1:
1) For people from all target groups of this dissertation to utilise the analysis
incorporated into Chapter 2 and the human rights compliance check-lists
incorporated into Annex I of this dissertation whenever assessing fairness of
criminal procedures or sanctions against seafarers and making allegations in
this regard.
2) For people from all target groups of this dissertation as well as for the human
rights tribunals to utilise general principles of punishment when assessing
whether particular punishment is at least degrading.
3) For EU law-makers to align the European Convention on Human Rights with
all other main international and regional human rights instruments in regards
to the right to non-discrimination.

8.3. Research Question 2
Research question 2 was: What rights concerning criminal procedures and
sanctions applicable against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents are prescribed by specific international “hard law” instruments (UNCLOS
and MARPOL) and whether relevant legal norms in these instruments are clear and
comply with human rights? If legal norms are unclear or do not comply with human
rights, how they should be interpreted and what can be done to improve them? The
answer to this research question began in Chapters 3 and 4. The question will be
continued to be answered in this chapter, particularly when potential overall ways
forward will be discussed and relevant recommendations provided.
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Chapter 3 analysed legal norms of UNCLOS which can be linked to criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents. During the analysis, several links between relevant legal norms of
UNCLOS and relevant human rights were found. For example, it was found that:
Art. 27, 223, 225 and 231 of UNCLOS are linked to the right to liberty; Art. 217(8)
and 230(1) and (2) – to the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment; Art. 218, 223 and 228 – to the right to fair trial; all relevant rules of
UNCLOS on jurisdiction – to both the right to fair trial and the right to liberty; and
Art. 230(3) and 300 – to all human rights.
Regarding Art. 220(7) and 226(1)(b) of UNCLOS (the articles on prompt
release in relation to ship-source pollution violations), it was concluded that they are
unrelated to the right to liberty, because they regulate only prompt release of ships
(property), but holders of the right to liberty (just like any other human right) are
humans, not property. At the same time, it was noted that further research on the
issues related to prompt release of ships and crew under UNCLOS is necessary.
As examples of rules of UNCLOS which were found to be not fully in line
with human rights the following rules can be mentioned:
•

Art. 230(1) and (2) – the rules which prescribe that different kinds of
punishment other than monetary (for example, imprisonment) may be applied
by a coastal State only for such ship-source pollution violations in its
territorial sea which render passage of a foreign ship through this territorial
sea non-innocent. Art. 230(1) and (2) do not secure balance of sanctions for
different offences, because these rules safeguard against penalties other than
monetary only in the cases of “marine pollution violations”. Consequently, if
after a ship-source pollution accident a seafarer is charged with “maritime
safety violation” or another type of violation, not a “marine pollution
violation”, he may still face penalties other than monetary, even if this
“maritime safety violation” or another type of violation, per se, is relatively
petty. Such approach is not in line with the right to be free from cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment.
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•

Art. 218(4) and 228 – the rules which prescribe when a coastal State or port
State should suspend or terminate proceedings in regards to pollution
violation upon taking of these proceedings by another state. On the one hand,
these rules safeguard against the violations of the right not to be tried or
punished twice for the same offence; but, on the other hand, they trigger such
violations: by prescribing specific exceptions from the general obligation to
suspend proceedings on request of the flag State and by prescribing that
nothing can preclude a flag State to take any measures irrespective of prior
proceedings by another State.

•

Art. 224, 225, 227, 228 and 230 – the rules which prescribe different kinds of
safeguards in relation to the prevention and preservation of the marine
environment; for example: that the powers of enforcement may only be
exercised by officials or by warships, military aircraft, or other ships or
aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and
authorized to that effect; that in the exercise of their powers of enforcement,
States shall not endanger the safety of navigation; and that proceedings to
impose penalties shall not be instituted after the expiry of three years from the
date on which the violation was committed. However, respective safeguards
are envisaged only for foreign ships. It can lead to the situation where in
relation to an, in fact, one and the same alleged violation one group of
seafarers is left without relevant safeguards compared to another group of
seafarers solely on the basis of the nationality of the ship they are serving on.
It is against the right to non-discrimination.

It was argued in Chapter 3 that all legal norms of UNCLOS, thus the abovementioned legal norms of UNCLOS also, must be read subject to human rights, inter
alia, because such obligation follows from Art. 230(3) and 300 of UNCLOS. At the
same time, it was acknowledged that the scope of Art. 230(3) and 300 of UNCLOS is
not fully clear and, consequently, further research in this regard is necessary,
particularly for determining whether the respective articles grant specific law of the
sea arbitration and adjudication bodies very wide authority to also deal with human
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rights and, if they do, whether such granting is adequate; for instance, are respective
arbitrators and judges competent enough to deliver qualitative judgment on human
rights?
As examples of rules of UNCLOS which were found to be unclear the
following rules can be mentioned:
•

Art. 27, 223 and 231 – the rules requiring states to facilitate involvement of
others (representatives of other states and representatives of relevant
international organisations) into proceedings. It is hard to understand from the
totality of Art. 27, 223 and 231, exactly, when and, exactly, who should be
notified about enforcement measures taken against a foreign ship alleged of
committing a ship-source pollution violation and, exactly, when and, exactly,
whose attendance in proceeding should be facilitated. The Chapter provided
the recommendation how to interpret Art. 27, 223 and 231 of UNCLOS in
their totality.

•

Art. 220(1) – the rule which prescribes that only when a ship is voluntarily
within a port or at an off-shore terminal of a State, that State may institute
proceedings in respect to any violation of its laws for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution from ships when the violation has occurred
within the territorial sea or EEZ of that State. On the one hand, Art. 220(1), as
if, strongly limits coastal State jurisdiction. On the other hand, such
limitations are illogical and out of the general system of flag State, costal
State and port State jurisdiction. Ultimately, the recommendation was made
to treat Art. 220(1) as accommodating only one specific practical scenario –
the scenario where just after committing an alleged ship-source pollution
violation in the territorial sea or EEZ a foreign ship proceeds outwards (not
inwards), without hot pursuit being exercised, leaving respective waters and,
then, after a shorter or longer period returns. When just after committing an
alleged ship-source pollution violation in the territorial sea or EEZ a foreign
ship proceeds inwards, a coastal State may exercise its jurisdiction on board
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the ship just like this ship would have been intercepted in a maritime zone in
which an alleged violation took place.
•

Art. 211(5) – the rule which prescribes that a costal State in its national law
may define as violation only such conducts in its EEZ which violate
“generally accepted international rules and standards”. The problem
identified in regards to this rule was that there are no clear-cut criteria for
determining whether a particular degree of acceptance of a particular rule or
standard is high enough to reach the threshold of “generally accepted”.
Ultimately, it was recommended for the international maritime community to
establish minimum requirements to be met for an international rule or
standard in the maritime field to be considered as “generally accepted”. Until
such minimum requirements are established, it was recommended for coastal
States to apply criminal procedures or sanctions against seafarers on board
foreign ships in its EEZ only when this ship violates such “generally accepted
rules and standards” which have reached the level of customary international
law.

Taking into consideration that, during the analysis, relatively many legal norms of
UNCLOS on jurisdiction were found to be unclear, the user-friendly table addressing
the issue of criminal jurisdiction over large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents
was prepared and incorporated into Annex II. It is recommended for all target groups
of this dissertation to utilise this table if and when necessary.
Obviously, all identified deficiencies of UNCLOS could be averted by
developing relevant amendments to UNCLOS. Yet, the recommendation to amend
UNCLOS was not made within Chapter 3, particularly because there is a strong
belief within the maritime community that amending UNCLOS can bring more evil
than good. Fear exists, if UNCLOS is reopened for amendments, among other things,
states may propose such amendments which destroy the existing balance between the
powers of flag States, coastal States and port States. Consequently, it seems
unrealistic to amend any rule of UNCLOS in the nearest future. Therefore, in this
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nearest future, all deficiencies of UNCLOS, where possible, should be averted with
the help of methods of interpretation of legal norms, as was done within Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 analysed rules of MARPOL which can be linked to criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents. During this analysis, it was concluded that, similar to Art. 27, 223 and 231
of UNCLOS, Art. 5(3) of MARPOL contains the requirement for states which apply
enforcement measures against a foreign ship alleged of committing a ship-source
pollution violation to facilitate involvement of others (particularly representatives of
the flag State of the ship in question) into proceedings. However, the abovementioned legal norms of UNCLOS and MARPOL are not absolutely coherent.
Consequently, the recommendation was made as to how to interpret Art. 27, 223 and
231 of UNCLOS and Art. 5(3) of MARPOL in their totality. It was also concluded in
Chapter 4 that, similar to Art. 217(8) and Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS, Art. 4(4)
of MARPOL directly addresses the question of severity of sanctions for ship-source
pollution violations; but, differently from UNCLOS, MARPOL also directly
addresses the question of liability (including criminal liability) for these violations –
by defining exceptions from liability. Unfortunately, the regulation of MARPOL,
which defines exceptions from liability in regards to oil pollution – Reg. 4 of Annex
I – was found to be deficient in several aspects.
First of all, it was found out that the use of some terms in Reg. 4 of Annex I
of MARPOL is unclear, for example: the term “damage to a ship or its equipment”,
the term “with knowledge that damage would probably result” and the term
“master”. Ultimately, it was recommended to interpret these terms as follows:
•

the term “damage to a ship or its equipment” – giving the dictionary meaning
to the term, i.e., as covering any physical harm caused to a ship or its
equipment in such a way as to impair its value, usefulness, or normal function
(until there are no rules directly stating that latent defects, faulty design or
wear and tear of a ship or its equipment should not be considered as “damage
to a ship or its equipment”);
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•

the term “with knowledge that damage would probably result” – to treat as
tautology and thus carrying no practical importance;

•

the term “master” – as referring to the master merely by way of example,
which means that, despite the fact that Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL
refers only to master, exception from the liability incorporated in this
paragraph should also apply equally to seafarers other than masters.
Secondly, it was found out that some of the legal norms of Reg. 4 of Annex I

of MARPOL deviate from the general principles of punishment as well as from other
similar legal norms in the maritime domain, for example:
•

Reg. 4(1), in fact, establishes the defence of necessity. The defence of
necessity in Reg. 4(1) is left unqualified, while under general principles of
punishment this defence is always qualified – to secure balance between the
harm done and harm averted. Also, in Article V of the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
possibility to benefit from the defence of necessity is made dependent on
particular pre-conditions: the condition that the discharge appears to be the
only way of averting the threat and the condition that there is every
probability that the damage consequent upon the discharge will be less than
would otherwise occur.

•

Reg. 4(2) excludes from any form of penal liability cases when damage to a
ship or its equipment ultimately resulting in the discharge of oil is caused
negligently and after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the
discharge a person takes all reasonable precautions for the purpose of
preventing or minimising the discharge. Under general principles of
punishment grossly negligent conducts are recognised as, in principle,
deserving to be punished – at least with relatively minor sanctions. In line
with this principle are also rules of MARPOL, itself, just in regards to
pollutants other than oil. Also, Rule 2(a) of COLREG points towards the
conclusion that grossly negligent conducts in regards to obligations towards
maritime safety and a clean environment should be treated as offences.
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Yet, at the same time, it was showed in Chapter 4 that not all above-mentioned
deviations of Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL from general principles of punishment
can be “corrected” by simply reading a relevant general principle into the Regulation.
It was showed that, in some instances, the rule of lenity precludes such reading.
Thirdly, it was found out that the mere fact that there exists Reg. 4 of Annex I
of MARPOL (MARPOL exceptions from liability) has triggered the interpretation
that any MARPOL violation that does not fall under the MARPOL exceptions from
liability should be treated as a strict liability offence. It was concluded in the Chapter
that, actually, MARPOL is silent on the issue whether its violations, in principle,
must be treated as strict liability offences or not; but, in such a case, keeping in mind
the need to follow the rule of lenity and presumption of innocence, the means rea
requirement must be presumed.
Finally, it was found out that the general scope of Reg. 4 of Annex I of
MARPOL is also unclear; for example, it was concluded that it is unclear whether
the Regulation covers only operational discharges of oil or any type of discharges of
oil. Ultimately, it was recommended to interpret the Regulation as covering any type
of discharges of oil. Similarly, it was concluded that it is unclear whether coastal
States should observe the exceptions from liability incorporated into the Regulation
in regards to discharges in any maritime zone or only in regards to discharges beyond
its territorial sea. However, the task of finding the answer to this essential question
was left for Chapter 5 on Directive 2005/35, because the particular issue has been
widely disputed in relation to this Directive.
All the above-mentioned deficiencies of Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL can
be rectified by developing relevant amendments to Annex I of MARPOL,
particularly because to amend an Annex of MARPOL is a relatively easy thing to do
(in accordance with Art. 16(2)(f)(ii) of MARPOL, it can be accomplished by the tacit
acceptance procedure). Yet, the recommendation to amend Annex I of MARPOL
was not stressed within Chapter 4, because, if one looks at this Annex in context – in
system with other rules of MARPOL and in system with IMO “safety conventions”
(such as SOLAS, STCW and COLREG) – it becomes evident that to amend just
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Annex I of MARPOL is not the best option for further development. Every Annex of
MARPOL contains a Regulation on exceptions from penal liability for ship-source
pollution violations. Yet, these Regulations are not coherent. It is hard to see
justification for such a divergent regime in regards to different pollutants.
Consequently, it is necessary to review legal norms on penal liability in all
MARPOL Annexes, not just Annex I. Yet, this also might not be enough. Not only
violations of MARPOL may cause ship-source pollution, also violations of IMO
“safety conventions” may cause such pollution. Thus, without setting in IMO “safety
conventions” exceptions from penal liability similar to those in MARPOL, it is
largely impossible to secure a truly proportional liability and sanctioning system.
Yet, to amend all relevant IMO conventions in a harmonised manner might be very
challenging work to do, seemingly even more challenging than to develop a new
IMO convention establishing general principles of penal liability in the maritime
domain, which would then cover violations of all other IMO conventions.
Main recommendations related to research question 2:
1) For people from all target groups of this dissertation to utilise the analysis
incorporated into Chapters 3 and 4 as well as the user-friendly table
incorporated into Annex II of this dissertation whenever interpreting rules of
UNCLOS and MARPOL, which can be linked to criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents, inter alia:
•

to read Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS subject to the right to be free
from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment;

•

to read Art. 218(4) and 228 of UNCLOS subject to the right not to be
tried or punished twice for the same offence;

•

to read Art. 224, 225, 227, 228 and 230 of UNCLOS subject to the right
to non-discrimination;
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•

to read Art. 220(1) of UNCLOS as accommodating only the scenario
where just after committing an alleged ship-source pollution violation in
the territorial sea or EEZ a foreign ship proceeds outwards (not inwards),
without hot pursuit being exercised, leaving respective waters and, then,
after a shorter or longer period returns;

•

to read Reg. 4 of Annex I as covering any type of discharges of oil, not
only operational discharges of oil;

•

to read the term “damage to a ship or its equipment” in Reg. 4 of Annex I
of MARPOL as covering any physical harm caused to a ship or its
equipment in such a way as to impair its value, usefulness, or normal
function;

•

to read the term “master” in Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL as covering
all seafarers;

•

taking into consideration the rule of lenity, to read Reg. 4(2) of Annex I
of MARPOL as excluding from any form of penal liability cases when
damage to a ship or its equipment ultimately resulting in the discharge of
oil is caused negligently and after the occurrence of the damage or
discovery of the discharge a person takes all reasonable precautions for
the purpose of preventing or minimising the discharge;

•

taking into consideration the rule of lenity and presumption of innocence,
not to treat as a strict liability offence any MARPOL violation that does
not fall under the MARPOL exceptions from liability.

2) For the international maritime community to establish minimum requirements
to be met for an international rule or standard in the maritime field to be
considered as “generally accepted”. Until such minimum requirements are
established, for coastal States to apply criminal procedures or sanctions
against seafarers on board foreign ships in its EEZ only when this ship
violates such “generally accepted rules and standards” which have reached
the level of customary international law.
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3) For IMO to develop the new convention establishing general principles of
penal liability in the maritime domain, which would then cover violations of
all other IMO conventions.797 If this recommendation is not followed – for
IMO to amend Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL so that the deficiencies of this
legal norm identified by this dissertation are rectified as well as to incorporate
in all its “safety conventions” the legal norm similar to Reg. 4 of Annex I of
MARPOL. If also this recommendation is not followed – for IMO to amend,
at least, Reg. 4 of Annex I of MARPOL accordingly so that the law on penal
liability in the maritime domain is improved at least to some extent.

8.4. Research Question 3
Research question 3 was: What rights concerning criminal procedures and
sanctions applicable against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents are prescribed by Directive 2005/35 and whether relevant legal norms in
this Directive are clear and comply with human rights, UNCLOS and MARPOL? If
relevant legal norms of Directive 2005/35 are unclear or do not comply with human
rights, UNCLOS or MARPOL, how these legal norms should be interpreted and
what can be done to improve them? The answer to this research question began in
Chapter 5 and, similar to research question 2, will be continued to be answered in
this concluding chapter.
At the beginning of Chapter 5 it was noted that the international maritime
community has highly criticised Directive 2005/35, inter alia, for incompatibility of
its Art. 5 with the MARPOL exceptions from liability and incompatibility of its Art.
4 with the rules of UNCLOS on the right to innocent passage. Unfortunately, the ECJ
in the INTERTANKO case refused to assess the validity of Directive 2005/35 in light
of MARPOL and UNCLOS. Consequently, the opportunity to clarify whether,
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This recommendation will be addressed in more detail at the end of the Chapter, when discussing
the potential overall ways forward for facilitating the fair application of criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents (and beyond).
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indeed, Directive 2005/35 conflicts with MARPOL and UNCLOS was lost. Chapter
5 revisited the issue.
After relevant analysis, it was concluded that Art. 5 of Directive 2005/35 –
the article which requires EU Member States (which are all State Parties to
MARPOL) not to follow the MARPOL exception from liability “discharge resulting
from damage to a ship or its equipment” in regards to discharges in their internal
waters and territorial sea – conflicts with Reg. 4(2) of Annex I of MARPOL.
Consequently, it was recommended for the EU to delete Art. 5 of Directive 2005/35.
If the EU fails to do so, it was recommended for the international maritime
community to consider initiation of new proceedings: either proceedings under Art.
10 of MARPOL, proceedings under Part XV of UNCLOS or proceedings at the
constitutional court of an EU Member State which does not accept supremacy of EU
law if this law is not in line with human rights (because, if Art. 5 of Directive
2005/35, indeed, conflict with MARPOL, the compatibility of the respective
Directive with human rights, particularly the principle of legality, can also be
questioned).
At the same time, it was concluded in Chapter 5 that the root cause of the
controversy on whether Art. 5 of Directive 2005/35 conflicts with MARPOL or not
is the fact that during the drafting process of MARPOL the issue of possibility for
State Parties to MARPOL to adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL,
although widely debated, was ultimately left unsolved, with conflicting views still
present.

Consequently,

for

overcoming

the

above-mentioned

controversy,

fundamentally, it is necessary to return to the debate which was abandoned during
the drafting process of MARPOL and, then, include in MARPOL clear rules
reflecting results of this debate.
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Regarding the potential conflict of Art. 4 of Directive 2005/35 – the article
which basically requires EU Member States to define in their national law as an
offence any intentional, reckless or seriously negligent ship-source pollution – with
the rule of UNCLOS on the right to innocent passage, it was concluded in Chapter 5
that there is no such conflict, because the mere defining of some conduct as an
offence in no way can hamper innocent passage. Innocent passage can be hampered
only by specific enforcement measures, such as physical inspection and detention of
the ship or her crew. Yet, those articles of the Directive which address such
enforcement measures – Art. 6 and 7 – envisage that Art. 4 may be applied only in a
manner which does not hamper the right of innocent passage.
In addition to the concern that Directive 2005/35 conflicts with MARPOL
and UNCLOS, the international maritime community has also expressed the concern
that the use of the term “serious negligence” in Art. 4 of the Directive, without
clearly defining this term, conflicts with the principle of legal certainty. In the
INTERTANKO case, the ECJ ruled that there is no such conflict, because the term
“serious negligence” can be easily associated with the term “gross negligence” as
well as because Directive 2005/35 (just like any EU directive) is not directly
applicable to individuals; consequently, it is the Directive together with the national
law implementing this Directive (not the Directive alone) which should ultimately
fully satisfy the requirement of legal certainty. Chapter 5 acknowledged the
soundness of this ruling. However, it was further argued that the incorporation of the
clear definition of the term “serious negligence” in the Directive is still highly
desirable. Without such definition, some states might still be tempted to criminalise
not only gross negligence but also ordinary negligence. Yet, criminalisation of
ordinary negligence goes against the general principles of punishment and, with that,
also against the human right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.
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The concern of the potential criminalisation of ordinary negligence exists
because Art. 5a and 8a of Directive 2005/35 requires EU Member States to treat
almost all intentional, reckless or seriously negligent ship-source pollution violations
not simply as offences but as criminal offences. It was concluded in Chapter 5 that
this requirement encroaches upon the sovereignty of EU Member States as well as
goes against the spirit of Art. 230(1) and (2) of UNCLOS, which seemingly aim to
decriminalise majority of ship-source pollution violations. Consequently, the
recommendation was made to delete Art. 5a and 8a of the Directive.
Main recommendations related to research question 3:
1) For the EU to delete Art. 5, 5a and 8a of Directive 2005/35. If the EU fails to
do so, for the international maritime community to consider initiation of new
proceedings: either proceedings under Art. 10 of MARPOL, proceedings
under Part XV of UNCLOS or proceedings at the constitutional court of an
EU Member State which does not accept supremacy of EU law if this law is
not in line with human rights.
2) For the EU to incorporate in Directive 2005/35 clear definition of the term
“serious negligence”.
3) For the international maritime community to return to the debate which was
abandoned during the drafting process of MARPOL, namely, whether State
Parties to MARPOL may adopt more stringent standards than MARPOL or
not and, then, include in MARPOL clear rules reflecting results of this
debate.
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8.5. Research Questions 4 and 5
Research question 4 was: What are examples of unfair national laws on
criminal procedures and sanctions applicable against seafarers after large-scale shipsource oil pollution accidents? Research question 5 was: Does the practical
enforcement of laws on criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers after
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents comply with human rights? These
research questions were answered, in tandem, in Chapter 6, where four specific
large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents – the sinking of Erika, the sinking of
Prestige, the grounding of Tasman Spirit and the collision of Hebei Spirit and
Samsung No.1 – were analysed. Taking into consideration that the focus of the whole
work is on human rights and relevant rules in international and EU legal instruments
(not national legal instruments), research question 4 was addressed in Chapter 6, only
in passing, to give a brief insight into the problem of unfair national laws. For
identification of more examples of unfair national laws and developing specific
recommendations how to remedy the identified deficiencies further research is
needed. Research question 5 was addressed in Chapter 6 in more detail, because,
although also the practical enforcement of laws on criminal procedures and sanctions
against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents is not the main
focus of this dissertation, this practical enforcement is the best way to illustrate the
essence of the problem addressed by this dissertation.
This dissertation identified the following unfair national law:
•

Art. L218-19 of the French Environmental Code – the article which
prescribes punishment for any negligently caused maritime casualty, if this
casualty has resulted in the pollution of French territorial sea or internal
waters. It was concluded that this legal norm conflicts with Reg. 4(2) of
Annex I of MARPOL, which, taking into consideration the principle of
legality and, related to this principle, rule of lenity, must be interpreted as
exempting from liability basically all negligent discharges of oil resulting
from damage to a ship or its equipment.
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•

Art. L218-10 and L218-21 of the French Environmental Code (as they were
in force at the time of investigation and adjudication of Erika accident) – the
articles which left the possibility to impose imprisonment as a sanction for a
MARPOL violation committed by a master of a French ship in French EEZ,
while for, in principle, the same violations, just committed by a foreign ship,
only fines were envisaged, as prescribed by Art. 230(1) of UNCLOS. It was
concluded that such legal regime violates the right to non-discrimination.
In relation to Art. L218-19 of the French Environmental Code, additional

conclusion was made, namely, that despite the above-mentioned unfairness of the
respective article, the report carried out by Milieu Ltd. under Contract with the
European Commission acknowledged that this article is in line with Directive
2005/35. This fact was found to be indicative that Directive 2005/35 has failed to
give to the EU Member States clear guidelines on how to implement relevant rules
from the international maritime conventions without breaching human rights. This
finding, in turn, accorded with what was stated earlier, in Chapter on Directive
2005/35, namely that the Directive has been criticised not only for its conflicts with
UNCLOS and MARPOL, but also for its failure to provide to the EU Member States
highly desirable clarifications of the relevant legal norms in these international
maritime conventions.
In relation to Art. L218-10 and L218-21 of the French Environmental Code
(as they were in force at the time of investigation and adjudication of Erika accident),
it was noted that the discriminatory nature of these articles has been averted by the 1
August 2008 amendments to the French Environmental Code. However, the very
existence of Art. L218-10 and L218-21 of the French Environmental Code in the first
place proved that the earlier expressed concern of this author that the wording of Art.
230 of UNCLOS may trigger discrimination of seafarers on non-foreign ships is well
founded.
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Regarding the practical enforcement of laws on criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers, it was found out that after all four large-scale ship-source
oil pollution accidents analysed within Chapter 6 seafarers faced criminal procedures
or sanctions which were not in line with one or another human right: in all four cases,
specific violations of the right to liberty were identified; in the Prestige case and the
Hebei Spirit/Samsung No.1 case, specific violations of the right to be free from
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as well as the right to be free
from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment were identified, in addition; in the
Prestige case and the Tasman Spirit case violations of specific rights under the fair
trial umbrella (such as the right to be tried without undue delay, the right to be tried
in presence and the right to be tried by independent and impartial tribunal) were
identified, in addition. All these identified derogations from human rights proved that
the concerns of the international maritime community about the unfair application of
criminal procedures and sanctions against seafarers in the aftermath of large-scale
ship-source oil pollution accidents are well founded. The fact that some of the
identified violations of human rights in regards to Prestige case happened as recently
as January 2016 proved that the problem of unfair application of criminal procedures
and sanctions against seafarers in the aftermath of large-scale ship-source oil
pollution accidents is not the history; it is a topical problem.
At the same time, it would be wrong to say that criminal procedures and
sanctions applied against seafarers in the aftermath of large-scale ship-source oil
pollution accidents are always hopelessly unfair. Chapter 6 revealed several positive
examples – the application of criminal procedures and sanctions in line with human
rights. In the opinion of this author, it is important to also highlight these positive
examples whenever discussing the problem of unfair treatment of seafarers: first of
all, because important lessons can be learnt not only from negative examples but also
from positive examples; secondly, because prising somebody for a positive practice
has the potential to encourage others to follow this practice.
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Consequently, it is recommended for the maritime industry NGOs to continue
to develop reports which list examples of unfair treatment of seafarers by law
enforcement institutions in particular states (like the BIMCO Study of the Treatment
of Seafarers), because such reports highlight the topicality of the problem and, thus,
encourage relevant institutions to work towards elimination of this problem. At the
same time, it is recommended to the maritime industry NGOs to also start to develop
such reports which show good practice – the examples of fair treatment of seafarers
by law enforcement institutions in particular states.
Main recommendation related to research question 5:
For the maritime industry NGOs to continue to develop reports which list examples
of unfair treatment of seafarers by law enforcement institutions in particular states.
At the same time, to also start to develop such reports which list examples of fair
treatment of seafarers by law enforcement institutions in particular states.

8.6. Research Question 6
Research question 6 was: What rights concerning criminal procedures and
sanctions applicable against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents are prescribed by IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers and
whether relevant legal norms in these guidelines are capable to bring significant
positive change in practice? This research question was answered in Chapter 7.
Chapter 7 started with the observation that the international maritime
community believes that IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers are
capable of bringing considerable positive change in practice. Further in the Chapter it
was examined whether this belief of the international maritime community is valid.
The examination was carried out from the perspective of human rights which are
treated as a standard of fairness for the purposes of this dissertation: the right to
liberty; the right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment; the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment; the
right to fair trial; and the right to non-discrimination.
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As a result, it was found out that IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of
Seafarers, to some extent, address all of the above-mentioned human rights.
However, at the same time, it was found out that many rules of the Guidelines, for
example, Paragraphs 5, 9.1, 9.3-9.7, 9.11-9.12, 9.14, 9.16, 9.18-9.20, 10.1, 10.5,
10.7, 11.6 and introductory part of Paragraph 12, are only declarative calls to observe
or facilitate observance of particular human rights. In the opinion of this author, such
calls have little, if any, added value; if, in practice, states do not follow particular
human rights, even despite the fact that they are obliged to do so under binding
human rights instruments, it is unlikely that they will start to follow the respective
human right simply after an additional rhetorical reminder to do so; more substantial
encouragements are necessary. IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers
were found to be not only, to a large extent, declarative, but also very fragmented, for
example, it was found out that: the scope of the Guidelines is limited to the cases of
seafarers’ potential detention; the situations when a seafarer is precluded to leave the
territory of a state, a national or resident of which he is, are not covered by the
Guidelines; only individual aspects of relevant human rights are covered; and the
very important right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment is
covered extremely poorly.
Some of the rules of IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers
were found to have some added value, thus:
•

Paragraphs 9.2, 9.9-9.10, 10.2, 10.6, 10.9-10.10, 11.1, 11.4-11.6, 12.2-12.5
and 13.4 were prised for encouraging co-operation between relevant
stakeholders;

•

Paragraphs 9.13 and 9.15 were prised for providing maritime-specific
explanations to law enforcement institutions, which, generally, have
relatively little maritime-specific knowledge;

•

Paragraph 13 was prised for providing the information on their rights directly
to seafarers, particularly because seafarers eagerly ask for such information.
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Yet, these, in principle, valuable legal norms within IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair
Treatment of Seafarers, still, were found to be very fragmented. Consequently, for
achieving greater practical benefits, it was recommended within Chapter 7 for the
international maritime community, instead of focusing only on the promulgation of
IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers, to take other steps as well, such
as: to prepare more detailed relevant “soft law”, for example, the Guidelines on Penal
Proceedings Which Involve Seafarers; to carry out personal meetings with law
enforcement officials and judges during which maritime-related issues would be
discussed; to prepare for seafarers informative materials covering all relevant human
rights; and to join the overall efforts (for example, through human rights NGOs) to
enhance the enjoyment of relevant human rights.
One specific rule of IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of Seafarers –
the rule which requires shipowners to ensure that adequate provisions are in place to
provide for the subsistence of each seafarer in the aftermath of a maritime accident –
was found to be so important for safeguarding the seafarers’ right to be free from
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, that it was recommended to
move this rule to the relevant “hard law”, namely, MLC.
Main recommendations related to research question 6:
1) For the international maritime community to prepare more detailed relevant
“soft law”, for example, the Guidelines on Penal Proceedings Which Involve
Seafarers.
2) For the international maritime community to carry out personal meetings with
law enforcement officials and judges during which maritime-related issues
would be discussed.
3) For the international maritime community to prepare for seafarers informative
materials covering all relevant human rights.
4) For the international maritime community to join the overall efforts (for
example, through human rights NGOs) to enhance the enjoyment of relevant
human rights.
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5) To move to MLC the rule of IMO/ILO Guidelines on Fair Treatment of
Seafarers which requires shipowners to ensure that adequate provisions are in
place to provide for the subsistence of each seafarer in the aftermath of a
maritime accident.

8.7. Potential Overall Ways Forward
Taking into consideration the earlier findings of this dissertation, as the best
way forward towards improving the international law on criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents (and
beyond) this author sees the development of a new IMO convention (the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal
Liability in the Maritime Domain), accompanied by two non-binding IMO guidelines
(the Sanctioning Guidelines for Offences in the Maritime Domain and the Guidelines
on Penal Proceedings Which Involve Seafarers). The Convention must not be
lengthy; it must only cover the basic issues related to penal liability. The Guidelines
must be relatively comprehensive, to allow, respectively: to identify, as far as
possible, the relative seriousness of different offences in the maritime domain and
apportion sanctions for them accordingly and to comprehend the specific aspects of
the maritime domain which must be taken into consideration when carrying out penal
proceedings which involve seafarers. Annexes III, IV and V of this dissertation list
some legal norms which could potentially be included in the above-mentioned new
IMO instruments. However, of course, development of the complete Convention and
Guidelines requires thorough debate.
The flow of thought which led this author to the recommendation to develop
the above-mentioned new IMO instruments was as follows:

365

1) Different case studies, including the case study incorporated in this
dissertation, show that practices in regards to the application of penal liability
and specific sanctions and procedures in relation to offences in the maritime
domain, despite several similarities, actually differ considerably from state to
state. Such differences do not allow the securing of a fully-proportional penal
liability and sanctioning system, which is one of the desires of human rights.
Therefore, the existence of some common international standard in regards to
penal liability and sanctioning system in relation to offences in the maritime
domain is desirable.
2) For developing the above-mentioned common international standard it is not
enough to amend just one existing maritime convention (for example,
MARPOL); several of them need to be amended (for example, also SOLAS,
COLREG and STCW) – because interests safeguarded by these different
conventions (the interest to protect the marine environment, the interest to
protect the safety of life at sea and other interests) are often not mutually
exclusive. If so, including specific rules on penal liability only in one of the
existing maritime conventions will leave the room for ignoring respective
rules, simply by defining a particular offence through the prism of another
convention. Furthermore, legal norms on specific sanctions may not be
included in any convention (a “hard-law” instrument) because strict dictates
regarding specific sanctions encroaches upon the sovereignty of states.
Consequently, these legal norms, if developed at all, must be included in a
“soft-law” instrument.
3) Leaving the issue of penal liability in the maritime domain to be settled
through amending different existing maritime conventions includes the high
risk that the system ultimately developed will still not be harmonised,
because, in such a case, the drafting process will be very fragmented.
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4) The development of one single instrument on penal liability in the maritime
domain and accompanying sanctioning and procedural guidelines will allow
for in depth and coherent discussion on all relevant issues. Although the
maritime community continuously expresses concerns related to penal
liability, maritime conventions in this regard have to large extent remained a
piecemeal, at times even deviating from the general principles of punishment.
An attempt should be made to change it.
Several scholars, similar to this author, have pointed to the fact that, for
improving the penal liability and sanctioning system for offences in the maritime
domain, the relevant action at international level is needed. For example, in relation
to ship-source pollution violations, de la Rue and Anderson have stated that the
clarity is desirable in the definition of penal liability standards in international
rules.798 Pozdnakova has stated:
In practice, real problem lies not in the absence of domestic legislative action within the field
[…], but in the absence of a harmonized international approach to the criminalization of shipsource pollution. This also causes legal uncertainty for alleged offenders due to
inconsistencies between States in the formulation and application of criminal penalties.799

As a result, Pozdnakova has proposed that IMO adopts “a new non-binding
instrument on penalties for discharge violations (e.g., guidelines), in which the
criminalization of ship-source pollution would be addressed”.800 This proposal of
Pozdnakova is somewhat similar to the proposal made by this author. However, at
the same time, it is different in several aspects.
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Colin de la Rue and Charles B. Anderson, Shipping and the Environment, London: Informa, 2009
at p. 1114.
799
Alla Pozdnakova, Criminal Jurisdiction over Perpetrators of Ship-Source Pollution: International
Law, State Practice and EU Harmonisation, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012 at pp. 41-42.
See also p. 324.
800
POZDNAKOVA, ibid. at p. 42.
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First of all, the proposal of Pozdnakova is relatively narrow; it covers only
ship-source pollution offences. The proposal of this author covers all offences in the
maritime domain, because, as found out earlier, the truly proportional penal liability
and sanctioning system for “pollution offences” may not be achieved by looking at
these offences separately; it is necessary to look at them in context with all other
offences in the maritime domain.
Secondly, the proposal of Pozdnakova is relatively general; it urges IMO to
develop relevant a new legal instrument, but does not elaborate on exact legal norms
to be potentially included in this legal instrument. The proposal of this author
provides such legal norms.
Thirdly, the proposal of Pozdnakova is relatively “soft”; it urges IMO to
develop “soft law” only. This author sees the development of “soft law” only as the
second option. As the first option she sees the development of one basic “hard law”
instrument (the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Penal Liability in the Maritime Domain), accompanied by relevant “soft
law”. In the opinion of this author, only “soft law” may not be enough for bringing
considerable positive change in practice, particularly, because in regards to penal law
states have very strong and different traditions which they hardly will be ready to
give up just because advised to do so by IMO. An important factor to be taken into
consideration, in this regard, is also the fact that people to whom any law on penal
liability and sanctioning system is primarily addressed (institutions which draft
general penal law, police officers, prosecutors, judges) are people outside the
maritime domain – the domain in which different IMO “soft law” instruments are
traditionally rather highly respected and, thus, have proven to be capable of
improving practice even without the existence of corresponding “hard law”.
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Pozdnakova has argued that development of relevant “hard law” instrument
would take too long and may ultimately even fail to bring about a binding treaty, as
shown by the failure of the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through
Criminal Law.801 This Convention was adopted on 4 November 1998, however, so
far, has been ratified by only one state and, consequently, has not entered into
force.802 However, it must be kept in mind that the content of the Convention on the
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law considerably differs from the
proposed content of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Penal Liability in the Maritime Domain, particularly: the Convention on
the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law (similar to Directive
2005/35 analysed in this dissertation) contains relatively specific pollution-related
rules, arguably encroaching upon sovereignty of states, for example, rules dictating
which specific pollution offences states must treat as criminal offences and which
specific pollution offences states must treat as regulatory offences803; the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal
Liability in the Maritime Domain is intended by this author to set only very basic
principles of penal liability, leaving all more debatable issues for “soft law”.804 In
other words, the development of such IMO legal instruments as proposed by this
dissertation has never been attempted before. Consequently, their successful
development may not be ruled out right away, just because of the failure of the
Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law.
Of course, regardless of whether one strives to develop international “hardlaw” or “soft-law” on a penal liability and sanctioning system for different offences
in the maritime domain, the challenge still remains enormous. Yet, if accepted and
accomplished, it will be a remarkable step towards enhancing proportionality of this
system worldwide and, with that, also enhancing the enjoyment of human rights by
seafarers. Furthermore, success of the development of a penal liability and
801
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sanctioning system for different offences in the maritime domain may potentially
trigger relevant bodies from other domains to engage in similar endeavour.
Ultimately, it may lead to the global cross-sectoral system, which, from the
perspective of human rights, would be an ideal result.
As it was stated already at the very beginning, the focus of this dissertation is
on law. Consequently, the main conclusions and recommendations of this
dissertation are also related to law – its interpretation and improvement. Yet, it
should be remembered that law is only one element of the wider mechanism with the
help of which the fair application of criminal procedures and sanctions against
seafarers can be enhanced. This dissertation, particularly its case study, allows one to
make some speculations about different causes of the unfair application of criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents:

Unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions
Inappropriate application of law by law enforcement institutions and courts

Inappropriate law

- public outcry;
- politicized environment
around the accident;
- concerns about civil claims;
- nature of shipping as such;
- inappropriate safety
investigation of the accident;
- etc.

Incompetence, in general, including the failure to maintain the balance
among different interests at stake
Figure 9 – Possible causes of the problem of the unfair application of criminal procedures and
sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents.
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For achieving the fullest possible enhancement of the fair application of criminal
procedures and sanctions against seafarers after large-scale ship-source oil pollution
accidents (and beyond) it is necessary to work on the elimination of all the abovementioned causes of unfairness. Importantly, respective work must be done by
people from all relevant fields closely co-operating with each other. Such cooperation seems to be lacking at the moment.
First of all, better co-operation between actors in the maritime domain (such
as IMO, maritime administrations and maritime academies) and actors in the penal
law domain (such as bodies drafting general penal law, police, prosecution, courts
and police academies) must be developed, in several aspects, for example:
•

when relevant law both in the maritime domain and the general penal law
domain is drafted (at all levels: international, regional and national);

•

when relevant conferences, seminars and workshops are organised;

•

when relevant courses at the higher education institutions preparing both
maritime experts and police officers, prosecutors or judges are developed and
delivered.

Such co-operation: on the one hand, has potential to encourage actors from the
maritime domain to understand and, consequently, respect general principles of
punishment more; on the other hand, it has the potential to encourage actors from the
penal law domain to understand and, consequently, respect maritime interests more.
To achieve such understanding and respect is vitally important for positive change in
practice, particularly because criminal law is not enforced by people from the
maritime domain; it is enforced by people from the penal law domain. Thus,
addressing the problem of the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions
against seafarers only at maritime forums and by maritime experts, as it is largely
done now, can bring little practical benefit.
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Secondly, better co-operation between actors in the maritime domain and
actors in the human rights domain, particularly relevant maritime industry NGOs
(such as SRI, BIMCO and INTERTANKO) and human rights NGOs (such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch), must be developed. Such cooperation, again, has the potential to be mutually beneficial: on the one hand, it may
give to the maritime industry NGOs a wider platform from which to fight against
human rights violations in the maritime domain; on the other hand, it may give to the
human rights NGOs more examples proving the need to enhance human rights,
including the fair application of criminal procedures and sanctions, in general. That
the problem of the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions is a
general problem, which potentially in one or another form might be faced by
anybody, not only seafarers, is clear from any single case from the case law of
ECtHR and IACtHR mentioned in this dissertation. Similarly, other information
sources point to the fact that seafarers and the maritime sector at large are not the
only victims of the unfair application of criminal procedures and sanctions.805 Thus,
all affected by the problem must unite their efforts against the common evil. General
human rights NGOs can be of great help in accomplishing this merger of efforts.
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Annex I
Human Rights Compliance Check-Lists

394

Compliance check-list
RIGHT TO LIBERTY
1.

Did the procedures applied against the
seafarer restrict his movement?

No

No violation. No need to
answer the following
questions.

Yes

2.

Did the restriction of the movement of
the seafarer amount to a deprivation of
liberty?

No

No violation. No need to
answer the following
questions.

Yes

3.

4.

Was the law based on which the seafarer
was deprived of his liberty sufficiently
clear?

No

Was the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer one of the following types of a
deprivation of liberty:
1) deprivation of liberty after
conviction;
2) deprivation of liberty for noncompliance with a legal
obligation;
3) preventive deprivation of liberty?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Questions 5-7 below must be answered only if the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer was a deprivation of liberty after conviction.
5.

Did the punishment imposed by the
conviction involve a deprivation of
liberty?

No
Yes

Violation.
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6.

7.

Was the conviction the result of flagrant
denial of justice?

Was there sufficient causal connection
between the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer and the conviction?

No
Yes

Violation.

No

Violation.

Yes

Questions 8-13 below must be answered only if the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer was a deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a legal obligation.
8.

Did there exist unfulfilled legal
obligation on the side of the seafarer?

No

Violation. No need to
answer questions 9-13
below.

Yes

9.

Was the legal obligation of specific and
concrete nature?

No

Violation.

Yes
10. Was the seafarer given an opportunity to
fulfil the legal obligation voluntarily?

No

Violation.

Yes
11. Was the deprivation of liberty necessary
measure for securing fulfilment of the
legal obligation?

No

12. Was the deprivation of liberty
proportional measure for securing
fulfilment of the legal obligation?

No

13. Was the seafarer released as soon as the
legal obligation was fulfilled?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation.
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Question 14 below must be answered only if the deprivation of liberty of the seafarer
was a preventive deprivation of liberty.
14. Was the preventive deprivation of liberty
based on one of the following reasons:
1) danger of absconding;
2) risk that the seafarer would take
action to obstruct the proceedings;
3) risk that the release of the seafarer
would cause public disorder?

No

Violation. No need to
answer questions 15-23
below.

Yes

Questions 15-19 below must be answered only if the reason of the deprivation of
liberty of the seafarer was danger of absconding.
15. Did there exist reasonable suspicion that
the seafarer committed the offence in
question?

No

16. Did there exist real danger of
absconding?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
17. Was the deprivation of liberty necessary
measure for securing non-absconding?

No

Violation.

Yes
18. Was the deprivation of liberty
proportional measure for securing nonabsconding?

No

Violation.

Yes

Questions 19-20 below must be answered only if a payment of a bail was set as a
condition for the release of the seafarer.
19. Was due care taken in fixing the
appropriate amount of bail for the release
of the seafarer?

No
Yes

Violation.
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20. Was the justification of the amount of
bail fixed convincingly demonstrated by
the authorities?

No

Violation.

Yes

Questions 21-23 below must be answered only if the reason of the deprivation of
liberty of the seafarer was a risk that the seafarer would take action to obstruct
proceedings.
21. Was there factual evidence supporting the No
fear that the seafarer, if released, would
take action to obstruct the proceedings?
Yes

Violation.

22. Was the deprivation of liberty necessary
measure for securing that the seafarer
would not take action to obstruct the
proceedings?

Violation.

No
Yes

23. Was the deprivation of liberty
No
proportional measure for securing that the
seafarer would not take action to obstruct Yes
the proceedings?

Violation.

Question 24 below must be answered only if the reason of the deprivation of liberty
of the seafarer was a risk that the release of the seafarer would cause public disorder.
24. Was there factual evidence supporting
the fear that the release of the seafarer
would cause public disorder?

No

25. Did the state which deprived the seafarer
of his liberty have jurisdiction to do so?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
26. Did the official who carried out the act of
deprivation of liberty of the seafarer have
jurisdiction to do so?

No
Yes

Violation.
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27. Was the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer carried out in accordance with
the relevant national law?

No

28. Was the seafarer after his deprivation of
liberty informed of the reasons for his
deprivation of liberty and charges against
him?

No

29. Was the seafarer informed of the reasons
for his deprivation of liberty and charges
against him personally or through his
representative?

No

30. Was the seafarer informed of the reasons
for his deprivation of liberty and charges
against him promptly?

No

31. Was the information of the reasons for
the deprivation of liberty and charges
provided to the seafarer in a language he
understands?

No

32. Was the information of the reasons for
the deprivation of liberty and charges
provided to the seafarer in simple, nontechnical language?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation. No need to
answer questions 29-32
below.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Questions 33-38 below must be answered only if the seafarer is deprived of his
liberty on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence.
33. Was the seafarer after his deprivation of
liberty brought for an automatic judicial
review of his deprivation of liberty?

No
Yes

Violation. No need to
answer questions 34-38
below.
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34. Was the authority before which the
seafarer was brought for an automatic
review of his deprivation of liberty judge
or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power?

No

35. Was the seafarer after his deprivation of
liberty brought for an automatic judicial
review of his deprivation of liberty
promptly?

No

36. Did the authority before which the
seafarer was brought for an automatic
review of his deprivation of liberty
examine all relevant merits of the
particular deprivation of liberty?

No

37. Did the seafarer participate in person at
the hearing at which his deprivation of
liberty was automatically reviewed?

No

38. Was the principle of equality of arms
followed during the automatic judicial
review of the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Question 39-45 below must be answered only if the seafarer made an application of
his deprivation of liberty to be reviewed.
39. Did the authorities examine the seafarers’ No
application of his deprivation of liberty to
be reviewed?
Yes

Violation. No need to
answer questions 40-45
below.
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Question 40 below must be answered only if the examination of the application was
refused on the basis of there being an unreasonably short period of time since the
previous judicial review of the deprivation of liberty of the seafarer.
40. Was the period since the previous judicial No
review of the deprivation of liberty of the
seafarer unreasonably short?
Yes

Violation.

41. Was the authority which reviewed the
deprivation of liberty of the seafarer after
his relevant application a judge or other
officer authorized by law to exercise
judicial power?

No

Violation.

42. Was the judicial review of the
deprivation of liberty of the seafarer after
his relevant application carried out
speedy?

No

43. Did the authority which reviewed the
deprivation of liberty of the seafarer after
his relevant application examine all
relevant merits of the particular
deprivation of liberty, particularly the
circumstances which might have changed
since the previous review?

No

44. Did the seafarer participate in person at
the hearing at which his deprivation of
liberty was reviewed after his relevant
application?

No

45. Was the principle of equality of arms
followed during the judicial review of the
deprivation of liberty of the seafarer after
his relevant application?

No

Yes

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation.
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45. In every case, was the justification for the
deprivation of liberty of the seafarer
convincingly demonstrated by the
authorities?

No

Violation.

Yes

Compliance check-list
RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
1.

Taking into consideration the cumulative
effect of the conditions, was the treatment
of the seafarer by the authorities at least
degrading?

No
Yes

Violation

Questions 2-51 below must be answered only if the seafarer was held as a prisoner
(untried or convicted).
Question 2 below must be answered only if the seafarer was held as an untried
prisoner.
2.

Was the seafarer incarcerated together
with convicted persons?

No
Yes

Violation.

3.

Did the accommodation provided for the use of the seafarer meet requirements
of health?
3.1. Space
No
Violation.
Yes
3.2. Lighting

No

Violation.

Yes
3.3. Heating

No
Yes

Violation.
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3.4. Ventilation

No

Violation.

Yes
3.5. Sanitary installations

No

Violation.

Yes
3.6. Bathing and shower installations

No

Violation.

Yes
3.7. General cleanliness

No

Violation.

Yes
4.

5.

6.

Was the seafarer enabled to use a bath or
shower frequently enough (according to
season and geographical region, but at
least once a week in a temperate
climate)?

No

Was the seafarer provided with water and
such toiletry articles as are necessary for
health and cleanliness?

No

Was the seafarer provided with facilities
for the proper care of the hair and beard?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
7.

Was the seafarer provided with separate,
sufficient and clean bedding?

No
Yes

Violation.

403

Questions 8 and 9 below must be answered only if the seafarer was held as an untried
prisoner.
8.

Was the seafarer allowed to wear his own No
clothing?
Yes

Violation.

9.

If the seafarer was wearing prison
clothing, was it different from that
supplied to convicted prisoners?

No

Violation.

10. Was the prison clothing provided to the
seafarer suitable for the climate and
adequate to keep him in good health?

No

11. Was the prison clothing provided to the
seafarer degrading or humiliating?

No

12. Was the prison clothing provided to the
seafarer clean and in proper condition?

Yes

Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation.

No

Violation.

Yes
13. Was the underclothing of the seafarer
changed and washed as often as
necessary for the maintenance of
hygiene?

No

14. When the seafarer was removed outside
the institution for an authorized purpose,
was he allowed to wear his own clothing
or other inconspicuous clothing?

No

15. Was the seafarer provided at the usual
hours with the food of nutritional value,
of wholesome quality and well prepared
(amount, variety, warm or cold etc.)?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation.
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16. Was drinking water available whenever
seafarer needed it?

No

Violation.

Yes
Questions 17-19 below must be answered only if the seafarer was held as an untried
prisoner.
17. Did the seafarer express the desire to
have his food procured at his own
expense from the outside?

No

18. Was the seafarer allowed to have his
food procured at his own expense from
the outside?

No

19. Was the seafarer required to work when
he did not want to?

No

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Yes

20. Was the seafarer employed in outdoor
work?

No need to answer
question 18.

Violation.

No
Yes

No need to answer
question 21.

21. Did the seafarer have at least one hour of
suitable exercise in the open air daily if
weather permitted?

No

Violation.

22. Was the seafarer examined by the
medical officer as soon as possible after
his admission to the institution?

No

23. Was the seafarer sick and needing
treatment of a medical specialist during
imprisonment?

No

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Yes

No need to answer
questions 24-28.
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24. Was the seafarer transferred to the
hospital facility in the institution or to the
civil hospital?

No

Violation.

Yes

Questions 25 and 26 below must be answered only if the seafarer was transferred to
the hospital facility in the institution.
25. Were the equipment, furnishing and
pharmaceutical supplies of the hospital
facility proper for the medical care and
treatment of the seafarer?

No

26. Was the staff of the hospital facility
suitably trained?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
Questions 27 and 28 below must be answered only if the seafarer was held as an
untried prisoner.
27. Did the seafarer express the will to be
visited and treated by his own doctor at
his own expense?

No

28. Was the seafarer allowed to be visited
and treated by his own doctor at his own
expense?

No

29. Was the seafarer disciplinarily punished
during his imprisonment?

No

No need to answer
question 28.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

No need to answer
questions 30-33

Yes
30. Was the disciplinary punishment imposed No
against the seafarer necessary for safe
custody and well-ordered community
Yes
life?

Violation.
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31. Was there in place law or regulation of
the competent administrative authority
defining conduct constituting a
disciplinary offence, the type and
duration of punishment which may be
inflicted for each disciplinary offence and
the authority competent to impose such
punishment? And, was the disciplinary
punishment against the seafarers imposed
in line with this law or regulation?

No

32. Was the seafarer before his punishing for
disciplinary offence given a proper
opportunity of presenting his defence?

No

33. Was the disciplinary punishment against
the seafarer cruel, inhuman or degrading
(corporal punishment, placing in a dark
cell etc.)

No

34. Were chains or irons used against the
seafarer during his imprisonment?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

35. Were any other instruments of restraint
used against the seafarer during his
imprisonment (handcuffs, truncheons,
metal cage during the hearings etc.)?

No

No need to answer
question 36.

36. Was the use of instruments of restraint
against the seafarer necessary?

No

Yes
Violation.

Yes
37. Was the seafarer during his imprisonment
allowed to communicate with his family
and reputable friends at regular intervals,
both by correspondence and by receiving
visits?

No
Yes

Violation.
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38. Was the seafarer during his imprisonment
kept informed regularly of the more
important items of news by the reading of
newspapers, by hearing wireless
transmissions, or by any similar means?

No

39. Did the institution where the seafarer was
imprisoned have a library for the use of
prisoners, adequately stocked with both
recreational and instructional books, and
was the seafarer encouraged to make full
use of it?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes

Questions 40 and 41 below must be answered only if the seafarer was held as an
untried prisoner.
40. Did the seafarer express the desire to
procure at his own expense books,
newspapers, writing materials and other
means of occupation as are compatible
with the interests of the administration of
justice and the security and good order of
the institution?

No

No need to answer
question 41.

Yes

41. Was the seafarer allowed to procure at his No
own expense books, newspapers, writing
materials and other means of occupation
as are compatible with the interests of the Yes
administration of justice and the security
and good order of the institution?

Violation.

42. Were the religious beliefs and moral
precepts of the seafarer respected during
his imprisonment?

Violation.

No
Yes
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43. Were the money, valuables, clothing and
other effects belonging to the seafarer,
which under the regulations of the
institution he was not allowed to retain,
on his admission to the institution placed
in safe custody? Did the seafarer sign the
respective inventory?

No

44. Was the seafarer allowed at once to
inform his family of his imprisonment?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
45. Was the seafarer during his imprisonment
transferred to another institution for
continuing to be imprisoned there?

No

46. Was the seafarer allowed at once to
inform his family of his transfer to
another institution for continuing to be
imprisoned there?

No

47. Did the seafarer die, suffer serious illness,
or was he seriously injured during his
imprisonment?

No

48. Was the spouse or the nearest relative or
any other person previously designated
by the seafarer informed about the death,
serious illness or serious injured of the
seafarer?

No

49. When the seafarer was removed to or
from the institution, was he exposed to
public view as little as possible, and were
proper safeguards adopted to protect the
seafarer from insult, curiosity and
publicity in any form?

No

No need to answer
question 46.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
No need to answer
question 48.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation.
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50. Did the seafarer submit complaint to the
relevant national authorities about his illtreatment during his imprisonment?

No

51. Did the relevant national authorities carry
out effective (independent, thorough and
prompt) investigation of the allegation of
ill-treatment of the seafarer?

No

No need to answer
question 51.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Compliance check-list
RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
PUNISHMENT
1.

Was the seafarer convicted?

No

No violation. No need to
answer the following
questions.

Yes

2.

3.

Was the conduct for which the seafarer
was convicted defined as a crime in
national criminal law?

No

Was the law based on which the seafarer
was convicted sufficiently clear?

No

Yes

Yes
4.

5.

Violation.

No need to answer
question 4.

Was the unclear law interpreted to the
detriment of the seafarer, inter alia, by
applying law by analogy?

No
Yes

Violation.

Did the seafarer do the conduct (act or
omission) as defined in rule under which
he was convicted?

No

Violation.

Yes
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6.

7.

Was the crime for which the seafarer was
convicted defined by harm (for example,
pollution caused)?

No

Was the harm caused as defined by rule
under which the seafarer was convicted?

No

No need to answer
questions 7-9.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
8.

Was the conduct of the seafarer factual
cause of the harm?

No

Violation. No need to
answer question 9.

Yes
9.

Was the conduct of the seafarer legal
(proximate) cause of the harm?

No

Violation.

Yes
10. Was the crime for which the seafarer was
convicted defined by objective elements
other than conduct and harm (for
example, particular territory where the
conduct was carried out)?

No

11. Were other objective elements of the
crime as defined by rule under which the
seafarer was convicted present?

No

12. If the definition of crime under which the
seafarer was convicted required intent as
a pre-condition for criminal liability, did
the seafarer do the conduct intentionally?

No

13. If the definition of the crime under which
the seafarer was convicted required intent
or recklessness as a pre-condition for
criminal liability, did the seafarer do the
conduct intentionally or recklessly?

No

No need to answer
question 11.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation.
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14. If the definition of the crime under which No
the seafarer was convicted required
intent, recklessness or gross negligence as
a pre-condition for criminal liability, did
Yes
the seafarer do the conduct intentionally,
recklessly or with gross negligence?
15. Was the criminal sanction imposed upon
the seafarer for simple negligence?

Violation.

No
Yes

Violation.

16. Was the crime for which the seafarer was
convicted defined by subjective elements
other than intent, recklessness or
negligence (for example, specific aim or
specific motive)?

No

No need to answer
question 17.

17. Were other subjective elements of a
crime as defined by rule under which the
seafarer was convicted present?

No

18. Was the seafarer convicted for the crime
without proof of all elements of this
crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

No

19. Was the criminal sanction imposed upon
the seafarer on the basis of strict
liability?

No
Yes

Violation.

20. Did the seafarer do the conduct for which
he was convicted in the situation of
necessity?

No

No need to answer
question 21.

21. Was the conduct for which the seafarer
was convicted carried out in the situation
of necessity?

No

Yes

Violation.

Yes

Yes

Violation

Yes

Yes

Violation.
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22.

Was the sanction imposed upon the seafarer proportional?

22.1. Did the sanction fit the offence?

No

Violation.

Yes
22.2. Was the sanction for the offence in
balance with the sanctions for other
offences in the same jurisdiction?

No

Violation.

Yes

Compliance check-list
RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL
1.

Was the seafarer tried?

No

No need to answer
questions 2-17.

Yes
2.

Was the seafarers’ case adjudicated at an
oral hearing which was open to the
public, including the press (public
hearing)?

No
Yes

Question 3 below must be answered only if the hearing was not open to the public.
3.

Was the exclusion of the public from the
hearing necessary for the protection of
public order or national security?

No

Violation.

Yes

Questions 4 and 5 below must be answered only if the case in principle was open to
the public.
4.

Was the information on time and the
venue of the hearing available to the
public?

No
Yes

Violation.
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5.

6.

Were adequate facilities for the
attendance of the public to the hearing
provided?

No

Was the judgment of the seafarers’ case
made public?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
7.

8.

9.

Was the tribunal adjudicating the
seafarers’ case established by an act of
parliament?

No

Was the bench adjudicating the seafarers’
case composed in accordance with the
relevant law?

No

Did the tribunal adjudicating the
seafarers’ case have jurisdiction to do so?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
10. Was the judge adjudicating the seafarers’
case, in fact, a party to the litigation (for
example, had financial interest in the
outcome of the case)?

No

11. Was there justified basis for suspicion
that the judge adjudicating the seafarers’
case was bias in some other way (for
example, that he in practice was in a
subordinate relationship to some other
organ of the state, that he previously had
acted as public prosecutor in relation to
the case or that he is not independent
from some private pressure group)?

No

Yes

Yes

Violation.

Violation.
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12. Was the hearing at the first instance court No
held in the absence of the seafarer?
Yes
13. Was the seafarer indeed “heard” during
the hearing at the first instance court?

No

Violation. No need to
answer question 13.
Violation.

Yes
Questions 14 -16 below must be answered only if the case went to appeal or
cassation court.
14. Was the hearing at the appeal or cassation
court held in the absence of the seafarer?

No
Yes

Question 15 below must be answered only if the case at the appeal or cassation was
held in presence of the seafarer.
15. Was the seafarer indeed “heard” during
the hearing at the appeal or cassation
court?

No

Violation.

Yes

Question 16 below must be answered only if the case at the appeal or cassation was
held in the absence of the seafarer.
16. Did the proceedings in front of appeal or
cassation court involve not only
questions of law but also questions of
fact?

No
Yes

Violation.

17. Was the judgment in the seafarers’ case
duly reasoned?

No

Violation.

Yes
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18. Before the final judgment was made, did No
public officials refrain from saying or
doing anything which would indicate that
they believed the seafarer to be guilty of Yes
an offence?
19. Was the seafarer required to prove his
innocence?

20. Was the seafarer informed of the charges
against him?

Violation.

No
Yes

Violation.

No

Violation. No need to
answer questions 21-24
below.

Yes

21. Was the seafarer informed of the charges
against him personally or through his
representative?

No

22. Was the seafarer informed of the charges
against him promptly?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes
23. Was the information of the charges
provided to the seafarer in a language he
understands?

No

24. Was the information of the charges
provided to the seafarer detailed?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

25. Did the seafarer have adequate time for
the preparation of his defence (for
example, were judicial decisions notified
to him timely)?

No
Yes

Violation.
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26. Did the seafarer have adequate facilities
for the preparation of his defence (for
example, was he held in a pre-trial
detention facility which had adequate
access to natural light and air)?

No

27. Was the seafarer tried without undue
delay?

No

Violation.

Yes

Violation.

Yes
Question 28 below must be answered only if the seafarer decided to invoke legal
assistance of his own choosing.
28. Was the seafarer forced to be assisted by
the lawyer provided by the state?

No
Yes

Violation.

Question 29 below must be answered only if legal assistance to the seafarer was
provided by the state.
29. Was the provided legal assistance
effective?

No

Violation.

Yes

30. Was the seafarer allowed to communicate No
with his legal assistant freely (was the
permitted number and length of visits
Yes
from a legal assistant adequate)?

Violation.

31. Was the seafarer allowed to communicate No
with his legal assistant privately (out of
the hearing of third parties)?
Yes

Violation.
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32. Was the seafarer given an opportunity to
examine all statements against him (to
arise any doubt about the quality of these
statements), inter alia, by obtaining the
examination of statements on his behalf?

No
Yes

Question 33 below must be answered only if the seafarer was not given an
opportunity to examine all statements against him.
33. Was the conviction of the seafarer based
solely on or to a decisive degree on
statements of a person whom the seafarer
had no opportunity to examine?

No
Yes

Violation.

Questions 34-36 below must be answered only if the seafarer did not understand or
speak the language used during the trial or pre-trial stage of proceedings.
34. Were oral statements and documentary
materials interpreted to the seafarer?

No

Violation.

Yes
35. Was the provided interpretation adequate
(continuous, precise, impartial etc.)?

No

Violation.

Yes
36. Was the interpretation provided free of
charge?

No

Violation.

Yes

37. Was the seafarer compelled to testify
against himself or to confess guilt?

No
Yes

Violation.
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Questions 38-40 below must be answered only if the seafarer was convicted.
38. Was the seafarer provided an opportunity
of his conviction or sentence being
reviewed by a higher tribunal?

No

39. Was the right to the review of conviction
or sentence easily accessible to the
seafarer?

No

Violation.

Yes
Violation.

Yes

Question 40 below must be answered only if the seafarers’ case actually went for a
review by a higher tribunal.
40. Was the review of the seafarers’ case
No
carried out superficially, in merely formal
manner?
Yes

41. Was the seafarer prosecuted, tried or
punished again for an offence for which
he had already been finally convicted or
acquitted in this country?

Violation.

No
Yes

Violation.

Question 42 below must be answered only if the seafarer was tried or punished in
one of the EU countries.
42. Was the seafarer prosecuted, tried or
punished again for an offence for which
he had already been finally convicted or
acquitted in this country or any other EU
country?

No
Yes

Violation.

Question 43 below must be answered only if the seafarer was tried or punished in
one of the countries, which is State Party to the American Convention on Human
Rights.
43. Was the seafarer prosecuted, tried or
punished again for an offence for which
he had already been finally acquitted in
this country or any other country?

No
Yes

Violation.
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Compliance check-list
RIGHT TO NON-DISCRIMINATION
1.

Was the seafarer treated differently than
others in a similar situation?

No

No violation. No need to
answer the following
questions.

Yes

2.

Were there very weighty reasons for
treating the seafarer differently than
others in the similar situation?

No
Yes

Violation.
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Annex II
Criminal Jurisdiction over Large-Scale
Ship-Source Oil Pollution Accidents

1.

A ship is alleged to have carried out in the internal
waters of the state conduct resulting in large-scale
ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the
pollution is the internal waters of this state (in
addition, possibly also other areas) and the ship in
question is still in the internal waters of the state.

Internal waters – internal waters
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X

Coastal State

Port State1

X

X

X

Flag State

Port State1

Coastal State

Flag State

Jurisdiction
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If the ship is in internal waters of another state (not a flag State, itself),
a flag State may only exercise such enforcement measures which do
not require physical intervention on board the ship.

Limitations of jurisdiction

2.

A ship is alleged to have carried out in the internal
waters of the state conduct resulting in large-scale
ship-source oil pollution. The area affected by the
pollution is the internal waters of this state (in
addition, possibly also other areas), but now the ship
in question is in the territorial sea/archipelagic
waters of the state (is outward-bound).

Internal waters –
territorial sea/archipelagic waters
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Enforcement measures which hamper passage (such as physical
inspection and detention of the ship, or arrest of crew) may not be
exercised if after committing an alleged offence in internal waters of
the state a ship left internal waters as well as territorial sea/archipelagic
waters of the state and now has come back.

If the ship is in territorial sea/archipelagic waters of another state (not a
flag State, itself), a flag State may exercise only such enforcement
measures which do not require physical intervention on board the ship.

3.

A ship is alleged to have carried out in the territorial
sea/archipelagic waters of the state conduct resulting
in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area
affected by the pollution is the territorial
sea/archipelagic waters of this state (in addition,
possibly also other areas), and the ship in question is
still in the territorial sea/archipelagic waters of the
state.

Territorial sea/archipelagic waters –
territorial sea/archipelagic waters
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Adopted law shall not apply to the design, construction, manning
or equipment of foreign ships unless this law gives effect to
generally accepted international rules or standards.3
In regards to straits subject to the regime of transit passage, law
may only be adopted to give effect to applicable international rules
and standards.4

Enforcement measures which hamper passage (such as physical
inspection and detention of the ship, or arrest of crew) may not be
exercised if after committing an alleged offence in territorial
sea/archipelagic waters of the state a ship left these waters outwards
and now has come back.

If the ship is in territorial sea/archipelagic waters of another state (not a
flag State, itself), a flag State may exercise only such enforcement
measures which do not require physical intervention on board the ship.

•

•

4.

A ship is alleged to have carried out in the territorial
sea/archipelagic waters of the state conduct resulting
in large-scale ship-source oil pollution. The area
affected by the pollution is the territorial
sea/archipelagic waters of this state (in addition,
possibly also other areas), but now the ship in
question is in the internal waters of the state (is
inward-bound).

Territorial sea/archipelagic waters –
internal waters
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Adopted law shall not apply to the design, construction, manning
or equipment of foreign ships unless this law gives effect to
generally accepted international rules or standards.3
In regards to straits subject to the regime of transit passage, law
may only be adopted to give effect to applicable international rules
and standards.4

Enforcement measures which hamper passage (such as physical
inspection and detention of the ship, or arrest of crew) may not be
exercised if after committing an alleged offence in territorial
sea/archipelagic waters of the state a ship left these waters outwards
and now has come back. In such cases only port State jurisdiction may
be applied, i.e. the measures may be exercised if the ship has
voluntarily come within the port or at the off-shore terminal.5

If the ship is in internal waters of another state (not a flag State, itself),
a flag State may exercise only such enforcement measures which do
not require physical intervention on board the ship.

•

•

5.

A ship is alleged to have carried out in the EEZ of
the state conduct resulting in large-scale ship-source
oil pollution. The area affected by the pollution is the
EEZ of this state (in addition, possibly also other
areas), and the ship in question is either still in the
EEZ of the state or in the territorial sea/archipelagic
waters of the state (is inward-bound).

EEZ – EEZ or territorial sea/archipelagic waters
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Only such law may be adopted which conforms to and gives effect
to generally accepted international rules or standards.3
In regards to specific ice-covered areas6 such law which goes
beyond generally accepted international rules or standards may
also be adopted, if specific conditions mentioned in Article 234 of
UNCLOS are met.

•

•

•

Only applicable international rules and standards may be
enforced.4
In regards to specific ice-covered areas6 other law than applicable
international rules and standards may also be enforced, if specific
conditions mentioned in Article 234 of UNCLOS are met.
Enforcement measures which hamper passage (such as physical
inspection and detention of the ship, or arrest of crew) may not be
exercised if after committing an alleged offence in EEZ of the
state a ship left these waters outwards and now has come back.

If the ship is in territorial sea/archipelagic waters of another state (not a
flag State, itself), a flag State may exercise only such enforcement
measures which do not require physical intervention on board the ship.

•

•

6.

A ship is alleged to have carried out in the EEZ of
the state conduct resulting in large-scale ship-source
oil pollution. The area affected by the pollution is the
EEZ of this state (in addition, possibly also other
areas), but now the ship in question is in the internal
waters of the state (is inward-bound).

EEZ – internal waters
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Only such law may be adopted which conforms to and gives effect
to generally accepted international rules or standards.3
In regards to specific ice-covered areas6 such law which goes
beyond generally accepted international rules or standards may
also be adopted, if specific conditions mentioned in Article 234 of
UNCLOS are met.

•

•

•

Only applicable international rules and standards may be
enforced.4
In regards to specific ice-covered areas6 other law than applicable
international rules and standards may also be enforced, if specific
conditions mentioned in Article 234 of UNCLOS are met.
Enforcement measures which hamper passage (such as physical
inspection and detention of the ship, or arrest of crew) may not be
exercised if after committing an alleged offence in EEZ of the
state a ship left these waters outwards and now has come back. In
such cases only port State jurisdiction may be applied, i.e. the
measures may be exercised if the ship has voluntarily come within
the port or at the off-shore terminal.5

If the ship is in internal waters of another state (not a flag State, itself),
a flag State may only exercise such enforcement measures which do
not require physical intervention on board the ship.

•

•

7.

A ship is alleged to have carried out on the high seas
conduct resulting in large-scale ship-source oil
pollution. The area affected by the pollution is high
seas (in addition, possibly also other areas), but now
the ship in question is within a port or at an off-shore
terminal of the state.

High seas – port or off-shore terminal
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X

X

X

X

•

•

•

•

Jurisdiction may be exercised only if the ship has voluntarily come
within the port or at the off-shore terminal.5
Only applicable international rules and standards may be
enforced.4
Upon request, all records of the investigation shall be transmitted
to the flag State.
Upon decision of the flag State to pre-empt proceedings,
respective proceedings shall be suspended (except cases of “major
damage to the coastal State” or cases of “a flag State which has
repeatedly disregarded its obligations”8).

If the ship is within a port or at an off-shore terminal of another state
(not a flag State, itself), a flag State may exercise only such
enforcement measures which do not require physical intervention on
board the ship.

Only such law may be adopted which is functionally necessary to
accommodate corresponding enforcement.

8.

A ship is alleged to have carried out in EEZ,
territorial sea/archipelagic waters or internal waters
of other state conduct resulting in large-scale shipsource oil pollution. The area affected by the
pollution is respectively EEZ, territorial
sea/archipelagic waters or internal waters of other
state (in addition, possibly also other areas), but now
the ship in question is within a port or at an off-shore
terminal of the state.

EEZ, territorial sea/archipelagic waters or
internal waters of other state – port or off-shore
terminal
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X

X

X

X

•

•

•

•

•

•

Jurisdiction may only be exercised upon request from the flag
State or the coastal State (except when violation has caused or is
likely to also cause pollution in internal waters, territorial sea or
EEZ of the port State).
Jurisdiction may only be exercised if the ship has voluntarily come
within the port or at the off-shore terminal.5
Only applicable international rules and standards may be
enforced.4
Upon request, all records of the investigation shall be transmitted
to the flag State or the coastal State.
Upon decision of the flag State to pre-empt proceedings,
respective proceedings shall be suspended (except cases of “major
damage to the coastal State” or cases of “a flag State which has
repeatedly disregarded its obligations”8).
Upon decision of the coastal State to pre-empt proceedings,
respective proceedings shall be terminated.

If the ship is within a port or at an off-shore terminal of another state
(not a flag State, itself), a flag State may only exercise such
enforcement measures which do not require physical intervention on
board the ship.

Only such law may be adopted which is functionally necessary to
accommodate corresponding enforcement.

2

Enforcement jurisdiction against foreign ships may be exercised only by officials duly authorised to that effect and capable of proving this authorisation by showing a
relevant service card.
Enforcement measures at sea against a foreign ship may only be applied from warship, military aircraft, or other ship or aircraft on government service duly authorised to
that effect and with the help of its marking clearly identifiable as, indeed, being warship, military aircraft, or other ship or aircraft on government service.

The above table describes the regime of criminal jurisdiction over large-scale ship-source oil pollution accidents only under UNCLOS. It should be kept in mind that general
powers under UNCLOS might be further limited by other more specific legal instruments, for example, Regulation 4 of Annex I of MARPOL.

4.

6.

5.

2.
3.

If a coastal State exercises hot pursuit of the ship in accordance with Article 111 of UNCLOS, after “catching” the ship as a result of hot pursuit, a coastal State has
jurisdiction over this ship mutatis mutandis as in the maritime zone in which an alleged violation took place.
Apart from cases mentioned above, only a flag State of the ship in question has jurisdiction over violations on high seas.
It is not fully clear how the general principles of criminal jurisdiction of states (such as subjective territorial principle, objective territorial principle, nationality principle,
protective principle, passive personality principle and universality principle) interact with the regime of criminal jurisdiction under UNCLOS, whether the application of the
general principles is limited by UNCLOS, or not. Consequently, states are largely free to choose which one of the two passes to follow.

1.

NOTES

Under this scenario port State jurisdiction is absorbed by coastal State jurisdiction.
Not applicable. Under this scenario a ship will never be within a port.
3
“Generally accepted international rules and standards” are international rules and standards supported by sufficient state practice. What exactly constitutes “sufficient” state practice
is not clearly defined.
4
“Applicable international rules and standards” are international rules and standards which, at the time of the violation, are operational in the direct relationship between the flag
State on the one hand, and the coastal State on the other. In other words, “applicable international rules and standards” are international rules and standards which are binding law in
both the flag State and the coastal State in question.
5
“Voluntarily” means – not due to force majeure or distress.
6
Ice-covered areas where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
7
Not applicable. Under this scenario an accident is not happening in the waters of a coastal State.
8
What exactly constitutes “major damage to the coastal State” and “a flag State which has repeatedly disregarded its obligations” is not clearly defined.

1
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Annex III
Potential Legal Norms of
the International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Penal Liability in the Maritime Domain

431

•

Legal norm defining the key terms used in the Convention, such as: “offences in
the maritime domain”, “minor offences”, “corpus delicti”, “factual causation”,
“legal causation”, “intent”, “recklessness”, “negligence”, “gross negligence”,
“simple negligence”, “strict liability” and “absolute liability”.

•

A legal norm reminding of the need to follow relevant human rights when
applying penal procedures and sanctions in relation to offences in the maritime
domain.

•

A legal norm reminding of the need to follow the jurisdictional limits established
by UNCLOS when applying penal procedures and sanctions in relation to
offences in the maritime domain.

•

A legal norm requiring to prove corpus delicti before a person may be held
liable for an offence in the maritime domain;

•

A legal norm reminding that, when an offence is defined by particular harm (for
example, pollution), it is necessary to prove, not only the existence of this harm
and the existence of the conduct which potentially might have caused this harm,
but also the factual and legal causation between the harm in question and the
conduct in question. It must be, inter alia, thoroughly examined whether the true
cause of the harm was not the conduct of persons other than seafarers directly
involved in the maritime accident, for example, the conduct of ship-owner or
ship-builder.

•

A legal norm requiring, in cases of criminal liability, to prove corpus delicti
beyond a reasonable doubt.

•

A legal norm allowing, in cases of milder forms of liability other than criminal
(administrative/regulatory liability), to prove corpus delicti only on a balance of
probabilities.

432

•

A legal norm stating that strict liability (the form of liability when the proof of
mens rea is not required but such defences as the defence of reasonable mistake
and the defence of necessity are still available to the alleged offender) may be
applied only in regards to minor offences and only in exceptional cases (the
cases when the application of strict liability is likely to significantly enhance the
enforcement regime in deterring respective offences).

•

A legal norm stating that absolute liability (the form of liability when the proof
of mens rea is not required and no defences are available) may never be applied.

•

A legal norm stating that the application of criminal liability for conducts caused
by simple negligence is forbidden and for conducts caused by intent,
recklessness or gross negligence must be kept to irreducible minimum (should
be imposed only for serious offences, for which other, milder forms of
intervention, such as administrative or civil liability, are not sufficient).

•

A legal norm requiring the specific sanctions prescribed and applied for offences
in the maritime domain to be proportional, in the sense: the single offence
against the sanction for this offence; the single offence and its sanction against
other offences and their sanctions in the same jurisdiction; and, as far as
possible, the single offence and its sanction against the sanctions for the same
offence in other jurisdictions. The reference to the Sanctioning Guidelines for
Offences in the Maritime Domain can be added to this legal norm.

•

A legal norm requiring the consideration of all relevant maritime-specific
aspects when applying penal procedures against seafarers. The reference to the
Guidelines on the Application of Penal Procedures Against Seafarers can be
added to this legal norm.
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Annex IV
Potential Legal Norms of the
Sanctioning Guidelines for Offences in the
Maritime Domain

434

•

A legal norm setting the broad categories of seriousness of different offences, for
example:
Category A
Category B
Category C

Great harm and high culpability
Great harm and low culpability
Little harm and high culpability
Little harm and low culpability

If deemed necessary, the sub-categories can be added.
•

A legal norm defining “great harm”, for example: death or grievous bodily
injury of a human, significant environmental damage or significant economic
loss.

•

A legal norm defining “high culpability”, for example: intent and recklessness.

•

A legal norm stating that application of strict liability may be considered only in
relation to the Category C offences.

•

A legal norm permitting to move a specific offence one category higher under
exceptional circumstances, for example, an extremely high rate of a particular
offence in a particular geographical area.

•

A legal norm setting the basic punishments and their bands, for example:
Starting point
Imprisonment 5 years
Fine Band 1
125% of monthly income
Fine Band 2
50% of monthly income

Range
0,5-10 years
100-175% of monthly income
25-100% of monthly income

If deemed necessary, the sub-bands can be added.
•

A legal norm apportioning specific punishment bands to specific categories of
offences, for example:
Category A offence
Category B offence
Category C offence

Imprisonment (for natural persons)
Fine Band 1 and above (for juridical persons)
Fine Band 1
Fine Band 2
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•

A legal norm listing aggravating factors and their weight, for example:
Factor
The offence was committed repeatedly
The offence was committed, taking advantage of the person’s
official, financial or other dependence on the offender
The offence has caused harm of a catastrophic level
The person committing the offence, for purpose of having his
punishment reduced, has knowingly provided false information
regarding an offence committed by another person
The person committing the offence, for purpose of escaping liability
or having punishment reduced, has knowingly created false evidence
or concealed existing evidence
The offence was committed under the influence of alcohol, narcotic
or other intoxicating substances

•

2
2
1
1

A legal norm listing mitigating factors and their weight, for example:
Factor
The perpetrator of the offence is of a good character and does not
have previous criminal record
The offence was committed due to official, financial or other
dependence
The offender has voluntarily compensated for harm caused by the
offence to the victims or has eliminated the harm caused
The offender has actively furthered the disclosure and investigation
of the offence
The offence was committed as a result of unlawful or immoral
behaviour of the victim
The offence was committed in the situation of distress

•

Weight
3
3

Weight
3
3
2
2
1
1

A legal norm stating that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors must
be taken into consideration when deciding upon the specific punishment to be
imposed for specific offence.

•

A legal norm stating that: in cases when aggravating factors significantly
outweigh mitigating factors the offence can be treated as a one category higher
as it otherwise would be and in cases when mitigating factors significantly
outweigh aggravating factors the offence can be treated as a one category lower
as it otherwise would be. Category C offences accompanied by many mitigating
factors must be exempted from penal liability completely.

436

•

A legal norm indicating which other conducts must be exempted from penal
liability completely, for example: conduct carried out in the situation of selfdefence, conduct carried out in the situation of necessity and conduct caused by
simple negligence if afterwards a person takes proper measures to avert or
minimise the harm.
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Annex V
Potential Legal Norms of the
Guidelines on Penal Proceedings
Which Involve Seafarers

438

•

A legal norm clarifying exactly how officials on government service must be
“marked” to be identifiable as to be, indeed, on government service and
authorised to arrest or detain seafarers at sea (such a legal norm, inter alia,
would help to implement Art. 224 of UNCLOS).

•

A legal norm clarifying how to carry out arrest or detention of a seafarer at sea,
without endangering such interests as safety of navigation and clean
environment (such a legal norm, inter alia, would help to implement Art. 225 of
UNCLOS).

•

A legal norm clarifying that, in cases when a seafarer is detained at sea, far away
from coast, and, therefore, is not brought before competent legal authority for
judicial review of his deprivation of liberty within the four-day period, he must
be brought for this review immediately after the transfer ashore (such a legal
norm would reflect maritime-specific case law of human rights tribunals).

•

A legal norm listing maritime-specific aspects to be taken into consideration,
when assessing the necessity and proportionality of deprivation of liberty of a
seafarer, for example:
- The fact that in accordance with human rights it is disproportionate to deprive a
person of liberty in any other context other than criminal proceedings;
consequently, a seafarer may not be deprived of liberty in relation to a safety
investigation of a maritime accident.
- The fact that not for everything in relation to a ship responsible persons are
seafarers. Consequently, responsibility of a seafarer for a particular offence,
actually, might be not as great as it looks at the first glance; other relevant
stakeholders (such as shipowner, shipbuilder and classification society) might be
primarily responsible.
- The fact that the seafarers’ State has provided the record indicating that a
seafarer in question is of good character, has not committed any offence before,
and alike.
- The fact that a seafarer in question is employed in a regular shipping service to
the port or coastal State in question.
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•

A legal norm stating that, when fixing a bail for the release of a seafarer, it must
be taken into consideration that bails are not covered by ship insurance contracts.

•

Legal norms on co-operation of relevant stakeholders in the maritime domain
and the law enforcement and judicial domain, inter alia:
- Legal norms clarifying, exactly, when and, exactly, who should be notified
about certain penal procedures applied against seafarers and, exactly, when and,
exactly, whose attendance in proceedings should be facilitated (such legal
norms, inter alia, would help to implement Art. 27, 223 and 231 of UNCLOS
and Art. 5(3) of MARPOL in their totality).
- Legal norms clarifying to which stakeholders in the maritime domain access to
a detained seafarer must be provided, and what are limitations in this regard.
- A legal norm requiring the stakeholders in the maritime domain to provide, as
quickly and fully as possible, all information required by law enforcement
institutions and courts within the proceedings.

